JUDGMENT : Meenakshi Madan Rai, J. 1. This Appeal assails the Judgment and Decree, dated 19-04-2014, of the Learned District Judge, West Sikkim, at Gyalshing, in Eviction Suit No.02 of 2014, vide which the Learned Trial Court ordered as follows; (i) That, the Plaintiff is entitled to a recovery of the arrears rent (sic) from the Defendant from the month of January, 2013 till the date of disposal of this case. However, in the interest of justice, there are no orders with regard to interest payable thereupon by the Defendant. (ii) That, the Plaintiff is entitled to an amount of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakhs and fifty thousand) only, for the damage caused. Defendant is accordingly directed to vacate the suit premises by taking the heavy machine (sic) after paying the arrears of rent and amount of damages as mentioned above within one month from the date of this Judgment. 2. The primary ground pressed in Appeal was that, the Learned Trial Court failed to appreciate that in the absence of a valid tenancy between the Appellant and the Respondent after 31-12-2012 and the surrender of the suit property by the Appellant, they were not liable to pay any rent and, therefore, no arrears of rent accrued. The next argument pivoted around the order of the Learned Trial Court directing the Defendant (hereinafter “the Appellant”), to pay a sum of Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakhs and fifty thousand) only, for causing damages to the suit property, without assessing the actual extent of the damage or ascertaining the real cause of the alleged damage to the suit property of the Plaintiff, (hereinafter “the Respondent”). 3. In order to appreciate the matter in its correct perspective, I deem it essential to advert to the facts of the case. 4. The Respondent is the absolute owner of a flat, measuring 1141.60 sq.ft., in a three storied RCC building situated at Soreng, West Sikkim, the property having been kept as “Jewni” (property for lifetime), by herself and her husband, Late Bhakta Bahadur Chettri, consequent to a family partition dated 05-12-1993. In 1993, the said property was leased out to the Appellant for a monthly rent of Rs.2,665/- (Rupees two thousand, six hundred and sixty five) only, for a period of five years from 13-04-1993, in terms of Exhibit 3, the Lease Deed document. In 1993, the said property was leased out to the Appellant for a monthly rent of Rs.2,665/- (Rupees two thousand, six hundred and sixty five) only, for a period of five years from 13-04-1993, in terms of Exhibit 3, the Lease Deed document. A Clause existed in the Lease Deed that the Lessee shall have the option of renewing the Lease of the said premises for further periods, on giving Notice of such intention, to the Lessor at least three months prior to expiration of the Lease. The Lessee, however, failed to take necessary steps as provided, hence on expiry of the lease period the Respondent’s husband vide letter, marked Document “X” (before the Learned Trial Court), requested the Appellant to either increase the house rent by 30% or to vacate the occupied premises. This request was communicated by the concerned Divisional Engineer of the Appellant’s Company to the Executive Engineer at Siliguri, West Bengal, in vain. That, the premises thereafter continued to be in the occupation of the Appellant at the previously fixed monthly rent of Rs.2,665/- (Rupees two thousand, six hundred and sixty five) only, duly collected by the Respondent allegedly on the belief that the Lease Deed would be renewed and rent revised. On the demise of the Respondent’s husband on 04-04-2008, the rent was sent in the name of the Respondent’s daughter, Tara Devi Chettri, who continued to collect it till August 2012, after which no house rent was forthcoming. The Appellant, vide letter dated 27-09-2012 intimated the Respondent that the suit property would be handed over on 31-12-2012 and the said letter be treated as “Notice” of three months. That, on checking the suit premises it was found to be in a dilapidated condition which the Appellant was bound to repair before handing over. The prayers of the Appellant were for enhanced rent from the period February 1998, to August 2012, @ Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only, per month, duly deducting Rs.2,665/- (Rupees two thousand, six hundred and sixty five) only, per month, as already paid by the Appellant. Enhanced rent from September 2012, to November 2014, amounting to Rs.2,60,000/- (Rupees two lakhs and sixty thousand) only, pendente lite and future interest @ 4% per month on the principal amount, till recovery of the said amount, Compensation for damages caused to the building amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) only. 5. Enhanced rent from September 2012, to November 2014, amounting to Rs.2,60,000/- (Rupees two lakhs and sixty thousand) only, pendente lite and future interest @ 4% per month on the principal amount, till recovery of the said amount, Compensation for damages caused to the building amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) only. 5. The Appellant, filed their Written Statement before the Learned Trial Court denying and disputing the contentions raised by the Respondent and, inter alia, held that the Suit had not been valued correctly in terms of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. That, the claim for enhanced rent is bad in Law and untenable, the Lease Deed being unregistered thereby attracting the provisions of Section 116 read with Sections 106 and 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter “T.P. Act”). That apart, the Suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, the sons of the Respondent having not been impleaded, on the demise of her late husband. It was also contended that although the Appellant, through its letter dated 27-09-2012, requested the Respondent to take over the possession of the leased property, she failed to do so. Simultaneously, she restrained the Appellant from taking the equipment from the suit property. That, the “Banda Patra” being unregistered, the Respondent cannot be said to be the sole owner of the suit property. On the aforesaid counts, it was urged that the Suit be dismissed. 6. The Learned Trial Court after hearing the parties settled the following Issues for determination; (i) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for a decree of eviction against the Defendant? Onus on Plaintiff. (ii) Whether the Defendant is liable to pay an enhanced rent after the expiry of Lease Deed dated 13-04-1993? Onus on Defendant. (iii) Whether the Lease of the suit property was month to month basis lease? Onus on Defendant. (iv) Whether the Plaintiff is the absolute and sole owner of the suit property and whether the present Suit is untenable/not maintainable for non-joinder of necessary party? Onus on Plaintiff. (v) Whether the Defendant caused material alternation/damages to the suit property and the Plaintiff is entitled to damages and arrear of rent? Onus on Plaintiff. (vi) Relief. Issue Nos.(i), (ii) and (iii) were decided against the Respondent, while Issue Nos.(iv), (v) and (vi) were decided in her favour. 7. Onus on Plaintiff. (v) Whether the Defendant caused material alternation/damages to the suit property and the Plaintiff is entitled to damages and arrear of rent? Onus on Plaintiff. (vi) Relief. Issue Nos.(i), (ii) and (iii) were decided against the Respondent, while Issue Nos.(iv), (v) and (vi) were decided in her favour. 7. The arguments advanced by Learned Counsel for the Appellant before this Court were that the Respondent had been informed of their intention to vacate the premises by their correspondence dated 27-09-2012, consequent thereupon, no valid tenancy existed between the parties. A tenancy would not be created merely because the machinery of the Appellant was unilaterally retained by the Respondent in the scheduled premises. On this ground, Learned Counsel referred to the decision of Raja Laxman Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1998 Rajasthan 44. That, the Learned Trial Court failed to arrive at the finding as to how the Appellant was a tenant after December 2012, and, therefore, the question of payment of arrears in rent to the Respondent as ordered by the Learned Trial Court, does not arise. It was next contended that the Learned Trial Court arbitrarily arrived at the amount of compensation to be paid by the Appellant, while assessment as per the Appellant was in terms of Exhibit ‘E’, duly proved by D.W.1 being a sum of Rs.1,26,051/- (Rupees one lakh, twenty six thousand and fifty one) only, from the date they vacated the suit premises, till the date of Judgment. That, although the Respondent assessed the damages at Rs.6,54,000/- (Rupees six lakhs and fifty four thousand) only, in terms of Exhibit 6, but failed to prove its contents. Hence, the Judgment of the Learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. Per contra, it was canvassed by Learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent that the husband of the Respondent died in 2008 and the relevant Notice was issued to the daughter of the Respondent, Tara Devi Chettri, who is not the owner of the property, thereby raising a question as to its validity. It is denied that the Respondent restrained the Appellant from taking the equipment from the suit premises. It is denied that the Respondent restrained the Appellant from taking the equipment from the suit premises. Referring to Exhibit ‘E’ of the Appellant’s document, it was contended that the assessment of Rs.1,26,051/- (Rupees one lakh, twenty six thousand and fifty one) only, was arrived at without basis by the Appellant, while the Respondent remained unrepresented at the inspection, therefore, the assessment is at best opaque with no clarity on the estimate arrived at. While drawing the attention of this Court to Document ‘Z’ issued by the Appellant to Tara Devi Chettri, dated 27-09-2012, wherein it is stated that the building is ready for handing over on 31-12-2012, it was argued that to the contrary Exhibit ‘E’, dated 23-02-2016, indicated that the Appellant found some damages in the building, clearly revealing that the premises were not ready for handing over in December 2012. That, the photographs exhibited by the Respondent reveal the extent of damages to the scheduled premises then in the occupation of the Appellant. As the suit premises were not handed over to the Respondent, the Appellant continued to be the tenants, till the decision of the Suit. The Appellant sought to rely on Venkita Pathi Naidu vs. Sethu Udayar and Others, AIR 1974 Kerala 132 and Puttegowda vs. State of Karnataka and Others, AIR 1980 Karnataka 102. That, as the assailed Judgment of the Learned Trial Court warrants no interference, the Appeal be dismissed. 9. Learned Counsel for the parties were heard at length and due consideration given to their rival contentions. I have also carefully perused the entire evidence and meticulously examined the documents on record as also the impugned Judgment. 10. The points that arise for determination by this Court are; (a) Whether a jural relationship existed between the parties consequent upon issuance of Notice dated 27-09-2012 by the Appellant? (b) Whether damages have been assessed correctly by the Learned Trial Court? 11. 10. The points that arise for determination by this Court are; (a) Whether a jural relationship existed between the parties consequent upon issuance of Notice dated 27-09-2012 by the Appellant? (b) Whether damages have been assessed correctly by the Learned Trial Court? 11. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to recapitulate here that although the Learned Trial Court while determining Issue Nos.(ii) and (iii) together found that the Respondent was not entitled to enhancement of monthly rent till December 2012 and ultimately ordered that arrears of rent be paid by the Appellant from January 2013, till disposal of the Suit @ Rs.2,665/- (Rupees two thousand, six hundred and sixty five) only, per month, it failed to spell out the relationship between the parties during the said period. In fact, no discussions have ensued on the legal position in terms of the T. P. Act. Instead of skirting the issue, it could well have been decided under Issue No.(ii), but unfortunately was not. 12. That having been said, I now turn to address the points for determination. Taking up point (a) for discussion, Exhibit 3 is the Lease Deed Document between the parties which indicates that it was executed on 13-04-1993, with the Lease period commencing from 11-01-1993, for five years, viz; 10-01-1998, rent being fixed @ Rs.2,665/- (Rupees two thousand, six hundred and sixty five) only, per month. Undisputedly the Lease Deed is unregistered. As rightly contended by the Appellant, a Lease Deed is required to be registered in terms of Section 107 of the T. P. Act. The Section provides that a lease of immovable property from year to year or any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument. The said provision is extracted hereunder for convenience; “107. Leases how made.?A lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Leases how made.?A lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by a registered instrument. All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the less or and the lessee: Provided that the State Government may from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct that leases of immoveable property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession.” 13. When a Lease Deed is not registered as envisaged under the above provision, Section 106 of the T. P. Act comes into play, which provides that in the absence of a contract to the contrary, the lease of immovable property other than for agricultural or manufacturing purposes, shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable on the part of either Lessor or Lessee by fifteen days’ notice. In Punjab National Bank vs. Ganga Narain Kapur, AIR 1994 All 221 it was held that if any person claims to the contrary that the lease was for a fixed term or to be a yearly lease instead of a month to month lease, he has to prove so by legal, valid and reliable evidence. 14. In the Suit at hand, upon determination of the Lease Deed in January 1998, the Appellant continued to pay rent @ Rs.2,665/- (Rupees two thousand, six hundred and sixty five) only, till August, 2012, which was accepted by the Respondent. As the Lease Deed was unregistered, the provisions of Section 106 of the T. P. Act falls into place and, therefore, the tenancy would be a month to month tenancy right from its inception. 15. We may now refer to Section 116 of the T. P. Act which deals with the “Effect of holding over”. As the Lease Deed was unregistered, the provisions of Section 106 of the T. P. Act falls into place and, therefore, the tenancy would be a month to month tenancy right from its inception. 15. We may now refer to Section 116 of the T. P. Act which deals with the “Effect of holding over”. The expression “holding over” means that the relationship of the landlord and the tenant is allowed to continue after the determination of the lease, with the consent of both parties. The Lessee remains in possession and tenders the rent payable while the Lessor or his legal representative accepts it, when infact it was open to the Lessor to recover possession from the Lessee or file a Suit for eviction on his refusal to vacate. Where a person holds over under an unregistered lease and continues in possession by paying the monthly rent, the holding over must be considered as a tenancy from month to month in view of Section 106 of the T. P. Act. The rent payable during such a tenancy would be the same as the previous lease [The State of U.P. vs. Zahoor Ahmad and Another : (1973) 2 SCC 547 ] and the assent of the landlord to the continuance of the tenancy after the determination of the tenancy would create a new right. In the matter at hand the Appellant continued to pay rent from January 1998, to December 2012, while the Respondent accepted it. From the conduct of the parties it is conclusive that from January 1998, to December 2012, a tenancy was created between the parties by holding over, which was a new tenancy in law, by implication. 16. That, having been settled, it would be appropriate to draw a distinction between a “tenant by holding over” and “a tenant by sufferance”, the latter being one that continues after determination of the lease, without the consent of the landlord. This is really no tenancy stricto sensu and requires no notice to determine it, as the status of the tenant is akin to a trespasser, though not exactly a trespasser being rightful in its inception, but wrongful in its continuance. A Lessee holding over with the consent of the Lessor is in a better position than a tenant at sufferance. This is really no tenancy stricto sensu and requires no notice to determine it, as the status of the tenant is akin to a trespasser, though not exactly a trespasser being rightful in its inception, but wrongful in its continuance. A Lessee holding over with the consent of the Lessor is in a better position than a tenant at sufferance. In the case of a tenant at sufferance the liability arises ex delicto, i.e., from a transgression and he will be liable for damages in the form of mesne profit and not payment of rent. 17. We may now examine the relationship of the parties pursuant to December 2012. The Notice being ‘Document Z’ was issued by the Appellant on 27-09-2012, to the Respondent’s daughter, the relevant portion of which is as follows; “………………………………………………………………………………. Dated at NBZ the 27-09-2012 Subject: Notice for Termination of Hiring your Building. As per the instruction from higher authority it is to (sic) intimated you that the rented accommodation by BSNL is to be handed over to your end after 3months (sic) i.e. on 31-12-2012. The Building is ready for hand over. The letter may be treated as Prior notice. Your kind co-operation during the lease period is highly appreciated. …………………………………………………………..………………….” 18. This Notice was followed by a “Handing over and Taking over memo of rented accommodation” which is dated 04-12-2012, Exhibit ‘C’. Vide this Memo, the Respondent’s daughter is informed as follows; “………………………………………………………………………. No: SDE(P)/NBZ/VACATING/OLD T.E BLDG/12-13/02 Dated: 04-12-12 Madam, As per the direction of DGM(CFA) Gangtok, it is to inform you that GMT BSNL Gangtok had decided to hand over the entire rented portion of the old Soreng T.E.-1 accommodation by 31-12-12. Accordingly the said rented portion is ready for handover to your end. Hence you are requested to take over the same on 31-12-12. …………………………..………………………………………………….” Apart from the Memo being dated 04-12-2012, it bears the following details; “(1) Hand over by (sic): Sri Arun Roy (SDE (P)/Nayabazar.) BSNL, Sikkim. On 31.12.12 Sd/- 19-12-2012. (Sig of Sri Arun Roy with seal) Sub-Divisional Engineer (Phones) BSNL, Nayabazar, (Jarethang) South Sikkim (2) Taken over by : Smt. Tara Devi chhetri Vill- soreng Dara Bazar P.O- Soreng Dist- Gayzing West-Sikkim-737121 (Sig of Smt. Tara Devi Chhetri)” 19. On 31.12.12 Sd/- 19-12-2012. (Sig of Sri Arun Roy with seal) Sub-Divisional Engineer (Phones) BSNL, Nayabazar, (Jarethang) South Sikkim (2) Taken over by : Smt. Tara Devi chhetri Vill- soreng Dara Bazar P.O- Soreng Dist- Gayzing West-Sikkim-737121 (Sig of Smt. Tara Devi Chhetri)” 19. The anomalies that stand out in this document are that; although dated 04-12-2012 it is signed by the concerned Officer of the Appellant on 19-12-2012, and purports to hand over the premises on 31-12-2012. The signature of the Respondent’s daughter does not appear on the document on any of the aforementioned dates. Clearly the shortcomings in the document are indicative of the fact that the Appellant continued to retain the Appellant. Merely because Notice was issued of intent to vacate is no proof of such. There is no indication of acceptance by the Respondent, the document being bereft of her signature or for that matter her daughter’s. No independent witnesses are found to be present. 20. Pursuant to this Memo, Exhibit ‘C’ dated 04-12-2012, the Respondent on 08-12-2012 issued a Legal Notice claiming enhanced rent and arrears of rent as found in the prayers to the Plaint and Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) only, for renovation of the premises which was found to be in a dilapidated condition before handing over the premises on 31-12-2012 or to pay a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs) only, in lieu thereof. Records do not bear any response to this communication of the Respondent from the Appellant. Instead, the Appellant rather belatedly after the efflux of several years in the month of February, 2016, constituted a Committee to inspect and assess the damages in the scheduled premises therein during their occupation, and vide Exhibit ‘E’ concluded that the damages to the building was to the extent of Rs.1,26,051/- (Rupees one lakh, twenty six thousand and fifty one) only. The inspection was carried out sans the Respondent or her representative. In the interim, the machinery belonging to the Appellant remained in the premises, it is thus axiomatic that the Appellant continued to be in the occupation of the premises. In view of the foregoing discussions, I have to hold that the Appellant was a tenant at sufferance from January 2013, considering their inaction, despite their purported Notice dated 27-09-2012, followed by the Memo dated 04-12-2012 and legal notice of the Respondent dated 08-12-2012. In view of the foregoing discussions, I have to hold that the Appellant was a tenant at sufferance from January 2013, considering their inaction, despite their purported Notice dated 27-09-2012, followed by the Memo dated 04-12-2012 and legal notice of the Respondent dated 08-12-2012. The anomalies that presented in the handing over Memo dated 04-12-2012 are not being reiterated to prevent verbosity. 21. That, having been said, I may now turn my attention to the provisions of Section 108 of the T. P. Act which lays down the rights and liabilities of Lessor and Lessee. In Section 108 (h), (m) and (q) of the T. P. Act reads as follows; “108. Rights and liabilities of lessor and lessee.—………………………………..……………………………………….… (h) the lessee may even after the determination of the lease remove, at any time whilst he is in possession of the property leased but not afterwards all things which he has attached to the earth; provided he leaves the property in the state in, which he received it; …………………………………………………………………….. (m) the lessee is bound to keep, and on the termination of the lease to restore, the property in as good condition as it was in at the time when he was put in possession, subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force, and to allow the lessor and his agents, at all reasonable times during the term, to enter upon the property and inspect the condition thereof and give or leave notice of any defect in such condition; and, when such defect has been caused by any act or default on the part of the lessee, his servants or agents, he is bound to make it good within three months after such notice has been given or left; ……………………………………………………………….. (q) on the determination of the lease, the lessee is bound to put the less or into possession of the property.” 22. None of the aforesaid conditions have been fulfilled by the Appellant and there is no evidence forthcoming to indicate that the Lessee put the Lessor into possession of the property as required under Section 108(q) of the T. P. Act. Section 108(m) of the T. P. Act requires that damages caused to the suit property be made good within three months, which was not complied with in the instant case. 23. Section 108(m) of the T. P. Act requires that damages caused to the suit property be made good within three months, which was not complied with in the instant case. 23. As the Appellant continued to hold the premises it could not be utilized by the Respondent. The Privy Council in Girish Chunder Lahiri vs. Shoshi Shikhareswar Roy, (1900) LR 27 IA 110 : 27 MIA 110 : MANU/PR/0005/1900 has observed that mesne profits were in the nature of damages which the Court may mould according to the justice of the case. The award of mesne profit is meant to compensate a person who was deprived of rightful possession. According to Section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”), the term “mesne profit” includes not only the profits which the person in wrongful possession actually received, but also those which he might have received with ordinary diligence, but does not include profits due to improvements made by person in wrongful possession. Given a wider connotation it would mean that which the Appellant has lost on account of the wrongful act of the Respondent, in other words the amount the Respondent might reasonably be expected to have made, had he been in possession. Hence, the Respondent is entitled to mesne profits which are assessed at Rs.1,43,910/- (Rupees one lakh, forty three thousand, nine hundred and ten) only, with interest @ 4% per annum, till full and final payment as it is fair to infer that had possession been with the Respondent she would have obtained rent at the prevailing rate. Consequently, the order of the Learned Trial Court on arrears of rent is set aside. 24. Now to address point (b), it is true that different assessments for damage to the premises have been made by the Appellant and the Respondent both of which did not appear to be reliable to the Learned Trial Court as the assessment of the Appellant was sans the presence of the Respondent, while the Respondent failed to prove her document. To obliterate any grievance the Learned Trial Court could have invoked the provisions of Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC to arrive at the assessment. Nevertheless, after due consideration of all materials on record and the photographs filed by the Respondent, I find that the damages assessed by the Learned Trial Court bears no infirmity. 25. To obliterate any grievance the Learned Trial Court could have invoked the provisions of Order 26 Rule 9 of the CPC to arrive at the assessment. Nevertheless, after due consideration of all materials on record and the photographs filed by the Respondent, I find that the damages assessed by the Learned Trial Court bears no infirmity. 25. In this context, it would be relevant to point to the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dalip Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 114 , it was observed that “In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well-established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.” The above observation appears to be apt for the present purposes. In Ramrameshwari Devi and Others vs. Nirmal Devi and Others, (2011) 8 SCC 249 , the Supreme Court has held that the Courts have to take into consideration pragmatic realities and have to be realistic in imposing the costs. 26. Hence, on consideration of the entire facts and circumstances and the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court hereinabove, it is ordered as follows; (a) The Appellant shall pay Rs.1,43,910/- (Rupees one lakh, forty three thousand, nine hundred and ten) only, as mesne profits with interest @ 4% per annum, from January 2013, to June 2017. (b) Rs.2,50,000/- (Rupees two lakhs and fifty thousand) only, for damages caused to the suit property. 27. The Judgment of the Learned Trial Court is modified to the extent detailed hereinbefore and Appeal allowed to that extent. 28. Vacant possession of the suit premises be handed over by the Appellant to the Respondent, on or before 30-06-2017, failing which the Appellant shall pay simple interest @ 10% per annum, on both the above sums till possession is handed over. 29. No order as to costs. 30. Copy of this Judgment be sent to the Learned Trial Court for information. 31. 29. No order as to costs. 30. Copy of this Judgment be sent to the Learned Trial Court for information. 31. Records of the Learned Trial Court be remitted forthwith.