ORDER : 1. While presiding over Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad as its Chairperson I have been examining and scrutinising the orders passed by different Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs) functioning under the jurisdiction, superintendence and control of DRAT, Allahabad while hearing appeals coming up before this appellate Tribunal arising out of orders passed, interim as well as final, in petitions filed by borrowers and other aggrieved persons under Section 17(1) of the SARFAESI Act as well as under the earlier Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 which now stands amended in the year 2016 and comes to be called the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993. As far as the litigation arising from invocation of the provisions of the SARFAESI Act by Banks and other Financial Institutions for recovery of their money which they had lent to various borrowers and which was not repaid by the borrowers, guarantors/mortgagors by way of taking over the possession of mortgaged properties in order to sell them by way of public auctions, is concerned, the same mainly centres around the efforts of the defaulting borrowers to save their properties which they have mortgaged in favour of the Banks and Financial Institutions from being taken over and sold. The defaulting borrowers invoke Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act and challenge the legality of the measures adopted by the Banks and other Financial Institutions and seek interim orders against dispossession from the mortgaged properties. DRTs not only entertain those Securitisation Applications (SAs) but also grant injunctions, ex-parte as well as after notice to the concerned Banks. Sometimes conditional stay orders are passed and sometimes unconditional also and Banks/Financial Institutions are restrained from taking over physical possession of their secured assets during the pendency of the SAs. 2. Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, recently gave one judgment in a case arising of the litigation under the SARFAESI Act and which is (2013) 9 SCC 620 , Standard Chartered Bank vs. V. Noble Kumar and Others and it was held therein that the defaulting borrowers who were facing dispossession from the properties which they had mortgaged with the Banks at the instance of the Banks in exercise of its rights and powers conferred upon them by the Legislature under the SARFAESI Act could invoke the remedy under Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act only after they have lost possession of the mortgaged properties in question. 3. In view of the said judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court two Division Benches of Hon'ble Allahabad High has also held that Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act can be invoked by defaulting borrowers only after possession of mortgaged properties is lost. In one judgment rendered on 23rd April, 2014 in the case of Sushila Steels vs. Union Bank of India and Others, (2014) 4 BC 518 (DB), Special Appeal No. 415 of 2014 this aspect was dealt with as under: "The real issue before us is as to whether the proceedings before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would be maintainable or not before the actual possession is taken. If the answer is negative then the interpretation of mere issuance of possession notice in any format becomes immaterial till the actual possession is taken. In some cases, there is resistance on the part of borrower to deliver possession and on that basis, proceedings under Section 14 are initiated by the Bank or the Securitisation Agency. Yet in such situation, the proceedings under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 would not lie till the possession of mortgaged property is delivered to the Bank. In this connection we may refer to Para 36 of the Apex Court judgment rendered in the case of Standard Chartered Bank vs. V. Noble Kumar and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 620 which enumerates three situations in Paras 36.1, 36.2 and 36.3. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the later judgment rendered in the case of Standard Chartered Bank does not refer to the earlier judgment passed by the Apex Court reported in (2009) 8 SCC 366 , therefore, the Tribunal fell into error by rejecting the proceedings initiated under Section 17 on the ground of maintainability." 4. Then in Special Appeal No. 462 of 2014, Rajat Steels vs. Union Bank of India and Others, decided on 8.5.2014 another Division Bench of Allahabad High dealt with the same point of maintainability SAs without the borrowers being dispossessed before filing of petitions under Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act and agreed with the aforesaid earlier judgment in the case of Sushila Steels (supra) disposed of the writ petition in the following manner: "1. Mr. Siddharth Srivastava appears for the appellant. Shri Ashish Agrawal has accepted notice on behalf of respondent-Bank. 2. Mr. Siddharth Srivastava appears for the appellant. Shri Ashish Agrawal has accepted notice on behalf of respondent-Bank. 2. Both these Special Appeals under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Rules of the Court arise out of a common judgment dated 21.1.2013 passed by learned Single Judge in Sushila Steels vs. Union Bank of India and Others, Writ C No. 148 of 2013, Rajat Alloys Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union Bank of India and Others, Writ C No. 156 of 2013 and Rajat Steels vs. Union Bank of India and Others, Writ C No. 154 of 2013. In all writ petitions a common question of law was raised with regard to maintainability of the appeals under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 against the notice under Section 13(4) of the Act, which was held by the Court to be a notice of caution to the borrower to deposit the amount, failing which proceedings under Section 13(4) of the Act could be initiated. The Court held that the appeal would not lie against the notice dated 22.10.2012. A review petition filed by Sushila Steels was rejected by the Court on 4.4.2014. 3. The common judgment in three writ petitions dated 21.1.2013 was challenged in Special Appeal No. 415 of 2014, Sushila Steels vs. Union Bank of India and Others, which was dismissed on merits on 23.4.2014. The Division Bench held relying upon Standard Chartered Bank vs. Noble Kumar and Others, (2013) 9 SCC 620 (paras 36.1, 36.2 and 36.3) that proceedings under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 would not lie until the possession of the mortgaged property is delivered to the Bank. 4. The Division Bench held that the Bank after dismissal of the writ petition has taken up proceedings under Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act which are pending. The said proceedings were taken up on the ground that the borrower-appellant had failed to deliver possession to the Bank. The proceeding under Section 14 was challenged in the review petition which was also dismissed in the light of observations made in Sub-para 2 of Paragraph 80 in Standard Chartered Bank's case. 5. The facts and circumstances of these cases are the same as in the special appeal dismissed by this Court on 23.4.2014. 6. A request has been made by Shri Siddharth Srivastava to adjourn the case as a Counsel from outstation will argue the matter. 7. 5. The facts and circumstances of these cases are the same as in the special appeal dismissed by this Court on 23.4.2014. 6. A request has been made by Shri Siddharth Srivastava to adjourn the case as a Counsel from outstation will argue the matter. 7. We do not find any good ground to adjourn the matter as the Special Appeal, arising out of the common judgment as well as the review petition have been dismissed. We entirely agree with the reasoning given by the Division Bench in dismissing the Special Appeal No. 415 of 2014, Sushila Steels vs. Union Bank of India and Others." (Emphasis supplied) 5. However, the DRT at Allahabad has vide its order dated 3rd August, 2017 allowed the SA of the respondents herein (being SA No. 49/2017), out of which the present appeal has arisen, and has very conveniently not even noticed the aforesaid decisions of two Division Benches of its jurisdictional High Court under whose superintendence it functions. The SA was not only entertained, interim stay was also granted in favour of the respondents against dispossession of the respondents from the mortgaged property in question but finally the SA itself was also allowed and appellant Bank was restrained from taking physical possession of its mortgaged assets from the respondents/borrowers in order to recover over a crore of rupees which had been lent to them by it. While giving these reliefs to the defaulting borrowers the DRT has totally ignored, he judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Noble Kumar's case and also of Allahabad High Court in Sushila Steels' case (supra) wherein it was held that before possession of secured assets is lost by the aggrieved borrower Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act cannot be resorted to. In the present case the respondents have till date not lost possession of the mortgaged property and the DRT has quashed the demand notice dated 27.4.2016 under Section 13(2) as well as possession notice dated 9.8.2016 mainly on the ground that one Panchnama dated 9.8.2016 regarding movable properties allegedly prepared on 9.8.2016 was a forged and fabricated document having been prepared and ante dated after the filing of the S.A. by the respondents in which the respondents had taken a plea that there was no compliance of Rules and to overcome that objection forged Panchnama was placed on record. As far as the observation of the learned Presiding Officer that some forged document was placed on record is concerned I find this view could be formed even in a premature petition because forgery/perjury for getting some relief by any litigant from Court or even from a quasi judicial Tribunal, like the DRT, pollutes the stream of justice and has to be viewed seriously and this position was not disputed by the Counsel for the appellant Bank also. However, as to who were the forgeries could be decided only after full inquiry which was not done by the DRT. After simply noticing the statement of the Authorised Officer of the Bank Shri Ajaz Syed Hussain that the particular document appearing to be forged (Panchnama of movable properties seized on 9.8.2016) was filled by one Dinesh Singh, nodal officer of the Bank deputed to do pairavi of Bank's cases pending in DRT Allahabad, and signed by him (Authorised Officer) the Presiding Officer had observed in the impugned order that the said Panchnama was fabricated/forged by these two Bank officials. Still the learned Presiding Officer also observed that "The persons who had actually committed such forgery are not before this Tribunal and such persons are not party to the proceedings." These two officials were very much before the DRT but instead of proceeding against the said two Bank officials for the offence of perjury/forgery the learned Presiding Officer shifted the responsibility of getting the offenders punished upon the Bank when it was observed in para No. 20 of the impugned order that "....this Tribunal finds prima facie evidence on record that officials of the Bank and Authorised Officer have committed forgery and the document produced on record Ex. No. 3 is a forged and fabricated document and on the strength of the said document, the Bank has no right to proceed further......" Then in para No. 25 it was observed that" ....Even if they have committed all such acts, principles of natural justice demanded that an opportunity to be heard is to be given to them before passing any orders for perjury. The applicants may file application by impleading erring officials in their individual capacity and at opportune time this Tribunal would decide such application in accordance with law." I was informed that the Security Applicants have not filed any such application, and so it is clear that the aforesaid observations objected to by the Counsel for the Bank in the memorandum of appeal as well as during the course of arguments cannot be said to be the final views of the DRT and cannot be used against any official of the Bank at the present moment and no official should feel hurt and affected by these observations of the Presiding Officer which in fact were not called for in the manner in which the same have been made. If at all those observations were to be made the same could have been made only after hearing the concerned officers of the Bank. Whether actually they or any other officials of the Bank has committed forgery/perjury during the course of quasi judicial proceedings before the DRT has to be examined if at all any proceedings get initiated in that regard at the instance of anyone. So, the observation made in the impugned order that forgery was committed by Dinesh Singh and Ajaz Sayed Hussain will stand expunged. This will however not debar anyone to establish that very fact in appropriately instituted inquiry in accordance with the law. Similarly the direction given to the Bank to proceed against these officials departmentally will also stand set aside but if the Bank also feels that these officials or any other official needs to be proceeded against departmentally on its independent assessment of the facts and not on the observations made by DRT it can always do that. 6. Similarly the direction given to the Bank to proceed against these officials departmentally will also stand set aside but if the Bank also feels that these officials or any other official needs to be proceeded against departmentally on its independent assessment of the facts and not on the observations made by DRT it can always do that. 6. It may also be noticed here that it was also argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant Bank and which submissions were made in the memorandum of appeal also, that the learned Presiding Officer has intentionally ignored to follow the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Sushila Steels case (supra) and the impugned order is a result of prejudice and grudge being harboured by the Presiding Officer against the Bank and its officials since a complaint was made against the Presiding Officer by Dinesh Singh and transfer petition was also moved by the Bank before this Tribunal for with-drawl of the present SA from Allahabad DRT to any other DRT. Though that transfer petition was rejected by this Tribunal hoping that an impartial decision will be taken by the learned Presiding but in fact he has rendered a totally biased verdict in favour of the defaulting borrowers who owe over a crore of rupees to the appellant Bank. Counsel drew my attention to the relevant allegations made against the Presiding Officer which inter alia are to the effect that he had asked Dinesh Singh to arrange one steno for DRT at the expense of the appellant Bank and when this request was declined by the higher officer in the Bank the Presiding Officer started having grudge against Dinesh Singh, Bank's nodal officer/legal officer, and started expressing openly that Dinesh Singh had committed forgery and he further showed his anger by personally calling up the Bank's higher officer and asked for transfer of Dinesh Singh out of Allahabad. Counsel submitted that only of this pressure exercised by the Presiding Officer and misusing and abusing his authority as the Presiding Officer of the DRT where a number of appellant Bank's cases are pending and apprehending that he may cause harm to those cases Dinesh Singh was transferred out of Allahabad. The concerned officers of the Bank filed their affidavits also before this Tribunal reiterating these allegations against the Presiding Officer of DRT, Allahabad. The concerned officers of the Bank filed their affidavits also before this Tribunal reiterating these allegations against the Presiding Officer of DRT, Allahabad. However, I am not making observations in this regard in this order since I am also seized of the complaint on same very allegations on administrative side and already the learned Presiding Officer has submitted his response also to those allegations which I will be looking into in due course. This appeal is however being allowed on the legal point alone discussed already. 7. No doubt, the DRT had also concluded that notice under Section 13(2) of SARFAESI Act was not served upon the borrowers/guarantors but I am not going into more details of this aspect of the matter also since this appeal deserves to be allowed on the short ground that the S.A. itself was premature when it was filed because the respondents had not been so far deprived of their possession of the' property which they had mortgaged with the appellant Bank. Questions of service of demand notice etc. could be agitated only when the petition legally maintainable was before the DRT and not in a premature petition in view of the binding dictum of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court referred to already. This appeal accordingly succeeds and the impugned order dated 3rd August, 2017 passed by the DRT, Allahabad is set aside and consequently the SA of the respondents herein will stand rejected as premature. They will always be at liberty to invoke Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act in case they lose possession of the property mortgaged by them in favour of the appellant Bank and at that time all their grievances against the measures taken by the appellant Bank under SARFAESI Act can be examined and if they succeed in establishing that there was any illegality in any of the measures taken by the Bank the DRT is fully competent to order restoration of possession of their property to them. 8. However, before I wind up I will also like to notice some judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and some High Courts for the information and guidance of the DRTs function under the superintendence and jurisdiction of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in which serious views were taken whenever subordinate Courts were found to have ignored the binding decisions of the superior Courts. Hon'ble Supreme Court has been saying in its judgments rendered from time-to-time whenever it came to its notice that the Courts below were not following the law declared by it in its judgments that not following its judgments laying down some law by subordinate Courts amounts to judicial impropriety. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Work, (1997) 2 CLT 468 (SC), decided way back on 7th May, 1997 the Hon'ble Apex Court had expressed its anguish in the following words: "It is unfortunate that the High Court did not consider it necessary to refer to various judicial pronouncements of this Court in which the principles which have to be followed while examining an application for grant of interim relief have been clearly laid down. The observation of the High Court that reference to judicial decisions will not be of much importance was clearly a method adopted by it in avoiding to follow and apply the law as laid down by this Court...... We are constrained to make these observation with regard to the manner in which the High Court had dealt with this case because this is not an isolated case where the Courts, while disobeying or not complying with the law laid down by this Court, have at time been liberal in granting injunction restraining encashment of Bank guarantees. It is unfortunate, that notwithstanding the authoritative the pronouncements of this Court, the High Courts and the Courts subordinate thereto, still seem intent on affording to this Court innumerable opportunities for dealing with this area of law, thought by this Court to be well settled. When a position, in law, is well-settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate Courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the seeded legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate Courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops. (Emphasis supplied) Before concluding we think it appropriate to mention about the conduct of the respondent-Bank which has chosen not to be in this case. It is time that this tendency stops. (Emphasis supplied) Before concluding we think it appropriate to mention about the conduct of the respondent-Bank which has chosen not to be in this case. From the facts stated hereinabove it appears to us that the respondent Bank has not shown professional efficiency, to say the least, and has acted in a partisan manner with a view to help and assist respondent No. 1. At the time when there was no restraint order from any Court, the Bank was under a legal and moral obligation to honour its commitments. It, however, failed to do so. It appears that the Bank deliberately dragged its feet so as to enable respondent No. 1 to secure favourable order of injunction from the Court. Such conduct of a Bank is difficult to appreciate we do not wish to say anything more but it may feel that it will be prejudicial in the event of the appellant taking action against it." 9. In a subsequent judgment in the case of Hombe Gowda Edn. Trust and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Others, (2006) 1 SLT 225, Appeal (Civil) 2554 of 2003, decided on 16 December, 2005 "Law declared by this Court in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India, as noticed in the decisions noticed supra, categorically demonstrates that the Tribunal would not normally interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by the employers unless an appropriate case is made out therefor. The Tribunal being inferior to that of this Court was bound to follow the decisions of this Court which are applicable to the fact of the present case in question. The Tribunal can neither ignore the ratio laid down by this Court nor refuse to follow the same. In Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. vs. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Another, (1997) 2 CLT 468 (SC) : (1997) 6 SCC 450 , it was held: "When a position, in law, is well-settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the feast, for the subordinate Courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate Courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops." 10. I will also like to note the views of some High Courts also. Gujarat High Court in the case of B.J. Pandya, Octroi Inspector vs. Arvind Kumar Kanubhai Hadial, (1995) 2 GLR 1100 had observed as under: "3. To state few relevant facts as far as they are necessary constraining this Court once again to raise the above question and further express itself in this regard, the same has to be broadly divided into two categories, viz. firstly, the particular gross facts and circumstances of the instant cases wherein in as many as 219 criminal cases, premature acquittal came to be recorded at the stroke of a pen on patently unjustifiable ground of absence of the complainant when the matters were called out and Secondly, the general continued, unabated irresponsible trend of illegally throwing away the criminal cases, at the very threshold of the trial in utter disregard to the clear-cut guidelines given on some of quite basic and elementary principle of the procedure to be followed when the complainant or witnesses are found absent on the date fixed for hearing, impairing the image and basic trust of the people in the administration of justice (Like in the present case the learned Presiding Officer of DRT has quashed the entire efforts of the Bank to recover huge amount of public money by an unmerited order ignoring the binding judgments of superior Courts and entertaining premature petition) 4.1. In all these appeals, respondents are duly served, however, for whatever reasons they have not remained present either personally or through learned Advocate before this Court. In this view of the matter, taking that they have nothing to say, it is decided to dispose of all these matters after hearing the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant and the State. (In the present appeal also the respondents, beneficiaries of the unmerited order of DRT had chosen not to ensure their representation at the time of hearing of this appeal and so only Counsel for the aggrieved Bank was heard.) 5. Now having heard the learned Advocate Mr. (In the present appeal also the respondents, beneficiaries of the unmerited order of DRT had chosen not to ensure their representation at the time of hearing of this appeal and so only Counsel for the aggrieved Bank was heard.) 5. Now having heard the learned Advocate Mr. Shah appearing for the appellant and the learned P.P. Mr. Trivedi for the State at length, it may be stated at the very outset that the submissions made by the learned Advocates have considerable force, and therefore, the same merits to be accepted to allow all these appeals. Looking to the gravity and seriousness of the offence and the tell-tale sordid facts of all these cases and the proceedings before the trial Court, not only the impugned judgment and order of en mass acquittal deserves to be quashed and set aside, and the matters be remanded to the trial Court for de novo trial but the further pain, shock and surprise which they carry in their folds constrains this Court to take a very serious view of the matter in overall interest of 'justice', in particular, and then administration of justice in general. Thus, over and above the alleged patent illegality and the perversity of the impugned order of acquittal, in the unbecoming conduct of the learned Magistrate raises in its turn many important questions in the mind of this Court, and to catalogue few of them, they are: (ii) How indeed the learned Magistrate in second place could have thought it fit of acquitting the accused who are alleged to have committed serious economic offence of octroi evasion to the tune of lacs of rupees where the public institution like the Municipality came to be robbed of its precious income by way of octroi revenue? (iii) How indeed the learned Magistrate in third place was unaware of the fact that the public institution like the Municipality carry on its ordinary public welfare activities as well as maintain its entire administration set-up on the basis of public revenue by way of tax and the octroi duty which is the most important source of its income? (iii) How indeed the learned Magistrate in third place was unaware of the fact that the public institution like the Municipality carry on its ordinary public welfare activities as well as maintain its entire administration set-up on the basis of public revenue by way of tax and the octroi duty which is the most important source of its income? (v) How indeed the learned Magistrate in the fifth place did not realise by way of common sense that by dismissing the complaints in such a cavalier and un-judicial fashion, he was indirectly encouraging the offenders of such a gross economic offences by putting premium over the wrong of their octroi-dodging!! (viii) How indeed the learned Magistrate became oblivious to the ordinary judicial propriety of not following the judgment of this Court rendered in case of State of Gujarat vs. Dr. C.K. Patel decided on 13.2.1991 which already stands and the copies of which came to be circulated to all the learned Magistrates on 25.3.1991. In this regard, it indeed cannot be disputed that as per the record (a) the judgment in case of State of Gujarat v. Dr. C.K. Patel (supra) was delivered on 13th February, 1991, (b) as per the direction of this Court, copies of the same were circulated to all the learned Magistrates on 25th March, 1991, and that (c) thereafter only an en mass acquittal orders in 219 criminal cases came to be passed on 31st August, 1991; that is to say 5 months after the circulation of aforesaid judgment, on the ground "complainant remaining absent." Not to follow decision of this Court directly on the point, more particularly when the copy of the same was duly circulated to all the learned Magistrates of the State, by no stretch of imagination, the same can be treated to be a simple and mere judicial error, as the same is nothing less than grave impropriety, which can as well amount to Contempt of this Court!! What else indeed it could be other than total disregard of the directions given by this Court in case of Dr. What else indeed it could be other than total disregard of the directions given by this Court in case of Dr. C.K. Patel, where despite the said decision on the point, the learned Magistrate went on to outrageously dispose of as many as 219 criminal cases with the stroke of a penal Thirdly, how indeed the learned Magistrate irresponsibly abdicated the judicial function in throwing away large number of cases on totally unjustifiable ground. Rather the combined effect of all these negligence on the part not the learned Magistrate prima facie demonstrates not only how the cases involving huge fraud on the public revenue came to be indiscreetly thrown to the winds but also his scant respect for the 'Law' and ultimate disregard for the 'Justice' and overall public cause. ...........Talking individually, in a particular given case of evasion of octroi duty, the amount involved may be quite small and insignificant, not warranting any serious view of the matter to be taken but that is not the way to look at the things in such type of offences where the accused displays tendency of evading octroi. The reason is one may like it or not, year after year, the offences involving evasion of public revenue takes place and go on increasing, some involving small amount while others involving quite large. This is quite instinctive greed of the most of the persons, and therefore, there is indeed no way to root it out from the complex human mind, unless every person becomes an ideal citizen. This is sheer impossibility and hoping against the hope. In this view of the matter, merely because evasion amount involved is small, if the Court gets relaxed and takes lenient view of the matter and lets off lightly the offender, not only he will be surely encouraged to repeat the same in future at the cost of the public revenue, which may or may not be detected, but even the law will lose all its sanction and respect to control such offenders. Not only this but further also we cannot afford to ignore that the coffers of public exchequer are filled up mostly and ordinarily with the help of small amounts that just drips into it, meaning thereby every small pie is precious and important to be ignored, as in totality, it ultimately swells the public exchequer or there is deficit every year to meet with the financial challenges of the institution. To illustrate this further, every drop of water has its own value, standing by itself perhaps little but as collected one invaluable! In fact what is the ocean, if drop after drop of water is taken away from the same, that is to say no ocean can ever be made and exist without collection of drops of water. Thus, if we look at the drop of water alone, it may appear quite insignificant but if we look at the same in totality, it can as well shape into either pond, lake, river or even ocean, and even for little purpose, a small tank of water in house, which stands to utility for much needed daily household works. Similarly, the offences pertaining to the public revenue or any other such public interest which may in a given case appear to be quite small and insignificant but at the same time taking the collective view of the matter, it is indeed quite grave and serious to countenance the same lightly. 6. Further, bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the case, like the present one, all the learned Magistrates, as of their duty, first of all must appreciate and know the basic difference between the "substantial justice" and the "technical or mechanical justice" on the one hand and his ultimate accountability towards the overall object and spirit of the particular act and the affected public interest in general, on the other. The gravity and seriousness of the offence and its overall impact on the socioeconomic set-up in the Society can never be under-estimated or ignored by any learned Magistrate while conveniently opting for cheap acquittals on the sole ground of absence of complainant and/or witnesses. The gravity and seriousness of the offence and its overall impact on the socioeconomic set-up in the Society can never be under-estimated or ignored by any learned Magistrate while conveniently opting for cheap acquittals on the sole ground of absence of complainant and/or witnesses. It is this honesty, anxiety and sensitivity of the judicial conscience, the light of wisdom and the resultant public-oriented judicial activism and involvement in cases which make them "the learned Magistrate" truly capable of rendering real and substantial justice, and thereby worthy to sit on the "Divine throne of Justice.................." (Highlighting is by me) 11. Jammu & Kashmir High Court in the case of Administrator, Jammu v. J&K Special Tribunal and Others, AIR 1998 J&K 56 it was observed as under: "11. The above observations made by the Supreme Court of India can be treated as law of the land and thus have to be followed. 12. Needless to mention that the judgments given by the Supreme Court are law of the land and those who disobey can be held guilty of contempt of this Court...." 12. It is thus hoped that the DRTs under the superintendence and jurisdiction of Hon'ble Allahabad High Court do not commit any act of judicial impropriety by entertaining petitions under Section 17(1) of SARFAESI Act at the instance of defaulting borrowers OR guarantors and mortgagors before their having lost actual physical possession of the mortgaged properties by ignoring the binding decisions of their jurisdictional High Court in the cases of Sushila Steels and Rajat Steels (supra). To this extent these observations made by me should be taken as a piece of guidance from the Chairperson of the DRAT, Allahabad which it can give to DRTs in exercise of the powers of superintendence over DRTs conferred upon the Chairpersons of DRATS under Section 17A of the erstwhile RDDBFI Act, 1993 as also of The Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 This should suffice. 13. A copy of this order be circulated amongst all the DRTs under the jurisdiction of DRAT, Allahabad for their information and strict compliance. Appeal allowed.