ORDER : Heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Mishra, learned G.P.-II for the respondents. 2. In this writ application, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of the order as contained in Memo No. 5/CCA/01/27/2017-2693 dated 15.5.2017 passed by the Additional Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi by which the detention order passed under Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002 has been extended till 7.9.2017. Further prayer has been made directing the concerned respondents to release the petitioner from illegal detention. 3. The factual aspects as narrated in the writ application is that the petitioner was made an accused in several cases which led the respondent no. 6 to intimate the respondent no. 4 that it was necessary for the petitioner to be detained under Section 12(2) of the Jharkhand Crime Control Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The respondent no. 5 thereafter vide Memo No. 65 dated 24.1.2017 made a recommendation to the District Magistrate, Garhwa (Respondent No.4) for detaining the petitioner in custody under Section 12(2) of the Act. The ground which was taken by the respondent no. 5 was that there was a likelihood of the petitioner being released from custody and his release will create a law and order problem and therefore it was necessary that the petitioner be detained under Section 12(2) of the Act as a preventive measure. The respondent no. 4 i.e. the District Magistrate, Garhwa passed an order on 8.3.2017 detaining the petitioner for three months which was confirmed by the respondent no. 3 vide Memo dated 16.3.2017 and, thereafter, the matter was referred to the Advisory Board which vide its order dated 1.4.2017 held that sufficient ground was enumerated for detaining the petitioner. Subsequently after the order of the Advisory Board the order of detention of the petitioner was confirmed by the State Government vide Memo dated 11.4.2017. On 15.5.2017 the detention of the petitioner was further extended for a period of three months till 7.9.2017 and the petitioner is aggrieved by the extension of his detention order. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order of extension passed by the respondent no. 3 is non est in the eye of law in view of the fact that the approval of the Advisory Board was never taken prior to such extension. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the order of extension passed by the respondent no. 3 is non est in the eye of law in view of the fact that the approval of the Advisory Board was never taken prior to such extension. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that under Section 12(2) of the Act the extension could be for a period of three months each subject to a maximum detention of one year in terms of Section 22 of the Act and the necessary paraphernalia with respect to the provisions of the Act were required to be fulfilled prior to extension of the period of detention and the same having been given a complete go-by the subsequent extension of the period of detention of the petitioner deserves to be set aside. In support of his contention learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cherukuri Mani vs. Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others reported in [ (2015)13 SCC 722 : 2014(3) JLJR (SC)158] as well as an order passed by this Court in the case of Prince Khan vs. State of Jharkhand and Others reported in [ (2017)2 JLJR 27 ]. 5. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Mishra, learned G.P.-II on the other hand has supported the impugned order and has submitted that the order of detention which is initially passed is required to be approved by the State Government and, thereafter, on further approval by the Advisory Board it has to be confirmed by the State Government. Learned G.P.-II for the respondents submits that repeating the process of confirmation and approval by the Advisory Board as well as by the State Government in the subsequent orders of extension is an impractical exercise and the provisions of the Act do not permit so. Learned G.P.-II for the respondents further submits that the period of three months as mentioned in the proviso to sub-Section 2 of Section 12 of the Act is only concentrated with respect to the delegation of power by the State Government to the District Magistrate and is in no way concerned with an order of detention. Learned G.P.-II for the respondents further submits that the period of three months as mentioned in the proviso to sub-Section 2 of Section 12 of the Act is only concentrated with respect to the delegation of power by the State Government to the District Magistrate and is in no way concerned with an order of detention. It has also been submitted by the learned G.P.-II that detention of a detenu extendable for a period of three months subject to the maximum period of detention of one year is impermissible as the Act nowhere denotes that the maximum period for which an order of detention can be passed is three months. It has been submitted that an ambiguous situation has already reared its head in view of the extension being made for a period of three months each as the provisions of the Act do not contemplate such process to be undertaken every time. The Government is inclined to extend the period of detention in view of the time schedule enumerated in Section 12(3), Section 19 and Section 20 of the Act. Learned G.P.-II has urged this Court to have a revisit to the order passed in the case of Prince Khan (supra) on the precincts of a decision rendered by a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T. Devaki vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and Others reported in [ (1990)2 SCC 456 ] which was neither brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cherukuri Mani (supra) or of this Court in the case of Prince Khan (supra). The learned G.P.-II therefore finally concludes his argument by stating that the period of detention is dependent upon the State Government and in no circumstance the three months period as concluded in the judgment of Cherukuri Mani (supra) is relatable to the period of detention, rather the same is only with respect to the delegation of power to the District Magistrate by the State Government. 6. In view of the submissions advanced by the learned G.P.-II and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T. Devaki (supra) this Court is compelled to revisit the order which has been passed in the case of Prince Khan (supra). 6. In view of the submissions advanced by the learned G.P.-II and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of T. Devaki (supra) this Court is compelled to revisit the order which has been passed in the case of Prince Khan (supra). It is to be noted herein that the order passed in Prince Khan (supra) was in view of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cherukuri Mani (supra). The judgment in the case of T. Devaki (supra) was never brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Supreme Court or before this Court at the time of deliverance of the judgment in the case of Prince Khan (supra). 7. The Jharkhand Control of Crimes Act, 1981 was enacted for the control and suppression of anti-social elements with a view to maintenance of public order. Section 12 of the Act is the initiation of the process of detaining a person under the Act and it reads as follows:- "12. Power to make order detaining certain persons.- (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social elements cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person, make an order directing that such anti-social element be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred upon by the said sub-section: Provided that the period specified in an order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such, order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at anyone time. (3) When any order is made by District Magistrate, he shall forthwith report, the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government: Provided that where under Section 17 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words "fifteen days" shall be substituted." 8. The proviso of sub-Section 2 of Section 12 ordains this Court to revisit and reconsider as to whether the period of three months as mentioned in the proviso is with respect to the detention of a detenu or with respect to delegation of power to the District Magistrate by the State Government. 9. The Act has articulated specific time frame which starts from the moment an order of detention is passed by the District Magistrate. Section 12(3) of the Act gives an outer limit of 12 days after the making of the detention order and if within the said time frame the order of detention is not approved the same becomes unenforceable and redundant. Section 18 of the Act deals with constitution of Advisory Board and the same reads as follows:- "18. Constitution of Advisory Board.- The State Government shall, whenever necessary, constitute Advisory Board for the purpose of this Act. (2) The Board shall consist of three persons who are or, have been, or are qualified to be appointed as Judges of High Court, and such persons shall be appointed by the Government. (3) The Government shall appoint one of the members of the Advisory Board, who is or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman." 10. An approval of the Advisory Board has to be taken as per Section 19 of the Act which reveals thus:- "19. (3) The Government shall appoint one of the members of the Advisory Board, who is or has been, a Judge of a High Court to be its Chairman." 10. An approval of the Advisory Board has to be taken as per Section 19 of the Act which reveals thus:- "19. Reference to Advisory Board.-Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, in every case where a detention order has been made under this Act, the Government shall, within three weeks from the date of detention of a person under the order, place before the Advisory Board constituted by it under Section 18, the grounds on which the order has been made and the representation, if any, made by the person affected by the order, and in case where the order has been made by the District Magistrate mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 12 also the report by such officer under sub-section (3) of that section." 11. Thus, the State Government has to place before the Advisory Board the order of detention along with the grounds and the representation if any filed by the detenu in terms of Section 17 of the Act. The procedure of the Advisory Board has been delineated in Section 20 of the Act which reads as under:- "20. Procedure of Advisory Board.- (1) The Advisory Board shall, after considering the materials placed before it and, after calling for such further information as it may deem necessary from the Government or from any person called for the purpose through the Government or from the person concerned, and if, in any particular case, it considers it essential so to do or if the person concerned desires to be heard, after hearing him in person, submit its report to the Government within seven weeks from the date of detention of the person concerned. (2) The report of the Advisory Board shall specify in a separate part thereof the opinion of the Advisory Board, as to whether or not there is sufficient cause for the detention of the person concerned. (3) When there is difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the Board. (3) When there is difference of opinion among the members forming the Advisory Board, the opinion of the majority of such members shall be deemed to be the opinion of the Board. (4) Nothing in this section shall entitle any person against whom a detention order has been made to appear by any legal practitioner in any matter connected with the reference to the Advisory Board and the proceedings of the Advisory Board and its report, excepting that part of the report in which the opinion of the Advisory Board is specified, shall be confidential." 12. Perusal of Section 20 of the Act reveals that the Advisory Board has to submit its report within a period of seven weeks from the date of detention of the detenu. 13. The entire process from the date of detention to the submission of the report by the Advisory Board is seven weeks which includes three weeks from the date of detention by which time the State Government is required to refer the matter to the Advisory Board for its approval. After the period enumerated as aforesaid is completed Section 21 of the Act then comes into operation delegating power to the State Government to confirm the detention and continue the detention for the period it thinks fit. The maximum period in which a detenu can be detained under the provisions of the Act is one year as depicted in Section 22 of the Act. The narration of the procedural safeguards which have been provided in the Act would reveal that it would be improbable for the State Government to go through the circuitous route every time an order of detention is extended. The Act does not provide any such procedure which would entail a detailed process as and when the question of extension comes up before the State Government. 14. Against the backdrop narrated above this Court endeavors to look into the real issue at hand which is whether the proviso to sub-Section 2 of Section 12 can be construed to be a period of detention extendable for a period of three months each or the same is with respect to the delegation of power to the District Magistrate by the State Government. As far back as in 1985 this issue had come up before the Patna High Court in the case of Bhim Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in 1985 PLJR 763 . The Division Bench of the Patna High Court concluded as follows:- "13. To conclude on the two primal questions posed at the outset, it must first be held that the proviso to sub-sec. (2) of S.12 of the Act is only a limitation on the period for which the delegation of power of detention by the State Government can at one time be made to the District Magistrate and has no reference or relevance to the period of detention which can be ordered by the Magistrate, and, secondly, that the provisions of S.3 pertaining to externment have no relevance whatsoever to the altogether different field of detention under S.12 and other ancillary provisions connected therewith." 15. Thus it was clearly expressed in the said judgment that the three months period referred to in the proviso to subsection 2 of Section 12 is only with respect to delegation of power to the District Magistrate by the State Government which can be extended from time to time not exceeding three months at one time. In the case of T. Devaki (supra) a three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 which reads as follows:- "3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons.- (1) The State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger or drug offender (or forest offender) or goonda or immoral traffic offender or slum grabber that with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. (2) If, having regard to the circumstances prevailing, or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing, direct that during such period as may be specified in the order, such District Magistrate or Commissioner of Police may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1), exercise the powers conferred by the said sub-section: Provided that the period specified in the order made by the State Government under this sub-section shall not, in the first instance, exceed three months, but the State Government may, if satisfied as aforesaid that it is necessary so to do, amend such order to extend such period from time to time by any period not exceeding three months at anyone time. (3) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government." 16. Section 12 of Jharkhand Crime Control Act is pari materia with the Tamil Nadu Act as quoted hereinabove. It was concluded in the said judgment that the period of three months as mentioned was with respect to the period of delegation of power to the District Magistrate by the State Government and was in no way concerned with the detention of a detenu. The relevant paragraphs are quoted hereunder:- "10. Provisions of the aforesaid sections are inbuilt safeguards against the delays that may be caused in considering the representation. If the time frame, as prescribed in the aforesaid provisions is not adhered to, the detention order is liable to be struck down and the detenu is entitled to freedom. Once the order of detention is confirmed by the State Government, maximum period for which a detenu shall be detained cannot exceed 12 months from the date of detention. The Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. Once the order of detention is confirmed by the State Government, maximum period for which a detenu shall be detained cannot exceed 12 months from the date of detention. The Act nowhere requires the detaining authority to specify the period for which the detenu is required to be detained. The expression "the State Government are satisfied that it is necessary so to do, they may, by order in writing direct that during such period as may be specified in the order" occurring in subsection (2) of Section 3 relates to the period for which the order of delegation issued by the State Government is to remain in force and it has no relevance to the period of detention. The legislature has taken care to entrust the power of detention to the State Government; as the detention without trial is a serious encroachment on the fundamental right of a citizen, it has taken further care to avoid a blanket delegation of power, to subordinate authorities for an indefinite period by providing that the delegation in the initial instance will not exceed a period of three months and it shall be specified in the order of delegation. But if the State Government on consideration of the situation finds it necessary, it may again delegate the power of detention to the aforesaid authorities from time to time but at no time the delegation shall be for a period of more than three months. The period as mentioned in Section 3(2) of the Act refers to the period of delegation and it has no relevance at all to the period for which a person may be detained. Since the Act does not require the detaining authority to specify the period for which a detenu is required to be detained, order of detention is not rendered invalid or illegal in the absence of such specification." "12. Section 3 of the Maharashtra Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Slumlords, Bootleggers and Drug Offenders Act, 1981 is identical in terms to Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act. Section 3 of Maharashtra Act does not require the State Government, District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police to specify period of detention in the order made by them for detaining any person with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Section 3 of Maharashtra Act does not require the State Government, District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police to specify period of detention in the order made by them for detaining any person with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Section 3(1) which confers power on the State Government to make order directing detention of a person, does not require the State Government to specify the period of detention. Similarly, sub-section (2) or (3) of Section 3 do not require the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police to specify period of detention while exercising their powers under sub-section (1) of Section 3. The observations made in Gurbux Bhiryani case that the scheme of the Maharashtra Act was different from the provisions contained in other similar Acts and that Section 3 of the Act contemplated initial period of detention for three months at a time are not correct. The scheme as contained in other Acts providing for the detention of a person without trial, is similar. In this connection we have scrutinised, the Preventive Detention Act, 1950, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, COFEPOSA Act, 1974, National Security Act, 1980, but in none of these Acts the detaining authority is required to specify the period of detention while making the order of detention against a person." 17. In the case of Roshan Kumar Thakur @ Roshan Thakur vs. The State of Bihar in Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 34 of 2016 on consideration of the judgment rendered in the case of Cherukuri Mani (supra) had held that no illegality or unconstitutionality was committed by the District Magistrate who had ordered preventive detention of the detenu for a period of 1 year. In the case of Cherukuri Mani (supra) reliance was placed on Article 22(4) of the Constitution of India which reads as under:- (4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless:- (a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention: Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or (b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7). 18. The issue being dealt with by this Court was also recently considered by the Full Bench of Karnataka High Court and while considering Article 22(4) of the Constitution it was held therein as follows:- "14. We reiterate that the period of three months stipulated in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution is relatable to the initial period of detention upto the stage of receipt of report of the Advisory Board and does not have any bearing on the period of detention, which is continued subsequent to the confirmatory order being passed by the State Government on receipt of the report of the Advisory Board. The continuation of the detention pursuant to the confirmatory order passed by the State Government need not also specify the period of detention; neither is it restricted to a period of three months only. If any period is specified in the confirmatory order, then the period of detention would be upto such period, if no period is specified, then it would be for a maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. The State Government, in our view, need not review the orders of detention every three months after it has passed the confirmatory order." "15. Thus, in our view, the period of three months specified in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution of India is relatable to the period of detention prior to the report of the Advisory Board and not to the period of detention subsequent thereto. Thus, in our view, the period of three months specified in Article 22(4)(a) of the Constitution of India is relatable to the period of detention prior to the report of the Advisory Board and not to the period of detention subsequent thereto. Further, the period of detention in terms of Article 22(4)(a) cannot be in force for a period beyond three months, if by then, the Advisory Board has not given its opinion holding that there is sufficient cause for such detention. Therefore, under Article 22(4)(a), the Advisory Board would have to give its opinion within a period of three months from the date of detention and depending upon the opinion expressed by the Advisory Board, the State Government can under Section 12 of the Act, either confirm the order of detention or continue the detention of the person concerned for a maximum period of twelve months as specified in Section 13 of the Act or release the detenu forthwith, as the case may be. If the order of detention is confirmed, then the period of detention can be extended up to the maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. With respect, we observe that it is not necessary that before the expiration of three months, it is necessary for the State Government to review the order of detention as has been expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cherukuri Mani. The Act does not contemplate a review of the detention order once the Advisory Board has opined that there is sufficient cause for detention of the person concerned and on that basis, a confirmatory order is passed by the State Government to detain a person for the maximum period of twelve months from the date of detention. On the other hand, when under Section 3(2) of the Act, the State Government delegates its power to the District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police to exercise its power and pass an order of detention. The delegation in the first instance cannot exceed three months and the extension of the period of delegation cannot also be for a period exceeding three months at anyone time." 19. The delegation in the first instance cannot exceed three months and the extension of the period of delegation cannot also be for a period exceeding three months at anyone time." 19. As regards the period of three months mentioned in Section 12(2) of the Act which is once again pari materia with Section 3 of the Karnataka Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Gamblers, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1985 which was a subject matter before the Hon'ble Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court which had decided the issue thus:- "16. Also having regard to the aforesaid discussion, we are inclined to follow the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in T. Devaki's case, which is also a decision of three Hon'ble Judges, as discussed in detail above to hold that the period specified in Section 3(2) of the Act does not relate to the period of detention, but to the period of delegation made by the State Government in favour of the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police." "17. On a careful reading of the recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cherukuri Mani, in light of the previous decision in T. Devaki, it becomes clear that there is a dichotomy or conflict of opinion between the two decisions. It is clear that in Cherukuri Mani, there is no reference made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Court in T. Devaki. Further, T. Devaki is a dictum of three judge Bench while Cherukuri Mani is a decision of the two Judge Bench. Obviously, the decision in T. Devaki has not been brought to the notice of the two Judge Bench, which rendered the decision in Cherukuri Mani. Significantly, the provision of law under consideration in the aforesaid cases namely, Section 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Act, the Tamil Nadu Act and the Karnataka Act, are in pari materia." 20. In the case of Prince Khan (supra) this Court had not gone into a detailed study of the proviso to sub-Section 2 of Section 12 of the Act as the . Judgment of T. Devaki (supra) was not placed before it. The subsequent judgments passed by the Patna High Court as well as the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court were also of a considerable help in deciding the issue at hand. 21. Judgment of T. Devaki (supra) was not placed before it. The subsequent judgments passed by the Patna High Court as well as the Full Bench of the Karnataka High Court were also of a considerable help in deciding the issue at hand. 21. Juxtaposing the factual aspects of the case with the legal issues dealt with in the preceding paragraphs would reveal that the State Government has extended the period of detention of the petitioner for a period of three months and the original order of detention also is confined to a period of three months. The State Government has the discretion to continue with the detention of a detenu for such period as it thinks fit in terms of Section 21 of the Act. The same therefore gives a prerogative to the State Government to either pass an order of detention at the initial stage itself for a maximum period of one year in terms of Section 22 of the Act or in fractured extensions and after the initial order of detention is passed in view of the legal mandate which flows from the judgment of T. Devaki (supra) no further necessity would arise for the State Government to take the opinion of the Advisory Board. 22. The prayer of the writ petitioner, therefore, is not tenable in view of the discussions made hereinabove and accordingly, the same is, hereby, dismissed.