ORDER : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. Ajay Kumar Shaw, an accused in FIR No. 10/2017 registered on 24.03.2017 at Police Station CID (SOG), Jaipur for offence under Sections 4/5 of the Indian Explosive Substance Act, 1908 (for short ‘the Act of 1908’) by means of this writ petition has challenged notification dated 02.08.2005 issued by the State Government in exercise of its powers under Section 2(s) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ‘the Code’) whereby the office of the Inspector General of Police (Special Crime and Economic Offence) with its headquarter at Jhalana Mahal, Malviya Nagar, Jagatpura Road, Jaipur has been declared Special Police Station for various offences under different enactments enumerated therein including those relating to open source involving large scale economic frauds; organised crimes, open source related to terrorist activities and offences prejudicial to National Security, public safety and offences against the State. Prayer has also been made to quash aforesaid FIR registered at the instance of one Virendra Kumar, Circle Inspector, SOG, Rajasthan, Jaipur. 2. It was alleged in the aforesaid FIR that on source information, godown of one Girraj Prasad Sharma situated behind Gangeshwar Petrol Pump, Galta Gate, Jaipur was raided. A truck No. RJ-05 GA 8840 was found loaded with explosive substances contained in white colour plastic bags. Two persons were unloading such explosive substances. They disclosed their identity as Girraj Prasad Sharma and Hansraj Meena. With their permission, godown and truck were searched. 204 rods of Gelatin Rods in a cartoon; 2600 detonators in 26 packets of paper; 9 bundle fuse wire in 9 plastic bags and 131 white plastic bags of Ammonium Nitrate were found in the godown. 94 bags of Ammonium Nitrate were found in the truck. On enquiry, both could not produce any licence or letter of permission to transport or store such large quantity of explosive substances, thus they were seized and taken into possession. Samples of Ammonium Nitrate were collected and sealed. The accused were arrested on the spot. During the course of investigation, the petitioner herein was also arrested as an accused and sent to police custody. Charge sheet was filed against these three accused and one Brijesh Kumar Gupta in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur. The matter is presently pending awaiting the requisite sanction of District Magistrate, Jaipur as required by the Act of 1908. During the course of investigation, the petitioner herein was also arrested as an accused and sent to police custody. Charge sheet was filed against these three accused and one Brijesh Kumar Gupta in the Court of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur. The matter is presently pending awaiting the requisite sanction of District Magistrate, Jaipur as required by the Act of 1908. At the outset it is significant to notice that impugned notification dated 02.08.2005 was substituted by notification dated 30.03.2011 though retaining substantially the same offences, but making Inspector, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Police and superior officers posted in Special Operations Group including Additional Deputy General of Police and Inspector General of Police and Inspector General of Police, Anti Terrorist Squad and Special Operational Group, Rajasthan and the Director General of Police, Rajasthan as officer-in-charge in respect of the Special Police Station: “Special Operations Group”. 3. Mr. Vijay Poonia, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that registration of FIR as also investigation into that FIR for alleged offences is also illegal as CID, Jaipur is not lawfully established police station in terms of the provisions of the Code and Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 (for short ‘Rajasthan Police Act’). It is argued that Special Operation Group was established by the State Government vide order dated 27.01.2003 issued by Director General of Police, Rajasthan. It was thereafter that notification dated 02.08.2005 was issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 2(s) of the Code declaring the office of the Inspector General of Police (Special Crime and Economic Offences) with its headquarter at Jhalana Mahal, Malviya Nagar, Jagatpura Road, Jaipur. Name of the police station has thus wrongly been mentioned as CID, Jaipur. Combined reading of order dated 27.01.2003 and notification dated 02.08.2005 would reveal that name of CID, Jaipur has wrongly been mentioned in the FIR. 4. It is argued that establishment of police station is not within the executive domain of the State Government and therefore, the issuance of the notification in exercise of its executive powers was bad in law. The executive powers of the State Government have been prescribed under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, which extends to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. The executive powers of the State Government have been prescribed under Article 162 of the Constitution of India, which extends to the matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws. However, in any matter with respect to which the Legislature of a State and Parliament have power to make laws, the executive power of the State shall be subject to and limited by the executive power expressly conferred by the Constitution or by any law made by Parliament upon the Union or authorities thereof. It is argued that there are two important factors among others on exercise of such executive powers. First, the exercise of such executive powers is subject to the provisions of the Constitution and secondly, the exercise of executive power cannot be stretched to the extent of infringing fundamental rights. Learned counsel referred to Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution of India and submitted that the matter of law which can be enacted by the Parliament and the State Legislature has been described in the form of three lists namely Union List; Sate List and the Concurrent List. As per Article 246 (4) of the Constitution of India, The Parliament has the power to make laws, with respect to any matter, for any part of the territory of India, not included in a State, notwithstanding that such a matter is a matter enumerated in the State List. ‘Police’ is a subject falling under Entry 2 of List II of State List. In view of Article 246 (3) of the Constitution of India, therefore, only a State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws relating to ‘police’ by taking recourse to Entry 2 of List II of State List. However, Union Territories are not States within the meaning of Article 246 of the Constitution of India and therefore, Parliament can make laws, on police for the Union Territories. 5. Learned counsel relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. D.C. Wadhwa & Others Vs. State of Bihar & Others, AIR 1987 SC 579 argued that executive cannot take away the functions of the Legislature. The executive powers are co-extensive with legislative powers of the Union or of the States, as the case may be and therefore, this power is to be exercised within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. D.C. Wadhwa & Others Vs. State of Bihar & Others, AIR 1987 SC 579 argued that executive cannot take away the functions of the Legislature. The executive powers are co-extensive with legislative powers of the Union or of the States, as the case may be and therefore, this power is to be exercised within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. Once a legislation occupies a field, neither any of the States nor the Union can exercise its executive powers on the same field beyond the relevant legislation inasmuch as enacting laws is the primary domain of the Legislature and not of the Executive or else. Executive powers of the State are to fill up the gaps and it cannot act as an independent law making agency. The Executive has to merely implement laws made by the Legislature and act in furtherance of the spirit and legislative policy as enacted by the legislature. It is only when there is no law occupying a field, a State Government can take recourse to its executive powers as long as exercise of executive power does not infringe fundamental rights under Part III of the Constitution of India. 6. Learned counsel argued that the Code provides that a first information report can be registered only in a police station and not otherwise. This would mean that a formal investigation can be carried out only in pursuant to information lodged before the Officer-in-Charge of a police station. Expression “Police Station” has been used in Section 154 of the Code. It is argued that the Supreme Court in H.N. Rishbud & Another Vs. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196 held that investigation usually starts on information relating to the commission of an offence given to an officer-in-Charge of a police station and recorded under Section 154 of the Code. According to said decision, investigation generally consists of, (1) proceeding to the spot; (2) Ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case; (3) Discovery and arrest of the suspected offender; (4) Collection of evidence relating to the commission of the offence and (5) Formation of the opinion as to whether on the material collected case is made out to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial. When therefore State Government proposes to set up a police station, it must trace its power to some statute and not by merely resorting to its executive power without the backing of a statute. 7. It is argued that Section 2(s) of the Code does not provide any statutory competence to the State but it merely recognizes method of establishment of an area as a police station by the concerned State by issuance of notification under the statutory enactment of the state legislature. Prior to enactment of the Rajasthan Police Act, such notification was required to be issued under Indian Police Act, but now after the enactment of Rajasthan Police Act, any notification issued prior thereto is required to be consistent to the provisions of Section 8 of the Rajasthan Police Act. The impugned notification dated 02.08.2005 does not qualify the test of consistency with the provisions of this new Act and therefore, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside. It is argued that existence of a legally constituted ‘Police Station’ is a prerequisite for initiating such criminal proceedings as per the scheme of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Rajasthan Police Act, which provide that each police district is to be divided into one or more circles and for one circle, one or more Police stations can be established but the vertical division of the police district, circle and police station cannot be turned upside down and no police station can be constituted for entire State of Rajasthan, as doing so would be violative of aforesaid provisions. Even as per Section 2(s) of the Code, police station means any post or place declared, generally or specially by the State Government to be a police station and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf. The Code, thus, gives recognition to a place or post as a police station, if declared to be so by the State Government. It is thus clear that this provision merely enables the State Government to make such declaration but does not define police station. The Code, thus, gives recognition to a place or post as a police station, if declared to be so by the State Government. It is thus clear that this provision merely enables the State Government to make such declaration but does not define police station. The reason for such recognition is obvious, because even though the Code is a subject of Concurrent List but whenever, any reference to the expression police station appears in the Code, it would mean and include the police station so declared by the State Government, the mode of declaration having been left to the State Government in accordance with the law made by its legislature. 8. Mr. Vijay Poonia, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is duly licensed by the competent authority to store and transport Ammonium Nitrate as per Explosive Substances Rules, 2012, therefore, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act are not applicable to him. Even if it is assumed that explosive substances have been purchased by co-accused from the petitioner herein, then also, it does not constitute any offence under Section 4 and 5 of the Act. SHO of the Police Station was not competent to conduct investigation. Reliance has been placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Others Vs. Bhajan Lal & Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in which the Superintendent of Police directed SHO of a police station to investigate an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act even though there was statutory prohibition in such investigation. It was held that he had no authority to so direct. The SHO was not clothed with the requisite legal authority within the meaning of second proviso to Section 5 A(1) of the Act to investigate the offence under clause (e) of Section 5(1) of the Act. 9. It is argued that change of nomenclature of the police station vide notification dated 30.03.2011 as “Special Police Station: Special Operation Group” having jurisdiction for investigation of subjects listed therein and subsequent notification dated 17.10.2016 by which expression, “Jhalana Mahal; Malviya Nagar, Jagatpura Road, Jaipur” has been substituted with the expression “SOG Building, Opposite Police Telecommunication Building, Ghat Gate, Agra Road, Jaipur, Rajasthan” does not cure basic defect in the notification as all the notifications have been issued under Section 2(s) of the Code. Even if the petitioner has not challenged the subsequent notifications and has challenged notification dated 02.08.2005 it would not in any manner adversely effect the maintainability of the writ petition and does not provide any escape route to the respondent State to submit that the subsequent notifications are also required to be assailed. It is submitted that the respondents have taken stand in the reply to writ petition that originally name of the police station was described as CID, Jaipur but thereafter it was on the request of the respondents that name of the police station was changed to “Special Operation Group”. Request was made by the respondents to State Crime Report Bureau and name of police station was substituted. It is argued that there is no provision in the Rules or the Code, which empowers the respondents to change the name of the police station reported in the FIR. 10. It is submitted that as per Section 42 of the Rajasthan Police Act, the State Government may by General or Special order create in each Police Station as it may decide from time to time, a separate Crime Investigation Unit headed by an officer not below the rank of Sub Inspector of Police provided that such Crime Investigation Unit in a Metropolitan Area shall be established by the State Government within a period of five years from the notification of the Metropolitan Area. The very creation of the special operation group by way of the order dated 27.01.2003 by the Director General of Police of State of Rajasthan was in the form of Special Crime Investigation Unit, which is envisaged under the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Police Act, therefore, it was not required by the respondent State to turn the special investigation unit of SOG as provided under the provisions of Section 42 of the Rajasthan Police Act as a special police station and that too under the provisions of Section 2 of the Code. 11. Per contra, Mr. 11. Per contra, Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General opposed the writ petition and submitted that notification dated 02.08.2005, which is under challenge has been substituted vide notification dated 30.03.2011 whereby ‘Special Police Station: Special Operations Group’ has been established and the Inspector, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Superior Officer posted in the Special Operations Group including the Additional Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police, Anti- Terrorist Squad and Special Operations Group and the Director General of Police, Rajasthan have been designated as the officer-in-charge of the aforesaid Police Station. However, the aforesaid notification has not been put to challenge in the present writ petition. Since the State Government has power to declare any area to be a Police Station under the provisions of Section 2(s) of the Code, in view of Section 2(k) of the Rajasthan Police Act, no fundamental right of the petitioner can be said to have been infringed thereby. Even otherwise, State Government, which was already having requisite power to declare a particular area and post as police station cannot be taken to have been denuded of its power by mere reason that Rajasthan Police Act has been enacted. Even in case of any conflict between the provisions of a Central Legislation and a State Legislation, the provisions of the Central Legislation shall prevail over the provisions of a State Legislation. Thus, notification dated 30.03.2011 does not suffer from any infirmity or illegality. The provisions of the Code and the Rajasthan Police Act operate in different field. 12. It is argued that the Rajasthan Police Act deals generally with the organization of the State Police and does not control the executive power of the State to declare a place or post as police station, within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Code. Learned Additional Advocate General relied on the judgment of Patna High Court in Md. Yunus Vs. The State of Bihar & Others (Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 563/2013 decided on 27.09.2016) wherein similar argument of Central Legislation has given discretion to State Legislation. It is argued that this issue stands covered by judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Yunus Vs. The State of Bihar & Others (Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 563/2013 decided on 27.09.2016) wherein similar argument of Central Legislation has given discretion to State Legislation. It is argued that this issue stands covered by judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Jaswant Singh, 1990 (1) WLN 572 wherein it was held that all the officers of the Anti Corruption Department of Rajasthan above the rank of Sub Inspector of Police can exercise the powers of officer-in-charge of the police station and Additional S.P., A.C.D. (Rural), Jaipur being an officer of the rank of Additional S.P. of the Anti Corruption Branch of the Rajasthan Police force shall also be an officer in-charge of the police station so far as Anti Corruption Department is concerned. Similar view has been taken by this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Bhagwan Saraogi & Others, 2001 (1) WLC (Raj.) 407 and State of Rajasthan Vs. Hotilal Parashar & Another (3) decided on 21.09.1999. It is submitted that since it came to the notice of the respondents that name of the police station in the impugned FIR was mentioned as CID instead of SOG, request was made by the respondents to SCRB for making necessary correction in the format of FIR and thereafter necessary correction was made, which does not in any manner tantamount to interference in the investigation. It is, therefore, prayed that writ petition may be dismissed. 13. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the material on record. 14. Power of the State Government in declaring a particular post or area as police station is not in any manner diluted by provisions of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Rajasthan Police Act. What is the police station has been defined by the Code in Section 2(s), which means that any post or place declared generally or specially by the State Government, to be a police station, and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf. Section 2(1)(k) of the Rajasthan Police Act also defines police station, but it has taken care to ensure that there should be no conflict in between Central Legislation and the said Act and, therefore, it has merely stated that police station means any area declared to be a police station under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 2(1)(k) of the Rajasthan Police Act also defines police station, but it has taken care to ensure that there should be no conflict in between Central Legislation and the said Act and, therefore, it has merely stated that police station means any area declared to be a police station under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Despite lengthy arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner, we hardly see any conflict between the two legislations and any restriction on the workability of the provisions of the Code after the Rajasthan Police Act was enacted. No doubt, “police” has been enumerated as State Subject in Entry 2 of List II of Schedule VII of the Constitution of India, but at same time we cannot loose sight of the fact that Entry 2 of List III, i.e. Concurrent List of Schedule VII of the Constitution includes all matters included in the code of criminal procedure at the commencement of the Constitution. 15. Contention, therefore, that Central Legislation will have to give way to State Legislation by reason of occupying field is hardly convincing on the contrary it is to be occupied by Central Legislation. Entry 2 of List III, i.e. Concurrent List was already in place when the Rajasthan Police Act was enacted by the State Legislature. State Legislature has purposely taken care to ensure that there is no conflict in so far as establishment of police station is concerned. Therefore, in definition of Police Station in Section 2(1)(k) of the Rajasthan Police Act, it has been categorically provided that police station means any area declared to be a Police Station under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In other words, no separate provision was made in the Rajasthan Police Act as to what would be the police station and all this was already provided by the Code and therefore left. 16. In other words, no separate provision was made in the Rajasthan Police Act as to what would be the police station and all this was already provided by the Code and therefore left. 16. Contention that existence of a legally constituted ‘Police Station’ is a prerequisite for initiating such criminal proceedings as per the scheme of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Rajasthan Police Act, which provide that each police district is to be divided into one or more circles and for one circle, one or more Police stations can be established but the vertical division of the police district, circle and police station cannot be turned upside down and a single police station cannot be constituted for entire State of Rajasthan, does not have any force. The establishment of regular police set up along with the administration of revenue disputes such as the police district and circle is meant for regular police administration. These provisions will have to be construed as General provisions. But when the State Government is of the view that any particular post or place is required to be specifically declared as police station u/s 2(s) of Cr.P.C., it is not denuded of its power only because subsequently, Rajasthan Police Act has been enacted. In fact, what has been argued by learned counsel for the petitioner in the present case is based on the minority view expressed in the judgment of Patna High Court in Md. Yunus (supra) wherein on conflict between the two Judges, matter was referred to third Judge. The Bihar Police Act is in pari-materia with and similarly worded to, Rajasthan Police Act. The arguments, which the learned counsel for the petitioner has advanced in the present case were agitated in that case too. Two Judges differed with the minority judgment and the majority view has to prevail. Unlike in Bihar Police Act, where “police station” was not defined, in the Rajasthan Police Act, police station has been defined to mean that any area declared to be a police station under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In Bihar Police Act also, Section 2 specifically provided all those words and expressions, which have not been specifically defined in that Act, would carry the same meaning as given in the Code of Criminal Procedure and Indian Penal Code. In Bihar Police Act also, Section 2 specifically provided all those words and expressions, which have not been specifically defined in that Act, would carry the same meaning as given in the Code of Criminal Procedure and Indian Penal Code. It was, therefore, held that act of the State Legislature in not defining the police station in the Act thus was intentional and with a purpose. In Rajasthan Police Act, police station has been purposely defined to mean any area declared to be a police station under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The plea of doctrine of occupied field cannot be, therefore, accepted. Moreover, doctrine of occupied field has no application to the present case and even if it has, it would apply in a converse manner. Special Police Station has to be established with a specific purpose to deal with special kind of cases and therefore, would be an exception to the rule. We therefore see no conflict between the provisions of the Code and the Rajasthan Police Act, especially Section 2(s) of the Code and Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Rajasthan Police Act. Argument of occupied field is totally out of place in the present context. 17. Several entries in the three Lists in the VII Schedule are mere legislative heads and it is quite likely that some of them very often overlap. It is trite that wherever such a situation arises, the issue must be solved by applying the rule of pith and substance. Whenever a piece of legislation is said to be beyond the legislative competence of a State Legislature, what one must do is to find out, by applying the rule of pith and substance whether that legislation falls within any of the entries in the State Legislation or the Central Legislation i.e. List I and II. If it does, no further question arises and the attack upon the ground of legislative competence should fail. Rajasthan Police Act is relatable to entry 2 of List 2 of Schedule VII and applying rule of pith and substance, power to notify a particular post or place or a specific officer as a Police Station having been conferred on the State Government itself by Central enactment with reference to List III of Schedule VII, competence of the State Government in issuing impugned notification cannot be doubted. 18. 18. This issue, so far as this Court is concerned, stands already concluded by judgment of this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Jaswant Singh (supra) wherein challenge was made to order passed by Special Judge, ACD Cases, Jaipur discharging the accused on the ground that Additional SP, Outpost, Jaipur Gramin was not in-charge of the police station, which in that case was specifically notified police station under Section 4(s) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Old Code), by which Special Inspector General of Police, Anti Corruption, Rajasthan was notified to be Police Station. It was held in para 5 to 7 of the judgment as under: “5. Sec. 4 of the Cr.PC 1898 (Old code) is the same as sec. 2 of the Cr.PC 1973 (New Code). Clause (s) of sec. 4 of the old code as well as clause (o) of sec. 2 of the New Code defines “Officer in charge of a police station” and it includes, when the officer in charge of the police station is absent from the station house or unable from illness or other cause to perform his duties, the police officer present at the station house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or, when the State Government so directs, any other police officer so present. 6. The State Government under notification No 5.14/1/4/HA/57 dated 15-7-1957 published in Rajasthan Gazette Extraordinary of part-4(Ga) in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (s) of sec.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, and all other powers enabling in this behalf was pleased to declare the office of the Special Inspector General of Police Anti Corruption, Rajasthan at Jaipur to be a Police station, which will be known as the Anti Corruption police station and whose territorial jurisdiction shall extend over the whole of the area of the State of Rajasthan and also directed that the aforesaid police station shall deal with all cognizable offences relating to bribery and corruption including criminal breach of trust, criminal misappropriation and criminal misconduct, in which a public servant is also involved. It is common knowledge that necessity for the aforesaid notification arose because Anti Corruption Department was created by the State of Raj. and a post of Insp. General of Police was created and Senior Police Officer was posted. Therefore, there can be no doubt that in Raj. It is common knowledge that necessity for the aforesaid notification arose because Anti Corruption Department was created by the State of Raj. and a post of Insp. General of Police was created and Senior Police Officer was posted. Therefore, there can be no doubt that in Raj. there is Anti Corruption police station at Jaipur. Police station is defined u/clause (s) of s. 2 of the new code and was also defined under the old code, and means any post or place declared generally or specially by the State Government, to be a police station, and includes any local area specified by the State Government in this behalf. As stated earlier the entire State of Rajasthan is a local area so far as the Anti Corruption police station is concerned. Yet another notification dated 15-7-1987 was issued and its number is F/14/1/4/HA/57. It was issued by the State Government in pursuance of clause (P) of sec. 4 read with secs. 156 and 551 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (old code) and all other powers enabling in this behalf. The State Government was pleased to direct that the powers of an officer in charge of a Police station shall be exercisable by all officers of and above the rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police in the Anti Corruption Branch of the Rajasthan Police Force with respect to the Anti Corruption Police station as notified under the above referred two notifications. It can, therefore, be said that the definition of ‘Officer in charge of police station’ as well as of ‘Police station’ was the same which is in sec. 2(o) and (s) respectively. In my opinion therefore, it can be said that all the Officers of the Anti Corruption Department of Rajasthan above the rank of Sub-Inspector of police can exercise the powers of officer in charge of the police station. Therefore, the Addl.S P. A.C.D. (Rural) Jaipur being an officer of the rank of Additional S.P. of the Anti Corruption Branch of the Rajasthan Police Force shall also be an officer incharge of the police station so far as Anti Corruption Department is concerned. 7. I am therefore, of the opinion that the Addl. Therefore, the Addl.S P. A.C.D. (Rural) Jaipur being an officer of the rank of Additional S.P. of the Anti Corruption Branch of the Rajasthan Police Force shall also be an officer incharge of the police station so far as Anti Corruption Department is concerned. 7. I am therefore, of the opinion that the Addl. S.P. (Rural) Anti Corruption Branch of the Rajasthan Police Force is and was officer incharge of a police station, and therefore, u/s 156 Cr.PC he could have filed a report to the Special Judge, A.C, D. Cases.” 19. This view was reiterated by this Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Hotilal Parashar & Another (3) (supra). When this judgment was not followed by the court concerned, the State approached this Court in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. This Court in State of Rajasthan Vs. Shiv Kumar Saraogi & Others (supra) in para 6 to 8 held as under: “6. Taking into consideration these notifications the definition given in Section 2(o) and 2(s) of Cr.P.C. in relation to officer in charge and police station, this Court in Hotilal Parashar’s case (supra) held that an Inspector of the Anti Corruption Department was competent to present a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. It was further observed that definitions must be construed in law of the Government notifications issued in July, 1957 and so construed the Anti Corruption Branch is a police station and all officers above the rank of Sub Inspector can exercise the powers of the officer in charge and hence the order of the trial Judge was set aside. 7. It has thus been held by this Court that for the purposes of Anti Corruption Act the Anti Corruption Branch of the police is a police station and all officers above the rank of Sub Inspector working in that branch are officers competent to be officers in charge to exercise the function of the officer in charge as contemplated by the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by my learned colleague after considering the definitions of the terms officer in charge and police station as defined in Section 2(o) and 2(s) of Cr.P.C. in view of this authoritative pronouncement by this Court Hotilal Parashar’s case (supra) the impugned order is liable to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. 8. 8. Normally this should be the end of the Misc. Petition. However, certain serious allegations have been made duly supported by affidavit in relation to a Judge whose order is impugned in this petition. It is stated on affidavit that the learned Judge does not regard the order in Hotilal Parashar’s case (supra) as laying down any law. This fact is borne out by the impugned order itself where the learned Judge does notice the judgment in Hotilal Parashar’s case (supra) and has sought to distinguish the same in view of another judgment of this Court in Mangal Singh’s case (supra). In that case it was observed that the officers in charge of police outposts are not officers in charge of police station within the meaning of Section 154 Cr.P.C. The Bench was considering in this case lodgement of an FIR which is required to be gone to an officer in charge of a police station and it was in that light that the Bench observed that the officer in charge of an outpost is not an officer in charge of a police station and consequently it was held that the officers in charge of the police outposts are not officers empowered to record the FIR. The learned Judge should have seen that recording of FIR is entirely different than lodging a report in the court under Section 173 Cr.P.C. after completion of investigation on an FIR already properly lodged. The case of Mangal Singh (supra) deals with lodgement of FIR whereas the judgment in Hotilal Parashar’s case (supra) dealt with lodgement of the report under Section173 Cr.P.C. in the court of competent jurisdiction. The provisions of Sections 2(o) and 2(s) of Cr.P.C. were not noticed by the Bench deciding above case. The question as to whether presentation of a report by an officer of the Anti Corruption Branch above the rank of Sub Inspector under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is proper or not, never fell for consideration before the Bench in Mangal Singh’s case (supra). The ratio in Mangal Singh’s case (supra) could not have been applied to the facts of the present case particularly in view of the judgment in Hotilal Parashar’s case (supra). The learned Judge, therefore, erred in relying on the judgment in Mangal Singh’s case (supra). That also can be considered as an error in interpretation of law and the matter can end at that. The learned Judge, therefore, erred in relying on the judgment in Mangal Singh’s case (supra). That also can be considered as an error in interpretation of law and the matter can end at that. Unfortunately it does not end at that. An affidavit has been filed before me today by Additional Superintendent of Police, Crime Branch, Anti Corruption Bureau, Head Quarter, Jaipur stating that approximately 80 cases are pending acceptance either of final report or challan in this court presided over by this Judge and he refuses to accept or reject either the final report or the challan on the ground that he will not do so till the matter is adjudicated upon by this Court. This, in my opinion, amounts to abdication of jurisdiction by the learned Judge. If he is of the view that he is rightly rejecting the final report or the challan on the ground that it is being improperly presented, he should exercise his jurisdiction and make a speaking order accordingly. He cannot sit over the report without making any order and ignoring a judgment of this Court requiring him to act otherwise. Such action, prima facie, may amount to interference with the administration of justice and, therefore, criminal contempt of this Court. It may also amount to serious misconduct on the part of the learned Judge inasmuch as he has refused to obey a binding decision of this Court and has refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law. I repeat that he could have taken to his opinion rejected the final report or the challan filed by Anti Corruption Bureau, but he could not stop the Judicial process of adjudication.” 20. Mere fact that CID, Jaipur which was earlier recorded as Police Station, has been corrected to “Special Operation Group” on the request made by the respondent, would not improve the case of the petitioner. We have examined the validity of all the three notifications dated 02.08.2005, 30.03.2011 and 17.10.2016, even though later two notifications were not under challenge and learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Advocate General addressed the Court on merits, since the charge sheet has already been filed by the investigating officer concluding a case worth trial, we, in view of the enormity of explosive substances recovered, see no justification in quashing the impugned FIR on merits. All these arguments, except the one which has been dealt with hereinabove, so far as merits of the case are concerned, if and when raised are left open to be examined by the court concerned. 21. In view of above, there is no merit in this writ petition and the same is dismissed.