ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioners whose writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3141 of 2015 was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 25.11.2016, whereby the claim for getting compassionate appointment has been rejected by the learned Single Judge, and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioners. 2. Having heard counsels for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that father of the appellant No. 1 expired on 25.5.2003. Thereafter 14 years period have elapsed by now. The very purpose of the compassionate appointment has been frustrated by now. It ought to be kept in mind that compassionate appointment is not an alternative mode of appointment in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The same is given as an exception to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India with a view to give immediate financial support to the family of the deceased employee. Lapse of time is a crucial factor for denial of the compassionate appointment. 3. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of LIC v. Asha Ramchhandra Ambekar, reported in (1994) 2 SCC 718 , in paragraphs 10, 11 and 13, which read as under :- "10. Of late, this Court is coming across many cases in which appointment on compassionate ground is directed by judicial authorities. Hence, we would like to lay down the law in this regard. The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration. No doubt Shakespeare said in "Merchant of Venice" : "The quality of mercy is not strain'd; It droppeth, as the gentle rain from heaven Upon the place beneath it is twice bless'd; It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes;" These words will not apply to all situations. Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that "law is the embodiment of all Wisdom". Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be. 11. At this juncture we may usefully refer to Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta. It should be remembered that "law is the embodiment of all Wisdom". Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be. 11. At this juncture we may usefully refer to Martin Burn Ltd. v. Corporation of Calcutta. At page 535 of the Report the following observations are found : "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a Court likes the result or not." The Courts should endeavour to find out whether a particular case in which sympathetic considerations are to be weighed falls within the scope of law. Disregardful of law, however, hard the case may be, it should never be done. In the very case itself, there are regulations and instructions which we have extracted above. The Court below has not even examined whether a case falls within the scope of these statutory provisions. Clause 2 of sub-clause (iii) of Instructions makes it clear that relaxation could be given only when none of the members of the family is gainfully employed. Clause 4 of the circular dated January 20, 1987 interdicts such an appointment on compassionate grounds. The appellant Corporation being a statutory Corporation is bound by the Life Insurance Corporation Act as well as the Statutory Regulations and Instructions. They cannot be put aside and compassionate appointment be ordered. 13. It is true that there may be pitiable situations but on that score, the statutory provisions cannot be put aside." (Emphasis supplied) 4. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Paras Nath, reported in (1998) 2 SCC 412 , in paragraphs 4 and 5, which read as under : "4. Seventeen years after the death of his father, the respondent, on 8.1.1986, made an application for being appointed to the post of a Primary School Teacher under the said Rules. His application was rejected. He, thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court. Seventeen years after the death of his father, the respondent, on 8.1.1986, made an application for being appointed to the post of a Primary School Teacher under the said Rules. His application was rejected. He, thereafter filed a writ petition before the High Court. This writ petition was allowed by the High Court and an appeal from the decision of the Single Judge of the High Court was also dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence the State has filed the present appeal. 5. The purpose of providing employment to a dependant of a Government servant dying in harness in preference to anybody else, is to mitigate the hardship caused to the family of the employee on account of his unexpected death while still in service. To alleviate the distress of the family, such appointments are permissible on compassionate grounds provided there are Rules providing for such appointment. The purpose is to provide immediate financial assistance to the family of a deceased Government servant. None of these considerations can operate when the application is made after a long period of time such as seventeen years in the present case." (Emphasis supplied) 5. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 192 , in paragraph 3, which reads as under : "3. We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. This Court has held in a number of cases that compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread-earner who had left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In fact such a view has been expressed in the very decision cited by the petitioner in Director of Education v. Pushpendra Kumar. It is also significant to notice that on the date when the first application was made by the petitioner on 2.6.1988, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief. (Emphasis supplied) 6. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief. (Emphasis supplied) 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Anil Badyakar, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 112 , in paragraph 20, which reads as under : "20. The principles indicated above would give a clear indication that the compassionate appointment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered after a lapse of time and after the crisis is over. (Emphasis supplied) 7. Now, in the facts of the present case, it appears that this appellant was minor as on the date of death of his father which has taken place on 25.5.2003. The date of birth of the appellant No.1 (original petitioner) is 12.5.1992, hence, his age as on the date of the death of his father was 11 years and 11 months approximately. His name cannot be kept alive in the live roster as per Clause 9.5.0 of National Coal Wage Agreement (V) which is brought into effect from 1.1.2000. 8. In view of Clause 9.5.0 of National Coal Wage Agreement (V), also his name cannot be kept in live roster. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition being W.P.(S) No. 3141 of 2015 vide judgment and order dated 25.11.2016. We, see no reason to take any other view than what has been taken by the learned Single Judge. 9. Counsel for the appellant has submitted that there is want of only one month, otherwise his name could have been kept in the live roster. This period of one month cannot be allowed by this Court or the order dated 25.11.2016 passed by this Court in violation of Clause 9.5.0 of National Coal Wage Agreement (V). 10. Charity beyond law is cruelty to others. If the law shows sympathy to everybody, then it is sympathetic to this appellant also. Looking to the cut-off date as stated herein above, the age of the appellant No.1 at that point of time was 12 years. 10. Charity beyond law is cruelty to others. If the law shows sympathy to everybody, then it is sympathetic to this appellant also. Looking to the cut-off date as stated herein above, the age of the appellant No.1 at that point of time was 12 years. Whenever there is any cut-off date as given by the law or agreement, there are bound to be few persons who are falling on the wrong side of the cut-off date. There cannot be any cut-off date which never generates the cases which are falling on the wrong side of the cut-off date or line. The line drawn under the National Coal Wage Agreement (V) cannot be altered by this Court, in view of catena of decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court. 11. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Parameshwaran Match Works, reported in (1975) 1 SCC 305 , in paragraph 10, which reads as under : "10. The concessional rate of duty can be availed of only by those who satisfy the conditions which have been laid down under the notification. The respondent was not a manufacturer before September 4, 1967 as it had applied for licence only on September 5, 1967 and it could not have made a declaration before September 4, 1967 that its total clearance for the financial year 1967-68 is not estimated to exceed 75 million matches. In the matter of granting concession or exemption from tax, the Government has a wide latitude of discretion. It need not give exemption or concession to everyone in order that it may grant the same to some. As we said, the object of granting the concessional rate of duty was to protect the smaller units in the industry from the competition by the larger ones and that object would have been frustrated, if, by adopting the device of fragmentation, the larger units could become the ultimate beneficiaries of the bounty. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; Dr. Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. That a classification can be founded on a particular date and yet be reasonable, has been held by this Court in several decisions (see Hatisingh Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Union of India; Dr. Mohammad Saheb Mahboob Medico v. Deputy Custodian-General, Bhikuse Yamasa Kshatriya (P) Ltd. v. Union of India and Daruka & Co. v. Union of India. The choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the Legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless we can say that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. See Louisville Gas Co. v. Alabama Power Co. per Justice Holmes." (Emphasis supplied) 12. It, has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra, reported in (1990) 2 SCC 669 , in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, which read as under : "6. There is no dispute that the eligibility of a candidate as to age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police should be determined according to Rule 5 of the A.P. Police Services Rules. It is, therefore, necessary to look first at that Rule. Rule 5 so far as is relevant provides : "5. Qualifications.-(A) No person shall be eligible for appointment as a Deputy Superintendent of Police, Category 2 by direct recruitment unless he– (i) has completed the age of 21 years and had not completed the age of 26 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. * * *" 7. The rule prescribes the minimum as well as the maximum age for appointment as Deputy Superintendent of Police. Minimum age is 21 years. The candidate must have completed 21 years on the first day of July of the year in which the selection is made. He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed : "According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. He should not have also completed 26 years as on that day. The Tribunal while construing this rule has observed : "According to the procedure the process of selection begins with the issue of the advertisement and culminates in forwarding the list to the appointing authority. The essence of the process lies in the preparation of the list. A selection can be said to have been done only when the list is prepared. In this view the eligibility of the candidates as to age has to be determined at this stage." If the word 'selection' is understood in a sense meaning thereby only the final act of selecting candidates with preparation of the list for appointment, then the conclusion of the Tribunal may not be unjustified. But round phrases cannot give square answers. Before accepting that meaning, we must see the consequences, anomalies and uncertainties that it may lead to. The Tribunal in fact does not dispute that the process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. Indeed, it consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny of applications, rejection of defective applications or elimination of ineligible candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview or viva voce and preparation of list of successful candidates for appointment. Rule 3 of the Rules of Procedure of the Public Service Commission is also indicative of all these steps. When such are the different steps in the process of selection, the minimum or maximum age for suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific, and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for recruiting agency to scrutinise applications. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority. 8. The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied) 13. It would be, therefore, unreasonable to construe the word selection only as the factum of preparation of the select list. Nothing so bad would have been intended by the rule making authority. 8. The appeal therefore, is allowed setting aside the order of the Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied) 13. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ami Lal Bhat (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 614 , in paragraphs 5, 7, 11 and 17, which read as under : "5. This contention, in our view, is not sustainable. In the first place the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age prescribed for a post is not, per se, arbitrary. Basically, the fixing of a cut-off date for determining the maximum or minimum age required for a post, is in the discretion of the rule-making authority or the employer as the case may be. One must accept that such a cut-off date cannot be fixed with any mathematical precision and in such a manner as would avoid hardship in all conceivable cases. As soon as a cutoff date is fixed there will be some persons who fall on the right side of the cut-off date and some persons who will fall on the wrong side of the cut-off date. That cannot make the cut-off date, per se, arbitrary unless the cut-off date is so wide off the mark as to make it wholly unreasonable. This view was expressed by this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works and has been reiterated in subsequent cases. In the case of A.P. Public Service Commission v. B. Sarat Chandra the relevant service rule stipulated that the candidate should not have completed the age of 26 years on the 1st day of July of the year in which the selection is made. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court, considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, "when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. Such a cut-off date was challenged. This Court, considered the various steps required in the process of selection and said, "when such are the different steps in the process of selection the minimum or maximum age of suitability of a candidate for appointment cannot be allowed to depend upon any fluctuating or uncertain date. If the final stage of selection is delayed and more often it happens for various reasons, the candidates who are eligible on the date of application may find themselves eliminated at the final stage for no fault of theirs. The date to attain the minimum or maximum age must, therefore, be specific and determinate as on a particular date for candidates to apply and for the recruiting agency to scrutinise the applications". This Court, therefore, held that in order to avoid uncertainty in respect of minimum or maximum age of a candidate, which may arise if such an age is linked to the process of selection which may take an uncertain time, it is desirable that such a cut-off date should be with reference to a fixed date. Therefore, fixing an independent cut-off date, far from being arbitrary makes for certainty in determining the maximum age. 7. In the present case, the cut-off date has been fixed by the State of Rajasthan under its Rules relating to various services with reference to the 1st of January following the year in which the applications are invited. All Service Rules are uniform on this point. Looking to the various dates on which different departments and different heads of administration may issue their advertisements for recruitment, a uniform cut-off date has been fixed in respect of all such advertisements as 1st January of the year following. This is to make for certainty. Such a uniform date prescribed under all Service Rules and Regulations makes it easier for the prospective candidates to understand their eligibility for applying for the post in question. Such a date is not so wide off the mark as to be construed as grossly unreasonable or arbitrary. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The time-gap between the advertisement and the cut-off date is less than a year. It takes into account the fact that after the advertisement, time has to be allowed for receipt of applications, for their scrutiny, for calling candidates for interview, for preparing a panel of selected candidates and for actual appointment. The cut-off date, therefore, cannot be considered as unreasonable. It was, however, strenuously urged before us that the only acceptable cut-off date is the last date for receipt, of applications under a given advertisement. Undoubtedly, this can be a possible cut-off date. But there is no basis for urging that this is the only reasonable cut-off date. Even such a date is liable to question in given circumstances. In the first place, making a cut-off date dependent on the last date for receiving applications, makes it more subject to vagaries of the department concerned, making it dependent on the date when each department issues an advertisement, and the date which each department concerned fixes as the last date for receiving applications. A person who may fall on the wrong side of such a cut-off date may well contend that the cut-off date is unfair, since the advertisement could have been issued earlier; or in the alternative that the cut-off date could have been fixed later at the point of selection or appointment. Such an argument is always open, irrespective of the cut-off date fixed and the manner in which it is fixed. That is why this Court has said in the case of Parameswaran Match Works and later cases that the cut-off date is valid unless it is so capricious or whimsical as to be wholly unreasonable. To say that the only cut-off date can be the last date for receiving applications, appears to be without any basis. In our view the cut-off date which is fixed in the present case with reference to the beginning of the calendar year following the date of application, cannot be considered as capricious or unreasonable. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. On the contrary, it is less prone to vagaries and is less uncertain. 11. In our view this kind of an interpretation cannot be given to a rule for relaxation of age. The power of relaxation is required to be exercised in public interest in a given case; as for example, if other suitable candidates are not available for the post, and the only candidate who is suitable has crossed the maximum age-limit; or to mitigate hardship in a given case. Such a relaxation in special circumstances of a given case is to be exercised by the administration after referring that case to the Rajasthan Public Service Commission. There cannot be any wholesale relaxation because the advertisement is delayed or because the vacancy occurred earlier especially when there is no allegation of any mala fides in connection with any delay in issuing an advertisement. This kind of power of wholesale relaxation would make for total uncertainty in determining the maximum age of a candidate. It might be unfair to a large number of candidates who might be similarly situated, but who may not apply thinking that they are age-barred. We fail to see how the power of relaxation can he exercised in the manner contended. 17. In the premises the appeals of the candidates who have challenged the cut-off date under the relevant rules are dismissed while the appeals filed by the State of Rajasthan are allowed. The validity of the Rules concerned relating to the, cut-off date being fixed with reference to 1st of January of the year following the application is upheld. There will be no order as to costs." (Emphasis supplied) 14. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of UGC v. Sadhana Chaudhary, reported in (1996) 10 SCC 536 , in paragraph 21, which reads as under : "21. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. We find considerable force in the aforesaid submissions of Shri Banerjee. It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the Legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See : Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31-12-1993, as fixed by notification dated 21-6-1995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of Lecturer has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph.D. thesis or obtaining M. Phil. degree by candidates who had undertaken the study for Ph.D. or M. Phil. degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31.12.1993, cannot be held to be capricious or whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lecturers. The High Court was in error in taking this view. .... (Emphasis supplied) 15. It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Government of A.P. v. N. Subbarayudu, reported in (2008) 14 SCC 702 , in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, which read as under : "5. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. In a catena of decisions of this Court it has been held that the cut-off date is fixed by the executive authority keeping in view the economic conditions, financial constraints and many other administrative and other attending circumstances. This Court is also of the view that fixing cut-off dates is within the domain of the executive authority and the Court should not normally interfere with the fixation of cut-off date by the executive authority unless such order appears to be on the face of it blatantly discriminatory and arbitrary. 6. No doubt in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India this Court had struck down the cut-off date in connection with the demand of pension. However, in subsequent decisions this Court has considerably watered down the rigid view taken in Nakara case as observed in para 29 of the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Nath Goyal. 7. There may be various considerations in the mind of the executive authorities due to which a particular cut-off date has been fixed. These considerations can be financial, administrative or other considerations. The Court must exercise judicial restraint and must ordinarily leave it to the executive authorities to fix the cut-off date. The Government must be left with some leeway and free play at the joints in this connection. 8. In fact several decisions of this Court have gone to the extent of saying that the choice of a cut-off date cannot be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is given for the same in the counter-affidavit filed by the Government (unless it is shown to be totally capricious or whimsical), vide State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad, Union of India v. Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal (vide SCC para 5), Ramrao v. All India Backward Class Bank Employees Welfare Assn. (vide SCC para 31), University Grants Commission v. Sadhana Chaudhary, etc. It follows, therefore, that even if no reason has been given in the counter-affidavit of the Government or the executive authority as to why a particular cut-off date has been chosen, the Court must still not declare that date to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 unless the said cut-off date leads to some blatantly capricious or outrageous result. 9. 9. As has been held by this Court in Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass and in Government of A.P. v. P. Laxmi Devi the Court must maintain judicial restraint in matters relating to the legislative or executive domain. (Emphasis supplied) 16. In view of these decisions, the cut-off date cannot be extended by this Court and hence, this Letters Patent Appeal cannot be entertained Thus, no error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while deciding the writ petition being W.P. (S) No. 3141 of 2015 vide judgment and order dated 25.11.2016 and we are in full agreement with the reasons given by the learned Single Judge. 17. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and the same is, hereby, dismissed. Appeal dismissed.