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2017 DIGILAW 203 (GUJ)

Rassiwala Rashidaben Dawoodibhai v. Latiwala Abbas Hatimbhai

2017-01-25

SONIA GOKANI

body2017
ORDER : Sonia Gokani, J. 1. Both the applicant and the respondent are married as per the Muslim rites (Dowoodi Vohra) on 5.9.2002 at Ahmedabad. No child is begotten out of the said wedlock. On account of certain irreconcilable issues, they chose to separate by way of deed of divorce. The deed of divorce was executed on 30.12.2015. Family Suit No. 12 of 2016 was preferred seeking declaration under section 7 of the Family Court Act, 1984 where both the parties admitted that Talaq has been given and they have both agreed to this proposition of Talaq. 2. In a suit for the decree of divorce, an application came to be preferred under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure at Exh. 11 and that was withdrawn with a liberty to file a fresh application by adding the contents barring the word "Talaq". Consequently, application below Exh. 12 had been moved. However, the Court vide its order dated 15.10.2016 rejected the application on the ground that with a view to take undue benefit of provisions of Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, such an application came to be moved, which was rejected. 3. Aggrieved petitioner is before this Court seeking following reliefs:- "6. The applicant therefore prays that your Lordships may be pleased to: (a) YOUR LORDSHIP may kindly be pleased to admit and allow the present petition (b) Issue a writ of mandamus or writ or in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ order or quash, quashing and setting aside an order dated 15.10.2016 passed by the learned Judge, Family Court No. 3, Ahmedabad below Exh-12 in Family Suit No. 12 of 2016 and also be pleased to allow an application below Exh-12 in Family Suit No. 12 of 2016, in the interest of justice (c) Grant any other relief/s as may deem fit in the interest of justice" 4. Learned advocate Mr. Hakim appearing with learned advocate Mr. Zabuawala for the petitioner has urged this Court that the parties are residing separately for the past 6 years. It is an admitted act that the Court at any stage of the Civil Suit can draw a decree and that has been requested for under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Zabuawala for the petitioner has urged this Court that the parties are residing separately for the past 6 years. It is an admitted act that the Court at any stage of the Civil Suit can draw a decree and that has been requested for under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He has urged that when the parties had agreed to their having separated by following the required procedure, there was no reason for the Court to deny on the ground that undue advantage was taken of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. Having heard learned advocate Mr. Kazi appearing for the respondent husband, who also has adopted the submission of learned advocate Mr. Hakim provision of Order XII Rule 6 of Code of Civil Procedure deserves to be reproduced as under:- "6. Judgment on admissions.-(1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. (2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1), a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced." 6. It is for the Court concerned to infer from facts and circumstances, either from pleadings or otherwise, admission made and allow the prayer as this cause is meant for speedy judgment. This Court had called both the parties to ascertain their wish and also to gauge the truthfulness of contents and did notice that from the year 2000, they both have been residing separately. The petitioner lady is educated and she is working as a teacher. The husband has already remarried after they separated. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that word "Talaq" has been thrice uttered. They both needed this decree for the purpose of preparation of official documents. In absence of any provision like section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act when decree by mutual consent is permissible for a speedy remedy they adopted this cause. 7. There is no dispute with regard to the fact that word "Talaq" has been thrice uttered. They both needed this decree for the purpose of preparation of official documents. In absence of any provision like section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act when decree by mutual consent is permissible for a speedy remedy they adopted this cause. 7. The parties before the Court of law when seek declaration of the marital status between the parties, whether on admission of facts either in the pleading or otherwise, a Court always retains its power to pronounce the judgment and decree having regard to the admissions. The Supreme Court in the case of Karam Kapahi and others v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust and another reported in (2010) 4 SCC 753 while referring to Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure held and observed that principles behind this provision is that it gives the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about "which there is no controversy". Referring the 54th Law Commission Report, the Apex Court held as under:- "37. The principles behind Order 12 Rule 6 are to give the plaintiff a right to speedy judgment. Under this Rule either party may get rid of so much of the rival claims about 'which there is no controversy' [See the dictum of Lord Jessel, the Master of Rolls, in Thorp versus Holdsworth in (1876) 3 Chancery Division 637 at 640]. 37. In this connection, it may be noted that order 12 Rule 6 was amended by the Amendment Act of 1976. Prior to amendment the Rule read thus:- "6. Judgment on admissions. - Any party may, at any stage of a suit, where admissions of facts have been made, either on pleadings or otherwise, apply to the Court for such judgment or order as upon such admission he may be entitled to, without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties and the Court may upon such application make such order or give such judgment, as the Court may think just." 39. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on the application of a party but on its own motion. In the 54th Law Commission Report, an amendment was suggested to enable the Court to give a judgment not only on the application of a party but on its own motion. It is thus clear that the amendment was brought about to further the ends of justice and give these provisions a wider sweep by empowering judges to use it 'ex debito justitiae, a Latin term, meaning a debt of justice. In our opinion the thrust of the amendment is that in an appropriate case, a party, on the admission of the other party, 31 can press for judgment, as a matter of legal right. However, the Court always retains its discretion in the matter of pronouncing judgment. 40. If the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is compared with Order 12 Rule 6, it becomes clear that the provision of Order 12 Rule 6 is wider in as much as the provision of order 12 Rule 1 is limited to admission by 'pleading or otherwise in writing' but in Order 12 Rule 6 the expression 'or otherwise' is much wider in view of the words used therein namely: 'admission of fact...either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing'. 41. Keeping the width of this provision in mind this Court held that under this rule admissions can be inferred from facts and circumstances of the case [See Charanjit Lal Mehra and others v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt.) and another, (2005) 11 SCC 279 at page 285 (para 8)]. Admissions in answer to interrogatories are also covered under this Rule [See Mullas's commentary on the Code, 16th Edition, Volume II, page 2177]. 42. In the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India and others, (2000) 7 SCC 120 , this Court, while construing this provision, held that the Court should not unduly narrow down its application as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment. 43. In that case it was contended on behalf of the appellant, Uttam Singh Duggal, that: (a) Admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 should only be those which are made in the pleadings. 43. In that case it was contended on behalf of the appellant, Uttam Singh Duggal, that: (a) Admissions under Order 12 Rule 6 should only be those which are made in the pleadings. (b) The admissions would in any case have to be read along with the first proviso to Order 8 Rule 5 (1) of the Code and 33 the Court may call upon the party relying on such admission to prove its case independently. (c) The expression 'either in pleadings or otherwise' should be interpreted ejusdem generis. [See para 11, pages 126-127 of the report] Almost similar contentions have been raised on behalf of the Club. In Uttam Singh (supra) those contentions were rejected and this Court opined no effort should be made to narrow down the ambit of Order 12 Rule 6. 44. In Uttam Singh (supra) this Court made a distinction between a suit just between the parties and a suit relating to Specific Relief Act where a declaration of status is given which not only binds the parties but also binds generations. The Court held such a declaration may be given merely on admission (para 16, page 128 of the report). But in a situation like the present one where the controversy is between the parties on an admission of non-payment of rent, judgment can be rendered on admission by Court. 45. Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code has been very lucidly discussed and succinctly interpreted in a Division Bench judgment of Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Shikharchand and others v. Mst. Bari Bai and others reported in AIR 1974 Madhya Pradesh 75. Justice G.P. Singh (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring judgment explained the aforesaid Rule, if we may say so, very authoritatively at page 79 of the report. His Lordship held: "...I will only add a few words of my own. Rule 6 of Order 12 of the Code of civil Procedure corresponds to Rule 5 of Order 32 of the Supreme Court Rules (English), now rule 3 of Order 27, and is almost identically worded (see Annual Practice 1965 edition Part I. p. 569). The Supreme Court Rule came up for consideration in Ellis v. Allen (1914) Ch 904. In that case a suit was filed for ejectment, mesne profits and damages on the ground of breach of covenant against sub-letting. The Supreme Court Rule came up for consideration in Ellis v. Allen (1914) Ch 904. In that case a suit was filed for ejectment, mesne profits and damages on the ground of breach of covenant against sub-letting. Lessee's solicitors wrote to the plaintiff's solicitors in which fact of breach of covenant was admitted and a case was sought to be made out for relief against forfeiture. This letter was used as an admission under rule 5 and as there was no substance in the plea of relief against forfeiture, the suit was decreed for ejectment under that rule. Sargant, J. rejected the argument that the rule is confined to admissions made in pleadings or under rules 1 to 4 in the same order (same as ours) and said: "The rule applies wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed." Rule 6 of Order 12, in my opinion, must bear the same construction as was put upon the corresponding English rule by Sargent, J. The words "either on the pleadings or otherwise" in rule 6 enable us not only to see the admissions made in pleadings or under Rules 1 to 4 of the same order but also admissions made elsewhere during the trial." (Emphasis added) 46. This Court expresses its approval of the aforesaid interpretation of Order 12 Rule 6 by Justice G.P. Singh (as His Lordship then was). Mulla in his commentary on the Code has also relied on ratio in Shikharchand (supra) for explaining these provisions." 8. The impugned order in wake of the foregoing decision and discussion, deserve to be quashed. The concerned Court is directed to consciously proceed with the matter bearing in mind the fact that the parties have already separated for the past six years an even without application being made by the parties under Order XII, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court on its own also could have taken recourse to this provision. 9. Family Suit No.12 of 2016 be decided within eight weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. 10. Taking note of the findings and observations of this order and also in the decision referred to hereinabove, Civil Revision Application is, accordingly, disposed of.