JUDGMENT : AJAY KUMAR MITTAL, J. 1. By way of instant writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari for quashing the order dated 24.7.2017 (Annexure P-13) passed by respondent No.2 debarring it from participation in the tender floated by respondent No.2 for a period of three years and cancelling the rate contract. Further, a prayer has been made directing the respondents to make the payment of the contact as the petitioner had already made 100% supplies. 2. Briefly stated, the facts necessary for adjudication of the instant writ petition as narrated therein may be noticed. The petitioner is engaged in the business of manufacture of Adhesive Plaster, Gauze Cloth, bandage cloth, rolled bandages, crepe bandages, POP bandages, lint and industrial adhesive tapes and various hospital consumable. The respondents floated a tender vide Notice Inviting Tender and tender document (Annexures P-1 and P-2, respectively) for supply of consumables under different packages for the year 2016-17 to be used in Government Hospitals and Government Medical Collages in the State of Punjab. Vide rate contract dated 15/17.6.2016 (Annexure P-3), the bid of the petitioner was accepted for the items, i.e. Rolled Cotton Bandages of different sizes and Absorbent Gauze Cloth. It was stipulated therein that the rate contract would be governed by the terms and conditions attached with the tender. Respondent No.2 vide purchase order dated 27.7.2016 (Annexure P-4) which included the schedules and delivery dates to various consignee hospitals etc. in phases, placed an order of Absorbent Gauze Cloth and Rolled Bandages of different sizes with the petitioner in terms of the rate contract. In pursuant thereto, the petitioner submitted the performance security against the said tender vide letter dated 8.8.2016 with the Bank Guarantee (Annexure P-5). On the basis of the said purchase orders, the petitioner had already supplied 100% stock. However, no anomaly was found in the supplies of Schedule No.1 with Delivery date as 8.8.2016. All the supplies were duly tested in NABL accredited laboratories and thereafter respondent No.2 had also got tested the entire material supplied and had not found any anomaly qua the respect to the standard and quality of the Absorbent Gauze Cloth and Rolled Bandage as is discernible from the statement, Annexure P-6. All the supplies were duly tested in NABL accredited laboratories and thereafter respondent No.2 had also got tested the entire material supplied and had not found any anomaly qua the respect to the standard and quality of the Absorbent Gauze Cloth and Rolled Bandage as is discernible from the statement, Annexure P-6. The petitioner had supplied a total number of 90655 Rolls (Thaans) of the Absorbent Gauze Cloth to respondent No.2 and its different hospitals, i.e. 100% as per the purchase order from time to time. According to the petitioner, out of the 23 batches supplied by the petitioner, two batches, i.e., 2701 and 2798 containing 4800 Rolls (Thaans) each were not as per the prescribed standard and specification. The said batches after manufacture were duly tested in NABL accredited laboratories which were in accordance with the specifications and were of standard quality as is clear from the lab reports dated 26.8.2016 (Annexure P-7) pertaining to batch No. 2701 and dated 1.12.2016 (Annexure P-8) pertaining to batch No.2798. The petitioner had replaced both the said batches with batch Nos.2832 and 2833, respectively after NABL test reports including the lab test report dated 6.2.2017 (Annexure P-9) pertaining to batch No. 2833. Thereafter, a show cause notice dated 5.5.2017 along with test reports (Annexure P-10 Colly) was served upon the petitioner that the material of Absorbent Gauze vide batch Nos. 2701 and 2798 had not passed the test of Government Laboratory and even the replaced material with batch No. 2833 had again not passed the test. Vide the said show cause notice, three actions were proposed to be initiated against the petitioner. The petitioner filed a report dated 11.5.2017 (Annexure P-11) to the said show cause notice. Subsequently, the petitioner also sent a representation dated 20.7.2017 (Annexure P-12) to respondent No.1 against the said show cause notice. However, respondent No.2 vide order 24.7.2017 (Annexure P-13) had debarred the petitioner from participation in the tender to be floated for Absorbent Gauze by respondent No.2 for a period of three years after forfeiting the security amount and cancellation of the rate contract. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. The said writ petition was contested by the respondents by filing a written statement. It was pleaded therein that the petitioner had supplied 23 batches of Absorbent Gauze as per the orders from time to time and each batch was duly tested by the Government laboratory. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. The said writ petition was contested by the respondents by filing a written statement. It was pleaded therein that the petitioner had supplied 23 batches of Absorbent Gauze as per the orders from time to time and each batch was duly tested by the Government laboratory. However, batch Nos. 2701 and 2798 were found to be below the standard quality and even batch No.2701 was not as per description, the average wrap and average weft were also not as per the standard prescribed. The petitioner replaced the said batches with batch No.2833 which was also sent for testing at the Government laboratory. The said batch also failed due to lack of absorbency. Thereafter, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner and vide order dated 24.7.2017 (Annexure P-13), the petitioner was debarred only for one item, i.e. Absorbent Gauze due to frequent failure of the product. The other averments made in the writ petition were denied and a prayer for dismissal of the writ petition was made. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that respondent No.2 vide order dated 24.7.2017 (Annexure P-13) had forfeited the security amount deposited by the petitioner and debarred the petitioner from participation in the tender to be floated by respondent No.2 for a period of three years without affording proper opportunity of hearing. It was also urged that the impugned order does not satisfy the test of being a reasoned and speaking one and was, thus, liable to be quashed. It was further submitted that the impugned order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents besides supporting the order, Annexure P-13, passed by respondents No.2 have submitted that the petitioner has rightly been debarred from participation in the tender for a period of three years. 6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record produced in the Court, we find merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. A perusal of the impugned order shows that it is not a speaking order passed after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 6. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record produced in the Court, we find merit in the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 7. A perusal of the impugned order shows that it is not a speaking order passed after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. Further, it was noticed that as per the reports of the Government Analyst, Punjab, the material Absorbent Gauze (Batch No. 2701.2798) supplied by the petitioner against the order in question was declared as 'not of standard quality'. Even the replaced material with batch No. 2833 was found as 'not of standard quality'. Consequent upon frequent failure of material supplied by the petitioner against the notification of award dated 27.6.2016, the security deposited by the petitioner was forfeited and the petitioner was debarred from participation in tender to be floated by respondent No.2 for Absorbent Gauze for a period of three years pursuant to Clause Nos. 15 and 20 of the Rate Contract Tender Conditions. Once the respondents were forfeiting the earnest money of the petitioner and debarring it, the same were required to be specifically dealt with by respondent No.2 by passing a speaking order and after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. 8. Delving into the issue relating to the passing of the speaking order by an authority whether administrative, quasi judicial or judicial, it was laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. and another v. Sh. Masood Ahmed Khan and others, (2010) 9 SCC 496 as under :- "17. The expression `speaking order' was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of Writ of Certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See 1878-97 Vol, 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report). 18. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the 'inscrutable face of a Sphinx'. 19 to 50 XX XX XX 51. (See 1878-97 Vol, 4 Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the report). 18. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the 'inscrutable face of a Sphinx'. 19 to 50 XX XX XX 51. Summarizing the above discussion, this Court holds; a. In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. b. A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. c. Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. d. Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. e. Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. f. Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. g. Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior Courts. h. The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the life blood of judicial decision making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. i. Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. j. Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. k. If a Judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or 'rubberstamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. l. Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or 'rubberstamp reasons' is not to be equated with a valid decision making process. m. It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision making not only makes the judges and decision makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor (1987) 100 Harward Law Review 731-737). n. Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See (1994) 19 EHRR 553, at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford, 2001 EWCA Civ 405, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of European Convention of Human Rights which require, "adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decision". o. In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "Due Process". 9. Further, the Apex Court in Canara Bank v. V.K. Awasthy, AIR 2005 SC 2090 while dealing with the doctrine of principles of natural justice had noticed as under :- "8. Natural justice is another name for commonsense justice. Rules of natural justice are not codified canons. But they are principles ingrained into the conscience of man. Natural justice is the administration of justice in a commonsense liberal way. Justice is based substantially on natural ideals and human values. The administration of justice is to be freed from the narrow and restricted considerations which are usually associated with a formulated law involving linguistic technicalities and grammatical niceties. It is the substance of justice which has to determine its form. 9. The expressions "natural justice" and "legal justice" do not present a water-tight classification. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. It is the substance of justice which is to be secured by both, and whenever legal justice fails to achieve this solemn purpose, natural justice is called in aid of legal justice. Natural justice relieves legal justice from unnecessary technicality, grammatical pedantry or logical prevarication. It supplies the omissions of a formulated law. As Lord Buckmaster said, no form or procedure should ever be permitted to exclude the presentation of a litigants' defence. 10. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognized by all civilized States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue. These principles are well settled. The first and foremost principle is what is commonly known as audi alteram partem rule. It says that no one should be condemned unheard. Notice is the first limb of this principle. It must be precise and unambiguous. It should appraise the party determinatively the case he has to meet. Time given for the purpose should be adequate so as to enable him to make his representation. In the absence of a notice of the kind and such reasonable opportunity, the order passed becomes wholly vitiated. Thus, it is but essential that a party should be put on notice of the case before any adverse order is passed against him. This is one of the most important principles of natural justice. It is after all an approved rule of fair play. The concept has gained significance and shades with time. When the historic document was made at Runnymede in 1215, the first statutory recognition of this principle found its way into the "Magna Carta". The classic exposition of Sir Edward Coke of natural justice requires to "vocate interrogate and adjudicate". In the celebrated case of Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works, (1963) 143 ER 414, the principle was thus stated: "Even God did not pass a sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. "Adam" says God, "where art thou has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that though should not eat". Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 11. "Adam" says God, "where art thou has thou not eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that though should not eat". Since then the principle has been chiselled, honed and refined, enriching its content. Judicial treatment has added light and luminosity to the concept, like polishing of a diamond. 11. Principles of natural justice are those rules which have been laid down by the Courts as being the minimum protection of the rights of the individual against the arbitrary procedure that may be adopted by a judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative authority while making an order affecting those rights. These rules are intended to prevent such authority from doing injustice." 10. In view of the above, the order dated 24.7.2017 (Annexure P-13) passed by respondent No.2 forfeiting the security amount and debarring the petitioner from participation in tender to be floated by respondent No.2 for Absorbent Gauze for a period of three years do not satisfy the requirements of being a reasoned order as enunciated by the Apex Court in M/s Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd's case (supra) and is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice as per law laid down by the Supreme Court in V.K. Awasthy's case (supra), as noticed hereinabove. 11. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the order dated 24.7.2017 (Annexure P-13) passed by respondent No.2 is quashed. The matter is remitted to respondent No.2 to pass a fresh speaking order after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner in accordance with law within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. Needless to say that anything observed herein above shall not be taken to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the controversy. 12. The original record be returned to the official concerned or counsel for respondent No. 2 under proper receipt.