JUDGMENT : DILIP GUPTA, DINESH KUMAR SINGH-I, J. 1. The petitioners had filed a Reference Application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act') which was decided on 5 October 1999 by the Reference Court in terms of a compromise entered into between the petitioners and Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority ('Greater Noida') that the petitioners would receive Rs. 39 per square yard as the market rate of the land as full and final settlement of the claim of the petitioners. This petition has been filed for a direction upon the respondents to direct the respondent to enhance the market rate of the land to Rs.65 per square yard since this market rate was determined in References filed by some other claimants in regard to the same acquisition initiated under Section 4(1) of the Act. 2. It transpires from the records of the writ petition that for planned industrial development in district Bulandshahr, a notification dated 1 March 1989 was issued under Section 4(1) of the Act for acquisition of about 854-4-12 bighas of land. This was followed by a declaration that was made on 31 March 1989 made under Section 6 of the Act. An award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer under Section 11(1) of the Act on 26 November 1990 for 800-15-7-15 bighas of land. The petitioners filed a Reference Application under Section 18 of the Act but ultimately negotiation took place between the petitioners and Greater Noida and a compromise was entered into that the petitioners would receive Rs. 39 per square yard as the market rate of the land as full and final settlement. This compromise executed on 4 August 1998 was duly accepted by the Reference Court and the Reference Application under Section 18 of the Act was, accordingly, decided in terms of the compromise which was directed to form part of the award. 3. The order passed by the Court on 5 October 1999 is reproduced below:- "Case called out. Parties counsel are present. 21A1- Parties filed compromise duly verified by their counsel. It is hereby recorded. Order Reference is decided in terms of Compromise 21A1 which shall form part of the award." 4. The matter attained finality as the petitioners did not file any appeal in the High Court under Section 54 of the Act nor the compromise was challenged in any Court. 5.
It is hereby recorded. Order Reference is decided in terms of Compromise 21A1 which shall form part of the award." 4. The matter attained finality as the petitioners did not file any appeal in the High Court under Section 54 of the Act nor the compromise was challenged in any Court. 5. It is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners that in regard to the same acquisition, the Reference Court at the instance of some other tenure holders enhanced the market rate of the land to Rs.65 per square yard and since the First Appeal filed by the Acquiring Body was dismissed, the same enhanced market rate of the land should be awarded to the petitioners. 6. It is also stated that in Civil Appeal No.9142 of 2017 that was filed by Munshiya (Dead through LRs), against the judgment dated 28 December 2016 passed by the High Court in First Appeal No.227 of 2015 filed by Munshiya, the petitioners, who had not filed a First Appeal in the High Court, filed an Impleadment Application with a prayer that they should be permitted to be impleaded as respondents in the Civil Appeal and they should be granted the same benefit as may be granted to the appellants. The said Impleadment Application filed by the petitioners was dismissed as withdrawn without prejudice to the liberty available to them to take recourse to any other remedy. It is for this reason that learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that this Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, should enhance the market rate of the land to Rs.65 per square yard and for this submission, learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors., Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 14 SCC 127 and Samiyathal & Ors., Vs. Special Tehsildar & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 5335 and 5336 of 2013 decided on 5 July 2013. 7. Learned Standing Counsel has appeared for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Sri S.K. Mishra has appeared for U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation, which has been impleaded as respondent No.4 while Sri B.B. Jauhari, has appeared for Greater Noida, which has been impleaded as respondent No.5. 8.
5335 and 5336 of 2013 decided on 5 July 2013. 7. Learned Standing Counsel has appeared for respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Sri S.K. Mishra has appeared for U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation, which has been impleaded as respondent No.4 while Sri B.B. Jauhari, has appeared for Greater Noida, which has been impleaded as respondent No.5. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that once the petitioners have settled the matter and accepted Rs.39 per square yard as full and final settlement for the market rate of the land, it is not open to them to contend after 18 years that they should be awarded Rs.65 per square yard as the market rate of the land, even if this market rate was awarded to certain tenure holders by the Reference Court. 9. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties. 10. The issue that arises for consideration is as to whether the petitioners can be permitted to claim the enhanced market rate of Rs.65 per square yard after 18 years when in the Reference Application filed by them for enhancement of the market rate, they had filed a compromise application which was duly accepted by the Court and the award was made by the Reference Court in terms of the compromise application. The terms of the memorandum of the compromise presented by the parties for passing the decree are as follows:- "Memorandum of Compromise Presented for Passing of Decree 1. Whereas agricultural land/house site belonging to the first party viz. Shri/Smt. Karan Singh, Yogesh, Gyan Chand son of Murari Lal, Dalchand and Girdhari respectively son of Nain Singh, all are resident of Village Kasna Pargana Dankaur Tehsil Sikandrabad, District Bulandshahr located in village Kasna Tehsil Sikanndrabad District Bulandshahr (Present District Gautam Budh Nagar) more fully described in the schedule below having been acquired by the Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as Second Party) represented by the Secretary for development of an Integrated Industrial Township and allied purposes; 2. And whereas the first party not having been satisfied with compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and having asked for reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, claiming enhanced compensation. 3. And whereas now after due negotiations settled with the Second Party to receive compensation at a rate of Rs.39/- (Rupees thirty nine) per sq.
And whereas the first party not having been satisfied with compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer and having asked for reference u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, claiming enhanced compensation. 3. And whereas now after due negotiations settled with the Second Party to receive compensation at a rate of Rs.39/- (Rupees thirty nine) per sq. yard (as the basic rate of the land acquired) plus solatium, additional amount, and interest as payable under the Land Acquisition Act, in full and final settlement of all his/her claims which included all benefits under various heads under the Land Acquisition Act and the Second Party agreeing to pay to the First Party at the said rate; The earlier received payment shall be adjustable against the final amount." (emphasis supplied) 11. As noticed above, the said compromise application being Paper No.21A-1 was accepted by the Reference Court and the Reference was decided in terms of the compromise executed on 4 August 1998 which was also directed to form part of the award by the order dated 5 October 1999. The petitioners have not raised any grievance about the compromise and in fact did not also file a First Appeal in the High Court under Section 54 of the Act and rightly so because a compromise application in the Reference had been filed by them. 12. The petitioners, however, in this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution contend that they should be awarded the same market rate which was awarded by the Reference Court in some other matters in regard to the same notification and in this connection have placed reliance upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Samiyathal and Dhiraj Singh. 13. It is against the Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court dated 11 May 2009 in the appeal filed by the State by which the amount of compensation was reduced that Samiyathal had filed a Civil Appeal in the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court after noticing that the Reference Court had determined the market rate of the land by carefully examining the entire evidence observed that the determination made by the Reference Court was based on a proper evaluation of the market rate of the land and the High Court was not justified in drastically reducing the amount of compensation.
The Supreme Court after noticing that the Reference Court had determined the market rate of the land by carefully examining the entire evidence observed that the determination made by the Reference Court was based on a proper evaluation of the market rate of the land and the High Court was not justified in drastically reducing the amount of compensation. The Supreme Court also directed the State to pay the same amount of compensation to other land owners whose land was acquired under the same notification but who may have on account of ignorance, poverty and other similar handicaps, not been able to approach the Reference Court or may not have been able to contest the matter before the High Court and the Supreme Court. 14. In Dhiraj Singh the appellants had filed First Appeal against the award made by the Reference Court which was dismissed on 24 December 1993. The appellants did not file any appeal before the Division Bench though certain other persons filed appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench enhanced the compensation. Subsequently the appellants also filed a belated appeal before the Division Bench. The delay was not condoned and, accordingly, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal. It is against this order of the Division Bench that the appellant filed the Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court though with delay. The Supreme Court condoned the delay and allowed the appeal holding that the appellant was also be entitled to enhanced compensation but with a rider that for the period of delay in approaching the High Court no interest should be paid to them. The Supreme Court also observed that in matters relating to compensation in land acquisition proceedings a pragmatic view should be taken. The Supreme Court relied upon its earlier decision in Samiyathal. 15. It is for this reason that learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that though the petitioners may not have filed a First Appeal in the High Court but as other tenure holders had been paid higher compensation, the same compensation should be paid to the petitioners. 16. It needs to be noticed that in the present case, the petitioners had filed a Reference Application under Section 18 of the Act and this Reference Application was decided in terms of the compromise that was entered into between the petitioners and the Acquiring Body.
16. It needs to be noticed that in the present case, the petitioners had filed a Reference Application under Section 18 of the Act and this Reference Application was decided in terms of the compromise that was entered into between the petitioners and the Acquiring Body. In the Compromise Application it was clearly stated that the amount mentioned in the Compromise Application was towards full and final settlement of all the claims. It is for this reason that the petitioners did not file a First Appeal in the High Court under Section 54 of the Act. It also needs to be noted that the Reference Court had enhanced the compensation in the case of other tenure holders on 27 August 1999 much prior to the order passed on the Reference Application filed by the petitioners on 5 October 1999. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be permitted to contend that because of ignorance, poverty or handicap, they could not file their claims for enhancement of the compensation. 17. It will, therefore, not be appropriate for the Court to entertain this petition filed almost after 18 years under Article 226 of the Constitution for granting them the enhanced compensation. The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.