JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri B.N. Mohata, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri S.N. Mohta learned counsel for the for respondent Nos.1 to 4. Perused the memo of writ petition and the documents filed along with it. 2. The petitioner is one of the legal heirs of deceased judgment debtor No.1 and the respondent Nos.1 to 4 are the original decree holders. Respondent No.5 is one of the representatives of the legal heirs of judgment debtor No.1 and the respondent No.6 is original judgment debtor No.2. 3. In the present case, there is a decree passed by the Civil Court on 11.09.2003 in Reg. Civil Suit No.107/2002, thereby decreeing the suit filed for eviction of the judgment debtors from the suit property. By this Judgment, the judgment debtors have been directed to vacate the suit property and deliver its vacant possession to the decree holders. 4. It appears that there was no compliance with the direction given in the judgment and therefore, the decree holders filed execution proceedings in the year 2005. Along with the application for execution of decree, copy of decree was also filed. However, the decree, though prepared by the trial court, was not signed by the presiding judge of the trial court, who decreed the suit, but that was not noticed nor objected to by anybody till recently. 5. The judgment debtors appeared in the execution proceedings and took objection to the execution of decree on different grounds, excluding the ground of non-signing of the decree. Those objections were repelled by the executing court and, therefore, they were carried in appeal/writ petition before this Court and it happened not once, but thrice. Recently, the petitioner along with some other legal heirs of deceased judgment debtor No.1, had filed Writ Petition No. 357/2016 taking objection that the suit was filed against two persons, Nazir Ahmed and Sheikh Jalil, but the Judgment dated 11.09.2003 disclosed that the suit was decreed against Nasir Ahmed (not Nazir Ahmed) and Sheikh Jalil and therefore, the decree was not executable. While upholding this objection and allowing the writ petition, this Court held that there was indeed such an error in the judgment and decree, but also found that such error may have occurred due to some typographical mistake. While upholding this objection and allowing the writ petition, this Court held that there was indeed such an error in the judgment and decree, but also found that such error may have occurred due to some typographical mistake. Therefore, this Court remanded the matter back to the executing court for its fresh consideration in the light of the observations made in the Judgment of this Court dated 5th May, 2016 rendered in Writ Petition No.357/2016. Accordingly, the clerical error was also removed. It is significant to note that at that time, this petitioner, though a party to the execution proceedings, did not take any objection regarding non-signing of the decree by the presiding officer of the court, who pronounced the judgment. Legal heirs of the original judgment debtors had also preferred one writ petition bearing No.525/2017 but on different grounds. It may be mentioned here that in this writ petition, no objection regarding non-signing of the decree by the learned judge was taken by them. The original judgment debtor No.1 too did not take any objection when he made his appearance before the executing court and that was way back in the year 2005 or so. He was alive till the year 2009 and no objection to the effect that decree was neither signed by the judge, who delivered the judgment nor signed by his successor, was taken at any point of time by him after his appearance before the executing court till his death in the year 2009. 6. Now, after having found that various objections taken to the execution proceedings at different points of time by the judgment debtors were all rejected not only by the executing court, but also by this court, the petitioner, one of the legal heirs of deceased judgment debtor No.1, digged out a new challenge, never taken before. He took an objection that the decree was in-executable, it being not signed by the judge, who passed the decree or his immediate successor. This objection was rejected on merits by the executing court by an order passed on 28.09.2017 and against this order, the present writ petition has been preferred. 7. He took an objection that the decree was in-executable, it being not signed by the judge, who passed the decree or his immediate successor. This objection was rejected on merits by the executing court by an order passed on 28.09.2017 and against this order, the present writ petition has been preferred. 7. Although, it is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the appellate court could not have directed the lower court to sign the decree by resorting to the provisions of Order 20 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “CPC”) for the reason that the power is to be exercised by the appellate court itself, I find no substance in such an argument. The provision of Order 20 Rule 8 of CPC is clear. It reads thus; “8. Procedure where Judge has vacated office before signing decree-Where a Judge has vacated office after pronouncing judgment but without signing the decree, a decree drawn up in accordance with such judgment may be signed by his successor or, if the Court has ceased to exist, by the Judge of any Court to which such Court was subordinate.” A careful reading of this provision would show that it does not say that such a power has to be exercised by the appellate court only, rather it lays down a procedure to be followed when the decree has remained to be signed and the judge has vacated office without signing the decree or the court has ceased to exist. It empowers the successor of the presiding officer, who pronounced the judgment, to sign the decree in case the latter has vacated the office. In case, the court has ceased to exist, this provision entrusts the responsibility to sign the decree to a judge of the court, which is superior to the court pronouncing the judgment. In the present case, the court which pronounced the judgment never ceased to exist. I must say it here that cessation or discontinuation of court is different from vacating of office by the judge. In the present case, the court which pronounced the judgment never ceased to exist. I must say it here that cessation or discontinuation of court is different from vacating of office by the judge. For former to happen, a notification to be issued by a competent authority regarding closing down of the court is required, which is not the case here and when the latter event happens, the court as such does not cease to exist, but it’s functioning is restricted only to urgent matters taken up by an in-charge judge temporarily till a successor assumes charge of the court. In this case, the appellate court has only issued a direction to the successor of the judge pronouncing the judgment to sign the decree. Such a direction in the backdrop of non-cessation of the court has to be understood only as a reminder given to the successor to use the power conferred upon him under Order 20 Rule 8 of CPC and nothing more. This is the reason why I am not inclined to accept the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner made in this behalf and it is rejected accordingly. 8. It is also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the word “successor”, used in Order 20 Rule 8 CPC, connotes only the immediate successor of the judicial officer, who pronounced the judgment and not a remote successor, which is, however, not agreed to by learned counsel for the respondents. 9. With due respect, I would differ with the learned counsel for the petitioner. If the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is to be accepted, it would only frustrate the intention of the legislature in making this provision and would give premium to the mischief it seeks to suppress. It is well settled canon of interpretation of statutes that when two interpretations of a provision of law are possible, the one which promotes the legislative intent or object and suppresses the mischief, should be adopted. A useful reference in this regard may be made to the law laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.R. Enterprises Vs. State of U.P., (1999) 9 S.C.C., 700. 10. A plain reading of the provision of Order 20 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives a clear idea about the intention of the legislature to include this provision in the Code. State of U.P., (1999) 9 S.C.C., 700. 10. A plain reading of the provision of Order 20 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure gives a clear idea about the intention of the legislature to include this provision in the Code. The intention is that, for failure to perform or delay in performing an official act, signing of decree is an official act, surely a decree holder be not deprived of the fruits of decree and be made not to suffer and that there must be a continuity to an official act. In other words, the Parliament has, by this provision, eliminated the mischief of a decree getting in-executable for some fault or lapse not attributable to a decree holder. Such legislative intent would be defeated by giving a restrictive meaning to the term “successor” used in this provision of law. But, this very intention would be taken to its logical destination, the destination where a decree holder would enjoy the fruits of decree, if the word “successor” is interpreted in a liberal and broader way. The liberal and broader way of interpretation would be to understand the term “successor” in its generic sense, which would mean that the term is all inclusive, nonspecific and collective and would thus, include not only the immediate successor but also a distant or remote successor or successor of successors. Comprehended this way, the term “successor” used in Order 20 Rule 8 CPC means not only a judge, who succeeds immediately the judge failing to sign the decree, but also every judge, who succeeds every judge failing to sign the decree or in other words, the successor of successors, as long as the line of succession is alive. If such an interpretation is not adopted, it would push the decree holder to the brink from where a fall into an abyss would almost be certain, and would result in punishing the decree holder for no fault of his. This would lead to chaos in justice dispensation system and lead to erosion in public faith in the system. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits at this juncture that what ennures to the benefit of a decree holder must also work equally for the benefit of the petitioner, who is one of the judgment debtors in the present case. This would lead to chaos in justice dispensation system and lead to erosion in public faith in the system. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits at this juncture that what ennures to the benefit of a decree holder must also work equally for the benefit of the petitioner, who is one of the judgment debtors in the present case. True it is, the law must not discriminate and must also equally apply to the judgment debtor. But, the solution, I must say, cannot be given to a judgment debtor at the cost of a decree holder for, as a general rule, the executing court, as held in the case of Deepchand & Others Vs. Mohan Lal, (2000)6, S.C.C., 259 by Hon’ble Supreme Court, should not find ways to dismiss the execution application. At the same time, when law creates some right in favour of judgment debtor, a decree holder also cannot be allowed to profit by depriving a judgment debtor of his such a right. But, a million dollar question is what right a judgment debtor has in law, in such a case ? The only right a judgment debtor would have in such a case, in my view, would be no more than to have a properly signed decree being taken up for execution. This right of the judgment debtor is ensured only if the broader interpretation of the term “successor” is adopted. In fact, such a liberal construction, I may say, hits two birds with one stone. It prevents a direction of a civil court standing in favour of a decree holder from reducing into a mere piece of paper and also protects right of a judgment debtor of not being asked to do something under an invalid decree. Of course, in a given case because of failure to perform an official act, there could be some inconvenience caused to the judgment debtor. In that event, the most that he could ask for is some solace in the nature of giving of some more time in obeying the decree and nothing more. Viewed in this way, I do not think that by giving a wider meaning to the term “successor”, injustice and unequal treatment would be meted out to a judgment debtor like the petitioner. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is answered thus. 12. Viewed in this way, I do not think that by giving a wider meaning to the term “successor”, injustice and unequal treatment would be meted out to a judgment debtor like the petitioner. The argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is answered thus. 12. Even otherwise, the petitioner, one of the legal heirs of original judgment debtor No.1, not having taken such an objection, as claimed in this petition, at the earliest available opportunity, now cannot seek to agitate the issue on this ground. This objection would have to be said as waived by the petitioner. It is pertinent to note here that in the year 2016, this petitioner had approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.367/2016 along with some other legal heirs of deceased Judgment Debtor No.1. At that time, this petitioner could have very well taken this objection, but he did not and so now, he is estopped from taking it. 13. Last but not the least, I would say that the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India being equitable in nature, it is not that in every case, an erroneous order would be interfered with by this Court. It would be only when it is perverse or arbitrary or illegal or illogical or it is necessary to do so in the interest of doing substantive justice between the parties. The discussion made thus far would show that the impugned order is neither perverse nor arbitrary nor illegal nor illogical. On the contrary, this case is a glaring example of cases wherein principles’ of substantive justice would dictate this Court to promote a culture wherein parties would respect the law and the law in the present case means the direction given in the judgment of the civil court dated 11.09.2004, to the judgment debtors to vacate the suit property and deliver its vacant possession to the decree holders, when such a direction has attained finality. This direction has attained finality in this case. Therefore, it was expected of the judgment debtors to voluntarily vacate the suit property and deliver its vacant possession to the plaintiffs or the decree holders without waiting for them to initiate execution proceedings, and the least that was expected of them was to shun raising frivolous objections in execution proceedings. The judgment debtors and the petitioner is one of them, have belied these expectations. The judgment debtors and the petitioner is one of them, have belied these expectations. Therefore, this is not a fit case for interfering with the impugned order by invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court or otherwise this court would fail in its duty to promote and foster the respect for law. 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no limitation prescribed for taking of an objection as to the maintainability of the execution proceedings. There is no dispute about this proposition of law. But, that by itself would not be a reason enough to upset the impugned order. Reasons for my such disinclination are already given in the previous paragraphs. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed his reliance upon the following cases; (i) Darayas Cawasji Balsara Vs. Shenaz Darayas Balsara (AIR 1992 Bombay, 175) (ii) Hakikullah Haji Rahimutullah & Others. Vs. The MHADA & Others. (AIR 1997 Bombay, 239) (iii) Kishen Dyal Lall Vs. Moulvie Abdool Luteef & Others. (1873, Civil, The Weekly Reporter, 267) In the first two Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is held that when the competent authority does not sign the Judgment, the successor incumbent has to sign the same and issue certified copies thereof to the concerned parties. Both these Judgments, however, do not interpret the word “successor” contained in Order 20 Rule 8 of CPC and they only speak about signing the judgment or the decree by the successor incumbent. Therefore, these two Judgments would render no assistance to the case of the petitioner here. 16. As regards the third case of Kishen Dyal Lall, I find that its facts are quite different. The facts of that case show that the learned judge, who had pronounced the judgment was no longer a judge of the district at the time when the lacuna was noticed and it became impossible to draw up the decree merely from the perusal of the judgment, which was given in that case and therefore, the court found that it was necessary to have a fresh trial and accordingly, it was ordered. In the present case, the judgment was available and even the decree was also drawn up, but it was not signed by the judge, who pronounced the judgment. In the present case, the judgment was available and even the decree was also drawn up, but it was not signed by the judge, who pronounced the judgment. These facts being different, the Judgment in the case of Kishen Dyal Lall would have no application to the instant case. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that although, no limitation is prescribed in Order 20 Rule 8 of CPC for successor of the judge, who pronounced the judgment and decree, to sign the decree, the decree when it is to be signed by the successor judge, must be signed within reasonable period of time and it would be in ordinary course of not more than three years from the date of pronouncement of the Judgment. He also submits that in the instant case, the decree has been signed in the year 2016, although the judgment was pronounced in the year 2003 and thus, there has been an inordinate delay, which makes the decree as non-est and in-executable. I do not find that such an argument can be accepted as in the instant case there appears to be no delay in removing the error, because the error itself came to the light in the year 2016 when an objection in that regard was taken for the first time and thereafter, it was removed within reasonable period of time. 18. In the circumstances, I find least substance in this writ petition and the same deserves to be dismissed and accordingly, it stands dismissed summarily. No costs.