JUDGMENT Chandrashekhar, J. - Aggrieved of order dated 11.8.2016 passed in Money Suit No. 9 of 2009 whereby an application for amendment in the plaint filed on 20.7.2015 when the suit was fixed for arguments, has been allowed, the petitioner-M/s. Toll (India) Logistics Pvt. Ltd. has approached this Court. 2. Money Suit No. 9 of 2009 was instituted by M/s. K.U. Auto Engineering Pvt. Ltd. for a decree of compensation for Rs. 5,95,87,250/- towards the cost of rebuilding the demised premises together with interest on the said amount till it is fully paid to the plaintiff. Another prayer was for payment of rental loss to the plaintiff from February, 2009 when the premises were abandoned by the defendants. The plaintiff has pleaded that in March, 2001, after a negotiation, 1,00,962 square feet vacant land alongwith infrastructural facilities bounded by pucca boundary wall from all sides belonging to the plaintiff-company was handed over to defendant No. 1 company on lease. The lease was for a period of 8 years and 5 months, commencing from 1st day of April, 2001 and the monthly rental fixed was Rs. 5,40,078/- per month. The plaintiff has further pleaded that on inspection from time to time, hazardous and packaging materials were found stored inside the demised premises, where upon he requested the officers and other staffs of defendant No. 1 not to store such materials in the premises. On 16.3.2008 a fire broke out in the demised premises, however, the fire brigades were promptly pressed into service which controlled the loss and damage to the person and properties, however, the defendants did not still become alert. In the mid-night of 3.4.2008, again a fire broke out within the demised premises which spread all over the building, on account of which the demised premises were completely damaged and now require rebuilding after demolishing the existing damaged structure. The defendants contested the suit denying the claim of damages on the ground that it was within knowledge of the plaintiff that for running a logistic centre in the demised property, the defendants were required to store goods and packaging materials. It was denied that any combustible and inflammable material like Mobil and grease were stored in the demised premises. The incident dated 3.4.2008 was attributed to short-circuit in the electric lines. It was denied that any combustible and inflammable material like Mobil and grease were stored in the demised premises. The incident dated 3.4.2008 was attributed to short-circuit in the electric lines. After the parties led their evidence in the suit and when it was posted for final arguments, an application dated 20.7.2015 was filed by the plaintiff for amendment in the plaint. 3. Mr. Vishal Kumar Tiwary, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order dated 11.8.2016 has been passed in ignorance of statutory limitation under proviso to Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. After the trial in a suit has commenced, amendment in the pleadings shall not be allowed unless, the party seeking amendment satisfies the Court that inspite of due diligence the matter could not have been pleaded. Supporting the order impugned, Mr. Jitesh Kumar, the learned counsel for the respondent submits that the trial Judge has recorded a finding that the proposed amendment would not change the nature of the suit and it was allowed by imposing cost of Rs. 1,000/- upon the plaintiffs, which the defendants have readily accepted and while so, they now cannot turn around and challenge order dated 11.8.2016. 4. Proviso to Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. is mandatory. It puts a statutory limitation on the powers of the Court under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. However, it is by now well-settled that amendment in the pleadings can be allowed at any stage of the trial, more precisely even at the stage of arguments. The test is, whether the proposed amendment would change the nature of the suit and it would cause prejudice to the other party. Another statutory limitation under proviso to Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. is that, whether the party seeking amendment in the pleadings has exercised due diligence and the Court is satisfied that inspite of due diligence the matter could not have been pleaded before. In North Eastern Railway Admn. vs. Bhagwan Das, (2008) 8 SCC 511 , the Hon''ble Supreme Court observed as under: "16. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. Insofar as the principles which govern the question of granting or disallowing amendments under Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. (as it stood at the relevant time) are concerned, these are also well settled. Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of the proceedings. In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil vs. Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil which still holds the fields, it was held that all amendments out to be allowed which satisfy the two conditions : (a) of not working injustice to the other side; and (b) of being necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. Amendments should be refused only where the other party cannot be placed in the same position as if the pleading had been originally correct, but the amendment would cause him an injury which could not be compensated in costs." 5. When the impugned order dated 11.8.2016 is tested on the aforesaid principles, I find mat amendment for substitution of the plaintiff is merely formal in nature. The plaintiff has pleaded that during pendency of the suit the company was merged into M/s. S.R.P. Oils Pvt. Ltd. by virtue of order dated 25.9.2015 passed by the Kolkata High Court. It was further pleaded that in its meeting held on 7.7.2015 the Board of Directors of M/s. S.R.P. Oils Pvt. Ltd. have passed necessary resolutions. The impugned order dated 11.8.2016 would reflect that only objection of the defendants to this proposed amendment was, that six years after the suit was instituted this amendment cannot be allowed. In the above facts, in my opinion, the trial Judge has rightly brushed aside such objection of the defendants. This amendment in the memo of parties is purely formal in nature and it would not cause any prejudice to the defendants. 6. Insofar as the proposed amendment for incorporating, "damages for the demised premises" in the prayer clause of the plaint is concerned, the trial Judge has not at all adverted to this amendment. There is no discussion in the impugned order dated 11.8.2016 on the proposed amendment for incorporating "damages for the demised premises" in the prayer (relief) clause. The plaintiff has not challenged order dated 11.8.2016 by filing a writ petition and while so, it must be construed in law that it has accepted the order passed by the trial Judge. There is no discussion in the impugned order dated 11.8.2016 on the proposed amendment for incorporating "damages for the demised premises" in the prayer (relief) clause. The plaintiff has not challenged order dated 11.8.2016 by filing a writ petition and while so, it must be construed in law that it has accepted the order passed by the trial Judge. The petitioner has pleaded that after the suit was instituted, certain developments took place and now it is an admitted position that the demised premises were leased out to M/s. B.M.W. Iron and Steel Industry Limited and a joint venture agreement was signed between M/s. K.U. Auto Engineering Pvt. Ltd. and M/s. B.M.W. Iron and Steel Industry Limited. The petitioner therefore contends that the relief for "cost of re-building" cannot now be expanded by adding "damages for the demised premises". 7. In the above facts, the impugned order dated 11.8.2016 invites interference of this Court insofar as the amendment for adding "damages for the demised premises" in the relief clause is concerned, for two reasons; (i) order dated 11.8.2016 is cryptic and it does not assign any reason for permitting the amendment in the prayer clause, and (ii) conditions under proviso to Order 6, Rule 17, C.P.C. are not satisfied. In the application for amendment the plaintiff has tried to justify the proposed amendment on the ground of delay by the defendant, which, in my opinion, cannot be a ground to seek amendment in the plaint. There is host of new facts pleaded in the application for amendment, however, these facts are not incorporated in the plaint nor these facts are sought to be incorporated in the plaint. After the parties led their evidence in the suit, an altogether new relief, without pleadings in the plaint, cannot be incorporated in the relief clause. 8. In the result, the writ petition stands allowed, in part. Amendment in description of the plaintiff from M/s. K.U. Auto Engineering Pvt. Ltd. to M/s. S.R.P. Oils Pvt. Ltd. stands allowed. Insofar as second amendment, "damages for the demised premises" is concerned, it shall not be incorporated in the relief clause in the plaint. The parties shall now not be permitted to lead any further evidence in the suit and argument in Money Suit No. 09 of 2009 must conclude on or before 31.12.2017.