JUDGMENT Hon’ble Krishna Singh, J.—This appeal has been filed by the appellant-Insurance Company being aggrieved against the impugned judgment and award dated 11.1.2012 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Aligarh in MACP No. 269 of 2008 (Smt. Preeti Gupta and others v. Shri D.P. Singh Range Hills Public School and others) awarding compensation to the tune of Rs. 23,22,066/- alongwith 6% percent interest per annum to the respondent-claimants inter alia on the ground that compensation, which has been awarded in favour of respondent-claimants is excessive and also that the Tribunal has not calculated the compensation as contemplated in law. 2. Brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the deceased Yogesh Gupta was posted at Police Station-Gangiri, Aligarh as Head Constable. On 22.4.2008, he was returning from Aligarh to Gangiri by his motor-cycle bearing registration No. U.P.-81-X-2233 and when he reached in front of Range Hills Public School, G.T. Road, Aligarh at about 7:30 A.M., all of sudden a bus bearing registration No. U.P. 81-W-9516 coming from opposite direction dashed his motor-cycle on account of which Yogesh Gupta sustained serious injuries and he was taken to District Hospital, where he was declared dead. Accident in question had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said offending bus. FIR of the said accident was lodged on 22.4.2008 at Police Station-Gandhi Park, Aligarh against the driver of the said offending bus. After investigation in the case Police has submitted the Charge-Sheet No. 89 of 2008 against the driver of the said offending bus under Section-279, 304-A and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, post-mortem of the deceased was conducted. At the time of accident said offending bus was insured with the appellant-Insurance Company. Respondents-claimants are the dependent and legal representative of the deceased. 3. The proceedings were contested by the owner and driver of the said offending bus as well as the appellant-Insurance Company. 4. The owner and driver of the said offending bus pleaded that accident in question had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the deceased and in any view of the matter since at the time of accident driver was having a valid driving license and the said offending bus duly insured with the appellant-Insurance Company, the liability was on the appellant-Insurance Company. 5. 5. It was pleaded on behalf of the appellant-Insurance Company that claim has been filed on false and concocted story and at the time of accident the driver of the said offending bus was not having valid and effective driving license and as such the claim petition was liable to be dismissed. 6. To support allegation made in the claim petition, the respondent-claimant Smt. Preeti Gupta examined herself as PW-1 and also produced Ashish Gupta as PW-2 and a Sub-Inspector Prem Singh as PW-3. The respondent-claimants have also filed a copy of the FIR, site plan, charge-sheet, post-mortem report of the deceased, registration certificate, insurance policy of the motor-cycle, driving license and salary certificate of the deceased. 7. To support the allegation made in the written statement respondent owner and driver of the said offending bus has filed a copy of registration certificate, permit fitness certificate and Insurance Policy of the said offending bus. The driver of the said offending bus has also filed a copy of his driving license. 8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that while awarding the compensation Tribunal committed an illegality in making only 1/4th deducation towards personal and living expenses of the deceased and in not making deduction the amount of family pension. Learned counsel further submitted that from the FIR, it is established that accident in question was a result of head on collision of bus and motor-cycle. Hence, in any case, the liability for making payment of compensation ought to have been opportioned but the Tribunal committed an illegality in not considering the same. Learned counsel further submitted that compensation awarded by the Tribunal is excessive and exorbitant, the award therefore is liable to be modified. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents-claimants has submitted that it is proved from the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respondent-claimant that accident in question had occured on account of rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said offending bus. Deceased was not responsible for the accident in question. Learned counsel further submitted that impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal is just and reasonable and therefore does not require any interference by this Court, as such, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. Deceased was not responsible for the accident in question. Learned counsel further submitted that impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal is just and reasonable and therefore does not require any interference by this Court, as such, this appeal is liable to be dismissed. 11. Learned counsel for the claimants-respondents has further submitted that the matter in respect of permission to file the appeal under Section 170 of the Motor Vehicles Act (for short ‘the Act’) has been referred to the Larger Bench. He further submits that once the reference has been made to the Larger Bench, the question of obtaining the permission under Section 170(b) of the Act is mandatory upon the appellant-Insurance Company. If permission has not been granted, then the objection can be raised only on limited ground in regard to quantum. 12. We have examined the argument of learned counsel for the claimants-respondents and we find that points (iii) to (v) have been referred to the Larger Bench, but they do not deal with the issue where the insurance Company has been impleaded as a party and has contested the claim before the Tribunal. If the Insurance Company has been impleaded as a party and had contested the claim before the Tribunal, then the issue which has been referred to the Larger Bench is not attracted. The Apex Court in para 8 of the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta and others, 2011 ACJ 2729 , held as under : “8. When an insurer is impleaded as a party respondent to the claim petition, as contrasted from merely being a noticee under Section 149 (2) of the Act, its rights are significantly different. If the insurer is only a noticee, it can only raise such of those grounds as are permissible in law under Section 149 (2). But if it is a party respondent, it can raise not only those grounds which are available under Section 149 (2), but also all other grounds that are available to a person against whom a claim is made. It, therefore, follows that if a claimant impleads the insurer as a party respondent, for whatever reason, then as such respondent, the insurer will be entitled to urge all contentions and grounds which may be available to it.” 13. It, therefore, follows that if a claimant impleads the insurer as a party respondent, for whatever reason, then as such respondent, the insurer will be entitled to urge all contentions and grounds which may be available to it.” 13. The present case is covered under Para-8 of the aforesaid judgment, wherein the contingency has been dealt with and, therefore, the argument of learned counsel for the claimants-respondents that the matter has been referred to the Larger Bench in regard to obtaining the permission under Section 170(b) of the Act does not hold good and the parties are to be governed by the finding recorded in para 8 of the judgment, which has become final and the same has been recorded in respect of point (i) and draws distinction as compared to points (iii) to (v) where the Insurance Company has not put in appearance and had not contested the claim. 14. It is important to mention here that registration of FIR and filing of the charge-sheet against the driver of the said offending bus under Sections 279, 304-A and 427 of the Indian Penal Code are not in dispute. It is also not in dispute that at the time of accident said offending bus was insured with the appellant-Insurance Company. In our opinion, it is proved from the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the respondent-claimants that accident in question had occured due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of the said offending bus. Deceased was not at all responsible for the accident in question. Arguments have been advanced on behalf of the counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company in respect of contributory negligence, but even in the written statement there is no mention of the same in the absence of any pleading in respect of contributory negligence, the view point of the learned counsel for the appellant-Insurance Company cannot be appreciated and neither the appellant-Insurance Company has led any evidence in this regard to substantiate the contributory negligence. In view of the above and considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are of the considered view that accident in question was not the result of contributory negligence and finding recorded by the Tribunal in this regard is based upon proper appreciation of evidence availabe on record. 15. In view of the above and considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case we are of the considered view that accident in question was not the result of contributory negligence and finding recorded by the Tribunal in this regard is based upon proper appreciation of evidence availabe on record. 15. In the case of Vimal Kanwar and others v. Kishore Dan and others, (2013) 7 SCC 476 , the Apex Court has held that “Family Pension and compassionate appointment cannot be termed as pecuniary advantage that comes under the periphery of Motor Vehicles Act.” 16. It is not in dispute that respondent-claimant Smt. Preeti Gupta is the wife of deceased and getting family pension from the Police Department after the death of deceased. It is also not in dispute that while awarding compensation, the Tribunal has not taken into account the family pension. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, we are of the view that Tribunal has not committed any mistake in not taking into account the amount of family pension while awarding compensation because family pension has no co-relation with the amount receivable under a statute occasioned only on account of accidental death. Such an amount will not come within the periphery of the Motor Vehicles Act and to be termed as pecuniary advantage liable to be deduction. 17. In the case of Sarla Verma (Smt) and others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and another, (2009) 6 SCC 121 , the Apex Court in Para 14 held as under : “14. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependant family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependant family members exceed six.” 18. It is evident from the record that respondent-claimants 1, 2, 3 and 7 are the legal representatives and dependents of the deceased. The Tribunal while awarding compensation has deducted 1/4th income of the deceased towards his personal and living expenses. In view of the above and considering the poor economic/financial condition of the claimants family we are of the view that deduction made by the Tribunal is just and proper. 19. The Tribunal while awarding compensation has deducted 1/4th income of the deceased towards his personal and living expenses. In view of the above and considering the poor economic/financial condition of the claimants family we are of the view that deduction made by the Tribunal is just and proper. 19. After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that compensation awarded by the Tribunal is just and reasonable. The finding recorded by the Tribunal is duly supported by the evidence and in our opinion there is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment and award. Hence, no interference is required by this Court. 20. Appeal is devoid of merit and dismissed accordingly.