ORDER : NANDITA DUBEY, J. 1. Heard on admission. 2. This second appeal is filed by the appellants/defendants being aggrieved the judgment and decree dated 15-12-2009 passed in C.A. No. 57-A/2009 by 1st Additional District Judge, Seoni arising out of judgment and decree dated 27-11-2007 passed in C. S. No 9-A/2007 by 2nd Civil Judge, Class-I, Seoni whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed. 3. Briefly stated, a suit for eviction alleging bona fide need and arrears of rent was filed against the defendant/appellant on the ground that the suit land and the Kachcha Hut built on it was purchased from the previous owner Laxmi Bai vide registered sale deed dated 11-11-1999 for Rs. 1,30,000/-. Defendant who was the tenant of Laxmi Bai @ 125/- per month since 1988 was informed accordingly about the sale of the suit land by previous owner. 4. Defendant No. 1 filed written statement and denied the averments made in the plaint. It was stated that the defendant No. 2 had purchased the house for Rs. 70,000/- through agreement to sell and in peaceful possession since last 8 years as owner and prayed for dismissal of the suit. Defendant No. 1 also filed a counter claim for permanent injunction and confirmation of the possession. During the pendency of the civil suit, the appellant No. 2/defendant No. 2 was impleaded as a party on the direction of the trial Court. Appellant No. 2 also filed a counter claim for declaration and permanent injunction against the plaintiff-respondent. 5. The trial Court after considering the pleadings of the parties, framed as many as eleven issues and after detailed appreciation of the evidence on record, found ownership and possession of plaintiff on suit land as proved. However, the tenancy was not found proved. The defendants were found in illegal possession of the suit land. The counter claim filed by the defendants was also dismissed. With the aforesaid findings, the suit of plaintiff was partly decreed and defendant was directed to hand over the vacant possession. 6. However, the tenancy was not found proved. The defendants were found in illegal possession of the suit land. The counter claim filed by the defendants was also dismissed. With the aforesaid findings, the suit of plaintiff was partly decreed and defendant was directed to hand over the vacant possession. 6. The Appellate Court after re-appraisal of the entire evidence on record affirmed the findings of the trial Court as regard the ownership and possession of the plaintiff but modified the decree to the extent of arrears of rent and directed the appellants/defendants to hand over the possession to the plaintiff within two months and to pay the arrears of rent @ Rs. 125/- per month from 21-11-2007. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant at length and perused the record. 8. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that the first Appellate Court has erred in interfering that the findings of the trial Court and erroneously held the appellant as tenant and granted arrears of rent to the respondent/plaintiff despite there being no appeal in this regard by the respondent/plaintiff. 9. In Para 8 and 9 of the case of Banarasi and ors. v. Ramphal, reported in 2003 MPLJ Online (S.C.) 5 = (2003) 9 SCC 606 the Apex Court has held as under:- 8. Sections 96 and 100 of the Civil Procedure Code make provision for an appeal being preferred from every original decree or from every decree passed in appeal respectively; none of the provisions enumerates the person who can file an appeal. However, it is settled by a long catena of decisions that to be entitled to file an appeal the person must be one aggrieved by the decree. Unless a person is prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree he is not entitled to file an appeal (See Phoolchand and anr. v. Gopal Lal, (1967) 3 SCR 153 , Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha v. M/s Golcha Properties (P) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 573 , Smt. Ganga Bai v. Vijay Kumar and ors., (1974) 2 SCC 393 . No appeal lies against a mere finding. It is significant to note that both Sections 96 and 100 of the Civil Procedure Code provide for an appeal against decree and not against judgment. 9. No appeal lies against a mere finding. It is significant to note that both Sections 96 and 100 of the Civil Procedure Code provide for an appeal against decree and not against judgment. 9. Any respondent though he may not have filed an appeal from any part of the decree may still support the decree to the extent to which it is already in his favour by laying challenge to a finding recorded in the impugned judgment against him. Where a plaintiff seeks a decree against the defendant on grounds (A) and (B), any one of the two grounds being enough to entitle the plaintiff to a decree and the Court has passed a decree on ground (A) deciding it for the plaintiff while ground (B) has been decided against the plaintiff, in an appeal preferred by the defendant, in spite of the finding on ground (A) being reversed the plaintiff as a respondent can still seek to support the decree by challenging finding on ground (B) and persuade the Appellate Court to form an opinion that in spite of the finding on ground (A) being reversed to the benefit of defendant-appellant the decree could still be sustained by reversing the finding on ground (B) though the plaintiff-respondent has neither preferred an appeal of his own nor taken any cross objection. 10. Order 41, Rule 33 of Civil Procedure Code reads as under :- The Appellate Court shall have power to pass any decree and make any order which ought to have been passed or made and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require, and this power may be exercised by the Court notwithstanding that the appeal is as to part only of the decree and may be exercised in favour of all or any of the respondents or parties, although such respondents or parties may not have filed any appeal or objection and may where there have been decrees in cross-suits or where two or more decrees are passed in one suit, be exercised in respect of all or any of the decrees, although an appeal may not have been filed against such decrees. 11. 11. In Para 18 of the case of Pralhad and others v. State of Maharashtra and another, reported in 2011(2) M.P.L.J. (S.C.) 33 = (2010) 10 SCC 458 , the Apex Court while considering the provision of Order 41, Rule 33 has held :- 18. The provision of Order 41, Rule 33 of Civil Procedure Code is clearly an enabling provision, whereby the Appellate Court is empowered to pass any decree or make any order which ought to have been passed or made, and to pass or make such further or other decree or order as the case may require. Therefore, the power is very wide and in this enabling provision, the crucial words are that the Appellate Court is empowered to pass any Order which ought to have been made as the case may require. The expression "order ought to have been made" would obviously mean an Order which justice of the case requires to be made. This is made clear from the expression used in the said Rule by saying the Court may pass such further or other Order as the case may require. This expression case would mean the justice of the case. Of course, this power cannot be exercised ignoring a legal interdict or a prohibition clamped by law. 12. It is evident from the record that the plaintiff and his witnesses have categorically deposed that the defendant was the tenant since time of the previous owner. These statements of the plaintiff and his witnesses remained unrebutted. The appellant No. 2/defendant No. 2 had failed to prove that he was put in possession of the suit premises on the strength of an agreement to sell. In view of the facts and evidence that has come on record, the findings recorded by the trial Court that tenancy was not found proved was erroneous. 13. Under such circumstances, the first Appellate Court has not committed any error invoking the provision of under Order 41, Rule 33 of Civil Procedure Code. 14. In view of the aforestated, the Appellate Court has rightly modified the decree. No substantial question of law arises for adjudication in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed in limine. 15. 13. Under such circumstances, the first Appellate Court has not committed any error invoking the provision of under Order 41, Rule 33 of Civil Procedure Code. 14. In view of the aforestated, the Appellate Court has rightly modified the decree. No substantial question of law arises for adjudication in this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed in limine. 15. The appellants/defendants are however, granted upto 31-7-2017 to vacate the premises subject to filing the usual undertaking within a period of one month on the affidavit of appellants to deliver vacant and peaceful possession over the premises to the landlord at the end of the extended time and in between regularly paying the rent.