JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. The State has preferred present appeal feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 31st March, 2006 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Fast Track Court in Sessions Case No. 126 of 2005. 2. The case of the prosecution is that one Mangalbhai Bhudarbhai Bariya filed a complaint regarding disclosure of murder of his son Balvantbhai. It is alleged in the complaint that his son Balvant was staying at Surat and to attend the Holi festival, he had come to his native - village Vaghjipur. It was further asserted in the complaint that the Holi fire had taken place at about 1-30 midnight on the day of Holi and the next day was celebrated as Dhuleti. The people were busy with Holi celebration and complainant and other people of the village were to take dinner at house of Sardarbhai Bhayajibhai Bariya. It was stated that his son Balvant did not wait for taking dinner and he had proceed to go to his house. Since he did not reach to his house, the family members thought that Balvant would have accompanied the people celebrating the festival. It has further been mentioned in the complaint that on 27th March, 2005 in the morning, when the wife of Dalpatbhai named Laxmiben was going to graze a herd of goats, she had seen that dead body of Balvant was lying on the road to Godhra-Nada and she reported this incident to father-in-law i.e. present complainant. Pursuant to which, the complainant went there along with other persons, it was found that deceased was injured and apprehended that he must have been beaten on the chest as well as on the face, which was found crushed. This complaint came to be filed before the concerned police station being I.CR. No. 38 of 2005. Pursuant to which, the police has started investigation. The scene of panchnama was executed. The dead body was sent for postmortem examination and with the help of police, the Scientific Officer has also taken steps, examined the articles, which were recovered from the spot and in addition thereto, the investigating officer has also taken help of sniffer dog squad. The articles which were recovered from the place of offence were sent for examination and after completion of detailed investigation, the charge-sheet came to be filed. The articles which were recovered from the place of offence were sent for examination and after completion of detailed investigation, the charge-sheet came to be filed. Since the case was triable by Court of Sessions, the same was committed to the Sessions, which was then registered as Sessions Case No. 126 of 2005. Since the accused persons have pleaded not guilty, the charge came to be framed vide Exh. 4, and accused have claimed to be tried, resultantly the statements came to be recorded at Exh. 5, 6 and 7. The prosecution has examined as many as 17 witnesses and have also produced the documentary evidence to prove the case and after closure purshis, having been given the further statement of accused persons came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal procedure and pursuant to which, since the accused persons have denied to have committed the offence, the case was put up for trial. 3. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the evidences and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which reads as under: PW Particulars 1 Parsingbhai Gamabhai Bariya, panch witness, Inquest Panchnama 2 Badharbhai Mathurbhai Matiya, Panch witness, Recovery of cloths. 3. Following witnesses have been examined by the prosecution to deal with the evidences and following evidences were also produced during the course of trial, which reads as under: PW Particulars 1 Parsingbhai Gamabhai Bariya, panch witness, Inquest Panchnama 2 Badharbhai Mathurbhai Matiya, Panch witness, Recovery of cloths. 3 Sardarsing Bhayajibhai Bariya, Panch witness, Recovery of cloths 4 Shivkumar Babulal Goyal, Medical officer 5 Parvatsinh Dalabhai Bariya, Panch witness, Recovery of shirt 6 Dalpathsinh Shankarbhai Bariya, Panch witness, recovery of article from Rekhaben 7 Mangalbhai Bhudabhai Bariya, Father of the deceased 8 Jagdishkumar Balvantsing Bariya, son of the deceased 9 Deepsing Dalsukh Bariya, Local resident of Vaghjipur 10 Shardaben Vakhatsinh Bariya, Local resident of village: Vaghjipur 11 Ravindrakumar Budsinh Bariya, Friend of Jagdishbhai 12 Dalpathbhai Mangalsinh Bariya, Brother of the deceased 13 Rekhaben Prabhatsinh Bariya, Niece of the deceased 14 Amarsing Kodarbhai Bariya, PSO 15 Chandubhai Nagjibhai Pargi, scientific officer, Godhra 16 Punjabhai Ratabhai Khant, Dog Handler 17 Kirtikumar Gokaldas Patel, PSI, Investigating officer LIST OF DOCUMENTS : Exhibit Particulars 47 Complaint 12 Scene of offence Panchnama 11 Inquest Panchnama 58 Report of scientific officer 23 Recovery of cloths of deceased 32 Post mortem Report 34 Recovery of shirt of Takhatsinh Bharatsinh 36 Arrest Panchnama 45 Recovery of Greeting card from Rekhaben 65 List of the articles forwarded to FSL 68 FSL report from Surat 69 FSL report from Vadodara 70 Serology report 71 Rough map of scene of offence 63 Track call from for Dog Squad. 4. During the course of trial, the depositions have been analyzed by learned Sessions Judge and upon examination of the documentary evidence as well as oral evidence, the issues were framed and after considering the overall material on record, learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Fast Track Court, Panchmahals at Godhra, was pleased to pass present judgment and order, whereby, in exercise of powers under Section 235(2) of the Cr.P.C., the accused Nos. 1 to 3 are acquitted of the charges under Sections 302, 201 read with Section 34 of the I.P.C and Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act. 5. It is this judgment and order, which is made subject matter of challenge in the present Criminal Appeal filed by State. The present Criminal Appeal appears to have been admitted in the month of July, 2007, which came up for final disposal. 6. To represent the State, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. 5. It is this judgment and order, which is made subject matter of challenge in the present Criminal Appeal filed by State. The present Criminal Appeal appears to have been admitted in the month of July, 2007, which came up for final disposal. 6. To represent the State, learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. Soni has contended on the basis of the material that prosecution has proved the charge leveled against the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt and on the basis of material on record. 7. Mr. Soni has further contended that prosecution case is based on circumstantial evidence no doubt but on the basis of evidence on which the circumstantial evidence have been successfully established by the prosecution and therefore, there appears to be a clear error of jurisdiction on the part of learned Additional Sessions Judge, which requires to be corrected. 8. Mr. Soni has further contended that from the overall documents on record, three main circumstances, which were required to be established by the prosecution have been proved bound reasonable doubt. The last scene together theory is substantiated by evidence on record. So much so that motive is also proved clearly and the depositions of material witnesses have been supported the case of prosecution. In addition thereto, Mr. Soni has further contended that from scene of offence, the material which have been recovered and cloth of accused persons, which have been collected, sent for scientific analysis. The report of FSL has also positively substantiated the case of the prosecution as from the place of incident, recovery which has been made, has clearly found the blood stain of deceased and therefore, the serological report is also substantiated the version of prosecution. The reasoning assigned by learned Judge are not cogent sufficient to grant acquittal to respondent accused. While contending this, learned APP Mr. Soni has drawn the attention of this Court mainly to the evidence of witness PW-7, i.e. father of deceased Mangalbhai Bhudarbhai Bariya and on the basis of this facts, Mr. Soni has contended that complaint has clearly spell out specifically the injuries which are corroborated by PM report, the assertion of this fact has also proved the incident in question as he has identified the accused Sanabhai Kashnabhai Bariya. 9. In addition thereto, Mr. Soni has contended that complaint has clearly spell out specifically the injuries which are corroborated by PM report, the assertion of this fact has also proved the incident in question as he has identified the accused Sanabhai Kashnabhai Bariya. 9. In addition thereto, Mr. Soni has further drawn the attention to yet another evidences of prosecution i.e. Jagdishkumar Balvantsinh Bariya, son of deceased, who was examined at Exh. 48, the prosecution witness No. 8 and has drawn the attention of this Court that this witness i.e. son has specifically conveyed that on the date of incident, the father was lying at the place of accused. It was also emphasized by this witness about the motive of the commission of crime and has specifically conveyed in his deposition that year before the date of incident, since Shana Kasna taken the goat from the field and there was an altercation between them and to fulfill vengeance, this witness - son of deceased has deposed that deceased has been done away. In addition thereto, one another circumstance was also brought to the notice of the Court that there was love affair between one Rekha and Mahesh Mohan and in that episode present deceased had taken part to case out the problem and therefore, keeping these two circumstances in mind, the respondents accused have done away his father and therefore, Mr. Soni has contended that this evidence of Jagdishkumar Bariya has clearly established the motive in commission of crime and therefore, the learned Judge has erred in passing the order of acquittal. 10. In addition thereto, there are other witnesses have also been read over by learned APP, one of such, Mr. Deepsing Dalsukh Bariya, who was examined at Exh. 51, the prosecution witness No. 9, one Shardaben Vakhatsinh Bariya, who was examined at Exh. 52, the prosecution witness No. 10 and by referring these two witnesses, learned APP has contended that there is specific corroboration assigned by these witnesses to the case of the prosecution. Mr. Soni has further contended that even the panch witnesses have also not turned hostile and have also supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, when the entire corroboration of evidence support the prosecution, as narrated hereinabove, which cannot allow an order to be sustained in eye of law and therefore, Mr. Mr. Soni has further contended that even the panch witnesses have also not turned hostile and have also supported the case of the prosecution and therefore, when the entire corroboration of evidence support the prosecution, as narrated hereinabove, which cannot allow an order to be sustained in eye of law and therefore, Mr. Soni has ultimately requested to reverse the order and convict the accused appropriately for commission of crime, for which they have been tried. 11. To oppose the stand taken by learned APP, Mr. Yogendra Thakore, learned advocate appearing for respondents accused has contended specifically that on the basis of overall material on record, the theory of last scene together is not proved. He has also pointed out from the evidence of son as well as record that when the deceased was last seen, there was no scuffle, there was no incident of any nature which can connect the accused persons on the basis of this last scene together theory and simply because, he was seen on the place of incident, no order of conviction can be passed. 12. Mr. Thakore has further contended that so far as motive is concerned, there is no cogent evidence coming out from the record of prosecution that in the episode of Rekha and Mahesh, any part was played by deceased, which can connect the respondents accused and the another theory which the prosecution has tried to connect the accused with crime regarding the incident happened one year ago of Shana Kashna, who took the goat from the field of deceased and there was some animosity between the accused and deceased and therefore, on the basis of these two theories, the prosecution has tried to rest their case and as nothing has been coming out during the course of investigation, no order of conviction can be passed and therefore, Mr. Thakore contended that learned Judge has assigned sufficient reasons to justify the order of acquittal. 13. Mr. Thakore has further contended that even apart from this animosity, which have been pleaded to prove the guilt of accused is very old. Mr. Thakore contended that learned Judge has assigned sufficient reasons to justify the order of acquittal. 13. Mr. Thakore has further contended that even apart from this animosity, which have been pleaded to prove the guilt of accused is very old. Mr. Thakore further contended that there is no further evidence warrant to suggest that any of the three circumstances, as mentioned by prosecution, have been established between the accused respondents to commit murder of the deceased and therefore, when such kind of evidence is not reflected, it is not safe to reverse the order of acquittal. 14. Mr. Thakore has drawn the attention of the Court to the evidence of prosecution witness No. 16, who was examined at Exh. 60 one Punjabhai Ratabhai Khant, who was a dog handler. Looking to his version to prove the case of prosecution, Mr. Thakore has contended that unless and until there is a specific corroborative evidence to believe the version of this witness, no order of conviction can be passed. While contending this, Mr. Thakore has relied upon the decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Baldevji Vajaji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2014 (5) GLR 3932, and contended specifically that this evidence can never be said to be a substantive piece of evidence, on the basis of which the order of conviction can be passed. The said fact, at the best can be helpful to carry out further investigation and nothing more and said fact can be said to be a very weak piece of evidence and therefore, unless and until the same is strongly corroborated by either independent witness, same cannot be considered to convict the accused persons and therefore, by referring to that learned advocate has contended that no interference is required to be made. 15. In addition thereto, Mr. Thakore has contended that this incident is of the year 2005 and the order of acquittal has been passed way back in the month of March, 2006 and therefore, after these many years, no order of conviction can be passed more particularly on the basis of these weak piece of evidences and ultimately requested the court to dismiss the Appeal filed by State. 16. We have considered the evidence led by prosecution in form of panch witness No. 1 for inquest Parsingbhai Gamabhai Bariya. In addition thereto Dr. 16. We have considered the evidence led by prosecution in form of panch witness No. 1 for inquest Parsingbhai Gamabhai Bariya. In addition thereto Dr. Shivkumar Babulal Goyal was also examined as PW-4 and couple with PM note and on the basis of these material on record, we do not find any reason to dislodge the findings arrived at by learned Additional Sessions Judge. In addition thereto, the father of deceased has also been examined as prosecution witness No. 7 Mangalbhai Bhudarbhai Bariya and the son of deceased Jagdishkumar Balvantsinh Bariya was also examined as PW-8 and in co-relation to that, even Deepsing Dalsukhbhai Bariya was examined as prosecution witness No. 9 and on the basis of these evidences also, nothing incriminating is found which would lead us to disturb the findings arrived at by learned Additional Sessions Judge. The recovery of cloths will have no that much significance in view of the decision of this Court in case of Baldevji Vajaji Thakor v. State of Gujarat reported in 2014 (5) GLR 3932 and therefore, simply on the basis of that circumstance that blood is found on the cloth as well as stone is recovered, it cannot be said that chain is completed to establish the guilt of the respondents accused on the basis of such circumstances prevailing on record. 17. It is well settled proposition of law pronounced by the Apex Court in one of such decisions, in case of Tomaso Bruno and Another v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 178 , wherein, the Apex Court in paras 12, 13, 14 and 15 held as under: "12. In every case based upon circumstantial evidence, in this case as well, the question that needs to be determined is whether the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are proved by reliable and cogent evidence and whether all the links in the chain of circumstance are complete so as to rule out the possibility of innocence of the accused. 13 There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on the circumstantial evidence. But it should be tested on the touchstone of the law relating to circumstantial evidence. This Court in C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., held as under: (SCC pp. 206-207, para-21) "21. 13 There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on the circumstantial evidence. But it should be tested on the touchstone of the law relating to circumstantial evidence. This Court in C. Chenga Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., held as under: (SCC pp. 206-207, para-21) "21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover, all the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In the present case the courts below have overlooked these settled principles and allowed suspicion to take the place of proof besides relying upon some inadmissible evidence." 14. After referring to a catena of cases based on circumstantial evidence in Shivu and Anr. v. Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka, this Court held as under: (SCC pp.717-18, para-12) "12. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. {See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, Eradu v. State of Hyderabad, Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka, State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Ashok Kumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances, the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt." 15. In Bhagat Ram v. State of Punjab, it was laid down that where the case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances, the cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the innocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable doubt." 15. In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., it was laid down that in a case of circumstantial evidence such evidence must satisfy the following test (SCC pp 710-11, para-10) "(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established; (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused; (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence. (See Gambhir v. State of Maharashtra)." 18. Even this Court, in case of Baldevji Vajaji Thakor v. State of Gujarat reported in 2014 (5) GLR 3932, in para-15, 16, 17, held as under: "para-15. Xxx xxx xxx 15. In Abdul Razak Murtaza Dafadar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1970 SC 283 : (1970 Cri LJ 373) a three Judge Bench of this Court declined to express any concluded opinion or to lay down any general rule with regard to tracker dog's or evidence or its admissibility against the accused, as it was not necessary to do so on the fact situation. However, their Lordships made the following observations on the usefulness or otherwise of such evidence (Para 11) : "11. It was argued that the tracker dog's evidence could be likened to the type of evidence accepted from scientific experts describing chemical reactions, blood tests and the actions of bacilli. The comparison does not, however, appear to be sound because the behaviour of chemicals, blood corpuscles and bacilli contains no element of conscious volition or deliberate choice. It was argued that the tracker dog's evidence could be likened to the type of evidence accepted from scientific experts describing chemical reactions, blood tests and the actions of bacilli. The comparison does not, however, appear to be sound because the behaviour of chemicals, blood corpuscles and bacilli contains no element of conscious volition or deliberate choice. But dogs are intelligent animals with many thought process similar to the thought processes of human beings and wherever you have thought processes there is always the risk of error, deception and even self-deception. For these reasons we are of the opinion that in the present state of scientific knowledge evidence of dog tracking, even if admissible, is not ordinarily of much weight." 16. In Surinder Pal Jain v. Delhi Administration, 1993 Suppl (3)681 : (1993 AIR SCW 1561 : AIR 1993 SC 1723 : 1993 Cri LJ 1871) a two Judge Bench expressed the opinion that "the pointing out by the dogs could as well lead to a misguided suspicion that the appellant had committed the crime." So save (sic saying) Their Lordships sidelined that item of evidence from consideration. 17. We are of the view that criminal Courts need not bother much about the evidence based on sniffer dogs due to the inherent frailties adumbrated above, although we cannot disapprove the investigating agency employing such sniffer dogs for helping the investigation to track down criminals. 18. Investigating exercises can afford to make attempts or forays with the help of canine faculties but judicial exercise can ill afford them." 16. Thus, from the above it is clear that sniffer dogs are more helpful to the investigating officer during the course of the investigation but the same could hardly be relied upon to use as one of the incriminating circumstances against the accused. 17. There is one more reason why we do not find it safe to rely upon the evidence of dog tracking. 17. There is one more reason why we do not find it safe to rely upon the evidence of dog tracking. The reason is that the actual dog handler has not been examined nor any other person, who was expert of the dog squad has been examined, although the presence of such experts and the dog handler at the time of dog tracking is admitted by the investigating officer, who has stated that he had procured the presence of the team of the dog squad and that the expert of the dog tracking and the dog handler was present at the time when the dog tracking was conducted. In such circumstances, it is too risky to place reliance on such a piece of evidence." 19. We have carefully gone through the aforesaid propositions. We have also carefully gone through the decision delivered by learned Additional Sessions Judge and reasons assigned therein and we found no distinguishable extra ordinary circumstance, which may lead us to disturb the order of acquittal passed by learned Additional Session Judge. 20. We are mindful of the fact that the appellate Court has wide power to evaluate and re-appreciate the evidence collected by the prosecution. But at the same time, the scope of appellate jurisdiction is not to review or reanalyze the entire evidence and therefore, the evidence on record of the present case is not substantially supporting the case of prosecution. Considering the scope of appellate jurisdiction, which is well defined by series of decisions, we see no reason to interfere in the order of learned Additional Sessions Judge. 21. We may refer to some of the well defined proposition enunciated by the Supreme Court in respect of exercise of appellate jurisdiction and we deem it proper to incorporate the same in the present judgment which substantiates the conclusion which has been arrived at by us and therefore, same are reproduced hereinafter : 21.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: 54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: 54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below. 21.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles; 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 21.3 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para.55, 56 and 57 which read as under : "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56.A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598) as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can re-appreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: i. The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; ii. The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; iii. The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; iv. The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; v. The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; vi. The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. vii. This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : (2013 AIR SCW 6180) particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : ( AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318) to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : ( AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889) Govindaraju v. State (2012) 4 SCC 722 : ( AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994). 21.4 The principle laid down in Chandrappa (supra) has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014(2) SCC (Cri) 497. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the said decision as under: "(15). In this context, yet another caution struck by this Court in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 would also be relevant. 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 21.5 The principle in Chandrappa (supra) has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Dasegowda & Ors. v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014(8) Scale 557 wherein it has been held in paragraph No. 17 as under: "(17). In the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. ( AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199), this Court said: 12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. 40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha (AIR 2004 SC 1053 : 2003 AIR SCW 6731) this Court observed; 21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P. ( AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177), this Court stated; 8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court". (Emphasis supplied) 21.6 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014(9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, re-appreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterized as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850)". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850)". 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, re-appreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside". 21.7 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015(5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 21.8 The Supreme Court in case of Golbar Hussain & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr., reported in (2015) 11 SCC 242, has held in Para.6, 7 and 8 as under : "6. The present case involves consideration on two issues. First being the powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. On the first issue, the legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, have been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. This Court culled down five general principles in Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as follows: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court. (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Ors. v. State of M.P., (2006) 10 SCC 313 , in the above-mentioned judgment, where it held that; While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court'. 21.9 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 124, the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under : "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and another v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : ( AIR 2004 SC 3249 ), this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (see Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the post-mortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : ( AIR 2003 SC 3601 ), wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to re-appreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : ( AIR 2002 SC 2907 ), "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W.7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 22. In view of the above position prevailing on record and in view of the aforesaid proposition of law, we are of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case to interfere with the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and accordingly appeal filed by the State being merit-less, deserves to be dismissed. 23. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is dismissed. The judgment and order dated 31.03.2006 passed in Sessions Case No. 126 of 2005 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 5th Fast Track Court, Panchmahals at Godhra, is hereby confirmed. Bail bond shall stand discharged. Records and proceedings be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith.