JUDGMENT : Ramchandra Singh Jhala, J. This second appeal has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 16.9.2008 passed by learned Additional District Judge (Fast Track) No. 2, Hanumangarh, H.Q. Nohar in Civil Appeal No. 8/2008 whereby the appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff has been dismissed while upholding the judgment and decree dated 23.01.2001 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Rawatsar in Civil Suit No. 190/1996 (11/93). 2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant-plaintiff filed a suit for mandatory and permanent injunction stating therein that the appellant-plaintiff is owner and in possession of the Nohra i.e. the suit property. The said plot of Nohra was purchased by his father on 16.4.1960 from the Gram Panchayat Rawatsar and a patta whereof had been issued in the name of his father and possession was handed over to him and after partition the said Nohra came in the share of appellant-plaintiff and he constructed a kotha in the said Nohra wherein he used to keep his cattle and domestic wood etc. For last 30 years, the appellant-plaintiff and his father are in possession of the said suit property. On 11.01.1993 the Tehsildar inspected the said Nohra and informed the plaintiff that his Nohra is illegal, therefore, within one week the plaintiff shall vacate the same otherwise by the help of police he will be evicted from the said Nohra. The appellant-plaintiff shown the patta and asked about his possession since 1960 but the respondents denied the same. 3. In written statement the respondent-defendants denied the ownership and possession of the plaintiff. It is stated that the land in dispute belongs to Mandi Vikas Samiti, Hanumangarh and in the area of Mandi, the Gram Panchayat has no right to issue patta, therefore, the patta issued in favour of the appellant-plaintiff is null and void. 4. 3. In written statement the respondent-defendants denied the ownership and possession of the plaintiff. It is stated that the land in dispute belongs to Mandi Vikas Samiti, Hanumangarh and in the area of Mandi, the Gram Panchayat has no right to issue patta, therefore, the patta issued in favour of the appellant-plaintiff is null and void. 4. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues:- ^^1 & vk;k fookfnr Hkw[kaM+ dk ftldk fooj.k okn i= dh en la0 2 esa vafdr gS] dks oknh ds firk us fnuakd 16-04-1960 dks rRdkyhu xzke iapk;r jkorlj ls Ø; fd;k Fkk rHkh ls oknh dk firk bl Hkw[kaM+ dks uksgjs ds :i esa dke esa ysrk jgk o 10 o"kZ iwoZ fookfnr Hkw[kaM+ caVokjs esa oknh ds fgLls esa vk x;k rHkh ls oknh fufoZ?urkiwoZd bldk mi;ksx o miHkksx dj jgk gS\ oknh 2 & vk;k 30 o"kksZ ls Hkh vf/kd le; rd Hkw[kaM+ dk 'kkafriwoZd mi;ksx djds fookfnr uksgjs ij oknh us VkbZVy izkIr dj fy;k\ oknh 3 & vk;k fookfnr txg e.M+h fodkl lfefr guqekux<+ dh gS o xzke iapk;r dks eaM+h {ks= es iV~Vk tkjh djus dk dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha FkkA vr% oknh ds firk ds uke ls tkjh iV~Vk izkjaHk ls gh 'kwU; o izHkkoghu gS\ izfroknh 4 & vk;k fookfnr Hkw[kaM+ dk cktkj ewY; vuqekur% 1]00]000@& :0 gSA vr% okn de U;k;'kqYd ij izLrqr fd;k x;k gS\ izfroknh 5 & vuqrks"k \** 5. The trial court decided the issues No. 1 to 3 against the appellant-plaintiff and issue No. 4 against the defendant and vide judgment and decree dated 23.1.2001 dismissed the suit of appellant-plaintiff. The appellant-plaintiff being aggrieved with the judgment and decree passed by the trial court filed appeal before the learned first appellate court, but the learned first appellate court vide judgment and decree dated 16.9.2008 dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant-plaintiff. 6. Being aggrieved with the judgments and decrees of both the learned courts below, the appellant has filed this second appeal before this Court. This Court while admitting the second appeal on 9.9.2009 framed the following substantial questions of law:- "(i) Whether the finding of both the courts below is perverse with regard to ignoring the patta in question issued by the Gram Panchayat which is still not cancelled by any competent authority? This Court while admitting the second appeal on 9.9.2009 framed the following substantial questions of law:- "(i) Whether the finding of both the courts below is perverse with regard to ignoring the patta in question issued by the Gram Panchayat which is still not cancelled by any competent authority? (ii) Whether both the courts below rightly gave finding with regard to ownership rights over the land in dispute? (iii) Whether the patta issued by the Gram Panchayat in the year 1960 is null and void?" Heard learned counsel for the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that both the courts below have erred in law as well as in facts in dismissing the plaintiff's suit and appeal. Both the courts below have failed to consider the material evidence on record and specially the very basic fact that the disputed Nohra had been purchased by the father of the appellant-plaintiff on 16.4.1960 from the Gram Panchayat, Rawatsar patta whereof had been issued in the name of father of the appellant-plaintiff and since issuance of the patta, the father of the appellant-plaintiff and thereafter the appellant has peaceful possession over the disputed Nohra since 1960. It is further contended that both the courts below have failed to consider the very important aspect of the matter that when the Tehsildar, Rawatsar made inspection on 11.1.1993 of the Nohra of the appellant-plaintiff and asked the appellant-plaintiff that his Nohra is illegal and warned the appellant to vacate the Nohra within a week otherwise he will be evicted from the Nohra with the help of police which clearly shows that the appellant has possession over the Nohra in the dispute. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant while relying upon the judgment of High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Avtar Singh & Ors. v. Atma Singh cited in AIR 1982 (J&K) page 141 has contended that in the said the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir has held that if the possession over the government land is proved more than 30 years old then on the basis of adverse possession, the actual owner of the property lost the ownership. v. Atma Singh cited in AIR 1982 (J&K) page 141 has contended that in the said the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir has held that if the possession over the government land is proved more than 30 years old then on the basis of adverse possession, the actual owner of the property lost the ownership. He also relied upon the case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Union of India reported in 1991 AIR (Patna) page 233 wherein the Patna High Court has held that if the possession over the government land is more than 30 years old then on the basis of this possession the plaintiff has got the ownership. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff has contended that in a similar case of the Gram Panchayat Rawatsar in which one Uma Ram S/o Om Prakash had possession for more than 30 years over the residential plot in Ward No. 6 which plot was purchased by the Uma Ram on 24.12.1960 from Gram Panchayat Rawatsar and when the Tehsildar of Mandi Vikas Samiti threatened Uma Ram to vacate the disputed plot then he filed a civil suit before the learned Civil Judge (JD), Rawatsar, who dismissed the suit thereafter he filed an appeal before the learned appellate court, the learned appellate court allowed the appeal of Uma Ram. The judgment passed in the appeal was challenged before this Court by way of filing second appeal, but the said second appeal was also dismissed by this Court vide judgment dated 20.5.2005 and thereafter the S.L.P. filed by Nagar Palika was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The case of the present appellant-plaintiff is squarely covered with the said judgments. 10. With these arguments, learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff has prayed that this second appeal may be allowed and set aside the judgments and decrees of both the courts below and the suit may be decreed in favour of the appellant-plaintiff. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Kalika Prasad and Anr. v. Chhatrapal Singh (dead) by LRs. reported in AIR 1997 SC 1699 . 12. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Kalika Prasad and Anr. v. Chhatrapal Singh (dead) by LRs. reported in AIR 1997 SC 1699 . 12. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent-defendant has opposed the contentions raised by learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff and has supported the impugned judgments and has submitted that there is concurrent finding of both the learned courts below, therefore, the same cannot be interfered with by this Court in the second appeal. It is also submitted that no error has been committed by the learned first appeal court as well as learned trial court while passing the impugned judgments and decrees as the same have been passed after appreciating and scrutinizing the material evidence available on record. He has also contended that the case of the Uma Ram is distinguishable from this case because in the case of Uma Ram, defendant failed to produce any evidence in the trial court but in this case the respondent-defendant had produced his evidence and proved his case. Therefore, it is prayed that the present second appeal may be dismissed. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent-defendant has relied upon the following judgments:- (i) Balu Ram v. Nagarpalika Mandal, Rajsamand S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 411/2007 and 8 connected appeals decided on 16.9.2008, (ii) Chandra Singh v. Smt. Shanta Devi & Ors. - 2017 (3) CDR 1636 (Raj.). (iii) Executive Officer, Arulmingu Chokkanatha Swamy Koil trust Virudhungar v. Chandran & Ors. - 2017(2) CDR 244 (SC), (iv) Karunanidhi v. Seetharama Naidu &,2017 (3) CDR 531 (SC), (v) Daya Sah & v. Chandra Datt Pandey &,(2015) 4 WLN 119, (vi) Lisamma Antony v. Karthiyayani &,(2015)3 AAJR 317 and (vii) Ashok Rangnath Nagar v. Shrikant Govindrao Sangvikar,(2015) 6 ABR 490. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused both the impugned judgments and material available on record. 15. The case of the plaintiff in the trial court is that he has patta Ex.2 of suit land and he is in possession over the same from the time of his father and after family settlement the suit land came in his share, but he failed to prove the Patta Ex.2 according to the provisions of law, he only marked Ex.2 at patta, but he had nothing said that which Sarpanch has issued the said patta. Even he failed to produce any witness of panchayat, whereby it may be proved that by whose signature and by which Sarpach, the said patta was issued. Neither he called any record of the panchayat at the time of trial nor he moved any application to call record from the panchayat in the trial court to prove the said patta. 16. It is settled proposition of law that mere exhibition marked on a document does not dispense with its proof. 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of LIC of India & Anr. v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen reported in 2010 DNJ (SC) 376 has held that:- "(B) Evidence - Proof - Mere admission of document in evidence does not amount to its proof - Mere marking exhibit on a document does not dispense with its proof." 18. Upon perusal of the evidence, it is clear that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to prove that patta Ex.2 issued by the panchayat according to the rules of Panchayat Act, but on the basis of evidence produced by the respondent-defendant in the trial court, it is proved that in 1959, the Government has allotted the suit land to Mandi Samiti and restricted the panchayat from issuing any patta in particular area. The patta Ex.2 was issued on 16.4.1960. In these circumstances, in the year 1960 the panchayat had no jurisdiction to issue patta of suit land because the suit land was not recorded in the name of panchayat, therefore, the panchayat has no power to issue patta so the said patta given to the plaintiff by the panchayat is void ab initio and the plaintiff-appellant has got no right with regard to the said patta which is void. It is also not proved that the suit land was abadi land, but it is proved that the suit property was government land and by way of notification it was allotted to the Mandi Samiti, so true owner of the suit land is Mandi Samiti. The respondent-defendant by producing DW-1 Tarsem Kumar, DW-2 Balram, DW-3 Kaddu Ram and DW-4 Ramesh Chandra had succeeded to prove that in the year 1993, the plaintiff-appellant had tried to trespass over the suit land and upon report of patwari DW-4, the trespass was removed by the defendant No. 3 Tehsildar with due process of law, who was competent authority to remove the trespass from the Government land. 19. 19. The case of the appellant-plaintiff is not in the trial court that when patta Ex.2 was issued by the panchayat at that time suit land was abadi land and in the record, it was also in the name of panchayat and thereafter it was handed over to the Mandi Samiti by the Government. In the trial court, the plaintiff-appellant utterly failed to prove that the said land was for time being registered in abadi as panchayat land. 20. The plaintiff has also failed to prove that the said Nohra was given to him by his father in family settlement. There is no iota of evidence available on record about this fact, whereas it is proved by the evidence of defendant that the plaintiff was trespasser and his trespass has been removed by the competent authority before institution of the suit. 21. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the appellant that the plaintiff-appellant has adverse possession over the said land is concerned, the same is not tenable because the appellant-plaintiff has not pleaded a single word in the pleadings about this plea, his suit is only based on patta Ex.2. Apart from this, the appellant-plaintiff has failed to prove his regular peaceful possession from long time, within knowledge of respondent-defendants whereas the defendant-respondent have proved successfully that in the year 1993 for the first time the appellant-plaintiff tried to trespass over the said land and when he came to know this fact, upon a report of patwari, the Tehsildar, who was competent authority to remove trespass, with due process of law, dispossessed the appellant-plaintiff from the suit land. 22. In view of above discussion, I am of the opinion that the appellant-plaintiff failed to prove patta Ex.2 according to the provisions of law and at the time of institution of suit, the plaintiff was not in possession and Mandi Samiti is true owner of the suit land. In these circumstances, both the learned courts below have rightly recorded the concurrent finding on the issues No. 1 to 3 against the appellant-defendant which is based on sound appreciation of evidence and after thorough examination of the matter. 23. In these circumstances, both the learned courts below have rightly recorded the concurrent finding on the issues No. 1 to 3 against the appellant-defendant which is based on sound appreciation of evidence and after thorough examination of the matter. 23. It is settled proposition of law that injunction cannot be granted in absence of possession and it is also settled proposition of law that trespasser is not entitle for injunction against true owner, therefore, the learned both the courts below have rightly found that appellant-plaintiff had no long and peaceful possession over the suit land and rightly denied to grant injunction in favour of the plaintiff-appellant and also not erred in finding that the plaintiff has failed to prove patta Ex.2 and the Panchayat was not empowered to issue patta Ex.2 which is ab initio void, true owner of the suit land is Mandi Vikas Samiti and rejected the suit. 24. It is well settled law that the scope of judicial review in second appeal is very limited, more particularly when there is concurrent finding of fact by both the courts below and finding of possession is also finding of fact. 25. I have not been able to notice any perversity in the impugned judgment of learned first appellate court so also there is no symbol to prove that both the courts below have committed any error in considering the evidence or misread the same in arriving its decision. 26. Finding of fact which is based on well appreciation of evidence produced by the parties, therefore, no case is made out for interference by this Court because the finding cannot be said neither contrary to evidence available on record nor misreading of evidence available on record. 27. A three-Judges-Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bholaram v. Ameerchand, (1981) 2 SCC 414 , considered the effect of amendment made in section 100 of the CPC in 1976, and held as under: "......The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law." 28. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Ramaswamy Kalingaryar v. Mathayan Padayachi- AIR 1992 SC 115 , while considering the scope of Section 100 (5) S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 452/2008 Trilok Chand Regar v. Nagar Palika, Niwai & Others CPC, held as under: "......Suggested shortcomings in the findings of fact recorded by the Courts below would not alter the situation that those were findings of facts, unquestionable, under the provisions of Section 100, C.P.C., which defines the contours of the power of the High Court in second appeal. ....." 29. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gurdev Kaur & Others v. Kaki & Others- (2007) 1 SCC 546 , considered the true import, scope and ambit of section 100 CPC by referring the section 100 CPC, before and after amendment of 1976, various declarations of law by Privy Council and Supreme Court, Legislative background in the 54th Report of the Law Commission of India submitted in 1973, Historical perspective, Rational behind permitting second appeal on substantial question of law, and held as under: "81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has not been correctly appreciated and applied by the High Courts in a large number of cases. In the facts and circumstances of this case the High Court interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the amendment of section 100 CPC in 1976. The High Court would not have been justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior to the amendment of section 100 CPC. The judgment of the High Court is 6 S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 452/2008 Trilok Chand Regar v. Nagar Palika, Niwai & Others clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. The judgment of the High Court is 6 S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 452/2008 Trilok Chand Regar v. Nagar Palika, Niwai & Others clearly against the provisions of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates the legislative intention. 82. In view of the clear legislative mandate crystallized by a series of judgments of the Privy Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to 2006, the High Court in law could not have interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at by the courts below. Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal is allowed with costs." 30. In view of above referred settled proposition of law, no interference can be made by this Court in concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below. 31. So far as the contention of learned counsel for the respondent is concerned that in the case of Uma Ram, the trial court dismissed the suit but the first appellate court decreed the suit and High Court dismissed the second appeal and S.L.P. was also rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but this Court on dated 20.5.2005 in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 175/2005 (Nagar Palika, Rawatsar v. Uma Ram & Anr.) held that "the findings recorded by the learned Lower Appellate Court regarding the plaintiff's possession and its period are pure findings of fact recorded on the basis of appreciation of evidence as produced on record. Admittedly, the patta issued in favour of the plaintiff in the year 1960 has not been assailed anywhere. In that view of the matter, I do not find the appeal to be involving any substantial question of law. The same is, therefore, dismissed summarily." 32. The first appellate court also found that the Uma Ram has possession over the suit land since 37-38 years. 33. It means Uma Ram proved his possession and period but in the case in hand the plaintiff has failed to prove his long and peaceful possession, period and patta Ex.2 also, therefore, the facts of the present case and Uma Ram's case are quite distinguishable. 34. 33. It means Uma Ram proved his possession and period but in the case in hand the plaintiff has failed to prove his long and peaceful possession, period and patta Ex.2 also, therefore, the facts of the present case and Uma Ram's case are quite distinguishable. 34. Therefore, this Court finds that above substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission of this appeal are required to be answered in negative, hence, it is held that the courts below have not committed any error while deciding the issues No. 1 to 3 against the appellant-plaintiff and drawing above inference and rejected the suit. 35. In view of above discussions, the instant second appeal is found to be devoid of merit and the same is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.