ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge on 21.04.2008 in W.P.(S) No. 5491 of 2003, whereby the writ application filed by the petitioner-respondent was allowed by this Court. 3. The facts of the case lie in a short compass. The petitioner-respondent’s father late Soren Manjhi was in service of the respondent-BCCL, who died in harness. After the death of his father, the petitioner-respondent applied for appointment in place of his father’s service in terms of provision of National Coal Wage Agreement-V. The application was processed by the appellant-BCCL following the prescribed procedure and after due consideration of all relevant aspects and due verification, including police verification, the appointment was given to the petitioner-respondent as Underground Mazdoor in Category-I by letter dated 31.12.1999 / 06.01.2000. The services of the petitioner-respondent was also confirmed by the appellants. 4. Suddenly, services of the petitioner-respondent was terminated by order dated 16.03.2002 passed by the appellant No. 5, and as to the ground of termination, it was mentioned in the letter that under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, his mother Smt. Dhani Manjhiain had opted for appointment of another person with the same name as ‘Nunu Lal Kisku’. On the basis of the said option of the mother, said Nunu Lal Kisku was appointed at the place of Smt. Dhani Manjhiain, after following all the procedures. Since the petitioner-respondent was given appointment in the same name of Nunu Lal Kisku, his services were terminated. 5. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner-respondent moved this Court in W.P.(S) No. 2480 of 2002. The said writ application was disposed of by setting aside the order and directing the Director (Personnel), M/s. BCCL and the Project Officer, Jogidih Colliery, Dhanbad, to consider the case of the petitioner-respondent and pass appropriate order. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 27.08.2003 was passed by the appellant No. 5, holding that the petitioner-respondent’s case had no merit unless and until the identity of actual Nunu Lal Kisku was established, which could be done by the State Authority. 6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-respondent again moved this Court in W.P.(S). No. 5491 of 2003. Thereafter, the impugned order dated 27.08.2003 was passed by the appellant No. 5, holding that the petitioner-respondent’s case had no merit unless and until the identity of actual Nunu Lal Kisku was established, which could be done by the State Authority. 6. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner-respondent again moved this Court in W.P.(S). No. 5491 of 2003. This Court by the order dated 21.04.2008 passed therein, set aside the impugned order dated 27.08.2003, holding that the services of the petitioner-respondent had been terminated illegally, without there being any fraud or misrepresentation on part of the petitioner at any stage, and even his identity was enquired through police, and he was found to be the son of late Soren Manjhi. As it was found by the learned Single Judge, that the petitioner-respondent had been kept out of service and had been prevented from discharging his duties for no fault of his, he was also held to be entitled for all consequential benefits of the intervening period, including the arrears of full salary and admissible allowances. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that pursuant to the directions passed by the learned Single Judge, petitioner-respondent has been reinstated in service and he is working as such. The challenge to the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge is now confined only to the direction that the petitioner-respondent was held entitled for all consequential benefits for the intervening period, including the arrears of full salary and admissible allowances. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that since there was no material to show that the petitioner-respondent remained unemployed throughout the period, and no gainful work was done by the petitioner3 respondent in the Company during the intervening period, he shall not be entitled for the full salary and admissible allowances and in any case, he would be entitled only for 50% of the full salary and admissible allowances. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mulin Sharma Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2016(4) JCR 101 (SC), as also in Allahabad Jal Sansthan Vs. In this connection, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mulin Sharma Vs. State of Assam & Ors., reported in 2016(4) JCR 101 (SC), as also in Allahabad Jal Sansthan Vs. Daya Shankar Rai and Anr., reported in (2005) 5 SCC 124 , wherein, keeping in view the fact that the workman had not raised any plea or adduced any evidence to the effect that he remained unemployed throughout the period he was out of service, he was allowed only for 50% of the back wages. 8. Learned counsel has also placed relience upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Reetu Marbels Vs. Prabhakant Shukla, reported in (2010) 2 SCC 70 , wherein it has been held that, it does not automatically follow that the reinstatement must be accompanied by payment of full back wages for the period when workman remained out of service and contributed little or nothing to the industry. In this case also, the workman was held entitled only for 50% of the back wages. 9. Placing reliance on these decisions, learned counsel submitted that the impugned Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge entitling the petitioner-respondent for the arrears of full salary and admissible allowances, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 10. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-respondent has submitted that the services of the petitioner was illegally terminated by the appellants for no fault on his part. It is submitted that the parents of the petitioner had only one son, i.e., the petitioner, but another person was taken in employment solely due to the fault on the part of the appellants, as the other person was appointed without necessary verification. It is submitted that after the death of the father of the petitioner-respondent, the petitioner-respondent had given the application for his employment and after due verification, as also the police verification, the petitioner-respondent was appointed in the year 2000. Subsequently, under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, his mother took V.R.S. in the year 2002. It is submitted that there was no misrepresentation on part of the petitioner either at the time of his appointment or at any stage later. Rather, the misrepresentation, if any, was on part of the petitioner-respondent’s mother or the other person impersonating Nunu Lal Kisku, for which, by no stretch of imagination, the petitioner could be punished. It is submitted that there was no misrepresentation on part of the petitioner either at the time of his appointment or at any stage later. Rather, the misrepresentation, if any, was on part of the petitioner-respondent’s mother or the other person impersonating Nunu Lal Kisku, for which, by no stretch of imagination, the petitioner could be punished. Learned counsel submitted that taking these facts into consideration the termination of the petitioner was held to be absolutely illegal and the petitioner has been directed to be reinstated with all consequential benefits, including the full salary and the admissible allowances. Learned counsel has placed reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramesh Kumar Vrs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2015 (3) JLJR 511 (SC), wherein the law has been laid down as follows:- “13. We are conscious that even in the absence of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, a court of law may take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The principle of “no work no pay” would not be attracted where the respondents were in fault in not considering the case of the appellant ------------------- .” (Emphasis supplied) 11. Placing reliance on this decision, learned counsel submitted that since the appellants were in fault in dismissing the petitioner-respondent, the petitioner would be entitled to all consequential benefits upon his reinstatement, including the arrears of full salary and admissible allowances, which had been rightly given by the learned Single Judge and there is no illegality in the same. 12. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon consideration of the fact that the services of the petitioner-respondent were terminated by the appellants for no fault on his part, which was absolutely illegal and void ab initio, we find that the petitioner-respondent is fully entitled to the arrears of full salary and admissible allowances. The law in this regard is no more res integra. In Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 , the law has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:- "22. The law in this regard is no more res integra. In Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 , the law has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as follows:- "22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter’s source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial / quasi-judicial body or court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him / her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments." (Emphasis supplied). This precedent has also been followed by the Apex Court in Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Anr, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 458 . 13. This precedent has also been followed by the Apex Court in Jasmer Singh Vs. State of Haryana & Anr, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 458 . 13. In the present case the appellants have neither pleaded nor proved that during the intervening period the petitioner-respondent was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. As also in view of the fact that the termination of the service of the petitioner-respondent was absolutely illegal and void ab initio, we find that the case of the petitioner-respondent is fully covered by the decisions of the Apex Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase's case (supra) and Jasmer Singh's case (supra). Accordingly, we find no illegality in the Judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, entitling the petitioner-respondent to full salary and admissible allowances, for the intervening period. 14. We find no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.