JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 20.09.2008 passed by the Court of Special Judge, Women Atrocities & Dowry Cases, Jaipur City, Jaipur (for short ‘the trial court’) whereby the accused-appellant Mahaveer Prasad has been convicted and sentenced under Section 302 IPC to life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 3,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo three months’ rigorous imprisonment; under Section 449 IPC to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo two months’ rigorous imprisonment; under Section 376/511 IPC to five years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo one month’s rigorous imprisonment. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this appeal are that on 04.11.2006 at 01.05 P.M., one unknown person informed Virendra Kumar, SHO, Police Station Mrulipura regarding murder of one Archana Sharma. The information was entered in Rojnamcha (Exhibit P-84) and the police went to the place of incident. At the place of incident, Sandeep Sharma, brother of the deceased Archana Sharma submitted a written report (Exhibit P-35) alleging therein that on 04.11.2006 at 9.00 A.M. he had gone to the Hospital for checkup of his mother. On return to the house at around 12.30 P.M., they found pool of blood in the hall of the house and his younger sister Archana Sharma was lying dead in the kitchen. Thereafter, he called his neighbour Bahadur Singh Jakhad and asked him to inform the police. The police then reached over there. It appears that someone has committed murder of his sister Archana Sharma. 3. On the basis of aforesaid written report, the police registered FIR No. 318/2006 for the offence under Section 302 IPC and started investigation. Upon completion of investigation, the police submitted charge sheet against the accused-appellant for the offence under Section 302 and 376/511 IPC. On committal, learned trial court framed charges against the accused appellant for the offence under Sections 449, 376/511, 302 IPC, which he denied and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as 29 witnesses and also got 100 documents exhibited. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the allegations. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as 29 witnesses and also got 100 documents exhibited. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., wherein he denied the allegations. In his defence, the appellant examined Matadeen (DW-1) and also got 12 documents exhibited. On conclusion of trial, the trial court vide judgment dated 20.09.2008 convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant in the manner as indicated hereinabove. Hence, this appeal. 4. Mr. V.R. Bajwa, learned counsel for the accused appellant argued that conviction recorded by the trial court is not legally sustainable being contrary to the provisions of law as also from the material available on record. The prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, no finding of conviction could have been recorded against the appellant. There are several infirmities and contradictions in the statements of witnesses, and therefore, no reliance can be placed on the testimony of such witnesses. Conviction based on such evidence is not sustainable and the same is liable to be set aside. Sentence awarded by the learned trial court is excessive. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case and the manner in which the incident is alleged to have taken place, there is no justification to award such excessive sentence. It is argued that the statement of accused-appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has not been recorded in accordance with the provisions of law, as all incriminating circumstances were not put to him. Sufficient opportunity of defence was not afforded to appellant. The prosecution witnesses are highly interested witnesses and their testimony also suffers from infirmities. Though the independent witnesses were available, but they were produced and examined, which is fatal for the prosecution. The prosecution has changed the story before the trial court and therefore no reliance can be placed on the prosecution case. There is no eye witness of the incident and the entire case of the prosecution depends upon the circumstantial evidence. There are various lacuna left by the prosecution in completing the chain of circumstances and the appellant is entitled to get the benefit of doubt. The prosecution failed to establish the complete chain of circumstances so as to connect the appellant with the crime and therefore, the guilt of the appellant is not proved beyond all the reasonable doubts. Evidence of last seen is lacking in the prosecution case. The prosecution failed to establish the complete chain of circumstances so as to connect the appellant with the crime and therefore, the guilt of the appellant is not proved beyond all the reasonable doubts. Evidence of last seen is lacking in the prosecution case. There is no evidence that the appellant alone was in the company of the deceased soon before her death. In such circumstances, conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial court is not sustainable and is liable to be quashed and set aside. 5. Learned counsel argued that the complainant party moved an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to implead the persons, who were not charge sheeted along with the appellant. It is therefore, clear that the prosecution itself was not confident that the appellant alone had committed the offence. The recovery effected at the instance of the appellant cannot be used against him. The place from where the alleged recoveries were made by the prosecution, was not in the exclusive possession of the appellant. The learned trial court without any cogent reason disbelieved the plea of alibi taken by the accused-appellant. The appellant from the oral as well as documentary evidence has established that he was not present at the time of incident. In such circumstances, the conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial court is not sustainable and liable to be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned counsel argued that as per the case of prosecution, the accused-appellant spoke on cell phone No. 9928690456 belonging to Mahesh Chand, father of deceased, when call was made on the said cell phone by one Rakesh (P.W.19) from his cell Phone No. 9828628376 on 04.11.2006 at 10.38 A.M. purportedly at the residence of the deceased. Therefore, the alleged call from cell phone No. 9828628376 to cell phone No. 9928690456 is in itself a neutral circumstance, with no element of incrimination of the appellant. The prosecution version that appellant spoke on the said call, is squarely dependent upon the testimony of Rakesh (PW19). Admittedly, neither of the cell phones belong to the appellant. In such a situation, the prosecution has to depend on the testimony of Rakesh (PW19) to establish the said circumstance against the appellant. Rakesh (PW19) is a completely unreliable witness as he has been shifting his stands at every juncture, in his court statement. He has also been declared hostile by the prosecution. In such a situation, the prosecution has to depend on the testimony of Rakesh (PW19) to establish the said circumstance against the appellant. Rakesh (PW19) is a completely unreliable witness as he has been shifting his stands at every juncture, in his court statement. He has also been declared hostile by the prosecution. Moreover, the electronic evidence in the form of CDR provided by the service providers of the respective cell phones, is inadmissible in evidence on account of lack of certificate requisite under Section 65-B, Evidence Act. The same is reflected out from the testimony of Vibhor Rastogi (P.W.7), Legal Officer, Hutch Company and Mahendra Pal Singh (P.W.22), official of Airtel Company. On this count, the aforesaid scientific evidence has to be eschewed from consideration. Reliance in this connection has been placed upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Anwar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer 2014 (10) SCC 473 wherein it was categorically laid down that in the absence of a certificate under Section 65-B of Evidence Act, such Call Data Record is of no value. 7. It is argued that the accused-appellant being a tenant in the house B-56, Jamnapuri, Murlipura Scheme, Jaipur, his presence is a neutral circumstance, as the same qualifies to be natural in character. Ram Gopal Sharma-Mausa of the deceased (P.W.1), alleged that he had visited the house where the incident had taken place, around the relevant time and had found the appellant standing at the gate of the house, who informed him that no one was there in the house. Ram Gopal Sharma (P.W.1) happened to be a chance witness. He does not state anything further than the factum that the appellant was standing outside the house, who informed that no one was there in the house. The said circumstance does not unerringly points towards the guilt of the accused and the same can be explained on numerous hypothesis, other than the guilt of the accused. The possibility cannot be ruled out that the appellant even if he was standing outside the house, might actually not know about any untoward incident having transpired inside the house. He might have given the information bona-fidely, not knowing the fact that deceased Archana Sharma was actually present in the house or not. Ram Gopal Sharma (P.W.1) did not notice any marks of violence on the face of the appellant, at that relevant time. He might have given the information bona-fidely, not knowing the fact that deceased Archana Sharma was actually present in the house or not. Ram Gopal Sharma (P.W.1) did not notice any marks of violence on the face of the appellant, at that relevant time. Matadeen (D.W.1), cousin of accused has categorically stated in his statement that the accused-appellant was present with him at the relevant time at SMS Hospital to provide assistance to him while his wife Santosh was being subjected to surgery. 8. Mr. V.R. Bajwa, learned counsel argued that motbir witnesses of arrest memo (Exhibit P-3) namely, Babulal (P.W.3) and Sonu (P.W.4) have not supported the case of prosecution and turned hostile, categorically stating that both of them did not notice any injuries on the person of appellant at the time of his arrest. Accused-appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has categorically stated that he was subjected to physical violence by the police in order to take his finger impression on the specks of the deceased, when he was apprehended and brought to police station. The said fact goes a long way to explain the injuries on his person. The remand application filed before the Magistrate by the police, when the accused-appellant was produced before the court, does not mention about any injuries on his body. In case there were any injuries on his person, the police was under an obligation to mention the same in the remand application before the Magistrate so as to bring the said fact in the knowledge of the Magistrate. The examination of the appellant by a doctor was only organized by the police after three days of the incident i.e. on 08.11.2006, which was in clear disregard of the mandate of Section 53A Cr.P.C., which directs for medical examination without any delay at all. All these facts create a doubt that the accused had injuries on his person at the time when he was arrested. The delay in examination of accused-appellant is a relevant factor. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Siva Valla Bha Nani Vs. State of Karnataka; 2015 (2) SCC 90 . 9. Learned counsel submitted that the specks of the deceased were never noticed by the Investigating Agency (Local police as also the F.S.L team) on 04.11.2006. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Siva Valla Bha Nani Vs. State of Karnataka; 2015 (2) SCC 90 . 9. Learned counsel submitted that the specks of the deceased were never noticed by the Investigating Agency (Local police as also the F.S.L team) on 04.11.2006. Interestingly, the specks were stated to be lying on the platform of the kitchen from where it was stated to have been taken by the police on the next day i.e. on 05.11.2006. But on 04.11.2006, the police had noticed the weapons of offence namely, knife and pestle (Musli) lying on the self same kitchen platform and the same were seized on 04.11.2006 itself. The said circumstance creates grave doubt on the fact of the specks lying on the platform of the kitchen on 04.11.2006 otherwise the same would have been noticed and seized on 04.11.2006 itself. The specks admittedly from the seizure memo (Exhibit P-47) as also from the testimony of Virendra Kumar (P.W.28), Investigating Officer, Padma Ram (P.W.25), Malkhana Incharge and Alok Srivastava (P.W.17) Inspector, was kept unsealed. In such circumstances, since the said article was kept unsealed, no credence can be laid on the recovery of the specks and more so the circumstance of finger print of appellant being found on the said article. More so, when the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has categorically stated that he was subjected to physical violence and under coercion his finger print was taken on the specks at the police station during his custody. It is argued that the specimen of the finger prints taken of the appellant by Hanuman Singh (P.W.28) Inspector was contrary to Section 4 of Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, as the same should have been either taken in the presence of a Magistrate or under orders of a Magistrate. Learned counsel, in supprot of his argument, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammad Aman and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan 1997 (10) SCC 44 wherein it has been laid down that such specimen prints taken on an accused in violation of the above mentioned procedure, cannot be relied upon. 10. Learned counsel, in supprot of his argument, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohammad Aman and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan 1997 (10) SCC 44 wherein it has been laid down that such specimen prints taken on an accused in violation of the above mentioned procedure, cannot be relied upon. 10. Learned counsel further submitted that recovery of knife (Exhibit P-39) from the place of incident as also recovery of pestle (Musli) (Exhibit P-40) from the place of incident cannot be read as an incriminating circumstance against the accused appellant as the same would be neutral in character. The weapons were never recovered at the instance of accused-appellant through an information under Section 27 of Evidence Act. Whosoever was the assailant had left the weapons at the spot, after perpetrating the crime. Besides, no finger prints were found on the weapons of the appellant. The blood found on the weapons as per F.S.L Report (Exhibit P-100) was of "B” Group. Interestingly, the police did not bother to ascertain the blood group of the deceased as also of the accused. In the absence of the same, the aforesaid circumstance cannot go a long way to incriminate the accused appellant. Learned counsel in support of his argument cited judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan 2001 Cr.L.R. (SC) 670 and judgment of this Court in Sayed Moeen Vs. State of Rajasthan; 2006 (2) Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1615; wherein it has been held that in the absence of ascertainment of blood group, the aforesaid circumstance cannot be taken to be incriminating in nature. 11. Learned counsel also submitted that recovery of towel (Exhibit P-48) at the instance of the accused appellant, which as per report of F.S.L. (Exhibit P-100), was found to be stained with "B" Group blood, again in the absence of ascertainment of blood group of the deceased and the appellant, cannot be considered to be an incriminating clinching circumstance. Recovery of hair from the right hand of deceased, which was declared to match with the DNA blood sample of the accused, as per DNA Report (Exhibit P- 96) could not be relied by the learned trial court. Bahadur Singh (P.W.11), Shimbhu Ram (P.W.13) and Manna Lal (P.W.16) have all categorically stated that there was nothing in the hands of the deceased. Bahadur Singh (P.W.11), Shimbhu Ram (P.W.13) and Manna Lal (P.W.16) have all categorically stated that there was nothing in the hands of the deceased. The hands of the deceased were not even clinched as a fist. Manna Lal (P.W.16) was the best witness in this regard, who happened to be a photographer of the police and had taken photographs of both the hands of the deceased (Exhibit P-55A and Exhibit P-61A) and had specifically stated that he did not see anything in the hands of the deceased and the right hand, in particular, was completely open, which also did not contain anything. It is argued that the first document, which was prepared with regard to depicting the condition of the dead body was the inquest report (Exhibit P-11), which again does not mention of any hair in the hands of the deceased. Suresh Kumar (P.W.29), Motbir of seizure memo of hair (Exhibit P-42) has in cross examination stated that he did not witness removal of any hair from the hand of the deceased. Investigating Officer (P.W.28) in his cross examination has admitted that no clear photo of hair in right hand of the deceased was taken in the investigation. 12. It is argued that DNA Report (Exhibit P-96) cannot be relied upon for two reasons. Firstly, there is complete lack of evidence to show through documentary proof that the blood sample which was taken for the second time on 10.11.2006 was requisitioned to F.S.L by Dr. R.K. Sharma (P.W.27). Interestingly, Dr. R.K. Sharma has not proved any report being prepared as per the mandate of Section 53A (2) (iv) Cr.P.C. In the absence of such report, there is no material to vouchsafe the ocular stand taken by the witness in court. Section 53A (2) (iv) Cr.P.C. statutorily mandate that a report of taking all the material with regard to DNA profiling has to be prepared by the doctor concerned and has to be given to the investigating officer, who would further submit the same along with the documents in the charge sheet. There is blatant non compliance of the same in the instant case. Further, Exhibit P-50 and Exhibit P-97 do not qualify to be such a report. The said document is just an identification form of C.D.F.D., Hyderabad. Interestingly, the said document is said to be scribed by Dr. There is blatant non compliance of the same in the instant case. Further, Exhibit P-50 and Exhibit P-97 do not qualify to be such a report. The said document is just an identification form of C.D.F.D., Hyderabad. Interestingly, the said document is said to be scribed by Dr. R.K. Sharma (P.W.27), but the said witness never cared to prove the contents of the said document through his testimony in court, so much so that he did not even exhibit the said document by proving his signatures on it. The aforesaid two documents were exhibited by police personnel. It is trite law that exhibiting a document is not proof of its contents. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit AIR 1988 SC 1796 and State of U.P. Vs. Mohammad Iqram; Judgment Today 2011 (6) SC 650, wherein the same preposition of law has been laid down. 13. Learned counsel further argued that there is no material dished out by the prosecution to satisfy the court regarding the safe upkeep of the blood sample during the travel period of taking of the sample from Jaipur to Hyderabad, which took two days. In this regard Amra Ram (P.W.24) has drawn a blank to satisfy the court with regard to proper upkeep of the sample, till it reached the C.D.F.D. Lab at Hyderabad. The link evidence in the case is also not above board as the issue of safe custody of the articles seized, beyond reasonable doubt gets dispelled through the testimony of Padma Ram (P.W.25), Malkhana Incharge, who has categorically submitted that the description of seal impression was never mentioned in the Malkhana Register as also the said seals were never deposited in the Malkhana Register. The nail clippings of the deceased, which were seized vide Exhibit P-43 were said to contain a DNA profile, which matched with the DNA profile of the blood sample of the accused. 14. Bahadur Singh (P.W.11) has said that he did not witness taking away of the nail clippings and seizure of the same by the police. Dr. The nail clippings of the deceased, which were seized vide Exhibit P-43 were said to contain a DNA profile, which matched with the DNA profile of the blood sample of the accused. 14. Bahadur Singh (P.W.11) has said that he did not witness taking away of the nail clippings and seizure of the same by the police. Dr. Rajendra Kakkad (P.W.8) has stated that he had removed the nail clippings of the deceased at the time of postmortem and had given the same to the police whereas Virendra Kumar (P.W.28) Investigating Officer, has stated that he had himself removed the nail of the deceased at the spot and the same were seized vide Exhibit P-43, whereas the brother of the deceased Sandeep Sharma (P.W.23) has categorically stated that the nail of the deceased were never removed by the Virendra Kumar (P.W.28) Investigating Officer. In such circumstances, it is mysterious to find out as to how, when and by whom the nails of the deceased were taken and seized. In such circumstances, no reliance on DNA report, with regard to nail clippings can be placed. 15. Learned counsel argued that pointing out of place of incident by the accused through his evidence under Section 27 of Evidence Act on 07.11.2006 is completely inadmissible in evidence. The place of incident was known to the police on 04.11.2006 itself when the police had visited the spot along with F.S.L. team, who had examined the place and prepared site plan of place of incident on 04.11.2006 itself (Exhibit P-25) and (Exhibit P-37). In such circumstances, there cannot be any rediscovery of a fact through information of the accused already discovered by the police earlier. In other words, there does not transpire any element of discovery through Exhibit P-5 in the instant case and such a re-discovery is completely inadmissible in evidence. Learned counsel, in support of his arguments, has relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Vijendra Vs. State of Delhi; 1997(1) Crimes 158 (SC), Makhan Singh Vs. State of Punjab; AlR 1988 (SC) 1705; State of Haryana Vs. Jagbir Singh; Judgment Today 2003 Supp.ll (SC) 393 (Para 21). 16. Learned counsel argued that no witness has stated about the accused-appellant being lastly seen with the deceased. State of Delhi; 1997(1) Crimes 158 (SC), Makhan Singh Vs. State of Punjab; AlR 1988 (SC) 1705; State of Haryana Vs. Jagbir Singh; Judgment Today 2003 Supp.ll (SC) 393 (Para 21). 16. Learned counsel argued that no witness has stated about the accused-appellant being lastly seen with the deceased. Neither any enmity or bad blood, nor history of any untoward incident earlier by the accused-appellant with the deceased and her family has been reported in the present case. Pushpa (P.W.14) mother of deceased and Sandeep (P.W.23) brother of deceased have specifically stated that there was no bad blood, enmity or any untoward incident in the past. On the contrary, the relationship was cordial and congenial between the deceased and the accused. It is argued that no finger prints of the accused appellant were found on the weapons or at the place of incident. No foot print or palm print found at the place of incident, to match with the foot print and palm print of the accused. The kith and kin of deceased came out with a categorical case that there were other assailants also so much so that on three occasions Section 319 application was filed for addition of other persons which met with the dismissal at the hands of the trial court. 17. Per contra, Mr. Anurag Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General appearing on behalf of the State opposed the appeal and supported the judgment passed by the trial court. It is argued that presence of the accused-appellant in the house of the deceased at the time of incident is well proved by the prosecution witnesses. He referred to statement of Ram Gopal (P.W.1), uncle (mausa) of the deceased, who stated that he saw the accused at the main gate of the house of Mahesh Chand around 11.00 A.M. Rakesh (P.W.19) also proved the presence of the accused appellant in the house of Mahesh Chand at the relevant time. He though turned hostile but he admitted portions of his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P-68). Learned Additional Advocate General argued that details of phone call (Exhibit P-27 and Exhibit P-28) proved that phone call was made by Rakesh (P.W.19) on Cell phone of Mahesh Chand which tallied with the time of incident. He though turned hostile but he admitted portions of his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (Exhibit P-68). Learned Additional Advocate General argued that details of phone call (Exhibit P-27 and Exhibit P-28) proved that phone call was made by Rakesh (P.W.19) on Cell phone of Mahesh Chand which tallied with the time of incident. Vibhor Rastogi (P.W.7) and Mahendra Pal Singh (P.W.22), officers of telephone companies have verified the details of CDRs and location of the accused-appellant at the relevant time. It is argued that DNA profile of hair and nail clippings taken from the fist/fingers of the deceased were found to be matching with the blood sample of the accused. DNA report has been proved by the scientist on record of the trial court. Besides, blood group on towel recovered from the accused matched with the blood found on knife and musli and blood lying on the spot around the body of the deceased. Finger print on spectacles of deceased also matched with that of the accused. Thus, guilt of the accused-appellant has been sufficiently proved by the scientific evidence on record beyond reasonable doubt. 18. It is argued that MLR of the accused-appellant (Exhibit P-30) and Arrest Memo (Exhibit P-3) connect him with the time of incident and prove that prior to murder of the deceased, the deceased had resisted the evil act of the accused till her last breath and in that process, she had even caused injuries to the accused resulting into bruises and abrasions. Crime scene report (Exhibit P-24) prepared and proved by R.K. Chaturvedi, Senior Scientist, SFSL (P.W.6) also proved that deceased had struggled against the vicious designs of the accused and in that process, she succumbed to the injuries caused by the accused-appellant. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that false plea of alibi taken by the accused-appellant further adds to his guilt. As regards non-submission of Certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that no objection was ever raised on behalf of the defence at the time, the same were proved and exhibited before the trial court. It is argued that recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the issue aforesaid in Sonu @ Amar Vs. As regards non-submission of Certificate under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, learned Additional Advocate General submitted that no objection was ever raised on behalf of the defence at the time, the same were proved and exhibited before the trial court. It is argued that recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court examined the issue aforesaid in Sonu @ Amar Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2017 SC 3441 and made observation as regards the admissibility of such documents as well as inconvenience, which may be caused in the cases decided after the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Navjot Sandhu’s case and prior to Anvar P.V. (supra). 19. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that injuries on the person of accused-appellant were mentioned in arrest memo (Exhibit P-3) and they were also taken note of by medical jurist in his MLR (Exhibit P-30). Non-mentioning of such injuries in the remand application has no bearing on the truthfulness of the prosecution case because the accused was also competent to make a prayer to the remand Magistrate when he was produced before him to order his medical examination. It is argued that in view of Section 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act and the ratio in Shankaria Vs. State of Rajathan, (1978) 3 SCC 435 and Full Bench Judgment of Delhi High Court in Bhupinder Singh Vs. State (Criminal Appeal No. 1005/2008) decided on 30.09.2011, the specimen of the finger print of the accused is not vitiated if they were taken by the police. Although the blood group of the deceased could not be ascertained from the sample of blood sent to FSL yet the sample of blood found on the clothes worn by the deceased tallied with the blood group found on all the aforesaid articles. Therefore, no other view can be taken in such a situation. Learned Additional Advocate General argued that nail clippings of the deceased and hair recovered from her fist, on being tested, tallied with the DNA of the accused. The report has been proved by the Scientist of CDFD, Hyderabad and the same cannot be viewed with any suspicion in any manner. 20. Learned Additional Advocate General in support of his arguments relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Laxman Naik Vs. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381 ; Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 15 SCC 269 ; Gajoo Vs. 20. Learned Additional Advocate General in support of his arguments relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Laxman Naik Vs. State of Orissa, (1994) 3 SCC 381 ; Rajendra Prahladrao Wasnik Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 15 SCC 269 ; Gajoo Vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2012) 9 SCC 532 and Muniappan & Others Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567 . It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal filed by the accused-appellant may be dismissed and the judgment passed by the learned trial court may be affirmed. 21. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully perused the record of the case. 22. This Court while accepting the application filed by the prosecution under Section 391 Cr.P.C. read with Section 293 (2) Cr.P.C. vide order dated 25.05.2016 remitted the record of the case to the trial court with direction for examination of Mr. SPR Prasad, Senior Technical Examiner, Laboratory of DNA Fingerprinting Services of CDFD, Nacharam, Hyderabad as prosecution witness and his cross-examination. Mr. SPR Prasad appeared before the trial court as P.W.30 and proved DNA Report (Exhibit P-96) and also proved that the source of exhibit A (hair) yielded DNA profile of a male origin. The source of exhibit B (nail clippings) yielded mixed DNA profiles of two individuals, which consists of a male DNA profile. The male DNA profile of the source of exhibit A (hair) is identical to the DNA profile of the source of exhibit C (blood sample said to be of accused-appellant Mahaveer Prasad). The alleles present in the mixed DNA profile of the source of exhibit B (nail clippings) is accounted for being present in the DNA profile of the source of exhibit C (blood sample said to be of accused-appellant Mahaveer Prasad). This circumstance was put to the accused in examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and his defence has been that the police during custody subjected him to beating and tinkered with his body, which does not convey anything. 23. There being no direct evidence of the incident, the entire prosecution case hinges on circumstantial evidence. This circumstance was put to the accused in examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and his defence has been that the police during custody subjected him to beating and tinkered with his body, which does not convey anything. 23. There being no direct evidence of the incident, the entire prosecution case hinges on circumstantial evidence. We have to therefore analyse the evidence to find out whether each of the incriminating circumstances which has been relied by the learned trial court against the accused-appellant is individually proved and if so, whether, when joined, they can make a complete chain of circumstances against the accused-appellant, having no scope of hypothesis, compatible with his innocence. What was alleged by the informant, Sandeep Sharma (P.W.23), brother of the deceased in the written report (Exhibit P-35) that his sister when she was alone in the house was murdered by someone. Dr. Rajendra Kakkar (P.W.8), who conducted autopsy over the body of the deceased has stated that she had total 21 injuries. Her forehead received fracture from the left side and pieces of bones became visible out of the head. All the injuries were ante mortem in nature and sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. 24. Ramgopal Sharma (P.W.1), uncle of the deceased stated that when he reached the house of Mahesh Ji, accused appellant was found standing outside the main gate of the house and upon his enquiry, he told that all the members of the family had gone to SMS Hospital. Thereupon, this witness left on a scooter. In cross-examination, he stated that accused Mahaveer was looking quite perturbed. In response to the query by defence, this witness stated that he could not carefully see to find any injury on the body of the accused. However, his hairs were very small ranging between 1/2 inch to 1½ inch. 25. Netram (P.W.2), another tenant of the house of the father of the deceased, has deposed that Mahaveer was also tenant in his house. Babu Lal (P.W.3) attesting witness to arrest memo (Exhibit P-3) of the accused has stated that though he saw the socks which the accused was wearing but he did not notice whether at the time of arrest he was having socks on his feet or not. He did not even notice minor injuries around the eyes of the accused. Babu Lal (P.W.3) attesting witness to arrest memo (Exhibit P-3) of the accused has stated that though he saw the socks which the accused was wearing but he did not notice whether at the time of arrest he was having socks on his feet or not. He did not even notice minor injuries around the eyes of the accused. But Sonu (P.W.4) has denied injury on the person of the accused. Rajendra Kumar Chaturvedi (P.W.6), In-charge of the mobile unit of FSL has stated that he along with his team visited the place of incident on requisition of Investigating Officer. He has proved inspection of the site and its report (Exhibit P-24) and photographs (Exhibit P-6 to Exhibit P-23). He has proved that the dubious person had abrasions on his left hand and there were abrasions also on shoulder. Contention that the accused-appellant was tenant in the house of the complainant party and his presence there is a neutral circumstance is noted to be rejected. It is not for the reason of mere presence of the accused appellant that he has been implicated in the case. It is owing to numerous incriminating circumstances. Rakesh Kumar (P.W.19) also proves presence of the appellant in the house at the relevant time. Even though he was declared hostile but when he was confronted with his statement under Section 164 (Exhibit P-68), he admitted having given such statement before the Magistrate and also admitted some portion of his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C. 26. DNA profile of hair and nail clippings taken from the fist/fingers of the deceased as per DNA Report were found to be matching with the blood sample of the accused. Besides, finger print on spectacles of the deceased also matched with that of the accused. There are in total 8 injuries found on the body of the accused. Defence set up by the accused-appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that police had obtained his finger impression on the spectacles of the deceased, which were recovered on the next day of the incident, cannot be said to be proved. The accused-appellant failed to give any explanation in his defence as to several adverse circumstances. Certificate on FSL Report (Exhibit P-98) proves that all the articles received were properly sealed bearing impression, which tallied with the specimen seal impression forwarded. The accused-appellant failed to give any explanation in his defence as to several adverse circumstances. Certificate on FSL Report (Exhibit P-98) proves that all the articles received were properly sealed bearing impression, which tallied with the specimen seal impression forwarded. Semen was detected in Exhibit 7 from Packet J. Towel which was recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant from his room was also found to contain human blood of B Group which was the blood group of the deceased, found lying on the spot around the body of the deceased and on knife and pestle. The top which the deceased was wearing was found to contain human blood of B Group. Exhibit P-30 is the injury report of the accused. The incident in the present case took place on 04.11.2006 whereas this injury report was prepared at 9.30 A.M. on 08.11.2006. According to this report, accused sustained total eight injuries which clearly shows that the deceased had tried to resist in devil design to the best of her ability. Crime scene report (Exhibit P-24) prepared and proved by Mr. R.K. Chaturvedi, Senior Scientist, SFSL, (P.W.6) clearly shows that the deceased had struggled against the attempted rape by the accused and in that process, she succumbed to the injuries caused by the accused-appellant. It also proves that the deceased struggled till the last to free herself from the clutches of the accused so much so the accused having received such resistance from the deceased applied greater force by hitting her head with pestle and knife and thereby causing her death. Non-ascertainment of the blood group of the deceased could not in any manner diminish evidentiary value of the FSL Report (Exhibit P-100) which clearly proved that the blood found on the spot was human blood of B Group and the blood found on the knife, pestle, specs, bucket as also jewellery recovered at the instance of the accused-appellant was also human blood of B Group. 27. Contention that the fingerprints of the accused, as per the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 (for short ‘the Act of 1920’), having not been obtained with due permission of the Magistrate, would not be admissible in evidence, is noted to be rejected for the stated reasons. 27. Contention that the fingerprints of the accused, as per the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 (for short ‘the Act of 1920’), having not been obtained with due permission of the Magistrate, would not be admissible in evidence, is noted to be rejected for the stated reasons. This question came up for consideration before the Larger Bench of Delhi High Court on a reference made by Division Bench of that Court in Bhupinder Singh Vs. State (Supra). The question that was required to be answered was whether the sample finger prints given by the accused during investigation under Section 4 of the Act of 1920, without prior permission of the Magistrate under Section 5 of the Act of 1920, will be admissible in evidence or not? Relying on judgment of three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Shankaria Vs. State of Rajasthan (Supra), it was held that concept of investigation as defined in Section 2(h) of Cr.P.C. clearly stipulates that investigation includes all the proceedings under the Code for collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person other than a Magistrate, who is authorized by the Magistrate in this behalf. The term investigation as defined in Cr.P.C. is an inclusive definition and includes all efforts of a Police Officer for collection of evidence namely proceeding to the spot, ascertaining facts and circumstances, discovery and arrest of the suspected offender, collection of evidence relating to commission of offence, which may consist of examination of various persons including the accused and taking of their statements in writing and the search of places or seizure of things, which are considered essential for investigation and to be produced at the trial. Delhi High Court also relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Pooran Mal Vs. The Director of Inspection (Investigation), New Delhi, (1974) 1 SCC 345 and Inspector of Police & Ors. Vs. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate, (2004) 5 SCC 729 wherein it was held that evidence obtained on an illegal search cannot be excluded and the criminal justice should not be allowed to become casualty for the wrongs committed by the investigating officers; secondly it was laid down that admissibility of evidence or a piece of evidence has to be judged having regard to the provisions of the Evidence Act. 28. 28. Relied judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohammad Aman (Supra) cannot be taken as authority to hold that the police is not competent to obtain finger prints of the accused in the course of investigation, unless permitted to do so by the Judicial Magistrate. Although the Supreme Court in that case held that it is true that under Section 4 of the Act of 1920, the police is competent to take finger prints of the accused, but to dispel any suspicion as to its bona fide or to eliminate fabrication of evidence, it is eminently desirable that they are taken before or under the order of a Magistrate. Thus, the observation only mentions about the desirability and the manner in which finger prints ought to have been obtained. Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Shankaria (supra) while dealing with the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act of 1920 held as under: “83. Mr. Gambhir next contends that in view of Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, it was incumbent on the police to obtain the specimen thumb-impressions of the appellant before a Magistrate, and since this was not done, the opinion rendered by the Finger Print Expert, Mr. Tankha, by using those illegally obtained specimen finger-impressions, must be ruled out of evidence. 84. The contention appears to be misconceived because in the State of Rajasthan, the Police were competent Under Section 4 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, to take the specimen finger-prints of the accused, and this they did, in the instant case, before the Superintendent of Police, Shri K. P. Srivastava. It was not necessary for them to obtain an order from the Magistrate for obtaining such specimen fingerprints." 29. Again in State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Devendra, (2009) 14 SCC 80 , a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court analysing the anatomy of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Act of 1920 held as under: “10. Section 3 deals with taking of measurements of the convicted persons. The photographs and measurements can be taken by the police officer in the manner prescribed. Section 4 deals with taking of measurement, etc. of non-convicted persons. It is taken if the police officer so requires it and it has to be done in the prescribed manner. 11. Section 3 deals with taking of measurements of the convicted persons. The photographs and measurements can be taken by the police officer in the manner prescribed. Section 4 deals with taking of measurement, etc. of non-convicted persons. It is taken if the police officer so requires it and it has to be done in the prescribed manner. 11. So far as Section 5 is concerned, it deals with the power of the Magistrate to direct any person for measurements or photographs to be taken if he is satisfied that for the purpose of any investigation or proceedings under the court the same is necessary. XXX XXX XXX l4. Needless to say, the directions are subject to provisions of the Act, the Regulations and the Code. In case of conflict statute itself prevails. In case of complainant as well as witnesses, where the prosecution wants to protect the identity, the reasons, therefor, must be recorded. In case of rape victims, photographs should not be taken.” 30. Argument before the Supreme Court in State of Bombay Vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808 was that Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 is violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India and the impression of the palms and finger prints taken from the appellant and there after his arrest for comparison with the impression on the glass panes and phials were not admissible in view of the provisions contained in Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Though the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Act of 1920 were not challenged or relied in that case, but it was argued in the context of Article 20(3) of the Constitution that the measurements collected would be inadmissible. Dealing with the said argument, the Supreme Court in para 16 held as under: “16. In view of these considerations, we have come to the following conclusions: (1) An accused person cannot be said to have been compelled to be a witness against himself simply because he made a statement while in police custody, without anything more. Dealing with the said argument, the Supreme Court in para 16 held as under: “16. In view of these considerations, we have come to the following conclusions: (1) An accused person cannot be said to have been compelled to be a witness against himself simply because he made a statement while in police custody, without anything more. In other words, the mere fact of being in police custody at the time when the statement in question was made would not, by itself, as a proposition of law, lend itself to the inference that the accused was compelled to make the statement, though that fact, in conjunction with other circumstances disclosed in evidence in a particular case, would be a relevant consideration in an enquiry whether or not the accused person had been compelled to make the impugned statement. (2) The mere questioning of an accused person by a police officer, resulting in a voluntary statement, which may ultimately turn out to be incriminatory, is not ’compulsion'. (3) 'To be a witness' is not equivalent to 'furnishing evidence‘ in its widest significance; that is to say, as including not merely making of oral or written statements but also production of documents or giving materials which may be relevant at a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. (4) Giving thumb impressions or impressions of foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing parts of the body by way of identification are not included in the expression 'to be a witness'. (5) 'To be a witness' means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing, made or given in court or otherwise. (6) 'To be a witness' in its ordinary grammatical sense means giving oral testimony in court. Case law has gone beyond this strict literal interpretation of the expression, which may now bear a wider meaning, namely, bearing testimony in court or out of court by a person accused of an offence, orally or in writing. (7) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused, any time after the statement has been made.” 31. In State Vs. (7) To bring the statement in question within the prohibition of Article 20(3), the person accused must have stood in the character of an accused person at the time he made the statement. It is not enough that he should become an accused, any time after the statement has been made.” 31. In State Vs. M. Krishna Mohan & Another, (2007) 14 SCC 667 , the supreme court held that specimen finger prints and hand writings can be taken from an accused. 32. In view of above position of law, it must be held that Police in the course of investigation cannot be held to have acted illegally in obtaining finger prints of the accused in the present case. The evidence in the present case reveals several incriminating circumstances against the accused-appellant which when joined together form a chain of circumstances against the accused, so complete as to rule out every other hypothesis that may be compatible with his innocence and unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused that it must be he alone and none else, who while attempting to ravish the deceased Archana Sharma, committed her murder. 33. In view of above discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the judgment passed by the learned trial court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the accused-appellant fails and is dismissed.