JUDGMENT K.S. Jhaveri, J. - Defect/s is waived in Appeal No. 80/2017. Both these appeals are filed against the common judgment and order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal has partly allowed the appeal of the assessee and they were not granted total exemption. 2. The facts of the case are that the appellant is a society formed for the resettlement of ex-servicemen. The appellant is required to comply with the Rajasthan State Government''s regulations and rules. The appellant is a not for Profit society and is aimed at settling the ex-servicemen and is not involved in commercial activities and cannot be considered as ''commercial concern''. The impugned order dated 21-2-2017 passed by the Ld. CESTAT on Customs Appeal No. 1173 of 2011 [2017 (52) S.T.R. 42 (Tri.-Del.)], was received on behalf of the appellant on 17-3-2017 wherein Service Tax amounting to Rs. 64,80,971/- (Rs. 19,64,39/- for the period November, 2004 to September, 2007 and Rs. 45,16,632/- for the period October, 2007 to September, 2009 was levied on the appellant and appeal was partly allowed. 3. Counsel for the appellant in appeal No. 33/2017 framed the following substantial questions of law :- (i) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case and in law the order passed by Ld. CESTAT is not unconstitutional, ex facie illegal, void and also perverse? (ii) Whether Ld. CESTAT has committed gross error of law by deciding the appeal on the preliminary issue of tax evasion and not adjudicating the contentions raised by the appellant on merits? (iii) Whether Service Tax under security agency can be levied for the period November, 2004 to 30-4-2006 as it is seen that the definition of ''security agency as given in Section 65(94) of the Act during the period of November, 2004 to 30-42006 stated that the service was required to be provided by a commercial concern and not by any person? (iv) Whether the Ld. CESTAT erred in applying Service Tax liabilities on the Rajasthan Ex-servicemen Welfare Cooperative Society which is not a commercial concern? (v) Whether the liabilities may be imposed retrospectively for the period when the cooperative society was not covered under the ambit of the Finance Act, 1994 to pay the Service Tax? (iv) Whether the Ld. CESTAT erred in applying Service Tax liabilities on the Rajasthan Ex-servicemen Welfare Cooperative Society which is not a commercial concern? (v) Whether the liabilities may be imposed retrospectively for the period when the cooperative society was not covered under the ambit of the Finance Act, 1994 to pay the Service Tax? (vi) Whether the Service Tax liability may be imposed on the appellant even when it could not recover the same from its clients, which are various departments of the Government and more specifically after the order dated 17-4-2008 wherein the State has agreed to pay the Service Tax? (vii) Whether accruing profits negate the nature of a charitable organization? 4. Counsel for the department in appeal No. 80/2017 framed the following substantial questions of law :- (i) Whether the Tribunal was justified in waiving the penalty levied on the assessee by invoking the provisions of Section 80 of the Finance Act, 1994 when admittedly the assessee was liable to pay Service Tax and there was no reasonable cause for it to not to pay the same? (ii) Whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the penalty only on the ground that it would not be possible for it to recover the same from its clients, ignoring that it failed to provide even the basic documents and there was a deliberate act by the assessee having mala fide intention and the assessee did not reflect the full gross amount receipts in the ST-3 Returns? 5. We have gone through the judgment submitted by counsel for the department in case of Punjab Ex-Servicemen Corporation vs. Union of India reported in (2012) 19 taxmann.com 280 (Punj. and Har.) = 2012 (25) S.T.R. 122 (P and H) wherein it has been held as under :- "5. We are unable to accept these submissions. As regards absence of profit motive, we find that the charging provision under Section 68 of the Act provides for levy of Service Tax on the value of taxable service on every service provider. Value of taxable service has been defined under Section 67 to be gross amount charged by the service provider as consideration. There is no requirement that the service provider should provide service for profit motive. 6. Value of taxable service has been defined under Section 67 to be gross amount charged by the service provider as consideration. There is no requirement that the service provider should provide service for profit motive. 6. In the definition of security agency under Section 65(94), security agency is defined as a commercial concern engaged in business of rendering services relating to security of property of persons. Learned counsel submitted that the expression business implies that there must be profit motive while the appellant was a statutory corporation created for helping the ex-servicemen by employing them in security agency services. 7. Use of the word business in the definition of security agency is not enough to hold that service provider must have profit motive. The word business does not necessarily imply requirement of profit motive. The expression is used in a taxing statute in the sense of occupation or profession which occupies time, attention and labour normally with the object of making of profit as against [sport] or pleasure. In State of A.P. vs. H. Abdul Bakshi and V. Bros., AIR 1965 SC 531 , it was observed :- 4. We are unable to agree with this view of the High Court. A person to be a dealer must be engaged in the business of buying or selling or supplying goods. The expression "business" though extensively used is a word of indefinite import, in taxing statutes it is used in the sense of an occupation, or profession which occupies the time, attention and labour of a person, normally with the object of making profit. To regard an activity as business there must be a course of dealings, either actually continued or contemplated to be continued with a profit motive, and not for sport or pleasure. 8. In State of T.N. vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras, (1999) 4 SCC 630 , it was held that whether profit motive was essential ingredient in a particular taxing statute depended upon the legislative intent as expressed in the statutory scheme. 9. In Sai Publication Fund, as per statutory scheme under Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the definition of dealer under Section 2(11) required profit motive. It was held that if in predominant activity, profit motive was absent, incidental business of such an assessee was excluded. 9. In Sai Publication Fund, as per statutory scheme under Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1959, the definition of dealer under Section 2(11) required profit motive. It was held that if in predominant activity, profit motive was absent, incidental business of such an assessee was excluded. As per definition of security agency under Section 65(94) service provider should be engaged in the business rendering specified service. There is no warrant for reading therein requirement of profit motive. The word business would denote that service should not be gratis or casual but for consideration and as regular activity. 10. As regards applicability of 2004 amendment, contention raised is that since order was passed after the amendment, limitation law applicable at the time of decision of a matter will apply - No doubt, limitation law as in force at the time of decision may apply but subsisting cause of action does not get affected. In MOI Engineering Limited vs. State of Punjab, (2008) 32 PHT 476 (P&H) relied upon by Learned Counsel for the appellant, after referring to "Principles of Statutory Interpretation" by justice G.P. Singh, it was held that a statute of limitation did not have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on the date of the amendment. The relevant passage quoted in the judgment relied upon is as under :- ".....Statutes of limitation are thus retrospective in so far as they apply to all legal proceedings brought after their operation for enforcing causes of action accrued earlier, but they are prospective in the sense that they neither have the effect of reviving a right of action which is already barred on the date of their coming into operation nor do they have the effect of extinguishing a right of action subsisting on that date." 6. In our considered opinion, in view of above and looking to the reasoning adopted by the Tribunal and the penalty which has been waived and considering that the society is consisted of ex-servicemen, we are of the firm opinion that no substantial question of law arises. 7. Hence, both the appeals stand dismissed.