JUDGMENT : Ramchandra Singh Jhala, J. 1. This second appeal has been filed by the appellant-defendant against the judgment and decree dated 15.4.2005 passed by learned District Judge, Pali in Civil Appeal Decree No. 41/2003 by which the appeal filed by the appellant-defendant was dismissed and the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Pali dated 14.5.2003 in Civil Original Case No. 156/2001 was upheld. 2. Brief facts of the case are that a suit was filed by the respondent-plaintiff for specific performance of contract as well as for grant of permanent injunction against the Municipal Council, Pali to restrain them from further making allotment of the plot in question to any other person. For the said plot, in an auction, the respondent-plaintiff had paid 1/4 of the total amount and he is in possession of the said plot. 3. The appellant-defendant had filed written statement wherein it was stated that on 20.6.1979, 1/4 amount of auction was deposited by the respondent-plaintiff, but due to non-depositing the remaining amount, the auction proceeding was cancelled and on 27.6.1986, the respondent-plaintiff was dispossessed. Earlier he was forcibly in possession of the suit property for which a notice was also given to him. It is also prayed by the appellant-defendant before the trial court that since the remaining amount was not paid and auction was cancelled, the suit may be dismissed. 4. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court had framed the following issues:- ¼1½ vk;k oknh dks oknxzLr Hkw[k.M dk dCtk uhykeh dh 1@4 jde tek djkus ij lqiqnZ fd;k x;k\ oknh ¼2½ vk;k oknh oknxzLr Hkw[k.M ds ckcr lafonk ds vuqlkj :i;s 7500@& izfroknh dk vnk dj fodz; foys[k fu"ikfnr djokus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ oknh ¼3½ vk;k oknh oknxzLr Hkw[k.M dks izfroknh }kjk fdlh vU; dks gLrkUrfjr djus ls jksdus gsrq LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS\ oknh ¼4½ vk;k oknh }kjk iwoZ esa blh vk/kkj ij eqaflQ U;k;ky;] ikyh esa okn is'k fd;k x;k ftlls ;g okn pyus ;ksX; ugha gS\ izfroknh ¼5½ vuqrks"k\ 5. The learned trial court decided the issue No. 1 partially in favour of respondent-plaintiff and partially in favour of appellant-defendant and issues No. 2 and 3 were decided in favour of respondent-plaintiff and vide judgment and decree dated 14.5.2003 decreed the suit in favour of respondent-plaintiff with the condition that he will deposit the remaining sum i.e. Rs. 7,500/- with the appellant-defendant. 6. Against the said judgment and decree of the learned trial court, the appellant-defendant preferred first appeal before the learned District Judge, Pali, who vide judgment and decree dated 15.4.2005 upheld the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. Thereafter the appellant-defendant has preferred the present second appeal before this Court. 7. This Court while admitting the appeal on 16.3.2007 framed the following substantial questions of law:- "(1) Whether the first appellate court committed serious illegality in passing the decree without examine the relevant provision of law relating to the disposal of the land vesting in the Municipal Board, Pali? (2) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court is perverse and there is a serious error in exercise of discretion for granting the decree for specific performance of contract in the facts and circumstances of this case as the discretion has not been exercised judiciously? (3) Whether the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff after lapse of three years is time barred or not?" 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 9. It is contended by learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that the learned appellate court had committed grave error of law by not giving issue-wise finding. He has also contended that neither the appellate court nor the learned trial court has looked in the legal proposition correctly, therefore, both the courts below have misinterpreted the clause of approval of auction by the higher authority. It is contended that it is settled proposition of law that when a statute or any rule which has satisfactory power provided that anything is to be done in certain manner. It is contended that it is settled proposition of law that when a statute or any rule which has satisfactory power provided that anything is to be done in certain manner. It is also contended by learned counsel for the appellant-defendant that since the respondent-plaintiff had not deposited the 3/4 amount of auction within one month, there is error on the part of respondent-plaintiff because he was not vigilant, therefore, the trial court has committed an error while granting an opportunity to the plaintiff-respondent to deposit the remaining amount while decreeing the suit merely on the ground that the file for sanction was pending. It is also contended that since the auction was cancelled in the year 1986 by the higher authority, then he cannot file a suit without challenging the said cancellation order. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant-defendant has placed reliance upon the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Chand Rani (Smt.)(Dead) by L.Rs. v. Kamal Rani (Smt.)(Dead) by L.Rs. reported in (1993) 1 SCC 519 and K.S. Vidyanadam and Others. v. Vairavan reported in AIR 1997 SC 1751 . 11. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant-defendant and has supported the impugned judgments and has submitted that there is concurrent finding of both the learned courts below, therefore, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court in the second appeal. It is also submitted that no error has been committed by learned first appeal court as well as learned trial court while passing the impugned judgments and decrees as the same have been passed after appreciating and scrutinizing the material evidence available on record. Therefore, it is prayed that the present second appeal may be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused both the impugned judgments and material available on record. 13. Therefore, it is prayed that the present second appeal may be dismissed. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused both the impugned judgments and material available on record. 13. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent failed to deposit 3/4 amount of auction and now he has no right to deposit the said amount is not tenable because upon perusal of record, it is proved that the respondent-plaintiff was willing and ready to deposit share of auction amount with the appellant-defendant but no approval was given by the competent authority about the said sale and relevant file was also misplaced from the office of the appellant-defendant so the appellant-defendant himself did not deposit the said share of auction amount and the error is on the part of the appellant defendant. 14. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant that suit is time barred so the learned trial court had wrongly decreed the suit and the first appellate court has also wrongly upheld the same is also not tenable because upon perusal of record, it is proved that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to deposit due amount of auction and when respondent-plaintiff came to know that the appellant-defendant does not want to deposit the remaining amount and refused to deposit remaining amount, then he had filed the present suit so it cannot be said that suit is time barred. In this connection, the respondent-plaintiff earlier requested the appellant and he also gave notice Ex.3 and Applications Ex.5 and 8 to the appellant-defendant to deposit the remaining amount. 15. In this connection, the respondent-plaintiff earlier requested the appellant and he also gave notice Ex.3 and Applications Ex.5 and 8 to the appellant-defendant to deposit the remaining amount. 15. Upon perusal of the impugned judgments, more particularly the judgment passed by learned first appellate court, this Court finds that the learned first appellate court has given its finding as under:- ^^8- fopkj.k U;k;ky; us bl lEcU/k esa rF;ksa ds lEcU/k esa fookn us gksus ls fof/k dh fLFkfr dk o.kZu pj.k la[;k 10 esa fd;k gS] ftlds vuqlkj fu;e 14 o 15 esa ifjf'k"B ^^, esa crk;s x;s rjhds ls uhykeh dh tkuh gSA bu fu;eksa ds vuqlkj ;g Li"V gS fd 1@4 fgLls dks uhykeh ds le; Lohdkj gksus ds ckn tek djok;s tkus ds ckn 'ks"k jkf'k ,d ekg esa tek djokus dk izko/kku gS] fdUrq ;g ugha crk;k gS fd ;fn Lo;a izfroknh uxj ifj"kn mDr jkf'k tek ugha djus ;k fdlh dkj.k ls jksd yxkos ;k fdlh fof/kd dk;Zokgh ds vkns'k ls tek ugha djs rks D;k gks\ bl lEc/k esa ifjf'k"B ^^, ds lkFk fu;e 1974 dk fu;e 30 egRoiw.kZ gS] ftlds vuqlkj nl gtkj :i;s rd dh laifRr ds fy;s cksMZ dh iwoZ Lohd`fr vko';d gS] fdUrq uhykeh ds ekeys esa ,slh Lohd`fr vko';d ugha gSA bldk izfrokn 1983 la'kks/ku ds tfj;s ykxw fd;k x;k gS rFkk [kkyh uhykeh ds izdj.k esa Hkh bl izdkj dh Lohd`fr vko';d FkhA bldk vFkZ ;g gS fd tc o"kZ 1979 esa ;g uhykeh gqbZ] rc uxj ifj"kn dh Lohd`fr vko';d FkhA fcuk ifj"kn dh Lohd`fr ds 'ks"k jkf'k tek ugha gks ldrh FkhA Lo;a izfroknh ds xokg us oknh dh i=koyh xqe gks tkuk dgk gS tks vkt rd ugha feyh vkSj dksbZ Lohd`fr cksMZ us ugha nh vkSj u [kkfjt dhA ekeyk foyaciw.kZ gksus ls funsZ'kd] LFkkuh; fudk; cksMZ dks Hkstk x;k] ftUgksus fcuk efLr"d dk iz;ksx fd;s uhykeh fujLr djus dk vkns'k fn;k] ftls Hkh pqukSrh nh xbZ gSA vr% oknh 30 fnu esa 'ks"k jkf'k tek ugha djkus dk nks"kh ugha gSA mlds }kjk 'ks"k jkf'k tek ugha djkus dk dkj.k izfroknh Lo;a gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa izfroknh@vihykFkhZ viuh Lo;a dh xyrh dk ykHk ugha mBk ldrk rFkk tSlkfd fopkj.k U;k;ky; us fu;eksa dh foospuk dh gS rFkk ekuuh; jktLFkku mPp U;k;ky; ds vizdkf'kr fu.kZ; fnukad 08-09-1999 ,dy ihB flfoy f}rh; vihy 157@1999 esa crk;k gSA bl izdj.k ds rF; o ifjfLFkfr;ka yxHkx leku gSA vr% oknh 'ks"k jde tek djokdj Hkw[k.M dk dCtk izkIr djus o foØ;i= izfroknh ls fu"ikfnr djokus dk vf/kdkjh gS rFkk vihy esa mBk;s x;s vk/kkj cyghu gSA** 16. In my considered opinion, learned first appellate court has not committed any error while appreciating the evidence. Both the learned courts below have rightly recorded the concurrent finding on the issues No. 2 and 3 against the appellant-defendant which is based on sound appreciation of evidence and after thorough examination of the matter. 17. It is well settled law that the scope of judicial review in second appeal is very limited, more particularly when there is concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below. 18. I have not been able to notice any perversity in the impugned judgment of learned first appellate court so also there is no symbol to prove that both the courts below have committed any error in considering the evidence or misread the same in arriving its decision. 19. A three-Judges-Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bholaram v. Ameerchand- (1981) 2 SCC 414 , considered the effect of amendment made in section 100 of the CPC in 1976, and held as under: "The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law." The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Ramaswamy Kalingaryar v. Mathayan Padayachi, AIR 1992 SC 115 , while considering the scope of Section 100 S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 452/2008 Trilok Chand Regar v. Nagar Palika, Niwai & Others CPC, held as under: "Suggested shortcomings in the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below would not alter the situation that those were findings of facts, unquestionable, under the provisions of Section 100, C.P.C., which defines the contours of the power of the High Court in second appeal. ....." The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others- (2007) 1 SCC 546 , considered the true import, scope and ambit of section 100 CPC by referring the section 100 CPC, before and after amendment of 1976, various declarations of law by Privy Council and Supreme Court, Legislative background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, Historical perspective, Rational behind permitting second appeal on substantial question of law, and held as under: "81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is 6 S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 452/2008 Trilok Chand Regar v. Nagar Palika, Niwai & Others clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs." 20. In view of above referred settled proposition of law, no interference can be made by this Court in concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below. 21. Therefore, this Court finds that above substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of this appeal is required to be answered in negative, hence, it is held that the courts below have not committed any error while deciding the issues No. 2 and 3 against the appellant-defendant and drawing inference that the respondent-plaintiff was ready and willing to deposit remaining amount of auction and suit is not time barred and the courts below have also not erred in granting injunction against the appellant-defendant. 22. 22. In view of above discussions, the instant second appeal is found to be devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed.