JUDGMENT : Arun Bhansali, J. This second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 9.2.2007 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 1, Bhilwara ('the First Appellate Court'), whereby, the first appeal filed by respondent-Rajendra Kumar has been allowed and judgment and decree dated 13.10.2004 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Bhilwara ('the trial court'), has been set aside. 2. The suit was filed by the appellant-Trust and its trustees for eviction and arrears of rent against the respondent. The trial court decreed the suit and the respondent-defendant was directed to handover vacant possession of the suit property (a shop) to the plaintiffs. 3. Feeling aggrieved, the defendant filed first appeal. 4. The First Appellate Court by its impugned judgment, came to the conclusion that the notice issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ('the Act') was not for requisite period and consequently, reversed the decree passed by the trial court. 5. The present second appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 15.10.2014:- "1. Whether the first appellate court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, issued by the plaintiff was not legal? 2. Whether the first appellate court committed error in ignoring provisions of Sub-section 3 of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and its retrospective operation in view of Section 3 of the amending Act of 2002?" 6. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the substantial questions of law framed in the present case already stands answered by judgment of this Court in Vipin Jain & Anr. v. Bhagwandas & Ors. : S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 41/2010, decided on 7.9.2012 as well as of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd. v. The Court Receiver, High Court of Bombay: Civil Appeal No. 5528 of 2014, decided on 9.5.2014. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent resisted the plea raised by learned counsel for the appellants and submitted that the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court does not call for any interference. 8. 7. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent resisted the plea raised by learned counsel for the appellants and submitted that the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court does not call for any interference. 8. Having considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material available on record as well as the judgments cited by learned counsel for the appellants, it is apparent that the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court, pertaining to the compliance of provisions of Section 106 of the Act, are ex-facie incorrect. 9. This Court in the case of Vipin Jain (supra) laid down as under:- "7. As per the clear provisions under sub-Section (3) of section 106 of the T.P. Act, 1882, after its amendment, the question of validity cannot be raised and such notice shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section (1) of section 106 of the T.P. Act, where a suit or proceedings is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in sub-section (1). Since, in the present case, the suit was filed on 09.07.2004, after one month of the notice dated 31.05.2004, which notice, however, same was received back on 08.06.2004 with the postal remark that 'refused to accept', the question of validity could not have been decided against the plaintiffs-appellants in the present case." Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Ram Urban Infrastructure Ltd. (supra) also laid down as under:- "The second point urged by Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel, is that the suit is bad with regard to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel, is that the suit is bad with regard to section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. We have duly considered the said question, and we find that the suit was filed after six months from the date of the notice issued under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, by the Receiver and furthermore, after the amendment of Section 106(3) which reads as follows:" "(3) A notice under sub-section (1) shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because the period mentioned therein falls short of the period specified under that sub-section, where a suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in that sub-section." We have noticed that the High Court duly considered the question of notice and correctly came to the conclusion that the Legislature wanted to plug the loopholes and to redress the mischief by making a change in the law. Therefore, if the notice is short of the period specified in sub-section (1) but the suit or proceeding is filed after the expiry of the period mentioned in sub-section (1), the notice shall not be deemed to be invalid. Clearly, in this matter, the notice was issued on July 26, 2001 and the suit was actually filed on February 6, 2002-after six months and, therefore, the notice cannot be declared or deemed to be invalid." 10. Besides the above, Section 3 of the amending Act of 2002 specifically provides that the amended provision would apply to all notices in pursuance to which any suit or proceeding is pending at the commencement of the amending Act and all notices which have been issued before the commencement of the amending Act, therefore, in those circumstances, the finding of the First Appellate Court cannot be sustained. 11. Consequently, both the questions of law framed (supra) are answered in favour of the appellant, the judgment of the First Appellate Court reversing the decree passed by the trial court deserves to be set aside. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent prayed for reasonable time to vacate the suit premises. 13. Looking to the circumstances of the case, wherein, the suit was filed way back in the year 1997 and about 20 years have already passed ever since, the respondent is granted time till 31.3.2018 to vacate the suit premises. 14. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent prayed for reasonable time to vacate the suit premises. 13. Looking to the circumstances of the case, wherein, the suit was filed way back in the year 1997 and about 20 years have already passed ever since, the respondent is granted time till 31.3.2018 to vacate the suit premises. 14. The respondent shall handover the vacant possession of the suit premises on or before 31.3.2018. It would be required of the respondent to pay/deposit all the arrears of rent, if any, in terms of the decree passed by the trial court within a period of six weeks from today. 15. Further for the period 1.10.2017 to 31.3.2018, the respondent would be required to pay mesne profit @ Rs. 2,000/- per month. The month to month mesne profit shall be paid/deposited by 10th of each subsequent month in the saving bank account of the appellants, particulars whereof, would be supplied by learned counsel for the appellants to learned counsel for the respondent within a period of two weeks from today. 16. In case of failure of the respondent to comply with any of the conditions above, the decree shall become executable forthwith. 17. Subject to the time granted to the respondent to vacate the suit premises on fulfilling the conditions indicated hereinbefore, the appeal filed by the appellants is allowed, the judgment and decree dated 9.2.2007 passed by the Additional District Judge No. 1, Bhilwara is set aside and the judgment and decree dated 13.10.2004 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) No. 1, Bhilwara is restored.