JUDGMENT Hon’ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.—Heard Sri Rahul Agarwal, learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner/tenant and Sri Wazahat Hussain Khan, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Sri Abhishek Tripathi, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2-landlord. 2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed praying for the following relief: (i) to issue a direction to set aside the order dated 21.8.2017 (Annexure 11) Rent Control Appeal No. 78 of 2009 passed by Additional District Judge, Court No. 14, Allahabad. 3. By the impugned order the application 22-C for issuance of Commission and the application 23-C for Amendment in written statement, have been rejected. Aggrieved with the order of rejection of the aforesaid two applications the defendant-petitioner has filed the present writ petition. Submission on behalf of the Defendant-petitioner 4. Learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner submits as under: (i) That Sri Bhola Nath Seth, brother of the respondent-landlord; had 3/4th share in the disputed bungalow No. 8/18 (building No. 16), Nawab Yusuf Road, Allahabad, who had died leaving behind him, his wife and son. Subsequently, the wife also died. The son of late Sri Bhola Nath Seth is a non resident Indian and is residing in U.S.A.. The respondent landlord is now enjoying entire building including the portion of his brother Sri Bhola Nath Seth and thus the bona fide need set up by him while filing the application under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 does not exist in view of the subsequent events. (ii) To find out the fact with respect to the subsequent construction raised by the respondent-landlord, it is necessary that an Advocate Commission be issued by the Court. But the application moved by the defendant-petitioner/tenant has been illegally rejected by the Court below by the impugned order. Submission on behalf of the Plaintiff-respondent 5. Sri Wazahat Hussain Khan, learned Senior Advocate, submits as under: (i) The word “family” is defined in Section 3(g) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 which does not include brother. Undisputedly, Sri Bhola Nath Seth was the brother of the respondent-landlord and as such 3/4th share held by late Sri Bhola Nath Seth in the disputed property and succeeded by his heirs and legal representatives, has neither any concern nor has any relationship with respect to the controversy involved in Rent Control Appeal No. 78 of 2009. Undisputedly, Sri Bhola Nath Seth was the brother of the respondent-landlord and as such 3/4th share held by late Sri Bhola Nath Seth in the disputed property and succeeded by his heirs and legal representatives, has neither any concern nor has any relationship with respect to the controversy involved in Rent Control Appeal No. 78 of 2009. The said appeal has been filed by the respondent-landlord to challenge the order of the Prescribed Authority, dismissing the release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act. (ii) The aforesaid Sri Bhola Nath Seth, brother of the respondent-landlord; has been succeed by his own heirs and legal representatives who are the owner and landlord and in possession of their share. The son of Sri Bhola Nath Seth himself returned to India and living in the portion of the house owned by him. (iii) Respondent-landlord owns and possesses only 1/4th portion of the disputed house which belongs to him and in a portion of which the defendant-petitioner is admittedly a tenant. The landlord-tenant relationship between the respondent-plaintiff and the defendant-petitioner is undisputed. (iv) The rejection of application 22-C for issuance of Commission, is wholly justified in view of the findings recorded in the impugned order. Discussion and Findings 6. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 is the owner and landlord of 1/4th portion of the disputed property. According to the defendant-petitioner, his family consists of six members. The plaintiff-respondent No. 2 filed a P.A. Case No. 15 of 1998 on 23.6.1998, under Section 21(1)(a) of The Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) for release on the ground of bona fide need. 8. The P.A. Case was filed against the tenant Miss Nazu Nanawati who subsequently died. During her life time she contested the aforesaid P.A. Case. As per facts noted in the order dated 28.9.2007 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22442 of 2006 (Amar Nath Seth v. Miss. 8. The P.A. Case was filed against the tenant Miss Nazu Nanawati who subsequently died. During her life time she contested the aforesaid P.A. Case. As per facts noted in the order dated 28.9.2007 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22442 of 2006 (Amar Nath Seth v. Miss. Nazu Nanawati and others) the aforesaid Miss Nazu Nanawati (tenant) filed a written statement admitting the case of the plaintiff-respondent No. 2, being paper No. 11-B. Compromise was also filed by both the parties being paper No. 13-B. Accordingly, the release application being M.P.A. Case No. 15 of 1998 was allowed by the Prescribed Authority by order dated 27.1.1999 in terms of the compromise paper No. 13-B. Thereafter, the aforesaid Miss. Nazu Nanawati (tenant) died. After her death plaintiff-respondent filed an Execution Case being M.P.A. Case No. 13 of 2000. Thereafter, the petitioner herein and one Adi Nanawati filed an application before the Prescribed Authority, being P.A. Case No. 18 of 2001 setting up a case that they were joint tenants with Miss. Nazu Nanawati but they were not impleaded in the release application, hence the order dated 27.1.1999 allowing the release application, be recalled. The said M.P.A. Case No. 18 of 2001 was dismissed in default for want of prosecution on 20.7.2004. Recall application was filed on 31.7.2004, which was registered as M.P.A. Case No. 29 of 2004. Lastly, the orders were recalled and the M.P.A. Case No. 18 of 2001 was heard and decided on 3.9.2004. The restoration application was allowed which was challenged by the plaintiff-respondent No. 2 by filing the aforesaid Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22442 of 2006. The writ petition was disposed of observing as under: “However, I am of the opinion that restoration application for setting aside the main order dated 27.1.1999 should have been allowed on payment of good cost and not cost of Rs. 50/-. Accordingly, order dated 3.9.2004 is modified and it is directed that the main restoration application, i.e. M.P.A. Case No. 18 of 2001, shall stand allowed and main order allowing the release application dated 27.1.1999 shall stand set aside on payment of Rs. 2,000/- as costs. The remaining cost of Rs. 1950/- shall be deposited or paid on 25.10.2007 on which date both the parties are directed to appear before the Prescribed Authority. 2,000/- as costs. The remaining cost of Rs. 1950/- shall be deposited or paid on 25.10.2007 on which date both the parties are directed to appear before the Prescribed Authority. In case the said cost is not deposited, then order dated 3.9.2004 shall stand set aside and M.P.A. Case No. 18 of 2001 shall stand rejected. If aforesaid costs are deposited on 25.10.2007, then the release application shall be decided by the Prescribed Authority very expeditiously preferably within four months from the said date. Absolutely, no unnecessary adjournment shall be granted to any of the parties. If Prescribed Authority is inclined to grant any adjournment to any of the parties in any form, then it shall be on very heavy cost. The Court intended to direct that the costs shall not be less than Rs. 500/- per adjournment. However, learned counsel for both the parties stated that this amount of Rs. 500/- is on the lower side and learned counsel for both the parties requested that higher cost might be directed to be imposed for every adjournment. Accordingly, it is directed that if Prescribed Authority is inclined to grant any adjournment to any of the parties, then the same shall not be for less than Rs. 1000/- cost per adjournment.” 9. The written statement was filed by the defendant-petitioner in which he took the stand that late Manik Ji Nanawati was the original tenant and after his death the tenancy was succeeded by his three sons and one daughter. First son had married to a British lady and had settled in England and subsequently died there. The second son was the father of the defendant-petitioner. The third son late Sri Sewak Nanawati had died as Bachelor. The daughter of the original tenant Miss. Nazu Nanawati (the other defendant) had died on 8.8.2000. Thus in the aforesaid written statement dated 18.7.2008, the defendant-petitioner has set up a case that he has succeeded the tenancy and is occupying the accommodation as tenant of plaintiff-respondent/landlord. The aforesaid P.A. Case No. 15 of 1998 was allowed by judgment dated 27.5.2009, passed by the Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause Court, Allahabad and the accommodation in possession of the defendant-petitioner as tenant was released. 10. The aforesaid P.A. Case No. 15 of 1998 was allowed by judgment dated 27.5.2009, passed by the Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause Court, Allahabad and the accommodation in possession of the defendant-petitioner as tenant was released. 10. The defendant-petitioner filed a Rent Control Appeal No. 78 of 2009 to challenge the judgment and decree passed by the Prescribed Authority which was allowed by judgment dated 7.9.2011, passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No. 13, Allahabad, whereby the judgment of the Prescribed Authority dated 27.5.2009, was set aside and the matter was remitted back with the direction to afford opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence and to decide application 54-C and 62-C at the time of final hearing. 11. Aggrieved with the aforesaid judgment of the appellate Court, the plaintiff-respondent No. 2, filed Writ-A No. 67535 of 2011 (Amar Nath Seth v. Miss Nazu Nanawati (Dead) and others) which was allowed by this Court by order dated 18.7.2016, observing as under: “I have considered the arguments of both sides and have gone through the record of the petition. The record reveals that under the order dated 3.9.2004 of the Prescribed Authority and that of the High Court dated 27.9.2007, the Prescribed Authority was required to decide the release application afresh expeditiously. The Prescribed Authority had thereafter, proceeded to decide the release application. The respondent No. 2 and 3, who were not party to the proceedings were impleaded and were allowed to file their written statements. It has also come on record that the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 not only filed the written statements, but has filed affidavit forming part of the evidence as in proceedings under Section 21 of the Act evidence is permitted on affidavit. At this stage, the above two applications came to be filed. The substance of the above applications was as to whether the respondents 2 and 3 were tenants or not and if not, whether the release application is liable to be dismissed. A bare reading of the judgement and order of the Prescribed Authority dated 27.5.2009 reveals that it has considered the above aspect of the matter in extenso, while dealing the issue No. 1 to the effect whether respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were the co-tenants of the accommodation in dispute alongwith respondent No. 1 Miss. Nazu Nanawati. The Prescribed Authority after recording that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were the co-tenants of the accommodation in dispute alongwith respondent No. 1 Miss. Nazu Nanawati. The Prescribed Authority after recording that respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have been accepted to be the co-tenants alongwith respondent No. 1 Miss Nazu Nanawati which fact has also been accepted by the petitioner, held them to be co-tenants. The aforesaid finding on issue No. 1 recorded by the Prescribed Authority is sufficient to indicate that the dispute or the controversy raised by the aforesaid two applications 62Ga and 54 Ga stands decided. In view of the above fact though the Prescribed Authority may not have specifically referred to and disposed of the above applications, they stood disposed of. Thus, the appellate Court was not justified in remanding the matter of the above case. However, the Appellate Court has not remanded the matter only for the above reason. The reading of the appellate judgement reveals that there was one other reason for remanding the matter that the Prescribed Authority had not permitted the respondents 2 and 3 to adduce the evidence. In this regard the order dated 16.5.2009 states that the case has been put up for consideration of the applications 54 Ga and 62 Ga. The respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have already been impleaded as party to the release proceedings pursuant to the order of the High Court and they have already filed their written statement and evidence on affidavit. The relevant part of the above order is reproduced hereunder : izLrqr ekeys esa ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; ds vkns'k ij foi{kh la[;k 2 o 3 dks i{kdkj cuk;k tkdj mudh vksj ls mRrj&i= ,oa lk{; 'kiFk&i= izLrqr fd;k tk pqdk gSA In view of the above, Prescribed Authority by the aforesaid order directed that the above two applications shall be considered at the time of final hearing of the release application. The final judgement and order passed by the Prescribed Authority on 27.5.2009 reveals that it had not only considered the issue No. 1 which it had covered the above two applications but has also dealt with bona fide need and comparative hardship which are essential and legal for the purpose of deciding the release application. The above two aspects of the matter were decided by the Prescribed Authority on the basis of the material on record i.e. evidence adduced the parties in the form of affidavits. The above two aspects of the matter were decided by the Prescribed Authority on the basis of the material on record i.e. evidence adduced the parties in the form of affidavits. In view of the above, as the parties have exchanged the necessary affidavits, it cannot be said that they were precluded from adducing evidence for consideration of the release application. This apart, the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to be the tenants of the accommodation in dispute had ample opportunity to adduce the evidence which they have filed on the merits of the release application right from the date they were impleaded and they had filed their written statement on 18.7.2008 but they have not to file any other evidence except the affidavit which has been considered by the Prescribed Authority. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the other ground on which the matter has been remanded to the Prescribed Authority is also not sustainable in law. Accordingly, in my opinion that there was no just and proper reason on the part of the Appellate Authority who have been remanded the matter. The Appellate Authority at the entire record before it sufficient to decide the appeal on merits. In these circumstances, there was no purpose in remanding the matter except prolonged the life of the litigation. In such circumstances, the impugned judgement of the Appellate Court dated 7.9.2011 is hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed with the direction to the Appellate Court to proceed and decide the appeal in accordance with law expeditiously, if possible, within a period of next four months by curtailing all unnecessary adjournments and fixing short and quick dates. In case any adjournment becomes imperative has been directed by this Court earlier vide order dated 28.9.2007, it shall not be allowed without imposing cost of at least Rs. 1,000/- per adjournment.” (Emphasis supplied by me) 12. Now, after expiry of the period provided by the aforequoted order dated 18.7.2016 for disposal of the appeal, the defendant-petitioner filed applications being Application No. 22-C and 23-C which have been rejected by the impugned order dated 21.8.2017. 13. By the Amendment Application 23-C, dated 27.7.2017, the defendant-petitioner sought amendment in the written statement for addition of paragraphs 28 A, 28 B, 28 C and 28 D as under: 28A. 13. By the Amendment Application 23-C, dated 27.7.2017, the defendant-petitioner sought amendment in the written statement for addition of paragraphs 28 A, 28 B, 28 C and 28 D as under: 28A. That during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 the brother of the land lord Amar Nath Seth namely Bhola Nath Seth and his wife who were permanently living in America as NRI died about 4 years back. The entire house No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, which is a very big house has been enjoyed by the land lord Amarnath Seth solely. 28B That land lord Amar Nath Seth during the pendency of the proceeding under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 has also altered and constructed new construction in House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad and big halls and rooms has been newly constructed by the land lord according to his requirement. 28C That the House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad is a big building of double storied consist of more than 15 rooms, halls, Kitchen, Bathroom and a big lawn, etc. The son of Amar Nath Seth namely Raj Kumar Seth is living with his father and mother jointly, Raj Kumar Seth has got only two children and in his way the total family member of Amar Nath Seth is six members. Four adult members and two children. The another son of Amar Nath Seth namely Bharat Kumar is permanently residing out side Allahabad District Uttar Pradesh alongwith his family and he is not living in House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad. 28D That there is no partition of House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad and the entire family of Amar Nath Seth is jointly enjoying the house according to his convenience and family of Amar Nath Seth is comfortably living in the House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad. Since the land lord Amar Nath Seth has intended to sell the house in dispute and that is why the proceeding under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 has been actuated by the Amar Nath Seth. 14. Since the land lord Amar Nath Seth has intended to sell the house in dispute and that is why the proceeding under Section 21 of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 has been actuated by the Amar Nath Seth. 14. In the Application 22-C, the defendant-petitioner has stated as under: “That in the above noted case it has been categorically stated in the written statement that the land lord Amar Nath Seth has got lot of accommodation in House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad. The land lord has also constructed new rooms and halls and hence in the interest of justice it is necessary that any senior advocate commissioner may be appointed for the inspection of the house No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad. The commissioner may be directed to inspect the House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad and the commissioner may be directed to give the details of House No. 8/18, Navab Yushuf Road, Allahabad after inspection.” Regarding rejection of application 22-C for issue of Commission 15. From the facts as briefly extracted above, it is evident that the plaintiff-respondent is undisputedly owner and landlord of the disputed premises in which the defendant-petitiner is a tenant who succeded the tenancy alongwith her sister from the original tenant, namely, their father late Sri Manik Ji Nanawati. The plaintiff-respondent had filed the P.A. Case No. 15 of 1998 about 19 years ago. The matter was carried twice before this Court being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 22442 of 2006 and Writ -A No. 67535 of 2011. By order dated 18.7.2016 in Writ - A No. 67535 of 2011 {Amarnath Seth v. Miss. Nazu Nanawati (dead) and others} this Court, while allowing the writ petition of the plaintiff-respondent by order dated 18.7.2016, specifically directed the appellate Court to proceed and decide the appeal in accordance with law expeditiously, if possible, within a period of next four months by curtailing unnecessary adjournment and fixing short and quick dates and adjournment shall not be allowed without imposing the cost of least Rs. 1000/- per adjournment. This Court also observed that the parties have already led their evidences and necessary affidavits have been exchanged. It was further observed that “this apart the respondent Nos. 1000/- per adjournment. This Court also observed that the parties have already led their evidences and necessary affidavits have been exchanged. It was further observed that “this apart the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 to be the tenants of the accommodation in dispute had ample opportunity to adduce the evidence which they have filed on the merits of the release application right from the date they were impleaded and they had filed their written statement on 18.7.2008 but they have not filed any other evidence except the affidavits which has been considered by the Prescribed Authority”. In this background it is evident on record that to avoid final disposal of the appal the defendant-plaintiff has filed the application 22-C for issue of Commission and the Application 23-C for Amendemnt in written statement. 16. The legal position regarding issue of Commission is well-settled. The power conferred upon the Court for issue of Commission under Section 34(1) (c) of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is discretionary. The local inspection or Commission by Court is made only in those cases where evidence have been led by the parties, but the Court is not able to arrive at a just conclusion either way or where the Court feels that there is some ambiguity in the evidence which can be clarified by making local inspection or commission. Such inspections are made to appreciate the evidence already on record and Court is not expected to visit the site for collecting evidence. 17. In the application 22-C the defendant-petitioner has referred to the allegations made in the written statement regarding some alleged new constructions and on that basis he prayed for issue of Commission for inspection so that evidence regarding alleged new construction may be collected. There is no averment in the application 22-C that any evidence has been led by the defendant-petitioner regarding alleged new construction by the plaintiff-respondent. Even the allegation of new constructions are also vague as it does not specify that how many rooms have been newly constructed and whereby the total covered area under ownership of the plaintiff-respondent stood increased. These facts lead to an irresitable conclusion that the application has been filed with intention to delay the conclusion of the appeal or in any circumstances to collect evidence which is not permissible. 18. These facts lead to an irresitable conclusion that the application has been filed with intention to delay the conclusion of the appeal or in any circumstances to collect evidence which is not permissible. 18. In the case of Avinash Chandra Tiwari v. ADJ, 2010(4) ADJ 117 (LB), the Lucknow bench of this Court referred to several decisions on the question of issue of commission and held as under: “11. To go for local inspection or issue of commission for the proper disposal of the controversy pending is a sole progrative of the Court to decide whether to move the same or not. Hence, it is late in a day to quarrel that it is not mandatory on the part of the Court to issue commission. When an application is moved for the said purpose. The local inspection or commission by Court is made only in those cases where on the evidence led by the parties, Court is not able to arrive at a just conclusion either way or where the Court feels that there is some ambiguity in the evidence which can be clarified by making local inspection or commission. Local inspection or issue a commission by the Court cannot be claimed as of right by any party. Such inspections are made to appreciate the evidence already on record and Court is not expected to visit the site for collecting evidence. (See Randhir Singh Sheoran v. 6th Additional District Judge, 1997(2) JCLR 860 and Radhey Shyam v. A.D.J., Court No. 13, Lucknow and others, 2010(2) ADJ 758 . 12. Further, in the present case as stated herein above, the opposite party No. 1 on the basis of the material facts on record given a categorical finding that at this stage, it is not necessary to issue commission, accordingly, rejected the application for issue of the Advocate/Commissioner, moved by the petitioner. Further the Court below held that if the application for issue of commission is allowed the same will linger the matter unnecessary, as appeal is pending since the year 2006. The said view taken by the opposite party No. 1 is in accordance with law as laid down by this Court in the case of Sonpal v. 4th Additional District Judge, Aligarh and others, (1992) 2 ARC 596. 13. The said view taken by the opposite party No. 1 is in accordance with law as laid down by this Court in the case of Sonpal v. 4th Additional District Judge, Aligarh and others, (1992) 2 ARC 596. 13. In the case of Smt. Shamshun Nisha v. Ist Additional District Judge, Lucknow and others, 1992 (1) ARC 423, it is held as under : “By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner challenges the order, dated 13.5.1991, passed by Ist Additional District Judge, Lucknow, contained in Annexure 6 by which the petitioner’s request for local inspection was rejected by the appellate Court. The appellate Court pointed out that the petitioner had been given sufficient opportunity to rebut the evidence of the expert. However, the fact is not disputed that the appeal is still pending and in appeal only an application for local inspection of the site by the Advocate Commissioner has been rejected. Therefore, in my opinion, the said order cannot be challenged in the writ petition.” 14. So far as, the judgment which is relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the M/s Harihar Sugandh (p) Ltd, Anandi Das Kannauj through it’s M.D. v. Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 3, Kanpur Nagar [2004(57) ALR 224], (435) Special Duty Collector LA. (Supra) and Radheshyam Rastogi (supra) are not applicable in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant case. 15. Further in the case of Anandi Das Kannauj through it’s M.D. v. Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Court No. 3, Kanpur Nagar [2004(57) ALR 224], it was held that if an application for issue a commission is rejected then, the same cannot be res judicata for moving another application for issue of the commission for collection of evidence, and in the case of Okhla Enclave Plot holder Welfare Association v. Union of India and others, 2009 LAR 51 (SC) the Hon’ble Supreme Court after hearing and examining issues involved in the present case deemed fit to direct appointment of Commissioner, however, in the present case the Court below on the basis of the material evidence on record, come to the conclusion that there was no necessity for issue of the commission so the petitioner cannot derive any benefit form the above said judgments. 16. 16. Accordingly, as it is a sole domain of the Court to issue a commission or not and the local inspection or commission cannot be claimed as a matter of right by a party, so there is neither any illegality nor infirmity in the order under challenge. 17. For the foregoing reason, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner lacks merit and is dismissed.” 19. Thus from the above discussion it is clear that the application 22-C has been lawfully rejected by the Courts below. Under the circumstances, I do not find any legal infirmity in the impugned order rejecting the application 22-C. Regarding Amendment 20. Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. provides for amendment of pleadings. It is settled law that Court may, at any stage of proceedings, allow either party to alter or amend its pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real question of controversy between the parties. The rule of conduct of the Court in such a case is that, however, negligent or careless may have been the first omission, and however late the proposed amendment, the amendment should be allowed, if it can be made without injustice to the either side. There is no injustice, if the other side can be compensated by cost, but if the amendment will put them into such a position that they may be injured, it ought not to be made. Reference in this regard may be had to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. (supra) and the judgment in the case of Klarapede and Co. v. Commercial Union Association, (1883) 32 WR 262 (CA). 21. In the case of Jai Jai Ram Manohar Lal v. National Building Material Supply, Gurgaon, (1969) 1 SCC 869 (paras 6 & 7) Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the power to grant amendment of the pleadings is intended to serve the ends of justice and is not governed by any such narrow or technical limitations. Rules of procedure are intended to be handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, careless or even infraction of the rules of procedure. Rules of procedure are intended to be handmaid to the administration of justice. A party cannot be refused just relief merely because of some mistake, negligence, careless or even infraction of the rules of procedure. The Court always gives leave to amend pleadings to a party unless it is satisfied that the party applying was acting mala fidely, or that by his blunder he has caused injury to his opponent which cannot be compensated by an order of cost. However, negligent or carelessness may have been the first omission and, however, late the proposed amendment, the amendment may be allowed if it can be made without injustice to the other side. 22. It is settled law that pleadings and particulars are required to enable the Court to decide true rights of parties in trial. Amendment in pleadings is a matter of procedure. Grant or refusal thereof is discretion of Court. However, like any other discretion, such discretion has to be exercised consistent with settled legal principles. Procedural law is intended to facilitate and not to obstruct the Courts of substantive justice. Provisions relating to proceeding in civil cases are meant to give each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be made to enable the Courts to determine real issue and to prevent deviations from the course which litigation on particular causes of action must take. Reference in this regard may be had to the judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., (2010) 4 SCC 518 and Ganesh Trading Company v. Moji Ram, (1978) 2 SCC 91 (para 2). 23. Perusal of the written statement of the defendant-petitioner filed as Annexure 3 to the petition, shows that the defendant-petitioner has admitted the respondent-plaintiff to be the owner and landlord of the disputed property. Perusal of the amendment sought by Application 23-C reveals that the pleadings regarding size of the family of the plaintiff-respondent/landlord, the alleged accommodation in his possession and the disputed building consisting of more than 15 rooms, halls, kitchen, bath room etc. have already been pleaded by the defendant-petitioner in his written statement. Reference in this regard may be had to paragraph Nos. 22, 24, 25 and 28 of the written statement. have already been pleaded by the defendant-petitioner in his written statement. Reference in this regard may be had to paragraph Nos. 22, 24, 25 and 28 of the written statement. The fact regarding the brother of the plaintiff-respondent to be residing abroad at that time and frequently visiting India and their share in the disputed property are well mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 7 of the plaint. 24. Thus the evidences have already been led by the parties and affidavits have also been exchanged as evident from the observations made by this Court in the order dated 18.7.2016 in Writ -A No. 67535 of 2011, {Amarnath Seth v. Miss. Nazu Nanawati (dead) and others}. Relevant portion of this order has already been quoted above. No averment has been made in the Application 23-C disclosing the reasons for seeking amendment at the stage after this Court directed to the appellate Court by order dated 18.7.2016 in Writ-A No. 67535 of 2011 to decide the appeal expeditiously, if possible, within a period of next four months by curtailing all unnecessary adjournments and fixing short and quick dates. More than one year has passed since then but the appeal could not be decided by the appellate Court due to delaying tactics adopted by the defendant-petitioner by moving Misc. Applications on one pretext or the other. Thus, the amendment application being paper No. 23-C itself is abuse of process of Court to delay the disposal of the appeal and to defeat the directions in the aforesaid Writ A No. 67535 of 2011. Such an amendment application, if allowed, would cause injustice to the plaintiff-respondent who is contesting the matter of release of the disputed property from tenancy of the defendant-petitioner from more than 19 years. The facts recorded in the impugned order further reveals that despite the directions dated 18.7.2016 in Writ -A No. 67535 of 2011 for disposal of appeal, expeditiously, if possible, within a period of four months by curtailing all unnecessary adjournments and fixing short and quick dates, the defendant-petitioner continued to seek adjournments after adjournments on one pretext or the other and thereafter filed the application 23-C. The appellate Court also noted the fact that the plaintiff-respondent/landlord is a senior citizen aged about 76 years. Considering the facts and circumstances and the reasons recorded in the impugned order, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned order whereby the amendment application being paper No. 23-C has been rejected by the Court below. 25. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any merit in this petition. Consequently, this petition fails and is, hereby, dismissed.