JUDGMENT By the Court.—This is a writ petition pertaining to land acquisition of certain plots of village-Harampur, Pargana-Loni, Tehsil-District-Ghaziabad assailed on the ground that the dispensation of inquiry under Section 5A under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been made against the material on record without therebeing any urgency and without inviting/entertaining objections of such persons who were interested and had purchased the land and were in occupation thereof. Thus, the invoking of Section 17 of the 1894 Act has been challenged on various contentions. The said issue is on the merits of the claim. 2. An objection had been raised with regard to the locus of the petitioners for maintaining the writ petition. The counter-affidavit of the respondent No. 4, the body for whom the land had been acquired for industrial development in paragraph No. 4, had raised the issue of locus and also alleged that even if there were members of the petitioner No. 1- Association, no Court fee had been paid on their behalf. A supplementary counter-affidavit was also filed on 5th January, 2008 by the said respondent in response to the supplementary-affidavit of the petitioners dated 17.12.2007 where a list of alleged 291 members of the petitioner No. 1-Association was appended. Under the orders of the Court, the Court fee of 291 persons who were claimed by the petitioner No. 1 to be members was deposited. This deposit of Court fee on 16.4.2008 was made in terms of the final judgment in the writ petition dated 29th January, 2008 whereby the notifications were quashed and the writ petition was allowed. Thus, the Court fee came to be deposited after the judgment in the present writ petition was pronounced on 29th January, 2008. The respondent No. 4 agreived by the quashing of the proceedings in the background aforesaid filed SLP No. 14421 of 2008 (Civil Appeal No. 601 of 2012) that was allowed by Hon’ble the Apex Court on 17th January, 2012 by the following judgment:- “Leave granted. 2. We have heard Mr. R.P. Bhat, learned senior counsel for the appellant, and Mr. S.K. Dubey, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. 3. In 1997, the appellant made proposal to the State Government for acquisition of 74.84 acres land for the purposes of industrial development in the name of Tronica City, Ghaziabad. 2. We have heard Mr. R.P. Bhat, learned senior counsel for the appellant, and Mr. S.K. Dubey, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. 3. In 1997, the appellant made proposal to the State Government for acquisition of 74.84 acres land for the purposes of industrial development in the name of Tronica City, Ghaziabad. Based on that proposal, the State Government issued notification under Section 4 of the Land 2 Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘Act’) proposing acquisition of 74.84 acres which was published in the Official Gazette on April 16, 2003. The State Government also invoked urgency clause and thereby dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. The declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on August 30, 2003. It is the case of the appellant that thereafter notices under Section 9 of the Act were issued to the concerned owners on September 25, 2003. The objections were filed by the concerned owners on October 13, 2003 regarding rate of compensation. The Collector approved the rate on February 27, 2004. In between March 29, 2004 and June 8, 2004, the compensation was disbursed to the concerned owners and thereafter the concerned owners handed over the possession to the Land Acquisition Officer on October 20, 2004. 4. It was then that the respondent No. 1 Sunder Garden Welfare Association (for short, ‘Association’) comprising of 291 members, filed a Writ Petition, being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53984 of 2004, before the Allahabd High Court. In the Writ Petition, the Association set up the case that they had purchased the land bearing plots Nos. 496, 497, 544, 501, 500, 578, 502, 504, 505, 498, 536, 538, 539 and 541 situate in village Harampur, Loni, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad, which after sub-division were distributed to its members. It is the 3 case of the Association that the above land was bhumidhar land and free from all encumbrances. It was avered that the members of the Association have got their houses constructed over their lands and developed a colony in the name of Sunder Garden Colony. The Association raised diverse grounds in the Writ Petition in challenging the notifications dated April 16, 2003 and August 30, 2003. 5. The present appellant contested the Writ Petition and challenged the very locus of the respondent No. 1 - Association being an unregistered society. The Association raised diverse grounds in the Writ Petition in challenging the notifications dated April 16, 2003 and August 30, 2003. 5. The present appellant contested the Writ Petition and challenged the very locus of the respondent No. 1 - Association being an unregistered society. The appellant also disputed the correctness of the averments made in the Writ Petition regarding purchase of the above plots by the Association. It is pertinent to notice that the subject matter of Writ Petition comprised of 29.43 acre land out of 74.84 acres acquired under the above notifications. 6. The High Court, after hearing the parties, by the impugned order has quashed the notifications dated April 16, 2003 and August 30, 2003. 7. On hearing the learned senior counsel for the appellant and counsel for the respondent No. 1, we are of the considered view that the High Court failed to examine the locus of the Association in right perspective. The legality of the transfer of the subject land in favour of the Association has not, at all, been examined. The material placed before the High Court does cast doubt as to 4 whether the Association or its members have, at all, acquired any legal right, title or interest in the land which is subject matter of acquisition. Admittedly, the awards came to be made on May 16, 2005 and January 13, 2006. In these awards, compensation for compulsory acquisition of the above land has been paid to the concerned owners. Neither the Association nor its members have challenged the awards before the Civil Court. The High Court ought to have examined the right, title or interest of the Association or its members in the acquired land before it quashed the impugned notifications. Obviously, the impugned notifications could not have been quashed at the instance of a party who has no legal right, title or interest in the subject land. On this short ground, we are constrained to set aside the order of the High Court. 8. Consequently, the Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment dated January 29, 2008 passed by the Allahabad High Court is set aside. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53984 of 2004 is restored to the file of the High Court for a fresh hearing and consideration of the matter. No costs. 9. The parties shall appear before the High Court on March 15, 2012. Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53984 of 2004 is restored to the file of the High Court for a fresh hearing and consideration of the matter. No costs. 9. The parties shall appear before the High Court on March 15, 2012. They shall be at liberty to file additional documents before the High Court. 10. On restoration of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 53984 of 2004, the interim order, if any, passed by the High Court shall become operative until the disposal of the above Writ Petition by the High Court.” 3. Consequently, the Judgment of the High Court having been set aside, the mattter stood remitted back to this Court for decision afresh. We had heard the matter on 22nd August, 2017 and learned counsel for the petitioner was called upon to assist the Court as the case was adjourned on his request. The order dated 22.8.2017 is extracted herein under:- “Heard Shri Siddharth Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioners, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Nos. 1,2 and 3 and Shri H.N.Singh, learned Senior Counsel alongwith Shri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 4. The present writ petition has a chequered history. The petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 claim themselves to be an association of which the petitioner No. 2 is the alleged Secretary. The writ petition questions the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, and has prayed for quashing of the notification under Section 4 and Section 6 of the said Act in respect of certain plots of village Harampur, Pargana Loni, Tehsil and District Ghaziabad. The writ petition was entertained and an interim order was passed whereafter the writ petition was finally allowed vide judgment and order dated 29th January, 2008 by a Division Bench of this Court. The U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation, the respondent No. 4 herein filed a Special Leave to Appeal before the Apex Court and the same was allowed vide judgment and order dated 17th January 2012 by a short judgment focusing on the point as to whether the petitioner- association had a locus to maintain the petition. The U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation, the respondent No. 4 herein filed a Special Leave to Appeal before the Apex Court and the same was allowed vide judgment and order dated 17th January 2012 by a short judgment focusing on the point as to whether the petitioner- association had a locus to maintain the petition. With the assistance of the learned counsel we have perused the judgment of the High Court as well as the pleadings on record and we do not find any material which may indicate that the petitioner association was ever a tenure-holder recorded as such in terms of the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 so as to claim any right, title or possession over the land in question. The petitioner No. 2 claiming himself the Secretary of the Association also has not disclosed the existence of any title in his favour in respect of the plots the acquisition whereof is subject matter of the present writ petition. The directions issued by the Supreme Court are categorical to the effect that this aspect having not been examined, the maintainability of the writ petition on behalf of the petitioners was questionable more so when the petitioner-association was professing to espouse the cause of its members who according to it were tenure holders. From the judgment of the High Court dated 29th January, 2008, it appears that the High Court proceeded to entertain the writ petition on this issue and held the petition to be maintainable after getting the defect of payment of Court fee cured. According to the petitioners 291 affected persons had deposited the Court fee. After the matter has been remitted by the Apex Court in the year 2012 itself, a supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents thereby giving details of the status of the claim of the so-called members of the petitioner association. On the strength thereof it is alleged on behalf of the respondents that even those members do not have any right so as to maintain the petition. On the strength thereof it is alleged on behalf of the respondents that even those members do not have any right so as to maintain the petition. It is thus evident that the issue which has to be addressed first in terms of the judgment of the Apex Court dated 17th January, 2012, is the locus of the two petitioners before us and then also as to whether the petition can be continued on behalf of the so called members who are stated to have made deposit of Court fee in terms of the judgment of the High Court dated 29th January, 2008. Shri Siddharth Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for an adjournment. List in the next cause list.” 4. Shri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner made a request yesterday that the petitioners should be permitted to file an affidavit bringing on record the sale deeds of those who had purchased the land prior to the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act and also file an impleadment application on behalf of those persons who had already deposited their Court fee. Learned counsel for the petitioner has then advanced his submissions on the aforesaid issue and we have proceeded to hear it as the direction of the Apex Court being categorical, the Court found it appropriate to deal with the same. 5. The notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the Land Acquisiion Act 1894 was issued on 16th April, 2003 and that under Section 6 was issued on 30th August, 2003. The present writ petition was entertained and on 12th January, 2005, the following order was passed:- “Learned Counsel for the petitioner is granted two weeks time to file supplementary-affidavit mentioning the exact number of members of the petitioner’s association for whom relief has been claimed with reference to paragraph 17 of the writ petition. The affidavit shall also disclose the respected plot number of the members and the nature of constructions, if any. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken objection with regards to the payment of the Court fee, as according to him, all the individual members who have separate cause of action, are liable to pay separate Court fee. List upon the expiry of two weeks in the next cause list for admission.” 6. Learned counsel for the respondent has taken objection with regards to the payment of the Court fee, as according to him, all the individual members who have separate cause of action, are liable to pay separate Court fee. List upon the expiry of two weeks in the next cause list for admission.” 6. The writ petition was admitted on 11th October, 2006 and the interim order dated 20th December, 2004 passed in the writ petition for maintaining status quo was continued until further orders. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that there was no serious contest put to the locus of the petitioners and as a matter of fact it was only the issue of payment of Court fee that was pointed out in the affidavits which stood rectified under the judgment of the High Court and its deposit as indicated above. 8. It is urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that inspite of the order of status quo passed in this writ petition on 20th December, 2004, the respondents proceeded to deliver award on 16.5.2005, 9.1.2006 and 13.1.2006. It is at the stage of Section 9 of the 1894 Act when notices were issued, that the purchasers of the land who claim themselves to be the members of the petitioner No. 1-Association had raised objections that the compensation should not be disbursed to the recorded tenure-holders. However, the fact remains that the compensation was received by the recorded tenure-holders who did not choose to challenge either the notification nor they did institute any other proceeding. 9. It is undisputed that those who had purchased the land and claim to be the members of the petitioner No. 1-Association did not challenge the award either through Section 13 of the 1894 Act or by way of reference under Section 18 thereof. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that those persons who had purchased the land from the original tenure-holders prior to the Section 4 notification, their rights survive so as to challenge the notification as well as all consequential actions. Relying on the language employed in the judgment of the Apex Court, extracted hereinabove, Shri Shashi Nandan contends that the Supreme Court has made it open for this Court to consider and decide the status of the locus of the parties and members of the petitioner No. 1-Association as well as their right, title or interest. Relying on the language employed in the judgment of the Apex Court, extracted hereinabove, Shri Shashi Nandan contends that the Supreme Court has made it open for this Court to consider and decide the status of the locus of the parties and members of the petitioner No. 1-Association as well as their right, title or interest. He, therefore submits that by virtue of the recital contained in the said judgment persons who are stated to be members as per the supplementary-affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioner, and who have deposited their Court fees, are entitled to be represented through the petitioner No. 1-Association and the writ petition would be maintainable for espousing the cause of such interested persons as they have a right, title and interest in the land, particularly those who had purchased the land prior to the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. He, therefore, submits that such persons who have been described as members of the petitioner No. 1- Association have a right to get their claim adjudicated and it is for this reason he had prayed for moving an appropriate application as also filing on record the respective sale-deeds of those purchasers who had purchased the land prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. 11. He contends that there is no challenge to the locus of the petitioners or to the members of the petitioner- Association in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State and so is the position of the counter-affidavit on behalf of the respondent No. 4 where primarily the issue of payment of Court fee was being canvassed that stood satisfied with its deposit. He submits that the fact of execution of sale-deeds now stands admitted in the supplementary counter-affidavit of the U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Limited itself that is on record and consequently it is not open to the respondents to question the right, title or interest of such purchasers as the sale-deeds have not been denied. He, therefore, submits that in the background aforesaid where the purchasers are of very small plots of land, they should not be ousted from being heard in the background aforesaid. 12. He, therefore, submits that in the background aforesaid where the purchasers are of very small plots of land, they should not be ousted from being heard in the background aforesaid. 12. Learned Standing Counsel has opposed the petition and has invited the attention of the Court to the contents of paragraph No. 11 of the supplementary counter-affidavit dated 7.4.2012 to urge that after the matter was remitted back from the Supreme Court this plea has been advanced on behalf of the State. Paragraph No. 11 asserts that the petitioner No. 1 claiming itself to be an Association, has not produced any documentary evidence in support of the said claim and therefore its status as an Association is unacceptable. 13. Shri H.N. Singh learned Senior Counsel for the respondent No. 4 has advanced his submissions contending that firstly the petitioner No. 1 has wrongly described itself as an Association inasmuch as neither its constitution is available nor the manner in which members can be inducted and further as to how and in what manner was the Association formed and as to how the persons claiming themselves to be members were enrolled as members. He has contended that according to the averments made in the writ petition the petitioner No. 1-Association has described itself to be a welfare society that had purchased land for distribution amongst its members. He submits that this assertion in the writ petition if accepted then such a society would be only a Cooperative Housing Society and not a society as understood under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. He contends that no such Housing Society has been framed or got registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1965 and therefore such an activity being professed by the petitioner No. 1-Association is impermissible in law and cannot have any legal recognition or locus to maintain a writ petition. On the other hand, if it is a society claiming itself to be a society as understood under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, then too even it could not function as a society for the benefits of its own members as alleged in the writ petition. On the other hand, if it is a society claiming itself to be a society as understood under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, then too even it could not function as a society for the benefits of its own members as alleged in the writ petition. A Society under the 1860 Act cannot be constituted for such purpose and even if the society has been got registered later on, as orally alleged on behalf of the petitioner, then too even there was no such society lawfully constituted as on the date of the filing of the writ petition to establish its locus. It is further submitted by Shri Singh that no person alleged to be a member as per the supplementary-affidavit filed has come forward to maintain its cause and the petitioner No. 2 also has not been able to establish his status as such. There is no evidence or existence of any such Association except for the bald assertion in the writ petition and there is no proof of any of the members having become members of the Association so as to espouse this cause in the name of the Association. He, therefore, submits that such a writ petition on behalf of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 cannot be maintained even if certain purchasers of the land have any right, title or interest in the land in dispute. 14. Shri Singh further points out that even the original tenure holders have not come forward and all these persons claiming themselves to be the purchasers of the property have got sale-deeds executed through one Shri Sundar Singh, the alleged power of attorney holder of the tenure holders. The power of attorney holder, Sundar Singh has not filed this writ petition even though he has described himself as one of the members in the list that has been appended alongwith the supplementary-affidavit by the petitioners. None of these members have challenged either the award or the proceedings consequential thereto and the land has already vested free from all encumbrances inasmuch as all the tenure holders have already received the compensation and have not choosen to challenge either the notification or the award. 15. None of these members have challenged either the award or the proceedings consequential thereto and the land has already vested free from all encumbrances inasmuch as all the tenure holders have already received the compensation and have not choosen to challenge either the notification or the award. 15. It is therefore, submitted that the present writ petition on behalf of the petitioner No. 1 and 2 is not maintainable and a mere deposit of Court fee after the delivery of the judgment of the High Court cannot act as a cure to espouse the cause on behalf of such interested persons through a non-existent loose association and the petitioner No. 2 who claims himself to be the Secretary. Thus neither the ingrediants of locus nor any of the ingrediants of dominus litis has been satisfied for maintaining the writ petition through the petitioner No. 1 and 2. He further submits that if any person who may fall within the bracket of interested persons in respect of the land, wants to question the correctness of the same, he could have done so at the appropriate time in his own individual capacity. It is urged that the petitioner No. 1 is neither the recorded tenure holder nor a Bhumidhar as defined under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 read with U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 nor an interested person having any right, title or interest so as to maintain the petition. Similar is the stand taken for the petitioner No. 2. He submits that this being a land acquisition proceeding, where either the land has to be retained or compensation awarded, can be a matter of contest by an affected tenure holder and not by the present petitioners. It is for this reason that the Apex Court set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 29th January, 2008 and issued directions to examine the said issue first. Shri Singh has relied on the judgment of this Court in Hardoi Roadways (Private) Union v. Contonment Board, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1991 All 59 : (1990) 2 UPLBEC 1253 to urge that this writ petition cannot be entertained on behalf of an association. 16. Shri Singh has relied on the judgment of this Court in Hardoi Roadways (Private) Union v. Contonment Board, Shahjahanpur, AIR 1991 All 59 : (1990) 2 UPLBEC 1253 to urge that this writ petition cannot be entertained on behalf of an association. 16. He has also cited two decisions to urge that the persons for whom this petition is being espoused claim themselves to be purchasers and barring a few sale-deeds most of the purchases have been made after the notification under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. Therefore, they did not have any right and as such their acts cannot be espoused in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Moti Lal Goel and another v. State of U.P. and others, 2014 (2) ADJ 687 (DB) and the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others, 2008 (9) SCC 177 . He has then urged that since the petitioners have misrepresented facts before this Court about their status and their entitlement to contest the acquisition proceedings, the same amounts to an abuse of process of Court and hence the writ petition deserves to be dismissed by this Court for which he relies on the authority of the Apex Court in the case of Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (2) SCC 114 and Oswal Fats and Oils Limited v. Additional Commissioner (Administration), Bareilly, Division, Bareilly and others, 2010 (4) SCC 728. 17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we find that this entire issue having been raised before this Court has almost taken ten years, and five years after the remand from the Apex Court in 2012. During this period no attempt has been made by any person claiming himself to be the purchaser of the land who may have filed any application for impleadment or for pursuing the writ petition. Learned counsel for the petitioner, as indicated above had at the time of hearing made a request to file an impleadment application on behalf of such persons who had deposited their Court fees under the orders of this Court dated 29th January, 2008. We can only observe that such an action does not appear to have been initiated or even undertaken after the matter was remitted by the Apex Court or even before this Court till 2017. We can only observe that such an action does not appear to have been initiated or even undertaken after the matter was remitted by the Apex Court or even before this Court till 2017. No purchaser, or even the power of attorney holder through whom the sale deeds have been executed, has come forward seeking hearing in this matter through any Vakalatnama or application being filed which could have been done keeping in view the provisions of Chapter XXII, Rule 5A of the Allahabad High Court Rule, 1952, which applies to writ proceedings as well. No attempt at all was made to join in the petition. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the Court fee had already been paid consequent to the direction of the High Court on 29th January, 2008. As noted above, the Court fee was paid after the judgment. A writ petition has to be filed duly stamped and Court fee paid which is ordinarily and normally a pre-condition for the filing of a writ petition. The Court can however issue directions for making good any deficiency, but in the present case it was only under a final judgment dated 29.1.2008 that the deposit of Court fee was permitted on behalf of 291 persons. The judgment has already been set aside by the Apex Court. The impact, therefore, is that any deposit of Court fee made by such persons cannot be a ground to be pressed into service for treating it to be the fulfilment of a condition of a proper and necessary party. As noted in the submissions above, no application had been moved or effort made to join in the petition at all. A belated request at the time of hearing after 13 years of the pendency of the writ petition therefore does not appeal to us for being accepted at this stage. 19. It appears that all such persons whom the petitioners are claiming to be members have not come forward for reasons best known to them to disclose their identity as members of the petitioner No. 1-Association or any evidence to establish as to how they associated themselves with the association, in support thereof. 19. It appears that all such persons whom the petitioners are claiming to be members have not come forward for reasons best known to them to disclose their identity as members of the petitioner No. 1-Association or any evidence to establish as to how they associated themselves with the association, in support thereof. Even assuming for the sake of arguments that they were members and were entitled to freely associate themselves keeping in view the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, yet in order to represent a cause in a legal matter for enforcement of legal rights there has to be a lawful existence of an Association. The Association was unregistered when the writ petition was filed and which fact has been noted by the Supreme Court as well in its order. It is, therefore, clear that there was no registered Association in existence and there is no evidence on record of the existence of even a loose association. As a matter of fact, when five or more persons assemble to form an Association, with a particular object to run a Society, then the minimum what is required is the passing of a resolution, the framing of bye-laws, the constitution of the members of the Association and the like. In the instant case there is nothing on record in either of the affidavits filed by the petitioners to even gather that there was a loose Association in existence. These facts were absolutely necessary for inferring that the petitioner No. 1 was espousing the cause of the acquisition proceedings duly authorised by its members to achieve the object of getting the acquisition annulled. No document or even pleadings so as to reflect the intention of the so-called members and authorising such contest is available on record. There is, therefore, a complete non joinder of necessary party and the petitioner No. 1-Association having no valid existence so as to maintain this petition for the purpose of challenging the land acquisition proceedings, we do not find the writ petition to be maintainable on behalf of the petitioner No. 1. 20. There is yet another issue which this Court had raised in the order passed on 22.8.2017, namely, the petitioner-Association is not a recorded tenure-holder so as to claim any right, title or possession or any interest over the land in question. 20. There is yet another issue which this Court had raised in the order passed on 22.8.2017, namely, the petitioner-Association is not a recorded tenure-holder so as to claim any right, title or possession or any interest over the land in question. The aforesaid fact that the petitioner-Association never acquired any land nor is it a tenure-holder could not be disputed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner-Association in its own capacity, therefore, had no cause to espouse or claim any right in respect of the land which is being claimed by certain persons who have purchased land through the power of attorney holder. Under Revenue Law in the State of U.P., land is governed by tenures as described in the U.P. Z.A. & L.R. Act, 1950 and now governed by the provisions of U.P. Revenue Act, 2006 and the Rules framed thereunder. A tenure-holder under the said Act is a tenant of the land the ownership whereof vests in the State. However, these tenancy rights of tenure-holders are of a nature where the tenure-holder in his capacity as such can claim compensation for the land. There is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioner No. 1 or the petitioner No. 2 are tenure-holders. The petitioner No. 2 also has not been unable to establish his status of that of a tenure-holder. He has however claimed himself to be one of the members amongst 291 whose list has been filed alongwith the supplementary-affidavit dated 17.12.2007. There is nothing however to support the fact that he had also become a tenure-holder on a valid purchase prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. There is no averment contained to that effect in the writ petition. Even if he had any such claim he ought to have pleaded the same, and in absence of any such material on record we do not find the petitioner No. 2 also to be a person interested. Further, we do not find any such authorisation in favour of the petitioner No. 2 in his individual capacity either through a power of attorney or otherwise to represent the cause of the so-called members of the petitioner No. 1-Association. 21. Further, we do not find any such authorisation in favour of the petitioner No. 2 in his individual capacity either through a power of attorney or otherwise to represent the cause of the so-called members of the petitioner No. 1-Association. 21. There is one striking feature which deserves to be noted that the award was made on three dates as noted above which the learned counsel for the petitioner states to be in violation of the interim order passed by the High Court on 20.12.2004. In our opinion, the direction for maintaining status quo was for the sake of the possession and status of the property and the interim order was passed ex parte without the recorded tenure-holders or their power of attorney holder being impleaded in the writ petition. There was no restraint in relation to the proceedings of the announcement of award or payment of compensation and even when the Apex Court revived the interim order no such direction was issued in favour of the petitioner or its members. Thus, it is evident that the matter had proceeded without there being any challenge to the award made by either the tenure holders or any such affected persons on whose behalf the present writ petition is being canvassed. The so-called members had ample opportunity to improve upon their lot if they had any claim by challenging the notification separately and they had also ample time to question the award but not having done so, the cause cannot be permitted to be espoused through the present petitioners. 22. The Apex Court has clearly directed that the High Court ought to have examined the right, title or interest of the Association or its members in the acquired land before quashing the notifications. It is here that Shri Shashi Nandan contends that this direction includes the examination of the right, title or interest of such persons who are claiming themselves to be the members of the Association. We find that the issue as to whether the petitioners were members of such an Association or not has not been decided by the Apex Court and as observed above, there is no material except for a list filed alongwith supplementary-affidavit so as to gather that they are members of an Association. We find that the issue as to whether the petitioners were members of such an Association or not has not been decided by the Apex Court and as observed above, there is no material except for a list filed alongwith supplementary-affidavit so as to gather that they are members of an Association. So far as the individual interest or title of the purchasers are concerned, some of the sale deeds have been filed alongwith supplementary counter-affidavit of the U.P.S.I.D.C. Inviting the attention of the Court to the sale deeds Shri Shashi Nandan submits that most of the sale-deeds are prior to the notification under Section 4 and therefore such purchasers had a right to contest the notifications as well as all consequential action and therefore this right of such persons deserves to be examined even if the petitioner-Association is not a tenure-holder. The question is, can the notifications be quashed, at the instance of a party who is not before the Court and the cause of such party is being espoused by an Association which has no legal or valid status? Our answer to the same is in the negative, as the petitioners cannot espouse the cause of any such persons who claim themselves to have a right, title or interest in the subject matter in dispute. The alleged members are claiming title on the basis of sale deeds through a power of attorney holder of the tenure holders. The tenure holders have already received compensation for the disputed land. This has happened after the filing of the present writ petition and the order of status quo. This development of the disbursement of compensation after announcing the award has not been challenged by any affected persons, even though they allege that objections had been filed at the stage of Section 9 of the 1894 Act. It is thus obvious that the recorded tenure-holders have walked away with compensation and their power of attorney holder has executed sale deeds. Thus, caught in their web, the purchasers who are the alleged members of the petitioner No. 1-Association had to assert their rights appropriately as the petitioners herein cannot act as a substitute for them. It is thus obvious that the recorded tenure-holders have walked away with compensation and their power of attorney holder has executed sale deeds. Thus, caught in their web, the purchasers who are the alleged members of the petitioner No. 1-Association had to assert their rights appropriately as the petitioners herein cannot act as a substitute for them. If the purchasers have been subjected to misrepresentation or manipulation either by the power of attorney holder or the petitioners, it is for such affected persons to seek their remedy before the appropriate forum by themselves and not through the petitioners who do not have any legal status to espouse their cause. The present petition is not a PIL for a class action. If some people gather some funds to pay Court fee, that by itself cannot convert their status to presume them to be members of a particular association so as to maintain the petition. There is a complete abscence of laws in both the petitioners to maintain a petition so as to challenge the impugned notifications. This we say without prejudice to the rights of any affected persons. In our opinion they ought to have filed separate petitions and their deposit of Court fee even under the judgment of the High Court cannot come to their aid as their separate pleadings confining to the area which they claim on the basis of any material that may be available is totally absent in so far as the pleadings of the petitioners are concerned. This writ petition, therefore, otherwise cannot be treated as a petition for class action on behalf of such persons who have their individual legal rights to espouse their cause in respect of acquisition of land. 23. For all the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any locus in the petitioners to maintain this petition nor can this petition be entertained on behalf of such persons who claim themselves to be the alleged members of the petitioner No. 1-Association. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid observations without prejudice to the rights of any affected or interested person who may have a right, title or interest in the land subject to his furnishing proof of the same, if permissible in law. Dismissed.