JUDGMENT : RAJESH SHANKAR, J. 1. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the letters contained in email communications dated 31.10.2017 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) and dated 01.11.2017 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) whereby, the respondents have rejected the offer of the petitioner, pursuant to NIT No. BSL/CP/GT/CAST ROLLS/2017-19. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondents to allow the petitioner to participate in the bid auction to be held pursuant to the aforesaid NIT, as it is a global tender and the petitioner fulfils all the eligibility criteria for the said tender. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is an authorized representative of M/S Changzhou Kaida Heavy Industry Technology Co. Ltd. The Steel Authority of India Ltd. (in short SAIL) floated a global tender being NIT No. BSL/CP/GT/CAST ROLLS/2017-19 in which M/S Changzhou Kaida Heavy Industry Technology Co. Ltd. participated through the petitioner. The said tender was for procurement of cast rolls to be used by different units of the SAIL. The petitioner submitted its tender on 20.07.2017 i.e. the last date of the opening of the tender. The petitioner preferred that 100% Letter of Credit will be used in order to complete the deal, provided 5% Bank guarantee is given by the supplier. The concept of Letters of Credit is that since there use to be different laws in different countries, the Banks are usually made party in the deal so that in the event, if the buyer backs out from the deal then the Bank will indemnify the supplier/seller for the loss incurred by the seller. Subsequently, the Bank procures the incurred loss from the buyer. On 06.09.2017, an email was sent to the petitioner by the respondents seeking clarification/confirmation with regard to the technical and commercial points and the eligibility criteria informing, inter alia, to clarify/confirm and submit the documents immediately by 13.09.2017 positively, failing which the offer of the petitioner was to be evaluated on the basis of the submitted documents and the respondent-SAIL was to decide the offer accordingly without any further reference to the petitioner. Vide email dated 08.09.2017, the petitioner was again sought the same clarification by the respondent-SAIL, which was replied by the petitioner vide its email dated 11.09.2017. Vide email dated 08.09.2017, the petitioner was again sought the same clarification by the respondent-SAIL, which was replied by the petitioner vide its email dated 11.09.2017. It is further submitted that the main dispute is with regard to the payment terms mentioned in Clause 4.1.1 of the tender/bid documents. Clause 4.1.1 of the aforesaid tender documents stipulates that 95% of the value of materials was to be paid to the supplier at the time of making supply and 5% payment was to be made by the respondent-SAIL after completion of the Guarantee terms successfully. The petitioner had made payment offer that 95% of payment against the Letter of Credit was to be made at the sight and 5% payment was to be made by submitting performance Bank guarantee with validity of two years. Learned counsel for the petitioner while clarifying the said payment offer made by the petitioner, submits that the petitioner was to be paid 100% of the supply value at the time of making the supply, however, 5% performance Bank guarantee was to be deposited by the petitioner, subject to successful completion of the Guarantee terms for the contract period. It is further submitted that there was no material difference between the payment terms mentioned in Clause 4.1.1 of the bid documents and the payment offer made by the petitioner. The grievance of the petitioner is that though it had duly clarified the payment offer made by it to the respondent-SAIL and it was waiting for further communication, however, without communicating the subsequent events which took place in the tender evaluation, the respondent-SAIL finally communicated through email on 31.10.2017 that the petitioner has not complied the terms and conditions of the bid documents. Further, on 01.11.2017, it was informed that the petitioner's payment offer has been rejected. It is further submitted that in fact, on 27.09.2017, the petitioner had accepted the payment terms as per Clause 4.1.1 of the bid documents and, therefore, its payment offer should not have been rejected by the respondent-SAIL vide the impugned letters, particularly, in view of the fact that the Reverse bid process was started by the respondent-SAIL on 28.10.2017. 3. Per contra, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent-SAIL, submits that the aforesaid NIT was floated by the respondent-SAIL for supply of cast rolls, the Techno Commercial bid of which was opened on 01.08.2017. 3. Per contra, Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the respondent-SAIL, submits that the aforesaid NIT was floated by the respondent-SAIL for supply of cast rolls, the Techno Commercial bid of which was opened on 01.08.2017. It is further submitted that clarification with regard to Techno Commercial evaluation was sought from the participants including the petitioner on 06.09.2017 and 08.09.2017 and the last date of submission of clarification was fixed as 13.09.2017. The petitioner replied the said communication on 11.09.2017 whereby, it did not accept the payment terms as per Clause 4.1.1 of the bid documents and insisted for its own payment terms. A meeting for finalization of the Techno Commercial bid was held on 14.09.2017, 15.09.2017 and 16.09.2017. Thereafter, the acceptable offers were decided. After internal approval, the price bid was opened for some items on 28.10.2017 and for balance items Reverse Auction process has started and the same is in progress. It is further submitted that communication of the respondent-SAIL dated 31.10.2017 and 01.11.2017 are justified in view of the fact that the payment offer of the petitioner was not considerable in the techno-commercial stage, as the payment terms stipulated in the aforesaid NIT was not accepted by it. Once the petitioner failed to qualify in the techno-commercial stage, it was not eligible to participate in the price discovery process started on 28.10.2017. The respondent-SAIL has acted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the aforesaid NIT/bid documents and since the petitioner failed to comply the terms of the aforesaid NIT, its techno-commercial bid was rejected. Hence, there can be no case of discrimination, arbitrariness or illegality on the part of the respondent-SAIL. It is lastly submitted that email communication sent by the petitioner on 27.09.2017 was received after finalization of the techno-commercial bid and hence the same could not have been entertained, particularly, in view of the fact that the petitioner was already informed that any clarification/confirmation with regard to the payment terms must be sent by 13.09.2017. 4. Heard leaned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. The aforesaid NIT was floated by the respondent-SAIL for procurement of cast rolls. The petitioner along with other tenderers participated in the bid process. 4. Heard leaned counsel for the parties and perused the documents available on record. The aforesaid NIT was floated by the respondent-SAIL for procurement of cast rolls. The petitioner along with other tenderers participated in the bid process. On 01.08.2017, the techno- commercial bid was opened by the respondent-SAIL and on 06.09.2017 and 08.09.2017, the respondent-SAIL sought certain clarifications from the participants and the last date of submission of clarification was fixed as 13.09.2017. The communications made to the petitioner through email on 06.09.2017 and 08.09.2017 have been annexed with the writ petition as Annexures- 3 & 4 respectively. On perusal of the same, it appears that the communications made by the respondent-SAIL were replied by the petitioner through email dated 11.09.2017 (Annexure-5 to the writ petition) by way of an attachment. The said email attachment has not been filed by the petitioner along with the writ petition, however, the respondents have brought the said attachment on record in their counter affidavit. On perusal of the same, it appears that from 06.09.2017 till 11.09.2017 the petitioner, in fact, reiterated its earlier stand regarding the specified mode of payment, inter alia, that the payment should be made on the basis of 95% against the Letters of Credit at sight and 5% by submitting the performance Bank guarantee with validity of two years. The said mode of payment was also earlier proposed by the petitioner pursuant to which the clarification was sought by the respondents-SAIL through email communication dated 06.09.2017 and 08.09.2017. The said payment mode proposed by the petitioner was not in conformity with Clause 4.1.1 of the terms and conditions of the aforesaid NIT, which reads as under: "4.1.1 95% of the value of materials (FOB/CFR) shall be paid against dispatch documents (B/L and other negotiable documents) through LC. All bank charges within India will be on the buyer's account. Bank charges of the supplier's Bank will be to the supplier's account. Confirmation charges, if any, shall be to supplier's account. Firms shall raise invoice for 100% value and amount claimed shall be 95% of value. Payment of rest 5% value of material (FOB/CFR) shall be released after completion of Guarantee terms successfully. In case of payment through LC, LC shall be opened as per base price (95%). Any extra amount payable for PVC shall be made through TT. Firms shall raise invoice for 100% value and amount claimed shall be 95% of value. Payment of rest 5% value of material (FOB/CFR) shall be released after completion of Guarantee terms successfully. In case of payment through LC, LC shall be opened as per base price (95%). Any extra amount payable for PVC shall be made through TT. However, the invoice shall be prepared including any extra amount (instructing that extra amount shall be paid separately through TT, claim amount being the same as LC value.) In case the rate of roll after application of PVC is Lower than base price, the supplier shall raise bill for such reduced value only." 5. Further, Clause 1.7.1.2 of the aforesaid NIT deals with commercial evaluation of the bid, which is also quoted hereunder: "1.7.1.2-Commercial Evaluation As part of the commercial evaluation process, SAIL sourcing team will check whether suppliers have agreed to the commercial terms specified in RFQ. In case of non-agreement, clarifications may be sought from the supplier. If the clarification is not found acceptable, the offer will be liable for rejection." 6. On perusal of the aforesaid clause, it would be evident that the sourcing team of the respondent-SAIL is supposed to verify as to whether the suppliers have agreed to the commercial terms specified in RFQ. In case of non-agreement, the respondent-SAIL may seek clarification from the suppliers. However, if the said clarification of the suppliers is not found acceptable, the offer is liable to be rejected. 7. Since the petitioner vide its clarification through email dated 8.09.2017 insisted on the same proposal made by it earlier, which was not in conformity with the payment terms mentioned in Clause 4.1.1 of the bid documents, on 13.09.2017 the respondent-SAIL proceeded to finalize the tender as per the available documents. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that in the email communication dated 27.09.2017, the petitioner had subsequently agreed to the payment terms, as mentioned in Clause 4.1.1 of the bid documents and therefore the respondent-SAIL should have permitted the petitioner to participate in the Reverse bid process, is not acceptable mainly due to the reason that it was specifically informed to the petitioner by the respondent-SAIL vide email communication dated 06.09.2017 and 08.09.2017 that the clarification/confirmation sought from the petitioner should be informed to the respondent-SAIL till 13.09.2017. Any clarification/confirmation given by the petitioner on subsequent dates is of no consequence. Learned counsel for the petitioner also tried to persuade the Court that the proposal given by the petitioner regarding the payment mode/terms was more or less in conformity with the payment mode provided under Clause 4.1.1. This Court is not persuaded by the said argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, as the respondent-SAIL, who has floated the tender and offered the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirement and interpret its documents. Any different meaning to what has been clearly mentioned in Clause 4.1.1 of the aforesaid NIT cannot be given. 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JSW Infrastructure Limited & Another v. Kakinada Seaports Limited & Others reported in (2017) 4 SCC 170 has held thus: "6. We have given our careful consideration to the arguments. This Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India held that the words used in documents cannot be treated to be surplusage or superfluous or redundant and must be given some meaning and weightage. It was held as follows: (SCC p. 500, para 7) "7. ... It is a well-settled rule of interpretation applicable alike to documents as to statutes that, save for compelling necessity, the Court should be prompt to ascribe superfluity to the language of a document "and should be rather at the outset inclined to suppose every word intended to have some effect or be of some use". To reject words as insensible should be the last resort of judicial interpretation, for it is an elementary rule based on common sense that no author of a formal document intended to be acted upon by the others should be presumed to use words without a meaning. The court must, as far as possible, avoid a construction which would render the words used by the author of the document meaningless and futile or reduce to silence any part of the document and make it altogether inapplicable." This view has consistently held the field and was recently reiterated in Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) 8. We may also add that the law is well settled that superior courts while exercising their power of judicial review must act with restraint while dealing with contractual matters. We may also add that the law is well settled that superior courts while exercising their power of judicial review must act with restraint while dealing with contractual matters. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India held that: (i) there should be judicial restraint in review of administrative action; (ii) the court should not act like court of appeal; it cannot review the decision but can only review the decision-making process; (iii) the court does not usually have the necessary expertise to correct such technical decisions; (iv) the employer must have play in the joints i.e. necessary freedom to take administrative decisions within certain boundaries. 10. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 825-26, paras 13 & 15-16) "13. ... a mere disagreement with the decision-making process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision. 15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given. 16. In the present appeals, although there does not appear to be any ambiguity or doubt about the interpretation given by NMRCL to the tender conditions, we are of the view that even if there was such an ambiguity or doubt, the High Court ought to have refrained from giving its own interpretation unless it had come to a clear conclusion that the interpretation given by NMRCL was perverse or mala fide or intended to favour one of the bidders. This was certainly not the case either before the High Court or before this Court." The view taken in Afcons was followed in Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd. Thus it is apparent that in contractual matters, the writ courts should not interfere unless the decision taken is totally arbitrary, perverse or mala fide." 9. On perusal of the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it can be construed that the owner or the employer of a project (the respondent-SAIL herein) may give an interpretation with regard to certain clause of tender documents, which may not be acceptable to the Constitutional Courts, but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given. It is well settled that while exercising the power of judicial review, the Writ Courts must act with restraint while dealing with contractual matters. The Court should not act like Court of appeal. It cannot review the decision, but can only review the decision-making process and in the cases in which malafide or arbitrariness or intention to favour someone are established. 10. It is not the case of the petitioner that the payment mode proposed by the petitioner was not accepted by the respondent-SAIL out of any malafide or with any intention to favour some other tenderer(s). Moreover, the respondent-SAIL also communicated its decision to the petitioner vide email dated 31.10.2017 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) and 01.11.2017 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) to the effect that the techno- commercial offer made by the petitioner has not been found suitable by the Committee. 11. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned letters contained in email communications dated 31.10.2017 (Annexure-10 to the writ petition) and dated 01.11.2017 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent-SAIL. 12. The present writ petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly, dismissed.