Prafulla Kumar Bhuyan v. Director of Estates, General Administration Department, State Secretariat
2017-02-28
B.R.SARANGI
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : B.R. Sarangi, J. The petitioner, during his posting at Bhubaneswar, was allotted with a quarter and was allowed to retain the same, even after he was transferred to Puri, on the ground that his wife was suffering from heart ailment and his children were prosecuting their study. 2. The Estate Officer, General Administration Department-opposite party no.2 initiated proceedings under Section 4(1) of the Orissa Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972 (for short “OPP Act, 1972”) and posted the case to 25.03.2006 for filing of show cause. Even though show cause was filed on 25.03.2006, opposite party no.2, without giving reasonable opportunity of hearing, passed order dated 25.03.2006 in Case No.38 of 2006 (Q) directing to vacate Qrs. No.17/ER situated at Chandrasekharpur, Bhubaneswar. Aggrieved by that order, petitioner preferred an appeal being Appeal Case No.35 of 2006 (Qr.) before the Director of Estates-opposite party no.1, which was dismissed vide order dated 21.06.2006, while rejecting the prayer for adjournment sought for by the petitioner, by confirming the order passed by the Estate Officer, without causing service of notice on opposite party no.2. Hence, this application. 3. Mr. Sanjeev Udgata, learned counsel for the petitioner states that the appeal preferred before the Director of Estates, against the order passed by the Estate Officer, being in the nature of First Appeal, the procedure envisaged under Rule 10 of the Orissa Public Premises (Eviction of Unauithorized Occupants) Rules, 1988 (for short “OPP Rules, 1988”), before admitting the appeal, has to be followed in its letter and spirit. Disposal/dismissal of the appeal preferred before the Director of Estates in a summery manner, without compliance of the provision of Rue 10 of the OPP Rules, 1988, cannot be held to be sustainable in the eye of law and, therefore, the order impugned cannot be allowed to stand. To substantiate his contention he placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Prafulla Chandra Das v. Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Central Division), Cuttack, 1989 (67) CLT 85. 4. Mr. P.K. Muduli, learned Addl. Government Advocate contended that the petitioner, being in occupation of the government quarter even after his transfer to Puri, was to vacate the same.
4. Mr. P.K. Muduli, learned Addl. Government Advocate contended that the petitioner, being in occupation of the government quarter even after his transfer to Puri, was to vacate the same. As he did not do so, steps for eviction of the quarter were taken in accordance with the provisions contained in OPP Act, 1972 and the Rules framed thereunder, since similarly situated persons were waiting to get allotment of the quarter in their favour. Therefore, the authority has not committed any illegality or irregularity in passing the order impugned in this writ application. 5. Heard Mr. Sanjeev Udgata, learned counsel for the petitioner, as well as P.K. Muduli, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State-opposite parties, and perused the records. It appears that though the writ application was filed in the year 2006, but no counter affidavit has been filed by the opposite parties as yet. Since the petitioner seeks for writ of certiorari, the writ application is being decided on the basis of the materials available on record itself. 6. The facts, as enumerated above, are undisputed. Therefore, only question which is to be examined is whether the order passed by the Director of Estates is in consonance with the provision contained in the OPP Act, 1972 read with OPP Rules, 1988. Section 2(g) defines “unauthorized occupation”, which is extracted below: “2(g) “unauthorized occupation” in relation to any public premises means the occupation by the person of the public premises without authority for such occupation and includes the continuance in occupation by any person of the public premises after the authority (whether by way of grant or any other mode of transfer) under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has expired or has been determined for any reason whatsoever.” 7. The provisions of the OPP Act, 1972 and Rules framed thereunder further reveal that if the Estate Officer is of the opinion that any person is in unauthorized occupation of any public premises and he should be evicted, the Estate Officer shall issue notice in writing calling upon the person concerned to show cause as to why an order of eviction shall not be made.
After considering the cause shown by such person, in pursuance of the notice issued under Section 4 of the Act, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, if the Estate Officer is satisfied that the public premises is in unauthorized occupation, he may make an order of eviction, for reasons to be recorded therein, and take steps in view of the provisions contained in Section 5 of the Act itself. Against such order of eviction passed under Section 5 of the Act, the appeal shall lie, in respect of any public premises situated within Cuttack and Bhubaneswar Municipal area and owned by the General Administration Department of Government, to the Director of Estates, Orissa under Section 9 of the Act. Every order made by the Estate Officer or appellate authority under the Act shall be final and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceedings. Consequentially, the order passed by the Director of Estates is to be reached its finality. 8. Similarly, Section 14 clearly states that no suit or other proceeding in respect of matters or disputes for determining or deciding which provision is made in this Act shall be instituted in any Court of Law, except under and in conformity with the provisions of this Act. It means, once an order under the Act attains finality under Section 10, Section 14 ousts the jurisdiction of Civil Court. In other words, if an authority having jurisdiction passes an order after giving adequate opportunity of hearing and the said order attains finality, in that case, suit is not maintainable. Similar question had come up for consideration before this Court in Bidyadhar Raul v. State of Orissa, 1993 (76) CLT 475, wherein the above view has been settled. 9. Section 17 of the Act states about the power to make rules, by which the State Government may, by notification, make rules for carrying out the purpose of this Act. In exercise of such power conferred by Section 17 of the Act, the State Government has framed the OPP Rules, 1988. Rule 10 thereof, which provides for procedure to appeal, is extracted below: “10.
In exercise of such power conferred by Section 17 of the Act, the State Government has framed the OPP Rules, 1988. Rule 10 thereof, which provides for procedure to appeal, is extracted below: “10. Procedure in appeal-(1) the memorandum of appeal filed under Section 9 of the Act shall precisely state the grounds of objection to the order appealed against and shall be accompanied by a copy of such order. (2) On receipt of the appeal the appellate authority shall call for the records of the proceedings before the Estate Officer and such other particulars as may be required and shall appoint a date and time for the hearing of the appeal by sending notice thereof to the Estate Officer against whose orders the appeal is preferred and to the appellant as well as the authority concerned under whose administrative control the premises situates. (3) The appellant shall along with the memorandum of appeal, supply copies thereof to be served on the respondents.” The aforesaid provisions, as provided in the statute, are mandatory in nature and are to be followed strictly. Therefore, the appellate authority has not been empowered to dispose of/dismiss an appeal preferred before it in a summary manner. 10. Sub-Rule-2 of Rule 10 specifically prescribes a particular mode of disposal of an appeal under Section-9 of the Act. According to it, on receipt of an appeal, the appellate authority shall have to follow the following procedure: “(a) The records of the proceedings before the Estate Officer shall be called for along with such other particulars as may be required; (b) A date and time for hearing the appeal shall be appointed by sending notice thereof to the Estate Officer against whose order the appeal is preferred; (c) Notice of the date and time of hearing shall be sent to the appellant; (d) Such notice shall also be sent to the authority concerned under whose administrative control and premises situates; and (e) As contemplated in sub-rule (3) copies of the memorandum of appeal shall be supplied so as to be served on the respondents.” The procedure which has been discussed above clearly indicates that it is complete by itself and does not admit of any departure to be made by the appellate authority.
As such, it does not give any discretion to it to dismiss an appeal summarily without sending for the records and causing service of notice to the Estate Officer, as well as the authority concerned under whose administrative control the premises situates. There is also no other provision in the OPP Rules, 1988 authorising the appellate authority for summary dismissal of an appeal. Similar question had come up for consideration before this Court in Prafulla Chandra Das v. Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Central Division), Cuttack and others, 67 (1989) CLT 85, which has been relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, in which the above view has been settled. 11. In view of the aforementioned provisions contained in the OPP Act, 1972 and Rules framed thereunder and perusing the order impugned under Annexure-2 dated 21.06.2016 passed in Appeal Case No.35 of 2006 (Qr.), this Court is of the considered view that the appellate authority has not been conferred with any specific power to dispose of/dismiss an appeal preferred before it in a summary manner. The appellate authority has to comply with Rule 10 of the OPP Rules, 1988, as it clearly envisages, by use of the word “shall” in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10, that the procedure is of mandatory character. Consequentially, the order impugned cannot be sustained and the appeal has to be remanded for fresh disposal in accordance with law in the light of discussions made in this judgment. 12. In the result, therefore, the writ petition is allowed, the order dated 21.06.2006 passed by the Director of Estates-opposite party no.1 in Appeal Case No.35/2006(Qr) is quashed and the matter is remanded back to the appellate authority for fresh disposal in accordance with law. No order as to cost.