JUDGMENT : Amol Rattan Singh, J. CM No.11125-C of 2013 & CM 11238-C of 2013 By these applications, the appellants seek to bring on record, in each appeal, the legal representative of appellant no.1 Ajmer Singh (one of the LRs. of the original defendant). The applications having been filed along-with a supporting affidavit on 09.10.2013 and no reply having been filed thereto, despite notice issued, these applications are allowed and Jaspal Singh son of the late Ajmer Singh, is brought on record as the LR of appellant no.1. By this application, restoration of the accompanying appeal is sought, which was dismissed in default on 12.04.2013, nobody having appeared for two dates in succession after the matter was taken up on 02.04.2013, (though it was taken up for the first time on that date, after notice was issued and it was admitted to regular hearing on 18.09.1985). As a matter of fact, both the appeals, i.e. RSA nos.2707 and 2509 of 1985, were dismissed in default on the same date, with separate applications thereafter filed seeking restoration of each of the appeals. RSA no.2507 of 1985 was restored upon CM No.11239-C-2013 having been allowed, vide an order of this Court dated 18.03.2016. However, very obviously inadvertently, the application (CM No.11126-C of 2013) filed in RSA no.2509 of 1985 was not decided on that date possibly because somehow it was not listed before the Bench. Subsequently, it was never brought to the notice of this Court that the said application has never been allowed and in fact, both the appeals have been argued by learned counsel on both sides, taking it that both the appeals were restored to their original number and status, with RSA no.2507 of 1985 having been so restored. Hence, there would be no reason to not pass a formal order actually restoring the accompanying appeal also, i.e. RSA no.2509 of 1985, the issue of this appeal having been dismissed in default along-with the other one, never having been raised by counsel for the respondent-plaintiff after the other appeal was restored. Yet, what is stated in the application seeking restoration, may be noticed, even so. Yet, what is stated in the application seeking restoration, may be noticed, even so. It is stated in the application, duly supported by the affidavit of appellant no.3, Tej Pal Singh, that he and appellant no.2 and the son of the late appellant no.1, came to know of the status of the case on 01.10.2013 from the learned counsel who had filed the appeal, who had since been elevated to the Bench and had even retired thereafter. Upon coming to know that the appeal had been dismissed in default on 12.04.2013, they engaged the present counsel and had there after filed this application. Along with the application, an amended memo of parties has been filed, showing the appellant no.1 now represented through his son, Jaspal Singh, as his LR, with a copy of the death certificate of appellant no.1 (Ajmer Singh) also annexed with the application, as has been the will of Ajmer Singh. Notice having been issued in this application (along-with the application seeking impleadment of Jaspal Singh as the LR of appellant no.1 Ajmer Singh), vide an order dated 23.10.2013, no reply has been filed thereto, hence the non-applicants-respondent obviously have no objection to the accompanying appeal (RSA no. 2509 of 1985) being restored, with RSA no.2507 of 1985 already having been restored as noticed. The application is consequently allowed and RSA no.2509 of 1985 is ordered to be restored to its original number and status, the appeal in any case having been argued on merits by both sides. RSA Nos. 2507 and 2509 of 1985 Both these second appeals have been instituted by the legal representatives of the defendant in two suits filed by the respondent-plaintiff (now also represented by his legal representatives). The suits of the plaintiff having been decreed in his favour and both the first appeals filed by the present appellants also having been dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, that has led to the filing of these two second appeals. Civil Suit no.225/18.07.1977 was filed by plaintiff Rajinder Singh, impleading his sister, Angrej Kaur, as the defendant therein, seeking a declaration to the effect that he was the owner in possession of agricultural land measuring 39 kanals 4 marlas (fully described in the head note of the plaint and the judgment of the learned Sub Judge, Ist Class, Jagadhri), situate in village Rasulpur, Tehsil Jagadhri, (at that time) District Ambala. He further sought a declaration that the “alleged gift deed dated 29.10.1969” which the defendant claimed was executed in her favour, by the father of the parties, be declared to be ineffective, inoperative, unenforceable, null and void, nonexistent and not binding upon the plaintiff. The second suit, i.e. Civil Suit no.613/16.08.1977, was also filed by respondent-plaintiff Rajinder Singh, again impleading his sister Angrej Kaur as the defendant, seeking therein a decree of permanent injunction, restraining her from interfering in any manner whatsoever, in his 'physical, cultivating and proprietary possession over the aforesaid suit land'. Both the suits were decided by a common judgment of the learned Sub Judge 1st Class, Jagadhri, dated 30.11.1981, leading to the filing of Civil Appeal nos. 6/1982 and 7/1982, which were also decided by a common judgment of the 1st appellate Court, on 12.03.1985, thereby leading to the filing of the present two appeals by the legal representatives of the original defendant, Angrej Kaur, who in fact is seen to have died during the pendency of the suits before the Sub Judge 1st Class, itself. 2. The facts contained in the plaints are being taken from the judgments of the learned Courts below. As per the plaintiff, the suit property was part of the domain of a dynasty which ruled and had sovereign power over the area, including villages Kot Mushtarka and Rasulpur, before the advent of British rule in the area. It was contended that Maharaja Gulab Singh had founded the dynasty that his descendents ruled over their kingdom till they were brought under the protection of British rule, by which they were reduced to the position of “mediatised rulers”. Thereafter, they came to be known as Cis-Satluj Jagirdars, having been confirmed in possession of the dominions that they held, with the estate having descended on a single heir even in the pre-British period, with the same rule of succession and restrictions on the holders continuing, with regard to alienation of the Jagir. Thereafter, they came to be known as Cis-Satluj Jagirdars, having been confirmed in possession of the dominions that they held, with the estate having descended on a single heir even in the pre-British period, with the same rule of succession and restrictions on the holders continuing, with regard to alienation of the Jagir. Hence, it was contended that the present holder of the estate (i.e. at the time of filing of the suits in 1977), continued to hold it on the same terms and conditions attached to the estate, such terms and conditions being that, firstly, the estate would devolve upon a single male heir in the male line of descendents, with the female relations, such as the widows, daughters and sisters having no right to succeed thereto. [It needs to be noticed at this stage itself that as a matter of fact the learned Sub Judge, in his judgment has stated that according to the plaintiff, the estate would devolve upon “a single male heir”, as regards Jagirdari land, but in the plaint itself, as pointed out by learned counsel, the word “single” is not seen, except to the extent that it has been scored out. The words used are, in fact, in paragraph 2(a) of the plaint, “male heirs”. That aspect would be discussed at the time of consideration of the questions of law involved.] Secondly, as per the plaintiff, the holder of the estate would have no right of alienation of any part thereof, so that it devolved upon the next heir unencumbered in any manner. 3. It was next contended that the said Cis-Satluj Jagir devolved upon Sardar Bishan Singh, father of the plaintiff and the defendant, who was a Jat Sikh, and other than being a Jagirdar, he belonged to a 'predominant' agricultural tribe of Tehsil Jagadhri, which was governed by customary laws of the province, in matters of alienation and succession. Hence, it was further contended that Sardar Bishan Singh was not competent to alienate any part of the estate in any manner, including by way of any gift. Hence, it was further contended that Sardar Bishan Singh was not competent to alienate any part of the estate in any manner, including by way of any gift. Consequently, it was the plaintiffs' case that he is the sole legal heir and surviving male descendent of Sardar Bishan Singh, and therefore the gift made by their father, by way of a deed dated 29.10.1969 in favour of defendant Smt. Angrej Kaur (daughter of the donee, Bishan Singh), was in violation of the rules of succession and was hence illegal, null and void and not binding on the rights of the plaintiff. 4. Upon notice issued in the suits, the defendant filed written statements to both of them, first taking the usual pleas of the suits being time barred, not maintainable and without cause of action, further denying the history of the estate, as given by the plaintiff. It was contended by the defendant that the plaintiff was not in possession of the suit property and that actually he was cultivating it as a tenant under her and further, as regards the suit seeking a decree of permanent injunction, it was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, the earlier suit for declaration already having been filed. It was further contended that the rule of succession laid down in Douies' Punjab Land Administration Manual was not applicable in the present case, and therefore, the gift deed made by the late Sardar Bishan Singh in favour of the defendant, was a valid document, binding on the rights of the plaintiff. 5. As per the judgment of the learned Sub Judge, the second suit seeking permanent injunction was instituted on 15.12.1977 (though in the head note of the judgment, it is shown to be suit no.613/16.08.1977), in which it was also prayed that the defendant be restrained from claiming Batai or taking forcible possession of the suit land and from otherwise alienating it. The suits were stated to have been consolidated vide an order dated 15.04.1978 and consequently, the following issues were framed by the learned Sub Judge:- “1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the suit land? OPP 2. Whether the property in dispute is Cis-Satluj Jagir, if so, its effect? OPP 3. Whether the parties are governed by custom in matters of alienation etc. If so, what that custom is? OPP 4. Whether the plaintiff is the owner and in possession of the suit land? OPP 2. Whether the property in dispute is Cis-Satluj Jagir, if so, its effect? OPP 3. Whether the parties are governed by custom in matters of alienation etc. If so, what that custom is? OPP 4. Whether the property in dispute is ancestral property of the parties? OPP 5. Whether the gift deed dated 29.10.1969 is void and is a nullity in the eyes of law as alleged, if so, its effect? OPP 6. Whether the suit is within time? OPP 7. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing this suit as alleged? OPD 8. What is the effect of coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, over the rights of the parties? OPD 9. Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to try this suit as alleged? OPD 10. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 11. Whether the suit is barred under section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act as alleged? OPD 12. Relief.” 6. Issues no.2 and 5 having been taken up to be decided together, the following pedigree table has been made in the judgment of the learned trial Court:- xxx xxx xxx 7. Thereafter, the learned Sub Judge went on to discuss the history of the Jagirs' in the Cis-Satluj area and recorded a finding of fact that the suit land had been described to be a Jagir in the revenue records and therefore, the contention of the defendant to the contrary could not be accepted. The lineage of the family of the parties was discussed, as per devolution of the suit land, on the basis of the revenue record exhibited and an excerpt (consolidated) of the history of such devolution. 8. The lineage of the family of the parties was discussed, as per devolution of the suit land, on the basis of the revenue record exhibited and an excerpt (consolidated) of the history of such devolution. 8. The Court referred to the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, in Section 2 (b) of which, a Jagir has been defined as follows:- (a) “Government” means the [State] Government (b) “Jagir” includes- (i) any assignment of land revenue made or deemed to have been made under this Act, (ii) any assignment of land revenue made by competent authority, before the passing of this Act, (iii) any grant of money made or continued by or on behalf of [the Central or State Government] which purports to be or is expressed to be payable out of the land revenue; and (iv) any estate in land created or affirmed by or on behalf of [the Central or State Government] which carries with it the right of collecting land revenue or receiving any portion of the land revenue; [(v) any cash grant made under this Act; and]” (c) “Jagirdar” means the holder of any grant falling within the definition of a Jagir.” 9. After that, the learned Sub Judge went on to discuss the manner in which Jagir property is to devolve upon the successors thereto, by citing paragraph 107 of Douie's Punjab Land Administration Mannual as follows:- “In 1851 the Government of India laid down the three following rules to regulate successions to horsemen's shares in Pattidari Jagirs:- 1. That no widow shall succeed 2. That no descendants in the female line shall inherit. 3. That on failure of a direct male heir, a collateral male heir may succeed if the common ancestor of the deceased and the collateral claimant was in possession of the share at or since the period 1908-09 when our connection with the Cis-sutlej territory first commenced.” The Court thereafter found that the aforesaid paragraph had been introduced in the Manual on the basis of the rules regulating succession, as had been formulated by the Government of India in the year 1851. Thereafter, however, an opinion was recorded by the Sub Judge that:- “it shall be too much to accept that the compliance of the rule was strictly adhered to by all the Jagirdars.” 10. Thereafter, however, an opinion was recorded by the Sub Judge that:- “it shall be too much to accept that the compliance of the rule was strictly adhered to by all the Jagirdars.” 10. The Court then recorded a finding that the shares of the Jagirdars in the land revenue collected from various villages which formed a part of the Jagir, were given on the back of the pedigree table, Ex.P2. From that a conclusion was drawn that there was a definite grant of land revenue to the 'Jagirdaran', which was collected from the villages. Thus, the contention on behalf of the defendant that the suit land was not Jagir land, was rejected, on that ground. The learned Sub Judge cited an authority of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh AIR 1961 SC 908 , and quoted from there as follows:- “The holder of a Jagir which is a part of Cis Sutlaj States does not own the property absolutely but holds it as a limited owner. All proprietary right to any part of the lands forming a part of the Jagir which may be held by the Jagirdar will be considered as pertaining to the Jagir and will go to the holder of the Jagir for the time being. This principle is applicable even to houses and other buildings standing on the Jagir which are in the nature of forts and may be considered to appertain to the estate.” 11. On an issue of three ladies having been described as co-sharers in the property and therefore, the nature of the property having ceased to be a Jagir, it was held that as regards one of the ladies, Smt. Dasso wife of Karim Bux, who was recorded to be an owner in possession in the jamabandi (record of rights) for the year 1896-97, she and one Smt. Kahni, widow of Rulia Chawar, were not Jat Sikhs. An inference was therefore drawn by the Court that they may have been given land for their maintenance by the Jagirdar and as such, their ownership could not be considered to be any impediment in the context of the land being Jagirdari land. An inference was therefore drawn by the Court that they may have been given land for their maintenance by the Jagirdar and as such, their ownership could not be considered to be any impediment in the context of the land being Jagirdari land. As regards Smt. Mehtab Kaur wife of Amir Singh who was found to have inherited some part of the suit land in the year 1872 and Smt. Gurdial Kaur, widow of Butta Singh, it was found that they were seen to be only owners of the estate by way of a life interest and therefore that was held not to have affected the nature of the suit property, it having reverted to the male line of descendants again, after their deaths. [The reference to the years 1872, 1891 and 1896-97 in the said part of the judgment of the learned Sub Judge (paragraph 14), does not specify that the said years are as per the Gregorian calendar, but since the said calendar has been referred to in the context of the year 1759 in paragraph 12, wherein the year 1816 is shown to be as per the 'Samvat calendar'- (probably Bikrami Samvat)-therefore, possibly the years referred to in paragraph 14 would also be in the context of the 'Samvat calendar', except the year 1942- 43, which is probably again as per the Gregorian calendar. However, as would be seen, that would not make any difference to the controversy at hand, and therefore the issue is not being gone into in detail, that part never having been an issue raised at any stage earlier also, in any case.] 12. A judgment of this Court having been cited on behalf of the defendants in Gurdeh Singh v. Balwant Kaur (RSA no.405 of 1964) , the reliance by the defendants' counsel was found to be not applicable to the circumstances of the present case, with the learned Sub Judge holding that in that case, one Mst. Daya Kaur was found to have perfected her title by way of adverse possession and therefore the chain of devolution of the land upon Jagirdars was held to have been broken and consequently, the suit land in that case was held to be not Jagirdari property. It was also held in that very case that whether any suit property is Jagir land or not, would depend upon the circumstances of each case. 13. It was also held in that very case that whether any suit property is Jagir land or not, would depend upon the circumstances of each case. 13. On the aforesaid reasoning, the learned Sub Judge went on to hold that the father of the parties, S. Bishan Singh, was only “to act as a conduit pipe and he was not competent to alienate the suit property” and therefore, since the gift deed dated 20.10.1969 (in favour of defendant Angrej Kaur) was in respect of a Jagir estate, the gift deed was void. It was further held that the entire property should have devolved upon the plaintiff, whose ownership rights were affected by the gift deed, with a further finding of fact recorded that, in the revenue record, he was shown to be in possession, with the nature of the possession described as “Bawajah Piser Khudd”, which was interpreted by that Court to mean that the plaintiff was in possession during the life time of his father. 14. To conclude on issues no.2 and 5, the learned Sub Judge held that the defendants (meaning the LRs of the original defendant and she herself, i.e. Angrej Kaur, the mother of the LRs), never became owners of the suit property and consequently, the plaintiff was held to be the owner in possession thereof. 15. Thereafter, going on to issue no.4, as to whether the suit property is ancestral property or not of the parties, that Court held that though in consolidation proceedings the old field numbers (khasra numbers) had changed, it could not be pointed out that the new numbers were not actually 'in lieu of the old ones' and therefore, the property was held to be ancestral in nature, a finding of fact having been recorded on the basis of revenue record, that the father of the parties (S. Bishan Singh) had never acquired any land himself, though he had sold some land as had devolved upon him. Consequently, finding that the land comprised in the revenue estate of Rasulpur had been earlier held by the ancestors of the plaintiffs, it was held by the Court that it was necessarily ancestral property which devolved upon S. Bishan Singh. 16. Consequently, finding that the land comprised in the revenue estate of Rasulpur had been earlier held by the ancestors of the plaintiffs, it was held by the Court that it was necessarily ancestral property which devolved upon S. Bishan Singh. 16. On the issue of whether the suit was filed within time (issue no.6), it was held that the gift deed having been executed on 29.10.1969 and Sardar Bishan Singh having died on 07.06.1975, a suit for possession could be filed within 12 years of its alienation and within three years of the death of the alien or and was therefore held to have been filed on time (i.e. Civil Suit no.389, instituted on 18.07.1977, seeking a declaration of ownership). Issue no.6 was also therefore, decided in favour of the plaintiff. 17. Issue no.7 (estoppel on filing the suit) was pressed on behalf of the appellants-defendants, before the learned Sub Judge, essentially on the basis of a previous suit filed by the plaintiff, challenging the alienation of 20 kanals and 4 marlas of land by his father in favour of one Nathu. Though in that lis, the learned Sub Judge, Jagadhri, had decided the suit in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the suit land (in that case) was a Cis-Satluj Jagir and the sale having been effected by S. Bishan Singh without legal necessity, it was an illegal sale, however, the first appellate Court in that case had reversed that judgment, holding that the property was not a Cis-Satluj Jagir. Yet, in the present lis, the learned Sub Judge refused to follow the dictum of the decree of the learned first appellate Court in the other lis, on the ground that, firstly, the subject land was different, and secondly, the court of the learned Additional District Judge in that case not being a court of record, the finding in that case would not be binding on him (the Court of the Sub Judge in the present lis). 17-A. While deciding issue no.7, another argument on behalf of the defendant was also noticed by the Court, to the effect that the gift deed not having been challenged for a long period of time, and the plaintiff having continued to cultivate the land “under Smt. Angrej Kaur”, he was estopped from filing the suit. 17-A. While deciding issue no.7, another argument on behalf of the defendant was also noticed by the Court, to the effect that the gift deed not having been challenged for a long period of time, and the plaintiff having continued to cultivate the land “under Smt. Angrej Kaur”, he was estopped from filing the suit. That argument was rejected holding that the plaintiff had been agitating his right of ownership even before the revenue courts and therefore, he could not be held to have been estopped from filing the suit in the present lis. 18. On the effect of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, over the rights of the parties (issue no.8), the learned Sub Judge held that Section 14 of the said Act “does not enlarge the limited right of Smt. Angrej Kaur given to her under the impugned gift deed” and that though otherwise after the death of S. Bishan Singh, his daughters and the plaintiff, Rajinder Singh, would have succeeded to his estate as “ordinary Hindus”, however, with the suit property having been found to be a Cis-Satluj Jagir, with a special rule of succession applicable to it, read with the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singhs' case (supra), it was to devolve entirely upon the male descendants of Bishan Singh and therefore the daughters would have no right to succeed to the suit property. 19. Issues no.9 and 10, on the suit being bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and the lack of jurisdiction with the civil Court, are shown before the trial Court as not having been pressed and therefore were also decided in favour of the plaintiff. 20. On the last issue, of whether the suit was barred under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, it was held that the said provision would have been attracted only if the plaintiff had been proved to be a tenant under the defendant, but with him already having been held to be entitled to succeed to the entire suit property irrespective of the gift deed in favour of the defendant, the question of estoppel on a tenant from claiming title to the property on which he was such a tenant, did not arise. This was held because though it was shown from the revenue record that the plaintiff was shown to be a gair marusi under Angrej Kaur (defendant), however, during the life time of his father, he was shown to be in possession “Bawajah Piser Khudd” (as already noticed in paragraph 13 hereinabove). Hence, it was held that he was actually cultivating the land in his own right and not as a tenant and consequently, the 11th issue was also decided in the plaintiffs' favour. 21. Upon the aforesaid findings, both the suits of the plaintiff, the first seeking a decree of declaration and the second seeking a decree of permanent injunction against the defendant and her LRs, were decreed in his favour, with the gift deed dated 29.10.1969 in favour of defendant Angrej Kaur, held to be null and void and not binding on the right of the plaintiff. 22. The aforesaid judgments and decrees in the two suits having been appealed against by the present appellants, i.e. the legal representatives (sons) of defendant Angrej Kaur, the learned first appellate Court noticed the contents of the plaints and the written statements filed in both the suits, as also the issues framed by the learned Sub Judge. That Court took up issues no.1, 2, 4 and 5 together and thereafter discussed the evidence in the form of the testimony of the plaintiff as PW1, in detail. 23. That testimony being essentially in terms of the contentions made in the plaint, in his cross-examination, the plaintiff is seen to have admitted that the estate of his grand-father, Udham Singh, was inherited by both, his father and his fathers' brother, Maha Singh, and after Maha Singhs' death, his share was inherited by his three sons equally. The plaintiff was also found to have admitted that his father had made three gift deeds in favour of his three daughters six years prior to his death, and that mutations had been sanctioned, but in his (plaintiffs') absence and thereafter, he had filed a suit for the 'agricultural produce'. He also admitted that his father had 700/800 bighas of agricultural land in the shape of a Jagir in several villages, some of which was purchased by tenants under Section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act. He however denied that the other gift deeds were executed with the plaintiffs' consent. He also admitted that his father had 700/800 bighas of agricultural land in the shape of a Jagir in several villages, some of which was purchased by tenants under Section 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act. He however denied that the other gift deeds were executed with the plaintiffs' consent. The sale by his father of 8 to 10 acres of land to the sons of one Manga Ram, in village Kot, was also admitted by the plaintiff but he qualified that by deposing that he had re-obtained the same on filing a suit for preemption. As regards the land gifted to his (other) sister, Bachan Kaur, the plaintiff deposed that he did not purchase the said land from her but that he had filed a suit against her for 'disposal of the said land'. As per the learned first appellate Court, the plaintiff was not cross-examined on whether the suit land was Jagir property or not, or whether it was ancestral property or not. 24. The learned first appellate Court thereafter discussed the testimonies of DWs Harbans Singh, Ranjit Singh and Joginder Singh, Harbans Singh being the brother of the defendants' husband, with Joginder Singh being her husband. In essence, these witnesses are seen to have testified to the effect that Bishan Singh had executed three separate gift deeds in favour of three daughters, with Harbans Singh being the attesting witness thereof. These witnesses, in cross-examination (as per the learned Additional District Judge), also admitted that as regards their own properties, as were inherited by them from their fathers, such properties had not devolved upon their sisters but were inherited solely by them and their brothers, in each case. 25. Upon discussing the aforesaid oral evidence, the learned first appellate Court held that the suit property was a Cis-Satluj Jagir property which Bishan Singh had no right to gift away and as such, the entire property should have devolved upon the plaintiff. That Court also further recorded a finding that the plaintiff was still in possession of the suit property, with such possession having been described as “Bawajah Piser Khudd”, during the life time of his father. The Court also held that the suit property was also ancestral and as such, those essential issues had been correctly decided by the trial Court. 26. The Court also held that the suit property was also ancestral and as such, those essential issues had been correctly decided by the trial Court. 26. On the issue of limitation (issue no.6), the learned first appellate Court held that the suit having been filed within three years of the death of the plaintiffs' father, which occurred on 07.06.1975, it could not be held to be beyond limitation and further, that if an adverse entry was made against a person who was in actual physical possession of the property, but he thereafter continued to retain possession, he was under no obligation to bring a suit. However, if that persons' rights actually were jeopardised, by actions or assertions of a defendant, then a suit must be brought by the plaintiff (against such actions/assertions), within three years of such actions/assertions. Holding as above, the suit of the plaintiff was held to have been filed within limitation. 27. The finding of the trial Court on the need to discard the findings of the learned first appellate Court in the other lis, by which the suit property (in that lis) had not been held to be Jagir property, was also upheld. 28. On the effect of the Hindu Succession Act over the rights of the parties, the first appellate Court held that the gift deed having been held to be null and void, there was no justification to reverse the finding of the trial Court on that issue (issue no.8) either, by which it had been held that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, would not be applicable, the property being a Cis-Satluj Jagir, with special rules of succession being applicable to it. 29. Similarly, as regards issue no.11, on whether the suit was barred under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the finding of the learned Sub Judge was again upheld by the first appellate Court, holding that the plaintiff was not a tenant under the defendant and he being entitled to succeed to the entire suit property, irrespective of the gift deed in favour of the defendant, there was no estoppel on him to claim ownership of the property. 30. Thus, the learned Additional District Judge earlier having stated that issues no.9 and 10 had not been touched upon in the first appeal before him, both the appeals filed by the defendant/her LRs, were dismissed. 31. 30. Thus, the learned Additional District Judge earlier having stated that issues no.9 and 10 had not been touched upon in the first appeal before him, both the appeals filed by the defendant/her LRs, were dismissed. 31. Before this Court, though no questions of law have been framed in the grounds of appeal in either of the two appeals before this Court, however, essentially, as could not be eventually denied by counsel on both sides, the questions of law that arise for consideration in these appeals are as follows:- (i) Whether the Courts below have correctly held the suit property to be a Cis-Sutlej Jagir, devolution of which is to be governed by the provisions of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941? (ii) Whether the suit property has been correctly held to be ancestral land? If so, the effect thereof, in terms of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. (iii) Whether the Courts below have erred in holding the suit for declaration filed by the respondent-plaintiff, to have been within limitation? (iv) Whether the issue on estoppel has been correctly decided. (v) As regards RSA no.2507 of 1985, arising out of the suit instituted by the respondent-plaintiff, seeking a decree of declaration, whether such decree has been correctly passed in his favour by the Courts below? 32. It is to be noticed at the outset that though in the written statement filed on behalf of the appellant-defendant, an issue of the second suit (seeking permanent injunction against the appellant-defendant), being barred by the provisions of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, was raised by the defendant, however, no specific issue was framed by the trial Court and no argument on that question has been raised before this Court, which is consequently not being gone into. The reason for not seriously raising that issue seems to be obvious, inasmuch as, the outcome of the second suit in any case would largely be dependent on the outcome of what is held on the issues pertaining to the first suit (seeking a declaration), out of which RSA no.2509 of 1985 arises. 33. Mr. The reason for not seriously raising that issue seems to be obvious, inasmuch as, the outcome of the second suit in any case would largely be dependent on the outcome of what is held on the issues pertaining to the first suit (seeking a declaration), out of which RSA no.2509 of 1985 arises. 33. Mr. Kulbhushan Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants, after giving the background and facts concerning the litigation, first submitted in respect of the revenue “excerpt”, Ex.P9, contending that it was inadmissible in evidence without examination of a revenue official, as it is neither a jamabandi (record of rights) nor an annual record (khasra girdawri) and therefore, the presumption in favour of such documents, as is raised in Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, would not apply to an Excerpt. In this context, Mr. Sharma cited three judgments, as follows:- (i) Banta Singh v. Phuman Singh 1971 PLR 1042 ; (ii) Hawa Singh v. Dayanand 2010(2) PLR 567 ; and (iii) Gurmail Singh v. Rajbir Singh 2014(4) RCR (Civil) 397 . 34. Mr. Sharma next referred to Section 2 (b)(iv) of the Act of 1941, to submit that the suit land not being “an estate in land created or affirmed by or on behalf of the Central or State Government, which carries with it the right of collecting land revenue”(or receiving any part thereof), it is not Jagir land so as to make the provisions contained in that Act, regarding succession to such land, applicable to the suit land. He next referred to Section 5(ii) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, with Section 5 reading as follows:- “5. He next referred to Section 5(ii) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, with Section 5 reading as follows:- “5. Act to apply to certain properties.- This Act shall not apply to (i) any property succession to which is regulated by the Indian Succession Act, 1925, by reason of the provisions contained in section 21 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954; (ii) any estate which descends to a single heir by the terms of any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State with the Government of India or by the terms of any enactment passed before the commencement of this Act; (iii) the Valiamma Thampuran Kovilagam Estate and the Palace Fund administered by the Palace Administration Board by reason of the powers conferred by Proclamation (IX of 1124) dated 29th June, 1949, promulgated by the Maharaja of Cochin.” Learned counsel submitted that the suit land not being land that had descended to a single heir by the terms of any covenant entered into by the ruler of any Indian State, with the Government, it would be the provisions of the Act of 1956 that would prevail as regards succession to the suit property, and not the provisions of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941. 35. Mr. Sharma next submitted that no marked document can be read in evidence as has been done by the Courts below, in reading Circular No.60 dated 26.02.1857, which was never an exhibited document but was only marked as “Mark-A”. In this context, he cited the following two judgments:- (i) Mukhtiar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1971 SC 1864 ; and (ii) Karnail Singh v. M/s Kalra Brothers, Sirsa 2009(2) RCR (Civil) 380. 36. Learned counsel for the appellants next submitted that the Courts below had wholly erred in deciding the issue of limitation in favour of the plaintiff, because even as per Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the limitation to file a suit seeking a declaration to cancel or set aside an instrument is three years and thus, with the gift deed sought to be annulled being a registered deed dated 29.10.1969, and the said deed being fully in the knowledge of the respondent-plaintiff, he could have filed a suit at best upto 29.10.1972, with the suit actually however having been filed in the year 1977. 37. Mr. 37. Mr. Sharma further submitted that actually in the present case if the land is accepted to be governed by customary law, it would then be Section 5 of the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act, 1920, that would govern limitation, by which the suit again was time barred, it not having been filed within 6 years of the date of registration of the gift deed; i.e. if the stand of the plaintiff were to be accepted that the suit land was governed by custom and not by the terms of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. In this respect, learned counsel drew attention to Section 5 of the aforesaid Act of 1920, read with Article 1 of the Schedule annexed thereto:- “5. Dismissal of suits of the descriptions specified in the act if instituted after the period of limitation herein prescribed has expired- Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 25 (inclusive) of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the first schedule of the said Act, every suit, of the description specified in the schedule annexed to this Act, instituted after the period of limitation prescribed therefore in the schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence.” xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx Schedule Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 1. A suit for a declaration that an alienation of ancestral immovable property will not, according to custom, be binding on the plaintiff after the death of the alienor (if the alienor is a female) after her death or forfeiture of her interest in the property. 2. A suit for possession of ancestral immovable property which has been alienated on the ground that the alienation is not binding on the plaintiff according to custom- (a) if no declaratory decree of the nature referred to in Article 1 is obtained (b) if such declaratory decree is obtained 6 years 6 years 3 years Firstly.-if the alienation is by a registered deed, the date of registration of such deed. Secondly.-If the alienation is not by a registered deed- (a) if an entry regarding the alienation in the Register of Mutations has been attested by a Revenue officer under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, the date on which the entry is attested. Secondly.-If the alienation is not by a registered deed- (a) if an entry regarding the alienation in the Register of Mutations has been attested by a Revenue officer under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, the date on which the entry is attested. (b) If such entry has not been attested, the date on which the alienee takes physical possession of the whole or any part of the property alienated in pursuance of such alienation. (c) in all other cases, the date on which the alienation comes to the knowledge of the plaintiff.” As above. The date on which the right to sue accrues or the date of which declaratory decree is obtained, whichever is later. 38. Learned counsel for the appellant lastly submitted that even if this Court for any reason comes to the conclusion that the Courts below correctly held the suit land to be Jagir land, with the devolution thereto to be governed under the provisions of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, the respondent-plaintiff in any case is estopped from invoking the provisions of that Act, he himself having acquiesced to the gift deeds executed by his father, the late Sardar Bishan Singh, in favour of his other two sisters, one of them being Bant Kaur, as has been duly noticed by the Ist appellate Court, while discussing the testimony of the respondent-plaintiff as PW1. He submitted that the respondent-plaintiff having admitted that his father had actually executed three gift deeds in favour of his three daughters (sisters of the plaintiff) and the plaintiff having challenged only one gift deed, i.e. that of the mother of the present appellants (defendant Angrej Kaur), he had wholly “given up the status of the suit land” as a Jagir land, even if it were to be accepted to have been such land for any reason. He further submitted that the suit land had also been admittedly transferred to other persons by the plaintiffs' father and therefore, the plaintiff could not keep harping that only the land gifted to one sister was Jagir land, that land not being different in character to the lands either gifted away or sold by the late Bishan Singh. He further submitted that the suit land had also been admittedly transferred to other persons by the plaintiffs' father and therefore, the plaintiff could not keep harping that only the land gifted to one sister was Jagir land, that land not being different in character to the lands either gifted away or sold by the late Bishan Singh. In a nut-shell, the last argument of learned counsel for the appellants was that the suit land had lost its character of being a Jagir land, the respondent-plaintiff having accepted the gift deeds made by his father to his other two sisters, as also other alienations made by him. 39. Per contra, Mr. M. G. Bagga, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff (now represented by his LRs), first took this Court through the history of Cis-Satluj Jagirs. Learned counsel submitted that such a Jagir is fully described in paragraph 81 of Douies' Punjab Land Administration Manual, clause (b) of which describes the 'plains' to have been taken under protection of the British (East India Company) in 1809 and the hill tract comprised in District Simla, in 1815. The Cis-Satluj territory comprising of the plains, was contained in Districts Ambala, Ludhiana, Ferozepore (except Tehsil Fazilka), and Tehsil Kaithal and Pargana Indiri, in District Karnal. He submitted that the Cis-Satluj was, thus, the territory that fell between the Satluj and Yamuna rivers, as regards the area in the plains. 39-A. He next referred to paragraph 100 of that Manual, to submit that these Jagirs were first formed upon the Sikhs winning the battle of Sirhind against the Afghans. They occupied the whole country upto the river Yamuna, with Sikh horsemen riding day and night, over different parts of the newly won territory, throwing their belts and scabbards, articles of dress and accoutrement, until a horseman was almost naked, thereby marking each successive village to be specifically in his domain. Thus, the Sikh Chiefs divided the newly won country upto the river Yamuna amongst themselves, asserting that each of the Chieftains was the ruler of the people in his domain. 40. Mr. Thus, the Sikh Chiefs divided the newly won country upto the river Yamuna amongst themselves, asserting that each of the Chieftains was the ruler of the people in his domain. 40. Mr. Bagga further referred to the subsequent wars inter se amongst these Chieftains and eventually, due to the threat posed by Maharaja Ranjit Singh (from across the Satluj), between 1806 to 1808 (AD), these Chieftains sought protection from the British, which they were granted upon a treaty having been entered into between the British and Maharaja Ranjit Singh on 25.04.1809, limiting the boundary of the Kingdom of the Maharaja upto the Satluj (starting, as per history, from Kabul in Afghanistan, and also including Kashmir). Further elaborating on the history of the Cis-Satluj States, Mr. Bagga submitted that the British made persistent efforts to “enforce good Government” through the Political Agent stationed at Ambala (in 1839), and eventually, the entire Punjab having been annexed (in 1849), it was provided that the Chieftains of the Cis-Satluj area be reduced to the status of “mediatised rulers” who were granted Jagirs of three kinds, with the suit land being part of a Pattidari Jagir (the other two being “Large Estates” and Zaildari Jagirs). Mr. Bagga pointed to paragraphs 100 to 103 of the aforesaid Manual in this context. 41. Learned counsel further submitted that in the aforesaid background, the plaintiff had proved, vide Exs.P1 and P2, that his ancestors had Hissa-Kassi (share of the land under cultivation of its owner). He further submitted that the genealogical tree of the plaintiffs' family also having been proved and in any case that not being doubted, the learned Courts below had very correctly come to the conclusion that the suit land was indeed Jagir land governed by the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941 and as such, succession thereto would not be in terms of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, even though the latter Act had come into effect. 42. Mr. Bagga next submitted that other than being a Jagirdar, the plaintiffs' father, S. Bishan Singh, was also a Jat Sikh and that the defendant had admitted in paragraph 3 of her written statement, the status of S. Bishan Singh, both as a Jat Sikh and a Jagirdar. Learned counsel therefore submitted that other than the property being Jagir property, it was also ancestral property, the devolution of which would be governed by custom. 43. Learned counsel therefore submitted that other than the property being Jagir property, it was also ancestral property, the devolution of which would be governed by custom. 43. Thereafter, going on to the history of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, Mr. Bagga submitted that the Act came into effect on 27.02.1941 in which (as already seen), a Jagir has been defined to be either an assignment of land revenue, or a grant of money made by the Central or the State Government, or of any estate in land, created or affirmed by or on behalf of the Central or the State Government, or lastly, a cash grant. He next submitted that the State Government thereafter enacted the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1957, but as a Muafi was not included in the definition of a Jagir, either in the Act of 1941 or in the Act of 1957, the Punjab Resumption of Jagirs (Amendment) Act, 1961, was enacted, by Section 2 of which sub-clause (b) of clause (2) of the Act of 1957 was omitted. Sections 2 and 3 of the Act of 1957 read as follows:- “2. Definitions.-In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (1) "Jagir" means – (a) any assignment of land revenue [or remission thereof by way of muafi] made by or on behalf of the State Government ;or (b) any estate in land created or affirmed by or on behalf of the State Government carrying with it the right of collecting land revenue or receiving any portion of the land revenue; of (c) any grant of money made or continued by or on behalf of the State Government which purports to be or is expressed to be payable out of the land revenue; or (d) any grant of [money (not being payable out of the revenues of the Central Government)] including anything payable on the part of the State Government in respect of any right, privilege, perquisite or office; and [includes, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clause (ii), any such grant or assignment existing in favour of Cis-Sutlej Jagirdars or a Bedi or Sodhi pension or a Jagir pension (pension to destitute dependents of deceased Jagirdars) referred to in paragraph 1 of the Financial Commissioner’s Standing Order No. 7 [5]or a hereditary parvarish or pension in the second or any subsequent generation]. but does not include- (i) any grant of money (whether or not payable out of the land revenue) made on behalf of the State Government for the relief of political-sufferers or their dependents after the 15th August,1947 ; or (ii) any pension as defined on clause (17) of Article 366 of the Constitution of India ; or (iii) any military Jagir [granted on or after the fourth day of August, 1914]; or (iv) any grant made in favour of a religious or charitable institution, but does not include a grant made for such a purpose to an individual ; (2) "Jagirdar" means the holder of a jagir; (3) "Military Jagir" means a jagir granted, affirmed or continued in favour of any person as a reward for his personal service as a member of the Armed Forces of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order or for similar services of any one related to him by blood or marriage ; (4) "religious or charitable institution" means an institution of every religious or charitable denomination established and maintained for religious or charitable purposes or for the purpose of providing religious or educational instruction or for the relief the poor or for providing medical relief or the advancement of any other object of general utility to the public or any section of the public; (5) "State Government"- (a) as respects any period before the Ist November,1956, shall mean – (i) the Government of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union or any of the Indian States which formed in to the Patiala and East Punjab States Union on the 20th August, 1948; and (ii) the Government of the State of Punjab and all predecessor Governments thereof by whatever name called, the Governor-General or the Governor-General in Council, as the case may be, and the Sikh Rulers, but shall not include the Central Government as defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, after the period commencing on the 15th August, 1947 ; and] (b) as respects any period after the Ist November,1956, shall mean the Government of the State of Punjab.” xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx “3. Resumption of Jagirs.- Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law or usage, any grant, settlement, sanad or other instrument, or any decree or order of any Court or authority, all jagirs shall, on and from the commencement of this Act, be extinguished and stand resumed in the name of the State Government; Provided that a military jagir granted at any time before the 4th day of August, 1914, shall ensue for the life of the person who is a Jagirdar immediately before such commencement and shall stand extinguished and resumed on his death.]” Mr. Bagga submitted that, however, with clause (b) of Section 2 of the 1957 Act having been omitted from that Act by the amendment made in 1961, Section 3 of the Act of 1957 became inapplicable to an estate created or affirmed by or on behalf of the State Government, carrying with it the right of collecting land revenue, or receiving any portion thereof. Hence, as per learned counsel, the suit land being such an estate, was correctly held to be Jagir land, governed by the Act of 1941, such Jagir estate not having been resumed even by the Act of 1957. He further submitted that the late plaintiff (Rajinder Singh) and his father, Bishan Singh, both were Jagirdars in terms of Section 2(c) of the Act of 1941, which defines a Jagirdar to be the holder of any grant falling within the definition of a Jagir. In this context, Mr. Bagga cited a judgment of this Court in Karan Amol Singh v. Tikka Rattan Amol Singh 1965 CLJ 752 (DB), wherein, as per learned counsel, it was held that the Resumption Act of 1957, read with its amendment in 1969, did not apply to resumption of Jagir estates. 44. On the issue of this Court not interfering in second appeal with the factual finding that the suit land is ancestral Jagir property, learned counsel cited two judgments of this Court in Abdul Ghafoor Khan v. S.Amarsarjit Singh (RSA no.561/1946) and Shiv Ditta Mal v. Sardar Rajinder Singh and others (RSA no.1734/1939). Upon the effect of Circular no.60 dated 26.02.1857, Mr. Upon the effect of Circular no.60 dated 26.02.1857, Mr. Bagga yet again reiterated what has been held by the Supreme Court in para-11 of Satinder Singh v. Umrao Singh AIR 1961 SC 908 , to submit that proprietary rights pertaining to land forming part of a Jagir, held by a Jagirdar, would vest only in the holder of the Jagir. Hence, learned counsel submitted that once the plaintiff and his predecessors were held to be Jagirdars, then all proprietary rights in the suit land of village Rasulpur vested only in the plaintiff. 45. Further elaborating on the nature of a Jagir estate and on its inalienability by a Jagirdar, Mr. Bagga referred to clause (c) of paragraph 111 of the Punjab Land Administration Manual. The said paragraph reads as follows:- “111. Subsidiary rule sanctioned in 1852. As the enquiry proceeded it became evident that the three rules sanctioned in 1851 did not completely cover the ground and eight subsidiary rules proposed by Mr. Edmonton the Commissioner of the Cis-Sutlej States were sanctioned by the Board in 1852. These are reproduced in Appendix III to Barkley’s Directions for Settlements Officers. It is only necessary to quote four of them here:- (a) That a specific order of a Government even though opposed to the principles and rules now prescribed shall avail in favour of the party concerned and his lineal male heirs. (b) That the official and recorded declaration of the Political Agent as to the person in possession in 1808-09 shall be accepted without questions and succession continued accordingly. (c) That alienations by a Jagirdar or pattidar of portions of his holding whether to his relations or strangers shall neither be officially recognized nor officially recorded. (d) That one or more sons of a common ancestor in 1808-09 being entitled to the whole share possessed by such common ancestor shall be held and be declared responsible for the maintenance of widows left by deceased brothers who had they lived would have shared with such son or sons.” He submitted that the aforesaid issue had also been considered by the Supreme Court in Satinder Singhs' case (supra). He further submitted that as regards the suit land, inheritance on it never remained in abeyance and therefore on the death of the last male holder, the next incumbent is to succeed to the property of the deceased. He further submitted that as regards the suit land, inheritance on it never remained in abeyance and therefore on the death of the last male holder, the next incumbent is to succeed to the property of the deceased. In this context, he cited the judgment in Raja Rameshwar Rao and another v. Raja Govind Rao AIR 1961 SC 1442 , wherein it was held that in the case of a Jagir, which is a grant for life, even adverse possession cannot be claimed. 46. He also referred to paragraphs 164 and 165 of the Manual, further contending that such Jagir land has to be treated as a Government grant, governed by the Government Grants Act, 1895, Sections 2 and 3 of which read as follows:- 2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 , not to apply to Government grants.- Nothing in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882 ), contained shall apply or be deemed ever to have applied to any grant or other transfer of land or of any interest therein heretofore made or hereafter to be made by or on behalf of the Government] to, or in favour of, any person whomsoever; but every such grant and transfer shall be construed and take effect as if the said Act had not been passed. 3. Government grants to take effect according to their tenor.- All provisions, restrictions, conditions and limitations over contained in any such grant or transfer as aforesaid shall be valid and take effect according to their tenor, any rule of law, statute or enactment of the Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding.” In this context, Mr. Bagga cited a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ms. Hajee S.V.M. Mohamad Jamaludeen Bros. and Co. v. Govt. of T.N. AIR 1997 SC 1368 . Lastly, in the context of the post-independence laws also not applying to Jagir land, learned counsel again referred to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Karan Amol Singhs' case (supra). 47. Specifically on the non-applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Mr. Hajee S.V.M. Mohamad Jamaludeen Bros. and Co. v. Govt. of T.N. AIR 1997 SC 1368 . Lastly, in the context of the post-independence laws also not applying to Jagir land, learned counsel again referred to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Karan Amol Singhs' case (supra). 47. Specifically on the non-applicability of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Mr. Bagga referred to Section 5(2) of the said Act (reproduced earlier), to submit that the said Act by its own provision was made inapplicable to Jagir land, and read with Section 7 of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, Jagir land would devolve as per Section 7 of the latter Act, which reads as follows:- “Rule of descent in family of Jagirdar. 7. (1) Where Government has heretofore declared or at any time hereafter declares that any rule of descent in respect of succession to any Jagir shall prevail in the family of jagirdars, such rule of descent shall be deemed to prevail, and to have prevailed, from the time when the declaration was made, anything in any law or contract to the contrary notwithstanding: Provided that no such declaration shall hereafter be made unless and until- (a) Government is satisfied that the rule of descent to be so declared actually prevails in the family and has been, continuously and without breach, observed in all successions (if any) to the jagir since it was made; or (b) the Jagirdar or his successor in interest for the time being has, by written instrument duly executed by him, either before or after the passing of this Act, signified, on behalf of himself and his family, acceptance of the rule of descent to be so declared, and either no succession has taken place since such acceptance, or else in all succession which have taken place since such acceptance the jagir has in fact not developed otherwise than it would have devolved had the said rule of descent been in force. (2) Any declaration made under sub-section (1) may be amended, varied or rescinded by Government, but always subject to the proviso thereto.” 48. Next, addressing a new argument on the right of a Jagirdar to continue to occupy Jagir land, Mr. (2) Any declaration made under sub-section (1) may be amended, varied or rescinded by Government, but always subject to the proviso thereto.” 48. Next, addressing a new argument on the right of a Jagirdar to continue to occupy Jagir land, Mr. Bagga referred to Section 5 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, and specifically sub-clause (d) thereof, to submit that a Jagirdar is an occupancy tenant if he has been in continuous occupation of his land for not less than 20 years and he therefore in any case cannot be evicted from such land even under that Act. He also referred to Section 59 of the said Act. Both the provisions are reproduced herein under:- “5. Tenants having right of occupancy.-(1) A tenant- xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (d) who being jagirdar of the estate of any part of the estate in which the land occupied by him is situate, has continuously occupied the land for not less than twenty years, or, having been such jagirdar, occupied the land while he was jagirdar and has continuously, occupied it for not less than twenty years, has a right of occupancy in the land so occupied unless, in the case of a tenant belonging to the class specified in clause (c), the landlord proves that the tenant was settled on land previously cleared and brought under cultivation by, or at the expense of, the founder. xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx 59. Succession to right of occupancy-(1) When a tenant having a right of occupancy in any land dies, the right shall devolve- (a) on his male lineal descendants, if any, in the male line of descent; and (b) failing such descendants, on his widow if any until she dies or remarries or abandons the land or is under the provisions of this Act ejected there from; and [(c) failing such descendants and widow, or widowed mother, if any, until she dies or remarries or abandons the land or is under the provisions of this Act ejected there from]. [(d) failing such descendants and widow, or widowed mother or, if the deceased tenant left a widow or widowed mother then when her interest terminates under clause (b) or (c) of this sub-section, on his male collateral relatives in the male line of descent from the common ancestor of the deceased tenant and those relatives]. [(d) failing such descendants and widow, or widowed mother or, if the deceased tenant left a widow or widowed mother then when her interest terminates under clause (b) or (c) of this sub-section, on his male collateral relatives in the male line of descent from the common ancestor of the deceased tenant and those relatives]. Provided with respect to clause 3(d) of this sub-section, that the common ancestor occupied the land. [Explanation.-For the purpose of clause 5(d) land obtained in exchange by the deceased tenant or any of his predecessors-in-interest in pursuance of the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 58-A shall be deemed to have been occupied by the common ancestor if the land given for it in exchange was occupied by him]. (2) As among descendants and collateral relatives claiming under sub-section (1) the right shall, subject to the provisions of that sub-section devolve as if it were land left by the deceased in the village in which the land subject to the right is situate. (3) When the widow of a deceased tenant succeeds to a right of occupancy she shall not transfer the right by sale, gift or mortgage or by sub-lease for a term exceeding one year. (4) If the deceased tenant has left no such persons as are mentioned in subsection (1) on whom hiss right of occupancy may devolve under that subsection, the right shall be extinguished.” 49. Finally, addressing arguments on the question of limitation raised by Mr. Kulbhushan Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Bagga submitted that in a suit seeking possession on the basis of inheritance, no period of limitation is prescribed, as held by a Division Bench of this Court in Mohinder Singh v. Kashmira Singh AIR 1985 (P&H) 215 . He further submitted that in any case, with the father of the plaintiff having died on 07.06.1975 and the date that the suit was instituted on being 16.08.1977, 'terminus-quo' of limitation would be the date of death of the owner of the estate and not the date of alienation, such owner being a limited owner thereof. In this context, learned counsel again referred to the judgment in Abdul Ghafoors' case (supra). 50. On the aforesaid detailed arguments, Mr. Bagga submitted that these appeals deserve to be dismissed with costs throughout. 51. In this context, learned counsel again referred to the judgment in Abdul Ghafoors' case (supra). 50. On the aforesaid detailed arguments, Mr. Bagga submitted that these appeals deserve to be dismissed with costs throughout. 51. Having heard learned counsel for the parties in detail and having gone through the judgments of the learned Courts below, also having considered the questions of law involved, though the question on whether the suit seeking a declaration was filed within limitation or not, is the third question of law framed, however, that being a crucial question going to the foundation of the lis, it is being taken up first, the arguments having been addressed on that issue, essentially in respect of the suit seeking a declaration, i.e. Civil Suit No. 225 of 18.07.1977, from which RSA No. 2509 of 1985 eventually arises. Thus, that appeal is being taken up first for consideration on the basis of the arguments addressed. RSA no.2509 of 1985 52. On that issue, of limitation, though the contention of Mr. Bagga, to the effect that in a suit seeking possession on the basis of title, there is no limitation prescribed (unless the defendant in the suit pleads adverse possession), is obviously a correct argument on principle, in terms of Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, factually it is an inapplicable argument, no suit for possession having been filed by the respondent-plaintiff, his suit being one seeking a declaration to the effect that he be declared to be the owner in possession of the suit land, with the Courts below having recorded a finding of fact that he was actually in possession of that land and that too not as a tenant of the defendant. Hence, that argument of learned counsel is to be rejected, it being not relevant to the context, and thus wholly inapplicable. 53. Thus, what is to be first considered is the contention of Mr. Kulbhushan Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants-defendants (LRs of the original defendant), that it would be the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act, 1920 and not the Limitation Act of 1963, that would be applicable to the case. 53. Thus, what is to be first considered is the contention of Mr. Kulbhushan Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants-defendants (LRs of the original defendant), that it would be the Punjab Limitation (Customs) Act, 1920 and not the Limitation Act of 1963, that would be applicable to the case. Undoubtedly, if the provisions of the Act of 1920 are to apply, then as per Articles 1 and 2 of the Schedule to that Act (already reproduced hereinabove in paragraph 37), limitation to seek such annulment of alienation of ancestral immovable property would expire 6 years from the date of registration of the gift deed in favour of the defendant, which admittedly was registered on 29.10.1969. Hence, limitation to file a suit seeking annulment of that decree would run out on 29.08.1975 or at best on 29.10.1975. Thus, Civil Suit no.225 having been instituted on 18.07.1977, it was clearly barred by the aforesaid provisions of the Limitation Act of 1920. 54. Next, it is to be considered that if it is to be held that it is not the Punjab Act of 1920 but the Limitation Act, 1963, that is to apply to the case of the plaintiff, then suits relating to immovable property are otherwise specifically governed by Articles 61 to 67 of the Schedule to that Act. However, Articles 61 to 63 relate to suits filed for either possession of mortgaged immovable property or to recover collections/money pertaining to mortgage of such property, or to foreclosure of the mortgage. Articles 64 to 67 all pertain to suits seeking possession of immovable property, either on the basis of previous possession, or on the basis of a title or interest therein etc., but exclusively as regards possession of such property. Thus, it is not Articles 61 to 67 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, that govern limitation pertaining to suits seeking a declaration qua immovable property, but Articles 56 to 58 (i.e. Part III of the Schedule), that govern limitation in filing such suits, (seeking any kind of declaration). The said three articles stipulate that the period of limitation to file a suit seeking a declaration is three years, with Article 58 being a residuary article, and Articles 56 and 57 pertaining to suits seeking a declaration on an instrument being forged and with regard to an invalid adoption respectively. 55. The said three articles stipulate that the period of limitation to file a suit seeking a declaration is three years, with Article 58 being a residuary article, and Articles 56 and 57 pertaining to suits seeking a declaration on an instrument being forged and with regard to an invalid adoption respectively. 55. Articles 59 and 60, falling within Part IV of the said Schedule, pertain to limitation in respect of suits relating to decrees and instruments, with Article 60 applying to transfer of a property by the guardian of a ward. Article 59 provides for a limitation of three years where a suit has been filed seeking cancellation or setting aside of an instrument or a decree or for rescinsion of a contract, with such period of three years beginning to run from the day the plaintiff first obtained knowledge of the instrument/decree/contract that he seeks to have cancelled or rescinded. 56. In the present case, it is to be noticed that it is not a finding of the Courts below, nor has it been pointed out in any manner by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, that it was the stand of the plaintiff that he gained knowledge of the instrument, i.e. the gift deed dated 29.10.1969, only within three years prior to the institution of the suit. In fact, learned counsel for the appellants pointed to the fact that in paragraphs 5 and 8 of the plaint (seemingly the amended copy), the plaintiff had specifically stated that cause of action first arose to him on 29.10.1969 and finally “a few days back”. Nothing is stated to the effect that he had gained knowledge of the gift deed only a few days earlier. 57. Consequently, even if it is not gone into as to whether it is the provisions of the Limitation Act of 1920 or of the Act of 1963 that are to prevail, in either case, the suit seeking a declaration of title, (possession of the suit land already being with the plaintiff), having been filed seven years and about 8 months after the gift deed dated 29.10.1969 was executed, the suit itself was filed beyond limitation and hence, the Courts below wholly erred in holding that it having been filed within 12 years of alienation of the land and within three years of the death of the alienor, it was within limitation. 58. 58. Having held so, it would still be appropriate to deal with the issue of whether it would be the 1920 Act or the 1963 Limitation Act, that would hold the field. Though, no doubt, Section 5 of the Act of 1920 (already reproduced in para 37 of this judgment), refers to Sections 4 to 25 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, with the Act of 1908 not specifically repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963, however, Section 30 of the 1963 Act provides a maximum period of 7 years of limitation, after its commencement, or the period provided in the Act of 1908, whichever period expired earlier, as the period of limitation for instituting a suit on the subject concerned. Hence, looked at in terms thereof, the Schedule to the Act of 1920 being subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 25 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, it is again seen that Articles 1 and 2 of the said Schedule providing a period of 6 years for instituting a suit seeking annulment of an instrument alienating ancestral land, and the suit land in the present case being held by this Court to be ancestral land, as would be seen further, the period of limitation governing the suit under the Act of 1920 would have expired 6 years from the date of enactment of the Act of 1963, i.e. on 04.10.1969, with the instrument in question itself having been registered on 29.10.1969, as already held hereinabove. Further, seven years after the enactment of the Limitation Act of 1963 having expired on 04.10.1970, it would not be the provisions of the 1908 Act, and by extension the Act of 1920, that would govern the filing of the suit in the present lis, even as regards ancestral property, and in fact it would be the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, that would apply, by which limitation in this case ran out on 29.10.1972, i.e. three years after the date of execution and registration of the gift deed dated 29.10.1969. 59. 59. That apart, it already having been seen that even as per the 1920 Act, in any case, limitation to institute a suit seeking annulment of an instrument of alienation of ancestral property, ran out in 1975 and the suit seeking a declaration in the present case having been instituted in July 1977, it was therefore instituted beyond limitation, both, in terms of Articles 1 and 2 of the Schedule to the 1920 Act, as also well beyond the limitation stipulated in Articles 58 and 59 of the Schedule to the 1963 Act, with Article 65 of that Act not having any application, the suit being one only seeking a declaration and not possession based on title, such possession already being with the plaintiff as has been discussed. Undoubtedly, in Abdul Ghafoors' case (supra) it has been held that the terminus quo of limitation of such cases, where the holder for the time being is a limited owner, is the date of death of the owner and not the date of alienation. However, that judgment, dated 28.09.1948, obviously came at a time when the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was in operation. No provision in the Limitation Act, 1963, is seen, by which limitation even in the case of a limited owner of an estate, would start running, for filing a declaratory suit seeking annulment of a deed, from the date of the death of such limited owner. Hence, the ratio of the said judgment would not be applicable to the present case, in my opinion. 60. Consequently, the 3rd question of law is answered to the above effect and the suit seeking a declaration, filed by the plaintiff (now represented by his LRs), i.e. Civil Suit no.225/18.07.1977, is held to have been instituted beyond limitation. 61. Now, though having held the declaratory suit to have been filed beyond limitation, the other issues involved in RSA no.2509 of 1985 need not actually be gone into; yet, the appeal having remained pending in this Court for the past 22 years, it is obviously necessary, and required, to adjudicate upon the other issues that have been framed as questions of law in these appeals. It needs to be stated that as regards the question of the suit land being a Cis-Satluj Jagir, i.e. the first question of law framed in paragraph 31 of this judgment, the findings of the Courts below, in the opinion of this Court, need to be reversed simply on the short ground that the plaintiff not having refuted and having accepted alienation of Jagir land by his father, to his other two sisters, but he (plaintiff) having challenged upto this Court, only the gift deed executed in favour of the 3rd sister, i.e. the defendant in the present two suits (the late Angrej Kaur), the status of the land being Jagir land, ceased the moment the plaintiff accepted the transfer, by his father, to the other two sisters, i.e. Bachan Kaur and Balwant Kaur. The issue with regard to the plaintiff being estopped from the instituting the suit against the defendant, i.e. only one of his 3 sisters to whom erstwhile 'Jagir' land was transferred, would also be an issue that should have been decided against him (plaintiff) for the same reason, in the opinion of this Court. (In paragraph 3 of the judgment of the learned 1st appellate Court, one of the sisters has been referred to as Bachan Kaur, but in paragraph 13, while discussing the testimony of DW1, she has been referred to as Gurbachan Kaur). It is to be noticed that as per the judgment of the learned 1st appellate Court, the plaintiff had deposed that he had not purchased the land gifted by his father to Bachan Kaur, but had filed a suit against her for “disposal of the said land”. The 1st appellate Court has referred to Ex.D1 as one of the gift deeds by the father of the plaintiff and the defendant, to which the plaintiff is stated to be an attesting witness. Nothing has been pointed out to this Court to show that the plaintiff actually was or was not such an attesting witness. The 1st appellate Court has referred to Ex.D1 as one of the gift deeds by the father of the plaintiff and the defendant, to which the plaintiff is stated to be an attesting witness. Nothing has been pointed out to this Court to show that the plaintiff actually was or was not such an attesting witness. However, undoubtedly, he is seen to have challenged the transfer to his sister Bachan Kaur, because though learned counsel for the parties have not referred to the details of such transfer, however, Ex.D2 has been pointed to from the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, disposing of two first appeals on 25.01.1980, (C.A. no.153/13 of 1979 and C.A. no.26/13 of 1979), the second of which was an appeal by Bachan Kaur versus the plaintiff in the present lis, i.e. Rajinder Singh (her brother). 62. A perusal of the said judgment became necessary even in this second appeal, as the plaintiffs' acceptance/non-acceptance of the transfer of the Jagir land in favour of his sisters, was an essential fact to be looked into, to determine the question of whether the land remained Jagir land or not. Thus, a perusal of the aforesaid judgment dated 25.01.1980 (Ex.D2 in the present lis), shows that a first appeal was filed by one Nathu Ram, who was a defendant in a suit filed by the plaintiff, challenging the alienation of land in his favour by the plaintiffs' father, Bishan Singh. Bachan Kaurs' case is shown, in the said judgment, to be on similar footing. Both the appeals were allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, Ambala, holding that the land was not Jagir land (as is discussed in the judgments of the Courts below in the present lis), further observing that the transfer of land was actually made in order to save Bishan Singhs' land from coming within the purview of surplus land proceedings. 63. Hence, what cannot be denied is that plaintiff Rajinder Singh accepted that judgment as final, as nothing has been shown to this Court that he challenged the judgment in his sister Bachan Kaurs' favour, by way of filing of any second appeal before this Court. 63. Hence, what cannot be denied is that plaintiff Rajinder Singh accepted that judgment as final, as nothing has been shown to this Court that he challenged the judgment in his sister Bachan Kaurs' favour, by way of filing of any second appeal before this Court. Therefore, he having accepted the transfer by his father in Bachan Kaurs' favour, he cannot be allowed to, in the opinion of this Court, agitate by way of another suit, that the transfer by his father to a 3rd sister, i.e. defendant Angrej Kaur (mother of the present appellants), was impermissible on the ground that the land was Jagir land. This would be especially so as the fact that land was transferred to the 3rd sister, Balwant Kaur, also, as was stated in the written statement filed by the defendant, has not factually been denied even before this Court. Yet further, land having been transferred to the aforesaid Nathu Ram also, by the plaintiffs' father, Bishan Singh, and the judgment in appeal in Nathu Rams' favour again not having been challenged by the plaintiff by way of a second appeal to this Court, he obviously accepted that transfer also. 64. Consequently, the plaintiff having accepted transfers of Jagir land (even if it is to be accepted as Jagir land prior to the transfers), to his other sisters and to Nathu Ram, as also 50 acres to “Mohammadans of village Daulatpur”, 8 acres to one Master Ganga Ram and 15 acres to some other persons, as pointed out from the plaint itself by learned counsel for the plaintiff, with such transfer not specifically refuted, though generally denied, it is not possible to hold that the suit land retained its 'Jagirdari character', so as to annul the gift deed only in favour of one sister of the plaintiff, by their father. It needs to be noticed here that as again pointed out by learned counsel for the appellants, in reply to paragraph 2 (b) of the written statement, in the replication filed by the plaintiff, he stated as follows:- “The plaintiff has challenged some of the transfer and is challenging the other illegal transfers as his right to challenge still subsists and so the principle of estopple is not applicable at all.” Hence, with all the transfers by his father not having been challenged by the plaintiff, right till the time of filing of the replication in 1978, i.e. about three years after his fathers' death, and, to repeat, the transfer to at least one sister, i.e. Balwant Kaur, and the transfer of land to the plaintiff himself by his father not having been specifically denied with such transfer referred to specifically in the written statement, it is not possible to hold that the suit land remained Jagir land any longer. 65. Naturally, it has to be noticed that the transfers in favour of Ganga Ram and the other persons in village Daulatpur, not having been led by way of documentary evidence, only the pleadings of the parties have been referred to before this Court to show that such transfers were actually made, along-with what is seen from the testimonies of the witnesses, discussed in the judgment of the learned lower appellate Court; yet however, firstly with the said transfers not specifically denied, including transfer of 10 acres stated to have been made by the plaintiff himself, and moreover, the transfers of land to Nathu Ram and one sister of the plaintiff, i.e. Bachan Kaur, having been accepted by the plaintiff without further challenge to the judgment in favour of Nathu Ram and Bachan Kaur, the said land not otherwise denied to be also Jagir land in the hands of the father of the plaintiff, this Court is of the opinion that the nature of the land stood wholly changed after such transfers, with it not retaining its character of being a Cis-Satluj Jagir any longer. Further, the plaintiff was also estopped from instituting the declaratory suit against the defendant, she being only one of the three sisters to whom erstwhile Jagir land was transferred by their father, such transfer not having been denied by the plaintiff at all in the case of the 3rd sister Balwant Kaur and she not having further challenged the judgment in favour of the 2nd sister, i.e. Bant Kaur, after the judgment in her favour by the 1st appellate Court in that lis (between her and the plaintiff). Thus, the 4th question of law framed in these appeals is answered to the effect that the Courts below wrongly decided issue no.7 on estoppel and consequently, the findings of the Courts below on that issue are reversed and the question of law is answered in favour of the appellants herein, holding that the respondent-plaintiff was estopped from instituting a declaratory suit against only one sister, he not having challenged the alienation made in favour of other two sisters, and other persons and yet further, he having not denied the alienation of land made by himself also, to the extent of 10 acres, all such land being Jagir land. 66. Next, whether or not the suit land actually remained a Cis-Satluj Jagir after 1950, is also, in the opinion of this Court, highly doubtful, in view of the fact that Section 2 (b)(iv) of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, describes a Jagir to be an estate in land created or affirmed by or on behalf of the Central or the State Government, carrying with it the right of collecting land revenue or “receiving any portion of the land revenue.” Undoubtedly, as was not seriously contested even by the defendant-appellants at any stage, the land initially was a Cis-Satluj Jagir, with the original Jagirdars (Gulab Singh and Ladha Singh), and their descendants at least upto the days of British Raj, continuing to collect at least some portion of the land revenue. That was found to be a matter of fact by the learned Courts below. However, with the actual collection of land revenue not proved at any time after 1950, i.e. after India gained the status of a republic, in the opinion of this Court the land actually ceased to be Jagir land at that very time itself. That was found to be a matter of fact by the learned Courts below. However, with the actual collection of land revenue not proved at any time after 1950, i.e. after India gained the status of a republic, in the opinion of this Court the land actually ceased to be Jagir land at that very time itself. Simply because it had been declared to be a Cis-Satluj Jagir, with the Jagirdars held to be “mediatised rulers” by the British and the method of succession having been clarified in the letter dated 26.02.1857 (Mark-A placed on record as such before the trial Court by the plaintiff), it would not continue to be a Jagir in perpetuity, once the right to collect land revenue had ceased, with in fact no land revenue after 1950 at least having been shown to have been collected by the plaintiff or his father, from any person of village Rasulpur, where the suit land is situate. It may be stated here that the argument of Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants, that the letter dated 26.02.1857 could not have been taken into consideration by the Courts below, it only being a marked document and not a duly exhibited one, is an argument which is not really sustainable, inasmuch as, the document itself has been referred to even in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singhs' case (supra) and therefore, even if it is not to be considered as a document on record, it would eventually make no difference This is further for the reason that it is a document mainly pertaining to the method of devolution of Jagir land, which is an issue also dealt with in the Punjab Land Administration Manual. The history of Cis- Satluj Jagirs, in any case not being in doubt, the manner of devolution of such land is also not found to be entirely dependent on the said document and hence, that argument need not be looked into further, it in any case not affecting the outcome of this appeal, where the primary question is whether the suit land remained Jagir land in the hands of the plaintiff or not. 67. 67. Coming back to the issue of non-collection of revenue, it needs to be stated here that the learned Sub Judge, Ist Class, in paragraph 11 of his judgment, has stated that Ex.P6 is a jamabandi (record of rights) for the year 1975-76, but it has not been specifically stated anywhere that the said jamabandi actually showed any collection of land revenue by the respondent-plaintiff or his father Sardar Bishan Singh, so as to hold that the land continued to be Jagir land even at that stage. Further, it is to be noticed that though in paragraph 11 the said document (Ex.P6) has been shown to be a jamabandi, however, in paragraph 19 thereafter, it is shown to be a Khatauni Paimaish. Thus, it is to be again repeated that there is no finding at all shown from the judgments of the Courts below, or even from the record, by the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, that either Bishan Singh or respondent-plaintiff Rajinder Singh, continued to receive land revenue or any part thereof, qua the suit land, at any time after the year 1950. Therefore, though a question of fact would not be gone into by this Court in a second appeal, however, there actually being no recording of fact brought to the notice of this Court, that land revenue was collected by the plaintiff and his fore-fathers at any time after 1950 right till the institution of the suit, the suit land being held, by the Courts below, as Jagir land in terms of the Act of 1941, is a wholly incorrect finding in the opinion of this Court. It also needs to be stated in this context that as a matter of fact, Exs. P5 and P6 have not been pointed to at all from the record by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff and are actually seen to be missing from the record. Consequently, the argument of Mr. It also needs to be stated in this context that as a matter of fact, Exs. P5 and P6 have not been pointed to at all from the record by learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff and are actually seen to be missing from the record. Consequently, the argument of Mr. Bagga, learned counsel for the respondents herein, to the effect that a finding of fact on the suit land being Jagir land, would not be gone into by this Court in second appeal, is a misplaced argument, inasmuch as, whether or not the land was or remains to be Jagir land is not wholly a question of fact but actually a question of law to be seen in the light of the facts recorded by the Courts below, such facts being derived from the evidence before that Court, including documentary evidence, showing that the basic ingredients of it being Jagir land, as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act of 1941, were fulfilled (as a matter of fact). Such recording not having been brought to the notice of this Court, either from the judgments of the Courts below or from the record of evidence before those Courts, it cannot be said that revenue was actually collected by the successive generations as came to inherit what was earlier undoubtedly Jagir land in the hands of their ancestors. 68. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singhs' case (supra), undoubtedly, as regards devolution of Jagir land, it has been held that such land vested in the holder of the Jagir only as a limited owner, with no right in him to alienate such land, the implication being that thereafter it would pass to his male heirs. It was, in fact, in that context that the circular dated February 26, 1857 was referred to by their Lordships, but in the context of that case, the issue of non-collection of land revenue or any part of it, after independence or after 1950, is not shown to be an issue raised in that lis. Therefore, reliance on the said judgment in that context by Mr. Bagga, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, is wholly misplaced in the opinion of this Court. Therefore, reliance on the said judgment in that context by Mr. Bagga, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff, is wholly misplaced in the opinion of this Court. The same would also hold good as regards the judgments of the Division Benches of this Court in Abdul Ghafoor Khans' and Karan Amol Singhs' cases (supra), where again the focus was on devolution of Jagir land and not on whether or not land revenue was paid or realised after independence, or after 1950. 69. Hence, it is held that the suit land in the present lis did not retain its character of being Jagir land, not only due to the acceptance by the plaintiff of transfer of other erstwhile Jagir land, by his father to his other two sisters, and to other people, but also because it was not shown that after 1950, i.e. upon India becoming a republic, the plaintiff, his father or grand-father, ever collected land revenue, as was necessary for the suit land to fall within the purview of the definition of Jagir land, as contained in Section 2(b) (iv) of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941. 70. It is also to be observed here that though no surplus land proceedings had been brought to the notice of this Court, qua the Jagir held by the plaintiffs' father in village Rasulpur, such surplus land proceedings have been referred to in the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Ambala, in the first appeal filed by the plaintiffs' other sister, Bachan Kaur. However, nothing further is being said in that context, no specific arguments on what land was exempt from the purview of the surplus land proceedings, having been addressed by either side. The observation hereinabove has been made only in view of the fact that obviously the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, did not seem to have affected surplus land proceedings, due to which the plaintiffs' father possibly transferred land to the names of various persons, as held by the Additional District Judge in the plaintiffs' sister, Bachan Kaurs' appeal, which judgment became final, as already discussed. However, it is again clarified that the suit land having lost its character of being Jagir land, is not being held to be so by this Court in the context of the surplus land proceedings, under any of the relevant statutes governing such proceedings. 71. As regards the reliance, though briefly, by Mr. However, it is again clarified that the suit land having lost its character of being Jagir land, is not being held to be so by this Court in the context of the surplus land proceedings, under any of the relevant statutes governing such proceedings. 71. As regards the reliance, though briefly, by Mr. Bagga, on Section 5(ii) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it has to be held that the said provision does not apply to the suit land because even though the fore-fathers of the plaintiff and defendant were Jagirdars, they were not Rulers of an “Indian State”, who had entered into a covenant or agreement with the Government of India. As regards the second part of clause (ii) of Section 5 of the Act of 1956, which was relied upon by Mr. Bagga, to submit that in view of the fact that the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, existed prior to 1956, Section 5(ii) would apply to the suit land also, the said contention is also unfounded, because the said clause refers to an estate descending to a single heir, either by the terms of a covenant or an agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State with the Government of India, or by the terms of an enactment passed before the 1956 Act. Undoubtedly, even as admitted by the plaintiff in his own testimony, as discussed in para 12 of the judgment of the learned 1st appellate Court, the suit land did not devolve, across different generations, upon a single male heir but on all male heirs of the Jagirdar. Even in the case of his father, Bishan Singh, he inherited his share of the land from his father Udham Singh, along-with his (Bishan Singhs') brother Maha Singh, in equal share, with Maha Singhs' sons further having inherited their own shares of land from their father. Thus, obviously the suit land and the larger holding in the hands of the original Jagirdars did not devolve by the law of primogeniture, as in the case of the big Indian States such as Bikaner, Patiala and Jodhpur etc., but continued to devolve upon all male heirs of the reduced Jagirs in the hands of each successive generation. 72. Thus, obviously the suit land and the larger holding in the hands of the original Jagirdars did not devolve by the law of primogeniture, as in the case of the big Indian States such as Bikaner, Patiala and Jodhpur etc., but continued to devolve upon all male heirs of the reduced Jagirs in the hands of each successive generation. 72. It also needs to be noticed that, in the opinion of this Court, clause (ii) of Section 5 of the Hindu Succession Act, cannot be interpreted to read that the Act shall not apply to any estate which is governed by the terms of any enactment passed before the commencement of the Act. This would be obvious from the fact that there is neither any comma after the word “descends” nor after the phrase “Government of India”, so as to suggest that the phrase after the word “or” in clause (ii), would read to mean so. The provisions reads as follows:- “This Act shall not apply to- xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx (ii) any estate which descends to a single heir by the terms of any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State with the Government of India or by the terms of any enactment passed before the commencement of this Act;” If there had been a comma after the word “descends” and/or after the phrase “Government of India”, it could have been read to mean as Mr. Bagga has contended; however, the entire clause being a single sentence without any punctuation in it, it has to be read to mean that the Act would not apply to any estate which descends to a single heir, either by the terms of any covenant or an agreement entered into by the Ruler with the Government, or to such single heir by the terms of any enactment passed before the Succession Act, 1956. 73. 73. This is other than the fact that even if, by some stretched interpretation, it were to be read with a comma after the word “descends”, and/or after the word “India”, to mean that all estates governed by the terms of any enactment passed before the 1956 Act are not to be governed by the said Act, it would make no difference to the conclusion to be drawn in these appeals, this Court in any case having already held that the suit land having ceased to be Jagir land, both on account of non-collection of land revenue after 1950 and on account of the plaintiff himself having finally acquiesced to the transfer of land by his father to his other sisters and in fact, to other persons, he could not file the present suit only to challenge such transfer to a 3rd sister. 74. Consequently, the first question of law, as to whether the Courts below have correctly held the suit property to be a Cis-Satluj Jagir, to be governed by the provisions of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, is answered to the effect that the Courts below wholly erred in doing so, on account of the aforesaid two reasons, i.e. firstly, no land revenue is shown to have been collected by the plaintiff or his father, after 1950, so as to bring the suit land within the purview of the definition of Jagir land in terms of Section 2(b) of the said Act of 1941; and secondly, because once the plaintiff had accepted the transfer of land by his father to his other two sisters, as also to other persons, including Nathu Ram in whose favour the appeal became final in the lis initiated by the plaintiff against Nathu Ram and against his sister Bachan Kaur, with no further challenge thereto by the plaintiff, he would be estopped from raising the same plea against another sister, as he cannot accept his fathers' land to be Jagir land only piecemeal. (That is to say, by accepting it as non-Jagir land in the case of Bachan Kaur, by not further challenging the findings in the first appeal in her favour and on the other hand, challenging the transfer to another sister of some other land also contended to be a Jagir land). (That is to say, by accepting it as non-Jagir land in the case of Bachan Kaur, by not further challenging the findings in the first appeal in her favour and on the other hand, challenging the transfer to another sister of some other land also contended to be a Jagir land). This is other than the fact that it could not be specifically denied that the plaintiff himself is also stated to have transferred 10 acres of land to other persons, thereby violating the basic principles of a Jagirdar being only a holder of the estate by way of a life interest. Hence, devolution of the suit land would not be governed by the provisions of the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941. 75. Coming to the last argument of Mr. Bagga, on the plaintiff being entitled to continue to occupy Jagir land in terms of Section 5 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, that argument is to be rejected in view of the fact that as per Section 5 (1)(d) of the aforesaid Act (reproduced in paragraph 48 of this judgment), such tenancy is only in respect of a Jagirdar, obviously occupying Jagir land. Hence, the suit land having been held not to be Jagir land in the hands of the plaintiff for the reasons already given many times heretofore, the said provision has no application. This is other than the fact that this was never a plea shown to be taken at any time before this second appeal. 76. Having already held for the reasons given hereinabove, that the suit land is not Jagir land, what is being stated in this paragraph, is not otherwise necessary to be stated but the need to observe so was considered essential by this Court, even though it would not otherwise have a bearing on the outcome of these appeals. In the opinion of this Court, the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, as it carves out an exception in favour of big landlords, contrary to the scheme of the Hindu Succession Act, should not prevail over the said Act, even though it is a pre-constitutional Act. In the opinion of this Court, the Punjab Jagirs Act, 1941, as it carves out an exception in favour of big landlords, contrary to the scheme of the Hindu Succession Act, should not prevail over the said Act, even though it is a pre-constitutional Act. However, since the Act was under consideration of the Supreme Court in Satinder Singhs' case (supra), without any comment on its unconstitutionality having been made by their Lordships, this Court would, naturally, refrain from making any such comment or holding to that effect, especially as the constitutionality of the Act is not under challenge in any proceedings. Thus, the effect of Article 372 of the Constitution, is also not an issue that needs to be gone into in these appeals, it having been held that the suit land is no longer Jagir land, for other reasons. 77. Having held that the suit land no longer remains Jagir land protected by the relevant provisions of the Act of 1941, and is also not protected by the provisions of Section 5 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the next question is as to whether it would still be the ancestral land. As a matter of fact, the ancestral nature of the land has never been denied even by the appellants or their predecessor-in-interest, i.e. their mother, defendant Angrej Kaur, the genealogical table and the manner of succession from one generation to the other, through male heirs, never ever having been successfully refuted. In fact, even the defendants' witnesses, as seen from the judgment of the learned Courts below, could not deny that the land had actually devolved upon the father of the parties, i.e. Sardar Bishan Singh, through the male line of descendants, starting from Ladha Singh to Mano Singh, except in the case of, as already seen, the two ladies who inherited the suit land for the period of their life times, i.e. Smt. Mehtab Kaur wife of Amir Singh and Smt. Gurdial Kaur widow of Butta Singh. Thus, they only had a life interest which would not change the ancestral nature of the land, it having thereafter also devolved wholly through the male line of descendants, across generations, right upto Sardar Bishan Singh. To that limited extent, I agree with the judgments of the learned Courts below, only because after that point of time, the devolution was again through the male line. 78. To that limited extent, I agree with the judgments of the learned Courts below, only because after that point of time, the devolution was again through the male line. 78. It needs also to be noticed here that Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, would have no application to the suit property, in view of the fact that a specific finding of fact has been recorded by the Courts below, not shown to be perverse in any manner by the appellants, that it was actually the respondent-plaintiff who was in possession of the suit property and not the mother of the appellants, or the appellants themselves. In fact, it was specifically recorded that the respondent-plaintiff had never actually been shown to have paid rent to the defendant or her successors-in-interest. Therefore, the defendants' contention that the plaintiff was in possession as a tenant, was a contention wholly devoid of any legality. 79. That being so, the suit property being ancestral property, but with the father of the parties, Bishan Singh having gifted the suit land away, to the extent of 39 kanals and 4 marlas of such ancestral land, to his 3rd daughter, i.e. defendant Angrej Kaur, such gift would only have been valid to the extent of Bishan Singhs' own share in the ancestral land, in terms of the Explanation to Section 30 of the Act of 1956. Sections 30 is reproduced herein under:- 30 Testamentary succession.—[***] Any Hindu may dispose of by will or other testamentary disposition any property, which is capable of being so [disposed of by him or by her], in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), or any other law for the time being in force and applicable to Hindus. Explanation.—The interest of a male Hindu in a Mitakshara coparcenary property or the interest of a member of a tarwad, tavazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru in the property of the tarwad, tavazhi, illom, kutumba or kavaru shall notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be property capable of being disposed of by him or by her within the meaning of this [section.] Hence, upon it being determined as to what was the extent of the share of Bishan Singh and respondent-plaintiff Rajinder Singh in the ancestral property held by Bishan Singh during his life time, the appellants would have been entitled to only that much of the suit property as may have been determined in appropriate proceedings to be held as Bishan Singhs' own share in his ancestral property, had it not been for the fact that this Court has held hereinabove that the suit seeking a declaration of ownership, filed by the plaintiff, i.e. Civil Suit no.225/18.07.1977, was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for filing such a suit. 80. Consequently, as regards the 2nd question of law, it is answered to the effect that the Courts below correctly held the suit land to be ancestral land but as regards the appellants' right to such land, in terms of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, it would have been governed by Section 30 thereof, upon it being determined as to the extent of the share of Bishan Singh in his ancestral land, vis-a-vis the share of the respondent-plaintiff, Rajinder Singh. However, on account of the law of limitation, that relief too cannot be granted to the respondents herein. 81. Resultantly, RSA no.2509 of 1985, eventually arising out of Civil Suit no. 225/18.07.1977 is to be allowed. RSA No.2507 of 1985 82. Coming then to this appeal, arising eventually from the 2nd suit seeking permanent injunction, restraining the defendant (now represented by her LRs), from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff, the question would now be limited, qua that relief, to the effect of the plaintiffs' suit for declaration having been dismissed by this Court. RSA No.2507 of 1985 82. Coming then to this appeal, arising eventually from the 2nd suit seeking permanent injunction, restraining the defendant (now represented by her LRs), from interfering in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff, the question would now be limited, qua that relief, to the effect of the plaintiffs' suit for declaration having been dismissed by this Court. Therefore, at best, the decree of permanent injunction issued by the learned Courts below, would continue to apply only to the extent that the respondent-plaintiff and his successors-in-interest, would not be dispossessed, except in due course of law; however, on account of the plaintiff not being entitled to a declaration of ownership qua the suit land, the appellants would now be entitled to take possession of the suit land, by due process of law. 83. In view of the detailed discussion herein afore, in conclusion, though it has been held that the suit property is ancestral property, with Bishan Singh entitled to will away only his own share in it, yet, with the declaratory suit itself having been held to have been filed beyond limitation, the respondent-plaintiff cannot take even that benefit, as the gift deed made by his father to his sister, i.e. defendant Angrej Kaur, dated 29.10.1969, was an instrument which cannot be declared to be null and void even to a limited extent, (the suit seeking such declaration of nullity being a suit barred by limitation). RSA no.2507 of 1985 is therefore to be partly allowed. 84. In conclusion, as a result of what has been held in this judgment, RSA no.2509 of 1985 is allowed, with the judgments and decrees of both the Courts below set aside. The suit of the plaintiff, seeking a declaration of title, i.e. Civil Suit no.225/18.07.1977, is hereby dismissed. RSA no.2507 of 1985 is partly allowed, to the extent that the judgments and the decrees of the Courts below are modified to the effect that the appellants are injuncted from entering the suit land except by due process of law. Thus Civil Suit no.613/16.08.1977 is partly decreed to that extent only. Both the parties are left to bear their own costs through out. Decree- sheets be prepared accordingly. 85. The assistance rendered by both learned counsel in this old matter is highly appreciated, especially on the history of Cis-Satluj Jagirs, as gone into in detail by Mr. Thus Civil Suit no.613/16.08.1977 is partly decreed to that extent only. Both the parties are left to bear their own costs through out. Decree- sheets be prepared accordingly. 85. The assistance rendered by both learned counsel in this old matter is highly appreciated, especially on the history of Cis-Satluj Jagirs, as gone into in detail by Mr. Bagga, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff.