ORDER : RAJESH SHANKAR, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the award dated 31.5.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad (in short CGIT) in Reference No. 40 of 1996 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) whereby, the reference has been answered in favour of the respondent-Management holding that the demand of the Union for regularization of the concerned workmen is not justified. The brief facts of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the concerned workmen Sri Gorelal Paswan and 32 others were working at Borragarh siding of M/s. BCCL as "shale picker" and "pusher" since 1988. The Union of the concerned workmen demanded their regularization. However, the conciliation failed and the failure report was sent to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, who in turn refused to refer the dispute to the concerned Tribunal. A writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 168 of 1996(R) was filed before Ranchi Bench of the Patna High Court, which was disposed of vide order dated 14.5.1996 directing the Government of India to pass appropriate order. Thereafter, the Ministry of Labour, Government of India referred the dispute for adjudication to the CGIT No. 1 in the following terms: "Whether the claim of the Union that Shri Gorelal Paswan and 32 others (as per list enclosed) were working at Borragarh Siding as shale picker since 1988 under Chotanagpur Motor Paribahan Sahyog Samity Ltd. (Kusunda) is correct? If so, whether the demand of the Union for their regularization by the Management of Bhalgera Area of M/s. BCCL is justified? If so, to what relief are those concerned workmen entitled?" 2. The aforesaid reference was registered as Reference No. 40/96 and both the parties appeared and contested their cases before the learned CGIT. The reference was finally answered in favour of the Management vide award dated 31.5.2012. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has assailed the impugned award on the ground that under the Coal Wage Board Recommendation, the category of job of the concerned workmen is at Sl. No. 17 of Appendix-V and, therefore, they are entitled to be regularized in Category-I as per the Coal Wage Board Recommendation. 3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has assailed the impugned award on the ground that under the Coal Wage Board Recommendation, the category of job of the concerned workmen is at Sl. No. 17 of Appendix-V and, therefore, they are entitled to be regularized in Category-I as per the Coal Wage Board Recommendation. It is further submitted that the concerned workmen have been shown as being employed by "Chotanagpur Motor Paribahan Sahyog Samity Ltd.", however, in fact, the said Samity had no control over the concerned workmen having no means and machinery to supervise the work of the concerned workmen. The Management of M/s. BCCL had devised the said arrangement of engaging the concerned workmen through Sahyog Samity, which was nothing but a camouflage to deprive the said workmen from getting their legitimate rights arising out of various beneficial laws including Nations Coal Wage Agreement. Thus, the core issue for consideration before the learned Tribunal was as to whether the contract awarded to the "Chotanagpur Motor Paribahan Sahyog Samity Ltd., Kusunda" was only camouflage in nature and thereby depriving the cornered workmen from regularization, which the learned Tribunal failed to decide. The learned counsel for the petitioner while referring to paragraphs 7 & 8 of the written statement filed before the learned CGIT, submits that a clear assertion was made on behalf of the concerned workmen that they have been engaged by the Management in the concerned colliery for doing the job of shale picking since 1988. It is also submitted that no issue was framed by the learned CGIT while passing the impugned award and as such the same is violative of the basic procedure emanating from Order 14 Rules 1 to 6 of Code of Civil Procedure, thus, not having the attributes of an award. Learned counsel for the petitioner while assailing the impugned award, further contends that the learned CGIT completely ignored the subsequent written statement filed by the Management of Kusunda Area admitting the fact of awarding contract to "Chotanagpur Motor Paribhan Sahyog Samity Ltd.", which included job of picking and segregation of stones/shale. Learned CGIT has not made any appreciation of evidence while coming to the conclusion and answering the reference against the petitioner-Union. Learned CGIT has not made any appreciation of evidence while coming to the conclusion and answering the reference against the petitioner-Union. Learned counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd. v. Nashik Workers Union & Ors. reported in (2003)6 SCC 416 and submits that the impugned award is liable to be set aside primarily on the ground that the material evidence adduced during the industrial adjudication has not at all been appreciated by the learned CGIT. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Management submits that the impugned award passed by the learned CGIT is based on pure finding of fact and as such it needs no interference. It is further submitted that the Management of Bhalgora Area of which Borragarh Colliery is a Unit, never awarded any contract to "Chotanagpur Motor Parivahan Sahyog Samiti Limited, Kusunda" at any point of time for carrying out job of shale picking or any other job. The petitioner failed to produce any appointment letter, identity card or pay slip to prove the engagement of the concerned workmen by the management at any point of time and as such the learned CGIT rightly rejected the claim of the petitioner. It is also submitted that the petitioner failed to produce any appointment letter of the concerned workmen issued by the Cooperative Society. Though the concerned workmen filed attendance register, which contains signature of Ali Hussian, the Siding Supervisor, but he was not examined before the learned Tribunal. The impugned award itself would show that the concerned workmen produced only one witness i.e. Gorelal Paswan (W.W. 1) who exhibited documents as Exts.-W-1 to W-4. The deposition of W.W. 1 has appropriately been discussed by the learned CGIT, therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned award suffers from non-application of mind. The impugned award itself would show that the concerned workmen produced only one witness i.e. Gorelal Paswan (W.W. 1) who exhibited documents as Exts.-W-1 to W-4. The deposition of W.W. 1 has appropriately been discussed by the learned CGIT, therefore, it cannot be said that the impugned award suffers from non-application of mind. It is further submitted that Ext.-W-1 are the certified copies of the orders passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Dhanbad in M.P. No. 402 of 1992 relating to a case registered under Section 107 of Cr.P.C. Ext.-W-2 is the carbon copy of the information given by the concerned workmen to the Officer-in-Charge, Borragarh T.P.S. received on 16.7.1991 and the attendance register of Borragarh siding (two registers) were marked as Ext.-W-3 and all these documents were not much relevant for adjudication of the case, hence, the learned CGIT, Dhanbad did not find the said documents relevant so as to go into further details of the same. It is not the case of the petitioner that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the workmen before the learned CGIT and the learned Presiding Officer hurriedly passed the impugned award. Learned counsel also submits that remand of the case would not give liberty to the petitioner to adduce any additional evidence and, thus, no purpose will be served in remanding the matter to the learned CGIT for passing a fresh order, as contended by. the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is further submitted that due to insufficient evidence/materials brought on record at the instance of the petitioner in the reference case, there was no occasion for the learned CGIT to go into further details of the matter. Accordingly, the reference has been answered against the petitioner. It is a settled position of law that the Writ Court should not interfere with the finding of fact recorded by an Industrial Tribunal. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. The petitioner representing the concerned workmen raised the industrial dispute for their regularization claiming that they had been working at Borragarh siding of M/s. BCCL as shale picker and pusher since 1988. The learned CGIT vide award dated 31.5.2012, rejected the claim of the petitioner and answered the reference in favour of the respondent-Management. The petitioner representing the concerned workmen raised the industrial dispute for their regularization claiming that they had been working at Borragarh siding of M/s. BCCL as shale picker and pusher since 1988. The learned CGIT vide award dated 31.5.2012, rejected the claim of the petitioner and answered the reference in favour of the respondent-Management. The learned counsel for the respondent has primarily argued that the High Court has no jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the finding of facts recorded by the learned CGIT. 6. Since the learned counsel for the respondent-Management has raised the issue of jurisdiction, it would be appropriate to deal with the said issue first. 7. In the case of Trambak Rubber Industries Ltd. v. Nashik Workers Union & Ors. reported in (2003)6 SCC 416 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "6. The High Court, conscious of its limitations under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, went into the question whether the conclusions reached by the Industrial Court were legally sustainable. Incidentally, it went into the question whether the Industrial Court ignored the material evidence on record. The one and only view that could be taken on the basis of the evidence on record, according to the High Court, is that the concerned persons whose engagement was terminated were not trainees but they were Workmen and therefore, their services could not have been terminated without following the due procedure. The High Court held that the action taken by the Management was an unfair labour practice within the meaning of the Act and directed reinstatement without back wages. 8. We are of the view that the High Court has not transgressed the limitations inherent in the grant of the writ of certiorari. The High Court had rightly perceived the patent illegality in the impugned award warranting interference in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The High Court is right in pointing out that the material evidence, especially the admissions of the witness examined on behalf of the Management were not considered at all. Moreover, the conclusions reached are wholly perverse and do not reasonably follow from the evidence on record. For instance, the fact that no appointment letters were issued or filed does not possibly lead to the conclusion that the Management's version must be true. Moreover, the conclusions reached are wholly perverse and do not reasonably follow from the evidence on record. For instance, the fact that no appointment letters were issued or filed does not possibly lead to the conclusion that the Management's version must be true. Similarly, if the workers' unions had taken the stand that ante-dated appointment letters were issued describing the employees as trainees after the dispute had arisen, it is difficult to comprehend how that would demolish the case of the Union that the concerned persons were really employed as workmen (helpers) but not as trainees. The Industrial Court makes a bald observation that there was no satisfactory evidence on record to suggest that these persons were employed by the respondents as regular employees at any point of time. This bald conclusion/observation, as rightly pointed out by the High Court, ignores the material evidence on record. In fact, the evidence has not been adverted to at all while discussing the issues. There was total non-application of mind on the part of the Tribunal to the crucial evidence. The Management's witness categorically stated that the concerned workers were engaged in production of goods and that no other workmen were employed for production of goods. In fact, one of the allegations of the Management was that they adopted go-slow tactics and did not turn out sufficient work. According to the Industrial Court, the fact that the trainees were employed for performing the regular nature of work would not by itself make them workmen. The question then is, would it lead to an inference that they were trainees? The answer must be clearly in the negative. No evidence whatsoever was adduced on behalf of the Management to show that for more than one and half years those persons remained as trainees in the true sense of the term. It is pertinent to note the statement of the Management's witness that in June-July, 1989, the Company did not have any permanent workmen and all the persons employed were trainees. It would be impossible to believe that the entire production activity was being carried on with none other than the so-called trainees. If there were trainees, there should have been trainers too. The Management evidently came forward with a false plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees so as to resort to summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. It would be impossible to believe that the entire production activity was being carried on with none other than the so-called trainees. If there were trainees, there should have been trainers too. The Management evidently came forward with a false plea dubbing the employees/workmen as trainees so as to resort to summary termination and deny the legitimate benefits. On the facts and evidence brought on record, the conclusion was inescapable that the appellant-employer resorted to unfair labour practice. There would have been travesty of justice if the High Court declined to interfere with the findings arbitrarily and without reasonable basis reached by the Industrial Court." 8. In the case of Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco Industries Ltd. reported in (2014)11 SCC 85 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "18. A careful reading of the judgments reveals that the High Court can interfere with an order of the Tribunal only on the procedural level and in cases, where the decision of the lower courts has been arrived at in gross violation of the legal principles. The High Court shall interfere with factual aspect placed before the Labour Courts only when it is convinced that the Labour Court has made patent mistakes in admitting evidence illegally or have made grave errors in law in coming to the conclusion on facts. The High Court granting contrary relief under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution amounts to exceeding its jurisdiction conferred upon it. Therefore, we accordingly answer the point No. 1 in favour of the appellant." 9. On perusal of the aforesaid judgments, it would emerge that the High Court has power to interfere with the finding of the learned Industrial Tribunal, if patent error is found in the impugned award and the conclusion reached is wholly perverse, which do not reasonably follow from the evidence on record. It has further been held that if the High Court finds that the material evidences adduced on behalf of either of the parties have not at all been considered by the learned Tribunal, the award may be interfered with. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention of this court to the omissions committed by the learned CGIT while passing the impugned award. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention of this court to the omissions committed by the learned CGIT while passing the impugned award. On perusal of the impugned award, it appears that after briefly discussing the testimony of W.W. 1, the learned CGIT directly reached a conclusion that the workmen's claim that Gorelal Paswan and 32 others were working at Borragarh siding as shale picker under Chotanagpur Motor Paribahan Sahyog Samity Ltd., Kusunda, is not correct and, thus, it has been held that the concerned workmen are not entitled to get any relief. On bare perusal of paragraph 7 of the impugned award, it would transpire that the argument of the Management has merely been detailed by the learned CGIT and without any independent appraisal of the evidences adduced by the parties, the learned Tribunal has concluded the impugned award giving a finding that the demand of the Union for regularization of the concerned workmen by the Management of Bhalgora Area of M/s. B.C.C.L. is not justified. It further appears from the record that though in the earlier written statement filed by the Management of Bhalgora Area, it was denied that the said Management ever awarded contract to Chotanagpur Motor Paribahan Sahyog Samity Ltd., Kusunda in the job of shale picking or in any other kind of job, however, pursuant to the order dated 20.10.2005 passed by the learned CGIT, adding Kusunda Area as a party in the said adjudication proceeding, the written statement was filed by the Kusunda Area (Annexure-6 to the writ petition) wherein it was admitted by the Management of Kusunda Area that the work order was issued by the General Manager, Kusunda Area vide order No. A6/GM(PS)117/3052 dated 17.10.1988 to "Chotanagpur Motor Paribahan Sahyog Samity Ltd." for the period from 1.8.1988 to 31.7.1990 i.e. for two years. The said work order also contained the job of picking and segregation of all stones/shale and extraneous material at KOCP before loading coal into the trucks for transportation to Borragarh siding. However, the said fact has not been dealt with/discussed by the learned Tribunal. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assiduously argued that the employment of the workmen was merely a camouflage and the workmen were actually working under the control of the respondent-Company. However, the said fact has not been dealt with/discussed by the learned Tribunal. The learned counsel for the petitioner has assiduously argued that the employment of the workmen was merely a camouflage and the workmen were actually working under the control of the respondent-Company. In my view, in a matter wherein the Union/workmen allege practice of sham contract in a camouflage manner in a work of perennial in nature depriving the workmen of getting regularized, it is the duty of the industrial adjudicator (the learned CGIT-1, Dhanbad in the present case) to make endeavour to test the bona fide/genuinity of the alleged practice of contractual engagements. The other infirmity apparent in the impugned award is that though in paragraph 5 of the same, the learned CGIT has mentioned the particulars of the witnesses/exhibits produced/adduced on behalf of the parties, however, no appraisal of the said depositions of the witnesses and the exhibits has been made in the subsequent paragraphs. Ext.-W-3 is the attendance register maintained by the concerned Management of M/s. B.C.C.L. in which the attendance of the concerned workmen were recorded. The attendance register coupled with the statement of W.W. 1 were at least required to be considered by the learned CGIT so as to weigh the claim of the concerned workmen regarding their engagement in particular nature of job and the supervision by different officers/officials of the concerned Management of M/s. B.C.C.L. The deposition of W.W. 1, who stated that the concerned workmen were performing the work of shale picking, loading and unloading of coal on wagons has also not been discussed in the light of related laws. The submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent-Management that the petitioner-Union produced only one witness (Gore Lal Yadav) as W.W. 1 and exhibited only four documents (Exts.-W-1 to W-4) is unfounded, as it is not the quantity, but the quality of evidence to be considered by the Court of law in reaching a logical conclusion. 11. In view of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned award cannot be sustained in law. Thus, the award dated 31.5.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 Dhanbad in Reference No. 40 of 1996 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) is set aside remanding the matter to the learned CGIT to pass a fresh award after due appraisal of the evidences already on record. 12. Thus, the award dated 31.5.2012 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 Dhanbad in Reference No. 40 of 1996 (Annexure-12 to the writ petition) is set aside remanding the matter to the learned CGIT to pass a fresh award after due appraisal of the evidences already on record. 12. It is, however, clarified that the factual observations made in this order, shall not prejudice the merit of the case of either of the parties. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions.