JUDGMENT K.S. Jhaveri, J. —Since both these appeals arise out of the same order, they are being decided by this common order. 2. By way of these appeals, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has allowed the appeal preferred by the assessee. 3. This Court while admitting the Appeal No. 41/2008 on 5-11-2008, framed the following substantial questions of law :- "(i) Whether the CESTAT is correct in law in applying the ratio of its earlier decisions which are distinguishable as in the relied upon cases the OIO''s were passed after 11-5-2001 whereas in the instant case the Order-in-Original was passed on 22-9-2000 which was prior to 11-5-2001 i.e. the date on which Section 3A was omitted? (ii) Whether the omission of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 by Section 121 of Finance Act, 2001, without any saving clause would effect the proceedings in respect of which decision has already been taken prior to the date of omission?" 4. This Court while admitting the appeal No. 42/2008 on 6-1-2009, framed the following substantial questions of law :- "(i) Whether the omission of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 by Section 121 of Finance Act, 2001, without any saving clause would affect the proceedings in respect of which decision has already been taken prior to the date of omission? (ii) Whether the CESTAT was correct in holding that the saving provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 were not applicable to ''omission'' of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which was omitted vide Section 121 of Finance Act, 2001? (iii) Whether the CESTAT was correct in holding that there is no saving clause provided in Section 121 or any other Section of Finance Act, 2001 ignoring Section 131 of the Finance Act, 2001 which inter alia provided for saving clause for Rules, Notification or Orders? (iv) Whether the CESTAT was correct in law in holding that Rule 96ZO of the Central Excise Rules, 1944 will not survive beyond 11-5-2001 i.e. the date of omission of Section 3A of the Central Excise Act, 1944 vide Section 121 of the Finance Act, 2001, while not considering the provisions of Section 131 of the Finance Act, 2001?" 5. Counsel for the respondents raised preliminary objection that the amount involved is covered by the circular. 6. Counsel for the respondents raised preliminary objection that the amount involved is covered by the circular. 6. However, the Supreme Court in Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. Commr. of Central Excise, 2015 (326) E.L.T. 209 (S.C.) has observed as under :- "12. First and foremost, it is important to refer to the definition of "enactment" contained in Section 3(19) of the General Clauses Act. The said definition clause states that "enactment" shall mean the following : "enactment" shall include a Regulation (as hereinafter defined) and any Regulation of the Bengal, Madras or Bombay Code, and shall also include any provision contained in any Act or in any such Regulation as aforesaid." 13. From this it is clear that when Section 6 speaks of the repeal of any enactment, it refers not merely to the enactment as a whole but also to any provision contained in any Act. Thus, it is clear that if a part of a statute is deleted, Section 6 would nonetheless apply. Secondly, it is clear, as has been stated by referring to a passage in Halsbury''s Laws of England in the Fibre Board''s judgment, that the expression "omission" is nothing but a particular form of words evincing an intention to abrogate an enactment or portion thereof. This is made further clear by the Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) by William C. Burton, 1979 Edition. This is made further clear by the Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) by William C. Burton, 1979 Edition. The expression "delete" is defined by the Thesaurus as follows : "Delete : Blot out, cancel, censor, cross off, cross out, cut, cut out, dele, discard, do away with, drop, edit out, efface, elide, eliminate, eradicate, erase, excise, expel, expunge, extirpate, get rid of, leave out, modify by excisions, obliterate, omit, remove, rub out, rule out, scratch out, strike off, take out, weed wipe out." Likewise the expression "omit" is also defined by this Thesaurus as follows : "Omit : Abstain from inserting, bypass, cast aside, count out, cut out, delete, discard, dodge, drop exclude, exclude, fail to do, fail to include, fail to insert, fail to mention, leave out, leave undone, let go, let pass, let slip, miss, neglect, omittere, pass over, praetermittere, skip, slight, transire." And the expression "repeal" is defined as follows : "Repeal : Abolish, abrogare, abrogate, annul, avoid, cancel, countermand, declare null and void, delete, eliminate, formally withdraw, invalidate, make void, negate, nullify, obliterate, officially withdraw, override, overrule, quash, recall, render invalid, rescind, rescindere, retract, reverse, revoke, set aside, vacate, void, withdraw." 14. On a conjoint reading of the three expressions "delete", "omit", and "repeal", it becomes clear that "delete" and "omit" are used interchangeably, so that when the expression "repeal" refers to "delete" it would necessarily take within its ken an omission as well. This being the case, we do not find any substance in the argument that a "repeal" amounts to an obliteration from the very beginning, whereas an "omission" is only in futuro. If the expression "delete" would amount to a "repeal", which the Appellant''s counsel does not deny, it is clear that a conjoint reading of Halsbury''s Laws of England and the Legal Thesaurus cited hereinabove both lead to the same result, namely that an "omission" being tantamount to a "deletion" is a form of repeal. 31. Applying the Constitution Bench decision stated above, it will have to be declared that since Section 3A which provides for a separate scheme for availing facilities under a compound levy scheme does not itself provide for the levying of interest, Rules 96ZO, 96ZP and 96ZQ cannot do so and therefore on this ground the Appellant in Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills has to succeed. On this ground alone therefore the impugned judgment is set aside. On this ground alone therefore the impugned judgment is set aside. That none of the other provisions of the Central Excise Act can come to the aid of the Revenue in cases like these has been laid down by this Court in Hans Steel Rolling Mill v. CCE, (2011) 3 SCC 748 as follows : 13. On going through the records it is clearly established that the Appellants are availing the facilities under the compound levy scheme, which they themselves opted for and filed declarations furnishing details about the annual capacity of production and duty payable on such capacity of production. It has to be taken into consideration that the compounded levy scheme for collection of duty based on annual capacity of production under Section 3 of the Act and the 1997 Rules is a separate scheme from the normal scheme for collection of Central excise duty on goods manufactured in the country. Under the same, Rule 96ZP of the Central Excise Rules stipulate the method of payment and Rule 96ZP contains detailed provision regarding time and manner of payment and it also contains provisions relating to payment of interest and penalty in event of delay in payment or non-payment of dues. Thus, this is a comprehensive scheme in itself and general provisions in the Act and the Rules are excluded. (at page 751) 33. On the facts before the Gujarat High Court, there were three civil applications each of which challenged the constitutional validity of the aforesaid rules insofar as they prescribed the imposition of a penalty equal to the amount of duty outstanding without any discretion to reduce the same depending upon the time taken to deposit the duty. The Gujarat High Court struck down the aforesaid Rules on the basis that not only were they ultra vires the Act but they were arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. 34. Shri Radhakrishnan, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the Revenue found it extremely difficult to argue that the aforesaid judgment was wrong. He therefore asked us to limit the effect of the judgment when it further held that after omission of the aforesaid Rules with effect from 1-3-2001 no proceedings could have been initiated thereunder. 34. Shri Radhakrishnan, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the Revenue found it extremely difficult to argue that the aforesaid judgment was wrong. He therefore asked us to limit the effect of the judgment when it further held that after omission of the aforesaid Rules with effect from 1-3-2001 no proceedings could have been initiated thereunder. In this submission he is correct for the simple reason that the Gujarat High Court followed Rayala Corporation in holding that "omissions" would not amount to "repeals", which this Court has now clarified is not the correct legal position. 44. Conclusion We have declared in this judgment that the interest and penalty provisions under the Rules 96ZO, ZP, and ZQ of the Central Excise Rules, [1944] are invalid for the reasons assigned in the judgment. Accordingly, the appeals filed by the Revenue are dismissed and the appeals filed by the Assessees are allowed to the extent indicated above. It may be noted that in an appeal from a judgment of the Allahabad High Court dated 8-11-2012 in SLP (C) No. 9796/2012, it has been held that the levy of penalty under the aforesaid provisions is mandatory in character. In view of what has been held by us today, this appeal will also have to be allowed in the same terms as the other Assessees'' appeals which have been allowed. All the aforesaid appeals are disposed of accordingly." 7. In view of the above, the issues are answered in favour of the department but looking to the fact that the tax amount involved is covered by the circular. Therefore, we clarify that the parties in future will be covered by the decision of Supreme Court. 8. Both the appeals are disposed of with above clarification.