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2017 DIGILAW 2119 (ALL)

MOHD. YAQUB KHAN (DEAD) v. JALIL KHAN (DEAD)

2017-09-08

RANG NATH PANDEY

body2017
JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rang Nath Pandey, J.—This second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the appellants-plaintiffs against the Judgment and Decree dated 19.5.1979 passed by Civil Judge, Sultanpur, whereby setting aside the Judgment and Decree dated 9.1.1978 passed by II Additional Munsif, Sultanpur, learned Civil Judge partly allowed the appeal and remanded back the matter to the learned Munsif. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that plaintiff-appellants filed the suit for declaration that they have got 1/32 share in the grove in dispute described in list ‘A’ given at the foot of the plaint and have got half share in the property given in list ‘B’. In the plaint, the plaintiffs had given long pedigree and had pleaded that property given in list ‘A’ is ancestral grove of parties and parties are joint bhumidhar in possession of the same and plaintiffs have 1/32 share therein. It was further pleaded that one Bisesar Tiwari was the owner of the property mentioned in list ‘B’. He had transferred the property to Rambahadur, Umrao Khan and Abdul Aziz. Kallu Khan, Lallu Khan and Sardar filed a suit being No. 305 of 1922 before the Munsif against Bisesar Tiwari, which was decreed on 19.12.1922. According to that decree, Kallu Khan, plaintiff of the said case, deposited money for pre-emption, which was taken by Rambahadur and others. Decree holders were given possession of the same. Lallu Khan and Sardar died issueless and their mother namely Maan Bibi also died. In these circumstances, Kallu Khan alone remained owner of the same. After death of Kallu Khan, plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 22 and 23 are bhumidhars in possession of the same. In this way, the plaintiffs have half share therein and defendants 1 to 21 have no concern with the same nor they ever remained in possession of the same. The grove mentioned in the list ‘A’ and ‘B’ were recorded in one Khata and due to that the other defendants also started to assert their title in the grove in suit, hence the suit. 3. While contesting the suit, defendant Nos. 12, 18 and 19 admitted the claims of the plaintiffs. Defendant Nos. The grove mentioned in the list ‘A’ and ‘B’ were recorded in one Khata and due to that the other defendants also started to assert their title in the grove in suit, hence the suit. 3. While contesting the suit, defendant Nos. 12, 18 and 19 admitted the claims of the plaintiffs. Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 filed written statement with the allegation that the plaintiffs have not got 1/32 share in the property of the list ‘A’ and have no concern with the property of list ‘B’ nor they ever remained in possession of the said property. In their written statement, it has been alleged that Bisesar was owner of the property mentioned in list ‘B’ and had executed sale-deed for Rs. 1000/- in favour of Rambahadur, Umrao and Abdul Aziz on 18.7.1921 and they and their descendants became owner of the same. Therefore, the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 22 and 23 have got no concern with the property of list ‘B’. It is further pleaded that the title regarding bhumidhari land is involved in this case, hence suit is barred by Section 229 B U.P.Z.A. Act. It is further alleged that consolidation has taken place, hence the suit is barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act and is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. Defendant Nos. 10,13 to 17 and 20 also filed written statement with the said allegations. Defendant Nos. 4, 6, 7 and 11 also filed written statement with the same allegation as made by defendant Nos. 1 to 3, 8 and 9 and defendant No. 21 filed the written statement with the same allegations. 4. After hearing the pleadings of the learned counsel for the parties and considering the evidence available on record as well as written statements, learned Munsif framed the following issues: “(i) Whether the plaintiffs have got 1/32 share in the property mentioned in list ‘A’ of the plaint? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs alongwith defendants Nos. 22 and 23 have got 1/2 share in the property mentioned in list ‘B’ of the plaint? (iii) Whether the pedigree given in the plaint is correct? (iv) Whether the suit is barred under Section 229B of the Z.A.L.R. Act? (v) Whether the suit is barred by Section 49 of the C.H. Act? (vi) Whether the suit is barred by Section 34 of the S.R. Act? (iii) Whether the pedigree given in the plaint is correct? (iv) Whether the suit is barred under Section 229B of the Z.A.L.R. Act? (v) Whether the suit is barred by Section 49 of the C.H. Act? (vi) Whether the suit is barred by Section 34 of the S.R. Act? (vii) Whether the suit is not maintainable? (viii) Whether the suit is within time? (ix) Whether the suit is triable by this Court? (x) Whether the suit is under valued? (xi) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of U.P. State and Gaon Sabha? (xii) To what relief if any is the plaintiff entitled?” 5. While deciding issue Nos. 10 and 11, the learned Munsif held that the suit is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and Court-fee paid is sufficient. While deciding issue No. 5, it was held that the suit is barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act and the suit cannot proceed. With the said findings, vide Judgment dated 9.1.1978, learned Munsif, accordingly, dismissed the suit as abated. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the plaintiff-appellant filed an appeal being Civil Appeal No. 75 of 1978 before the Civil Judge, Sultanpur. 7. Learned Appellate Court while considering the appeal filed by the plaintiffs, framed a question/point for consideration as to whether the matter could be raised before the consolidation authorities and was not raised. 8. Considering the pleadings as well as the evidence produced by learned counsel for the parties and discussing the question/point for consideration, the learned Appellate Court partly allowed the said appeal and set aside the judgment passed by the learned Munsif vide Judgment dated 19.5.1979. Learned Civil Judge also remanded back the matter to the Court of learned Munsif for afresh consideration. 9. Being aggrieved with and dissatisfied by the Judgment dated 19.5.1979, the plaintiff-appellant filed the present second appeal. This Court, vide order dated 29.7.2016, was pleased to frame following two substantial questions of law for consideration: (i) Whether a declaration of the extent of share of the appellants in the grove where the title of some of the other co-sharers is denied is barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act? This Court, vide order dated 29.7.2016, was pleased to frame following two substantial questions of law for consideration: (i) Whether a declaration of the extent of share of the appellants in the grove where the title of some of the other co-sharers is denied is barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act? (ii) Whether in view of the object of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act being formation of chaks in which groves are not included the suit for declaration of the title in the grove can be said to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act? 10. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants has vehemently argued that the trial Court severely erred in law in deciding issue No. 5 by holding that the dispute pertaining to grove land ought to have been resolved during the continuance of the consolidation proceedings itself, when there is no bar of raising the dispute before the competent Court which has not been raised before or decided by the Consolidation Courts. He further argued that the regular suit filed by the plaintiff being for declaration of rights of grove land, the suit ought to have been entertained by the learned Civil Court as the Consolidation Courts had not adjudicated on the question of title in respect of grove land. He has further argued that the learned trial Court erred in holding that the dispute ought to have been resolved before the consolidation Courts ignoring the time when the cause of action arose. 11. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants has contended that the learned Appellate Court committed severe illegality in holding that the suit in respect of list ‘A’ with the plaint will not be maintainable before the Civil Court when the nature of land mentioned in list ‘A’ and list ‘B’ were the same. Learned counsel further contended that learned Appellate Court ought to have decreed the suit for the reason that the question of title had not been adjudicated by the consolidation Courts and the notification under Section 52 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 having taken place, the contesting parties could not approach the consolidation authorities and because the only remedy to get the title decided was before the Civil Court. 12. 12. Learned counsel further contended that in any view of the matter when the nature of land of list ‘A’ as well as list ‘B’ with the plaint are the same, the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court is short of differentiating as to how the suit in respect of list ‘A’ will not be maintainable before the Civil Court. Learned counsel also contended that the judgments and decrees passed by the learned trial Court as well as the learned appellate Court suffer from severe illegality and as such the impugned judgments and decrees deserve to be set aside. 13. In support of their submissions, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants has placed reliance upon the following judgments: (a) Special Appeal No. 39 of 1964 (Thakur Sant Bux Singh v. S.G. Singh, Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lucknow and others) decided on 12.1.1965. (b) Civil Misc. Writ No. 4100 of 1967 (Rishal Singh v. Board of Revenue, U.P., Allahabad and others) decided on 2.12.1969. (c) Second Appeal No. 780 of 1978 (Harihar Prasad and others v. Brij Bahadur Singh and others), decided on 15.11.1988 (d) Consolidation No. 87 of 1982 (Ram Chandra and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Faizabad and others), decided on 28.3.2017 14. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellants, on the basis of aforesaid judgments, has contended that because a duty is cast upon the Deputy Director of Consolidation to maintain the record of rights, he should not be presumed to have jurisdiction to decide disputes and questions of title with respect to those areas which are not covered by the provisions of this Act. 15. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents has contended that in respect of suit for declaration of the property in dispute, the plaintiffs should have filed objection before the Consolidation Court and should have decided their share by it and if they did not do so, then Section 49 would come in the way, therefore the suit would be deemed to be barred by Section 49. In such circumstances, the suit for declaration of share cannot proceed in Civil Court. In this regard, she has placed reliance upon the Judgment of the learned Appellate Court, wherein respondent already relied on Section 3 (4C). 16. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the RD 1974P. In such circumstances, the suit for declaration of share cannot proceed in Civil Court. In this regard, she has placed reliance upon the Judgment of the learned Appellate Court, wherein respondent already relied on Section 3 (4C). 16. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon the RD 1974P. 25 as was already relied upon before the Appellate Court, wherein it was held that consolidation means re-arrangement of holding in one unit amongst several tenure-holders so as to make their respective holdings more compact. The grove is excluded from holding only in connection with re-arrangement of the plots i.e. in allotment of chaks. For all purposes, grove is included within the purview of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Learned counsel has further relied on ALJ 1973p. 14 as was also relied upon before it, wherein it was held that if a matter which could have been raised before the Consolidation Authorities and was not raised there, it can be raised subsequently. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents has contended that questions of title in consolidation operation are final. 18. In support of their case also, learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon the following judgments for the ready reference: (a) Bansu v. Board of Revenue and others, 2010 (110) RD 1981. (b) Sudarshan v. Tapeswar and others, 2011 CJ (All) 2409. (c) Narendra Singh and others v. Jai Bhagwan and others, 2006 (100) RD 69. (d) Baijnath Rai and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur and others (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 216 of 1973, decided on 29.7.1986). 19. Learned counsel for the respondents has also placed reliance upon Shailendra Tewari and others v. 1st Additional District Judge, Faizabad and another, (2013) (5) ALJ 463, wherein the term ‘land’ has been defined in Section 3(14) of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 and it reads as under: “3(14) “Land” except in Sections 109, 143 and 144 and Chapter VII means land held or occupied for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry which includes pisciculture and poultry farming” 20. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as the aforesaid judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the parties. 21. It is not in dispute that the consolidation took place in the village. I have considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record as well as the aforesaid judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the parties. 21. It is not in dispute that the consolidation took place in the village. Perusal of the revenue record shows that both the parties are recorded bhumidhar with respect to the property given in list ‘A’. It is also not in dispute that the suit is for declaration of right in respect of grove mentioned in list ‘A’ and list ‘B’. 22. Plaintiff-appellants filed the suit for declaration that they have got 1/32 share in the grove in dispute described in list A given at the foot of the plaint and has got half share in the property given in list B, and also for declaration that defendant Nos. 1 to 21 have got no concern with the property of list B. 23. It has been discussed by learned Appellate Court that the aforesaid relief cannot be granted by Civil Court in respect of property given in list B because it involves declaration of right in respect of bhumidhari land which is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the revenue Court. In case the plaintiffs and the defendant Nos. 22 and 23 were bhumidhar, they should have raise this matter before the consolidation Courts and if before the consolidation Courts, it was held that both the parties are joint owner, they cannot raise the same before the Civil Court. It has further been discussed in the judgment that if the plaintiffs say that entry made is incorrect and the name of the defendant Nos. 1 to 21 were recorded by mistake, then he should have filed the suit under Section 229B of the U.P.Z.A. Act before the Revenue Court for correction of entry and Goan Sabha and State of U.P. would have been necessary parties. 24. Finding of the learned Munsif to the effect that the suit is barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act in respect of property given list ‘B’, has been upheld by the learned Appellate Court. 25. 24. Finding of the learned Munsif to the effect that the suit is barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act in respect of property given list ‘B’, has been upheld by the learned Appellate Court. 25. The Appellate Court, in its findings, has come to the conclusion that suit for relief in respect of property of list ‘B’ cannot proceed in Civil Court and is barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act and the suit is maintainable in Civil Court in respect of land shown in list ‘A’ as the suit for declaration of share in joint land can be filed in Civil Court and, therefore, learned Munsif should have decided the same in that grove. Learned Appellate Court has also come to the conclusion that learned Munsif committed error in dismissing the suit as abated and order of the learned Munsif is apparently illegal. If he was of the opinion that Civil Court has no jurisdiction, he should have returned the plaint to the plaintiff for presentation before proper Court and could not have been dismissed. Even if he held that the suit was barred by Section 49 U.P.C.H. Act even then he should not have dismissed the suit and he should not abated the same. 26. In the case of Bansu v. Board of Revenue and others, 2010 (110) RD 181, it has been observed that during the consolidation operation, no attempt was made to get her rights declared before the Consolidation Courts and, therefore, the suit for declaration was not maintainable and barred by Section 49 of the Act. Relevant paragraphs 5, 6, and 12 are extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: “5.There is no dispute between the parties that the land in dispute was under the consolidation operation where petitioner had raised a dispute claiming exclusive rights in the disputed land which was registered as case No. 304. The claim was allowed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer vide order dated 2.2.1976 and it was given effect to by carrying out ‘amaldaramad’ on 12.9.1977. Accordingly, annual register of record of rights was revised. Therefore, even if, respondent No. 6 was not arayed as party. The claim was allowed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer vide order dated 2.2.1976 and it was given effect to by carrying out ‘amaldaramad’ on 12.9.1977. Accordingly, annual register of record of rights was revised. Therefore, even if, respondent No. 6 was not arayed as party. Respondent No. 6 would be presumed to be having kowledge of the same and that she was entitlted to raise claim in respect of her rights or interest in the land before the consolidation authorities, as she herself moved an application under Section 12 of the Consolidation Act which came to be registered as case No. 314, even through she was not arrayed as party in case No. 304. However, for the reasons best known to respondent No. 6 she failed to pursue the same and allowed the said case to be dismissed on 6.3.1981 probably for the reason that in the meantime she had instituted the suit for declaration. 6. The very fact that she preferred objections under Section 12 of the Consolidation Act in respect to her rights and interest in the land in dispute which were rejected on 6.3.1981 by the Assistant Consolidation Officer, indicates that the consolidation operations were continuing till 1981. The suit was instituted in 1979 i.e., during the consolidation operations. Therefore, respondent No. 6 ought to have initiated and perused appropriate proceedings for the establishment of her rights in the land in dispute before the consolidation authorities alone and not before any Court either civil or revenue. This is implicit from the plain and unambiguous language used in Section 49 of the Consolidation Act which provides that adjudication in respect of rights in land or in respect of other matters for which proceedings could or ought to have been taken under the Act shall be done in accordance with the Act and no civil or revenue Court shall have any right to enterain any suit or proceeding in respect of such matters. Certainly, respondent No. 6 as such had the remedy of getting her rights in respect of land in dispute adjudicated by the consolidation authorities either by applying for the recall of the order dated 2.2.1976 passed in favour of the petitioner or to prefer an appeal against the same or any other separate objections but instead of doing any such thing she chose to institute the present suit. The jurisdiction of the revenue Court for entertaining such a suit during the consolidation operation stood expressly barred. 12. In view of the above, in my considered opinion the suit as instituted by respondent No. 6 was not maintainable and was clearly barred by Section 49 of the Consolidation Act. The Courts below mainfestly erred in law in holding otherwise basically for the reason that respondent No. 6 was not a party to case No. 304 and her on case No. 314 was not decided on merits both of which were not material for deciding the controversy. The impugned orders dated 31.8.1992, 27.5.2006 and 13.1.2009 passed by the authorities below are quashed and a writ in the nature of certiorari is directed to be issued accordingly.” 27. In the case of Sudarshan v. Tapeswar and others, 2011 CJ (All) 2409, wherein it has been held that as far as question of title is concerned, the consolidation Courts have got full jurisdiction to decide the matter and bar of Section 49 squarely applies. Relevant paragraphs 3 and 5 of the judgment is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: “3. The number of the plot in dispute is 40, area 13 biswas 16 biswansis. S.D.O., Ghazipur dismissed the Suit No. 359 on 15.3.1986 holding the same to be barred by Section 49 of U.P.C.H. Act as consolidation in the area in question had taken place and the plea raised in the suit by the plaintiff could be raised by him before consolidation Courts but it was not done. Against the said order, Appeal No. 33 of 1986 was filed. Additional Commissioner First, Varanasi Division, Varanasi allowed the appeal on 26.6.1989 (Annexure III to the writ petition). The lower appellate Court in para 10 of its judgment held that plaintiffs appeared to be the only grove holders/bhumidhars in use and occupation of the land in dispute. Ultimiately, lower appellate Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and remanded the matter to it. Against the appellate Court judgment and decree, Second Appeal No. 39 of 1988-89 was filed. Board of Revenue, Allahabad dismissed the second appeal on 30.5.1994, hence this writ petition. 5. Considering in respect of grove land cannot take place in the sense that a plot having grove cannot be given to any other person in rearrangement of chak. Against the appellate Court judgment and decree, Second Appeal No. 39 of 1988-89 was filed. Board of Revenue, Allahabad dismissed the second appeal on 30.5.1994, hence this writ petition. 5. Considering in respect of grove land cannot take place in the sense that a plot having grove cannot be given to any other person in rearrangement of chak. However, as far as question of title is concerned, consolisation Courts have got full jurisdiction to decide the matter and bar of Section 49 squarely applies. In this regard reference may be made to Dalel v. Baroo, 1963 Rev Dec 67 (H.C.F.B.), Ram Dulare v. Ram Charan, 1977 RecDec 108, Shambhu v. D.D.C., 1975 AWC 469 Baijnath Rai v. D.D.C., 1986 RevDec 306 (D.B.) and Anwar Ali v. Munir Ali, 1981 RevDec300.” 28. In the case of Narendra Singh and others v. Jai Bhagwan and others, 2006 (100) RD 69, wherein it has been categorically held that Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon dispute or rights and title relating to lands included in consolidation proceedings. Relevant para 8 of the said judgment is extracted hereinbelow for ready reference: “8.It is not in dispute that that the suit lands were recorded exclusively in the name of the deceased-defendant who was the father. The sons, even after becoming major and fully aware of the execution of the agreement of sale, did not make any attempt to get their names jointly recorded in the revenue papers by appropriate proceedings under Section 49 of the Act of 1953. The present appellants have been brought on record of the suit only as legal representative after the death of the original defendant. Section 49 of the 1953 Act bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon dispute of rights and title relating to lands included in consolidation proceedings. The jurisdiction to decide dispute of rights and title of the lands in consolidation proceedings has been conferred by the Act exclusively on the authorities under the said Act. Section 49 of the 1953 Act bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon dispute of rights and title relating to lands included in consolidation proceedings. The jurisdiction to decide dispute of rights and title of the lands in consolidation proceedings has been conferred by the Act exclusively on the authorities under the said Act. Section 49 of the Act of 1953 reads thus: “Section 49: Bar to civil jurisdiction- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the declaration and adjudication of rights of tenure-holders in respect of land lying in an area, for which a notification has been issued under sub-section (2) of Section 4 or adjudication of any other right arising out of consolidation proceedings and in regard to which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act, shall be done in accordance with the provisions of this Act and no civil or revenue Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding with respect to rights in such land or with respect of any other matters for which a proceeding could or ought to have been taken under this Act. Provided that nothing in this section shall preclude the Assistant Collector for initiating proceedings under Section 122-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 in respect of any land possession over which has been delivered or deemed to be delivered by a Goan Sabha under or in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” 29. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 216 of 1973 titled ‘Baijnath Rai and another v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazipur and others’ decided on 29.7.1986, the Court held as under: “And land, therefore, having trees in such number as to preclude cultivation becomes grove-land. And once a land banjar or otherwise, becomes grove land the Consolidation Authorities shall have jurisdiction to decide. In cases where right or title is claimed on trees standing over land what has to be decided as if the trees standing over it where such in number that it became grove land. If the finding is in affirmative the Consolidation authorities shall have jurisdiction to decide right or claim of parties. If the finding is in negative the objection has to be dismissed and parties directed to seek their remedy in Civil Court.” 30. If the finding is in affirmative the Consolidation authorities shall have jurisdiction to decide right or claim of parties. If the finding is in negative the objection has to be dismissed and parties directed to seek their remedy in Civil Court.” 30. So far as issue No. 1 i.e. whether a declaration of the extent of share of the appellants in the grove where the title of some of the other co-sharers is denied, is barred by Section 49 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, is concerned, in my opinion, it is well-settled that Section 49 of the Act bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court to adjudicate upon dispute of rights and title relating to land included in consolidation proceedings. In this case also, the consolidation proceeding took place. In view of the aforesaid discussions and the proposition of law, it is evidently clear that during consolidation proceeding, a suit for declaration was not maintainable and barred by Section 49 of the Act. Therefore, question No. 1 is answered in affirmative. 31. So far as the question No. 2 i.e. whether in view of the object of the U.P. Consolidation of Holding Act being formation of Chaks in which groves are not included the suit for declaration of the title in the grove can be said to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act is concerned, in my opinion, it is clear from perusal of order passed in the case of Sudarsan (supra) that considering in respect of grove land cannot take place in the sense that a plot having grove cannot be given to any other person in rearrangement of chak and, therefore, as far as question of title is concerned, consolidation Courts have got full jurisdiction to decide the matter and bar of Section 49 squarely applies. Accordingly, the question No. 2 is also answered in affirmative. 32. Learned Appellate Court has committed an error of law while deciding the suit that although both lands in dispute are grove-land, on the one hand learned Appellate Court has observed that suit for the relief in respect of the land of list B is barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act and on the other hand learned Appellate Court has observed that the suit for the relief in respect of the land of list A is maintainable before the learned Civil Court. 33. 33. When the nature of land is same, either the suit should have been barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act or the suit should have been maintainable before the learned Munsif. 34. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and the legal proposition as narrated above, I am of the view that the learned Munsif has not committed any error in holding the suit to be barred by Section 49 of the U.P.C.H. Act. 35. For the forgoing reasons, I hold that learned Munsif rightly exercised his jurisdiction in deciding the matter and the learned Appellate Court after holding that it was beyond the competence of the Civil Court in respect of land shown in list ‘A’, has erroneously partly allowed the suit of the plaintiffs. The judgment of the learned Appellate Court so far as it holds that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the suit in respect of property given in list ‘A’ and reversion of the decree passed by the learned Munsif, is, therefore, required to be set aside. 36. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment of Lower Appellate Court dated 19.5.1979 to the extent that the suit is maintainable in Civil Court in respect of land shown in list ‘A’, is hereby set aside and Judgment and decree passed by the learned Munsif dated 9.1.1978 is hereby affirmed. 37. There shall be no order as to costs. 38. Office is directed to send back lower Court record to the Court concerned forthwith.