JUDGMENT : Rongon Mukhopadhyay, J. Heard Mr. Anil Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K.P. Deo, learned counsel for the CBI. 2. In this application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in connection with R.C. Case No. 17(A)/2014-R instituted for the alleged offences under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Pursuant to I.A. No. 5153 of 2015 being allowed by the Court on 5.11.2015, the petitioner has also challenged the order dated 3.7.2015 by which cognizance was taken for the offences punishable under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 3. It has been stated by Mr. Anil Kumar, learned senior counsel for the petitioner that no case under the Prevention of Corruption Act could have been instituted against the petitioner. Even the petitioner was working on a contractual basis in Central University at Jharkhand and, therefore, he was not a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned senior counsel submits that the petitioner was never appointed against any sanctioned post in the University. It has been stated that the petitioner after his working hours used to work in a private capacity for a which he was used to be paid and such income was never taken into consideration prior to lodgement of the FIR. In fact the income of the petitioner is reflected in his income tax returns. Learned senior counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the appointment letter of the petitioner dated 6.7.2011 as also to the relevant provisions of the Central University Act with respect to the manner of appointment and the council which is entrusted for such appointment. It has been further been stated that the appointment of the petitioner was not on a regular or substantive post and therefore, the same being not in terms of the statute, the petitioner cannot be said to be a public servant. Learned senior counsel also submits that the petitioner can be construed to be a public servant, if a substantive against a vacant and sanction post was made in accordance with law. Further submission has been advanced that Section 2(c)(viii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act includes an office and thus, the same signifies a sanctioned post. Learned senior counsel also submits that the petitioner can be construed to be a public servant, if a substantive against a vacant and sanction post was made in accordance with law. Further submission has been advanced that Section 2(c)(viii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act includes an office and thus, the same signifies a sanctioned post. Learned senior counsel in support of his contention has referred to the judgments in cases of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) reported in 1998 (2) EastCrC 734 (SC) : (1998) 4 SCC 626 and Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela reported in (2006) 2 SCC 482 . 4. Countering the arguments advanced by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, Mr. K.P. Deo, learned counsel for the CBI has referred to Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act while stating that the petitioner was a public servant, although being in contractual appointment in the University. Learned counsel submits that the duty of the petitioner would also reveal the characteristics of a public servant and merely because the petitioner was appointed on a contractual basis for a fixed term, the petitioner cannot claim himself not be a public servant so as to escape prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Learned counsel in support of his contention has referred to a judgment in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell v. Ramesh Gelli and others reported in (2016) 2 JLJR 212 (SC). 5. The pivotal point for deciding the issue is as to whether the petitioner comes within the definition of a public servant or not in terms of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 5. The pivotal point for deciding the issue is as to whether the petitioner comes within the definition of a public servant or not in terms of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act reads as follows : 2(c) "Public Servant" means,- (i) any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty; (ii) any person in the service or pay of a local authority; (iii) any person in the service or pay of a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or an authority or a body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); (iv) any Judge, including any person empowered by law to discharge whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions; (v) any person authorised by a Court of justice to perform any duty, in connection with the administration of justice, including a liquidator, receiver or Commissioner appointed by such Court; (vi) any Arbitrator or other person to whom any cause or matter has been referred for decision or report by a Court of justice or by a competent public authority; (vii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is empowered to prepare, publish, maintain or revise an electoral roll or to conduct an election or part of an election: (viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty; (ix) any person who is the president, secretary or other office-bearer of a registered co-operative society engaged in agriculture, industry, trade or banking, receiving or having received any financial and from the Central Government or a State Government or from any corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act, or any authority or body owned or controlled or aided by the Government or a Government company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956); (x) any person who is a Chairman, member or employee of any Service Commission or Board, by whatever name called, or a member of any Selection Committee appointed by such Commission or Board for the conduct of any examination or making any selection on behalf of such Commission or Board; (xi) any person who is a Vice-Chancellor or member of any governing body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other teacher or employee, by whatever designated called, of any University and any person whose services have been availed of by a University or any other public authority in connection with holding or conducting examinations. (xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an employee of an educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institution, in whatever manner established, receiving or having received any financial assistance from the Central Government or any State Government, or local or other public authority." 6. Section 2(b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act defines a public duty which means a duty in the discharge of which the State, the public or the community at large has an interest. 7. The petitioner was appointed on 6.7.2011 for a period of one year on a consolidated amount of Rs.35,000/- only per month. It was clearly indicated in the appointment letter itself that the services will be governed by the Central Government Rules and Regulations and the University/petitioner may terminate his contract by giving one month written advance notice. The petitioner had tried to create an aura that the post he was holding was never a substantive post and therefore, he was not a public servant in terms of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The functions and the responsibility of the petitioner who is a Civil Engineer was of assisting the OSD (Project) for civil works, planning and design of the permanent campus of Central University of Jharkhand. The duty of the petitioner therefore, was a public duty in terms of Section 2(b) of the Act. Section 21 of the Central Universities Act is with respect to formation of the Executive Council and Section 26 is the power to make statutes which includes the appointment of teachers and academic staffs for a specified period, the condition of the service of the employees and other conditions which flow as a natural corollary. Section 18 of the Central Universities Act is with respect to the manner of appointment and powers and duties of other officers of the University which had to be prescribed by the statute. 8. In the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE) reported in 1998 (2) EastCrC 734 (SC) : (1998) 4 SCC 626 , while considering the meaning of the term Office, it was held as follows : "61. We will first examine the question whether a Member of Parliament holds an office. The word "office" is normally understood to mean "a position to which certain duties are attached, especially a place of trust, authority or service under constituted authority". We will first examine the question whether a Member of Parliament holds an office. The word "office" is normally understood to mean "a position to which certain duties are attached, especially a place of trust, authority or service under constituted authority". (See Oxford Shorter English Dictionary, 3rd Edn., p.1362) In McMillan v. Guest Lord Wright has said: "The word 'office' is of indefinite content. Its various meanings cover four columns of the New English Dictionary, but I take as the most relevant for purposes of the case the following: 'A position or place to which certain duties are attached, especially one of a more or less public character'. In the same case Lord Atkin gave the following meaning: “.....an office or employment which was subsisting, permanent, substantive position, which had an existence independent of the person who filled it, which went on and was filed in succession by successive holders.” In Statesman (P) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb and Mahadeo v. Shantibhai this Court has adopted the meaning given by Lord Wright when it said: "An office means no more than a position to which certain duties are attached." 62. In Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana Sikri, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for the majority, while construing the words "holds any office of the profit") in Article 19(1)(g), has said that "there must be an office which exists independently of the holder of the office". It was observed that there is no essential difference between the definitions given by Lord Wright and Lord Atkin." 9. In the case of Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Vaghela reported in (2006) 2 SCC 482 , it was held as follows: "24. For reasons discussed above, we are clearly of the opinion that respondent No. 1 cannot be said to be a Government servant as he was working on contract basis and, therefore, he was not eligible for any relaxation in upper age-limit. The view taken by the High Court is clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." 10. The judgment in the case of Union Public Service Commission (supra) was with respect to the respondent having been appointed as the Drugs Inspector on a contractual basis. The view taken by the High Court is clearly erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside." 10. The judgment in the case of Union Public Service Commission (supra) was with respect to the respondent having been appointed as the Drugs Inspector on a contractual basis. However, the definition of a public servant in Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act has a wider magnitude and ambit and it includes any person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by the Government by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty. It no where states that a contractual employee under an appropriate authority would not be encompassed within the term Public Servant. In the case of CBI, Bank Securities and Fraud Cell v. Ramesh Gelli and others (supra), while considering public service vis-a-vis public duty, it was indicated as follows : “34. While there can be no manner of doubt that in the Objects and Reasons stated for enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it has been made more than clear that the Act, inter alia, envisages widening of the scope of the definition of "public servant", nevertheless, the mere performance of public duties by the holder of any office cannot bring the incumbent within the meaning of the expression "public servant" as contained in Section 2(c) of the PC Act. The broad definition of "public duty" contained in Section 2(b) would be capable of encompassing any duty attached to any office inasmuch as in the contemporary scenario there is hardly any office whose duties cannot, in the last resort, be traced to having a bearing on public interest or the interest of the community at large. Such a wide understanding of the definition of "public servant" may have the effect of obliterating all distinctions between the holder of a private office or a public office which, in my considered view, ought to the maintained. Therefore, according to me, it would be more reasonable to understand the expression "public servant" by referred to the office and the duties performed in connection therewith to be of a public character. 40. Turning to the case in hand there can be no dispute that before the enactment of the PC Act. Therefore, according to me, it would be more reasonable to understand the expression "public servant" by referred to the office and the duties performed in connection therewith to be of a public character. 40. Turning to the case in hand there can be no dispute that before the enactment of the PC Act. Section 46-A of the BR Act had the effect of treating the employees/office-bearers concerned of a banking company as public servants for the purpose of Chapter IX, IPC by virtue of the deeming provision contained therein. The enactment of the P.C. Act with the clear intent to widen the definition of "public servant" cannot be allowed to have the opposite effect by expressing judicial helplessness to rectify or fill up what is a clear omission in Section 46-A of the B.R. Act. The omission to continue to extend the deeming provisions in Section 46-A of the B.R. Act to the offences under Sections 7 to 12 of the P.C. Act must be understood to be clearly unintended and hence capable of admitting a judicial exercise to fill up the same. The unequivocal legislative intent to widen the definition of "public servant" by enacting the P.C. Act cannot be allowed to be defeated by interpreting and understanding the omission in Section 46-A of the B.R. Act to be incapable of being filled up by the Court.” 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case was considering as to whether Section 46(A) of the Bank Regulations Act, 1949 was applicable for the purpose of Prevention of Corruption Act. 12. The petitioner who was appointed on a contractual basis in the Central University of Jharkhand and assigned with the task of assisting the OSD projects for planning and designing of the permanent campus was therefore, carrying out a public duty and was therefore, a public servant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Setting at rest, the controversy as to whether the petitioner is a public servant or not, the factual aspects of the case and the allegations levelled against the petitioner has also been considered by this Court. Since the FIR specifically alleged against the petitioner that after he joined Central University of Jharkhand as a Civil Engineer, the petitioner had acquired immovable assets in his own name and that of his wife and son which came to about Rs. Since the FIR specifically alleged against the petitioner that after he joined Central University of Jharkhand as a Civil Engineer, the petitioner had acquired immovable assets in his own name and that of his wife and son which came to about Rs. 1,17,51,000/- which was disproportionate to his own sources of income which the petitioner was not able to explain satisfactorily. Investigation by the cm also resulted in submission of charge-sheet and taking of cognizance. There being a prima facie case in existence and as has been held above, the petitioner was a public servant and, therefore, amenable for being prosecuted under the provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act, this application fails, and the same is accordingly, dismissed. Application dismissed.