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2017 DIGILAW 2210 (BOM)

Ashok Sunderlal Daga v. Union of India

2017-10-13

ARUN D.UPADHYE, B.P.DHARMADHIKARI

body2017
JUDGMENT : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. By these petitions, petitioners more or less identically placed question application of provisions of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as "the 2002 Act" for short), to them and pray for quashing and setting aside of Enforcement Case Information Report with different numbers registered by respondent No. 2 Directorate of Enforcement against them, along with enquiry/investigation therein. They also pray for awarding them the compensation for wrongfully resorting to the 2002 Act. 2. Though in each matter an order of attachment under Section 8[5] of the 2002 Act has been passed and that is the cause of action for approaching this Court, challenge thereto is pending before the Appellate Authority. 3. Union of India along with Directorate of Enforcement and its Assistant Director have raised a preliminary objection. They invite attention to judgment dated 13.07.2017, delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1137/2017 (Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I.), and submit that this Court cannot take cognizance, as such controversies are to be looked into by a Special Court constituted for that purpose at Delhi by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. They submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has restrained any other Court in India, including any High Court from taking cognizance. They point out that hence, the interim protection given to petitioners by this Court is unwarranted and the same needs to be withdrawn immediately. They also pray for dismissal of Writ Petitions for want of jurisdiction. 4. In the light of this preliminary objection and judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 13.07.2017 (supra), we find it proper to consider this objection at threshold by issuing Rule and making it returnable forthwith with consent of all. Accordingly, we have heard Shri U.M. Aurangabadkar, learned A.S.G.I. with Mrs. M. Chandurkar, learned Counsel in support of the same. Shri S.P. Dharmadhikari, learned Senior Counsel with Shri S. Dewani, learned counsel for Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 697/2017; Shri H.D. Dangre, learned Counsel for petitioners in Writ Petition Nos. 463 and 489 of 2017, Shri D.V. Chauhan, learned Counsel for petitioner in Writ Petition No. 343/2017, Shri A.A. Naik, learned Counsel for Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 549/2017 and Shri S. Khedkar, learned counsel for Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 607/2017. 5. 463 and 489 of 2017, Shri D.V. Chauhan, learned Counsel for petitioner in Writ Petition No. 343/2017, Shri A.A. Naik, learned Counsel for Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 549/2017 and Shri S. Khedkar, learned counsel for Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 607/2017. 5. To understand the controversy, we find that narration of facts in Writ Petition No. 697/2017 argued as lead matter, more than sufficient. The petitioner is Managing Director of various companies and as per charge sheet No. 20/15, filed by CBI, EO-III in Regular Case No. 221/2014/EOO16, he fraudulently applied in the year 2000-01 to Ministry of Coal for allocation of coal block. Application was moved by Gondwana Ispat Limited, a Company before its incorporation. Various other details are also then given. In charge sheet it is claimed that the petitioner disposed of his 50% equity in said Gondwana Ispat Limited at a profit of Rs. 7,50,000/-. It is also claimed that he disposed off the company without installing plant and developing the coal mine for captive consumption. This was without any intimation and permission from Ministry of coal. It is claimed that the agreement for sale of equity shares by M/s. Gondwana Ispat Limited dated 28.10.2005 with Shri Nandkishore Sarda and Shri Govind Daga consisted of two parts. As per part-I of the Schedule, petitioner received Rs. 10 lakhs, while as per Part-II, he was to receive an amount of Rs. 2.75 Crores to be paid in installments of Rs. 25 lakhs, based on production and disposal of coal from allocated coal mine. Complaint filed by CBI that this amounted to sale of coal meant for captive/exclusive use in EPU (end process unit) undertaken to be set up by the petitioner. It is claimed that Shri Daga made huge financial gains by cheating the government. We need not go into other details of the complaint or charge sheet, however, petitioner has submitted that he terminated this agreement and in consideration thereof got Rs. 1.55 Crores. There is reference to statements made by other petitioners in this matter. All petitioners, except Shri Nandkishore Sarda are accused in the matter. 6. In this background learned A.S.G.I. has relied upon judgment dated 13.07.2013, (Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I.), to submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court is monitoring the investigation in coal block allotment errors and it has directed investigation to be carried out by CBI. All petitioners, except Shri Nandkishore Sarda are accused in the matter. 6. In this background learned A.S.G.I. has relied upon judgment dated 13.07.2013, (Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I.), to submit that the Hon'ble Supreme Court is monitoring the investigation in coal block allotment errors and it has directed investigation to be carried out by CBI. He points out how & why the Hon'ble Supreme Court has found it essential, looking to the magnitude of illegalities and prima facie involvement of Director of CBI. The criminality associated with allocation of coal blocks extends also to money laundering matters, and hence, the present Writ Petitions as filed before this Court needs to be dismissed. He has taken us through opening paragraph of the said judgment to explain the background, and then through other paragraphs to demonstrate the concern felt by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and remedial measures mandated by it. 7. He submits that charge sheet No. 20/2015, is admittedly filed in Special Court at New Delhi in matter of coal block allotment and relies upon disclosure in reply to state that as case involves economic offence and money laundering, CBI is the only authority empowered to investigate into it. He submits that during investigation, proceeds of crime related to schedule offence were identified and a provisional attachment order 1/2016 dated 12.09.2016, attaching properties worth Rs. 1.67 Crores was issued under Section 5[1] of the 2002 Act. Different orders on similar lines have been issued in other petitions. He states that interim orders passed by this Court on 06.06.2017, interfere with the freedom available to investigating agency & militate with the orders of the Apex Court. 8. Senior Counsel Shri Dharmadhikari, submits that facts as presented by the investigating agency itself show that money laundering has surfaced in 2015, and provisional attachment order was passed on 12.09.2016. This order has been confirmed on 08.02.2017. Relying upon provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution of India, he submits that in present facts alleged offence, if any, was complete in 2005 or then in any case 2011, when petitioners got Rs. 1.56 Crores. Section 120-B or Section 420 of Indian Penal Code do not form part of Schedule of 2002 Act then and hence, the retrospective application of 2002 Act in present facts is unconstitutional. 1.56 Crores. Section 120-B or Section 420 of Indian Penal Code do not form part of Schedule of 2002 Act then and hence, the retrospective application of 2002 Act in present facts is unconstitutional. He adds that facts are not in dispute and though petitioners deny any such crime, and all related facts, presuming facts disclosed by the investigating agency to be correct, the above argument needs to be upheld. 9. Learned Senior Counsel draws our attention to Section 3, Section 4 of 2002 Act along with Section 2[u], defining "proceeds of Crime" and Section 2[y] defining "Schedule Offences", to explain the relevance thereof for the purpose of proviso to Section 4. He submits that Section 120-B of Indian Penal Code dealing with criminal conspiracy & Section 420 about offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, have been added to Part "A" of Schedule by Amendment Act No. 2 of 2013 w.e.f. 15.02.2013. Thus, these provisions regulating scheduled offences are not applicable and cannot be invoked against petitioners. Our attention is also invited to Section 44 of the 2002 Act to submit that no complaint has been filed against any petitioner under Section 44[2] till date. Section 8[5] is also relied upon to show that it envisage orders to be passed at the conclusion of the trial and purpose of attachment to secure recovery. However, in present matter, no offence as yet has been registered under 2002 Act, against petitioners. Action of provisional attachment therefore is erroneous and without jurisdiction. In an attempt to distinguish judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Girish Suneja (supra), he submits that petitioners do not seek stay of the trial going on at Delhi or then stay of investigation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has only found it proper not to create obstacles in pending prosecution or investigation. However, final prayers in relation to either investigation or such prosecution are not prohibited by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and petitioners can very well approach this Court. He therefore, submits that in the face of Article 20[1], as 2002 Act is sought to be artificially enforced retrospectively, petitions need to be allowed. 10. Shri D.V. Chavan, learned counsel for petitioner in Writ Petition No. 343/2017 submits that in view of notification dated 06.03.2009 and Schedule appended to 2002 Act, 2002 Act cannot be used in present matters at all. 11. 10. Shri D.V. Chavan, learned counsel for petitioner in Writ Petition No. 343/2017 submits that in view of notification dated 06.03.2009 and Schedule appended to 2002 Act, 2002 Act cannot be used in present matters at all. 11. Shri H.D. Dangre, learned counsel adopts above arguments and submits that 2002 Act envisages three types of proceedings; First proceeding is to secure property; Second proceeding contemplates complaint by authority. Third proceeding envisaged under Section 44[b] and [c] of 2002 Act, contemplate merger of IPC prosecution with P.M.L.A. prosecution. In present petitions, there is no challenge to proceedings under the Special Act, and there is no attempt to interfere with those proceedings or investigation. He submits that as yet no offence under Section 3 or Section 4 has been substantiated, and hence, there is no "proceeds of crime" in any of the matters before this Court. 12. Shri Aurangabadkar, learned A.S.G.I., briefly points out that all petitioners are already facing trial at New Delhi except Shri N.K. Sarda. P.M.L.A. attachment is on the basis of information gathered during said investigation and he adds that at the most petitioners could have approached this Court in appeal against order of attachment. He also adds and reiterates that proceedings under Section 3 and prosecution for "scheduled offence" are independent of each other. He therefore prays for dismissal of petitions. 13. Thus, petitioners before this Court mainly contend that action for attachment taken against them is in respect of a scheduled offence and offence under Section 120B and 420 of Indian Penal Code, came to be added to the Schedule in its paragraph No. 1 either in 2013 or 2009. Their submission is, before this addition, alleged offence was already complete and hence for such completed act provisions of 2002 Act, cannot be invoked. 14. The attachment in present matters has been considered and cleared under Section 8[1] of the 2002 Act. The provisions of Section 8[1] envisage satisfaction of the adjudicating authority, that any person has committed an offence under Section 3, or is in possession of proceeds of crime. Two types of persons are thus envisaged here, one an offender & other holding proceeds of crime. 15. Section 5[1] is the first step in that direction. The provisions of Section 8[1] envisage satisfaction of the adjudicating authority, that any person has committed an offence under Section 3, or is in possession of proceeds of crime. Two types of persons are thus envisaged here, one an offender & other holding proceeds of crime. 15. Section 5[1] is the first step in that direction. The director or any other officer, not below the rank of Deputy Director, if he has reason to believe that any person is in possession of any proceeds of crime, and such proceeds are likely to be concealed/transferred or dealt with in any manner, which may result in frustrating the proceedings relating to its confiscation, such offence by order in writing can provisionally attach such property. Section 5[1] also contemplates that reasons are to be recorded in writing and satisfaction has to be reached on the basis of material in his possession. The provisional attachment can last maximum for 180 days and within 30 days of such attachment, the officer attaching the proceeds provisionally has to file complaint before the adjudicating authority. Section 8[1] (supra) then springs into action. 16. Adequacy or sufficiency or relevance of material or then process of formation of subjective satisfaction by the authority attaching provisionally are not the issues presented to this Court. Section 5[1] does not contemplate provisional attachment only if offence is established i.e. only if person is convicted. It empowers Director to take action against any person who is in possession of any proceeds of crime. Section 8[1] again draws this distinction between person committing offence under section 3 and a person in possession of proceeds of crime. Contention of petitioners that offence is not registered against them under 2002 Act, or then offence is not established and therefore, alleged proceeds cannot be seen as proceeds of crime, therefore, prima facie appear to be erroneous. In any case, the issue needs to be first decided by the authorities functioning under 2002 Act as per directions of the Hon. Apex Court. This Court can comment upon their findings and reach appropriate conclusion in this respect thereafter, if challenge can reach it legally. 17. Section 3 is offence of money laundering. It contemplates direct or indirect attempt to indulge or knowingly sustain or bring a party or getting involved in any process of activity connected with proceeds of crime. This Court can comment upon their findings and reach appropriate conclusion in this respect thereafter, if challenge can reach it legally. 17. Section 3 is offence of money laundering. It contemplates direct or indirect attempt to indulge or knowingly sustain or bring a party or getting involved in any process of activity connected with proceeds of crime. This phraseology therefore, is employing wide words and attempt obviously is to cover as much as possible, the field of money laundering. Its' wide scope is also apparent from efforts like concealment, possession, acquisition or use and projecting or claiming such money as untainted property attempted to be dealt with therein. Thus, this mode and manner of dealing with proceeds constitutes it an offence of money laundering. Again this mode and manner is not exhaustive, but, only inclusive and hence, there may be other types of steps or action possible in relation to such money or tainted property. Together, Section 3 therefore, occupies maximum possible field to prohibit money laundering. We find that the Courts while interpreting it must construe it as liberally as possible to advance the interest of public revenue. 18. Section 4 prescribes punishment for money laundering and it is in two parts. Its substantive part prescribes rigorous imprisonment for a term not less then 3 years and upto 7 years. It has a proviso which speaks of laundering of money, if such money is in connection with offence specified in paragraph No. 2 of Part A of the Schedule. If that be the case, the maximum possible punishment is upto 10 years. Paragraph No. 2 of schedule deals with offence under Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Presently we are not concerned with any such offence. Here, the offence with which petitioners are concerned fall in paragraph No. 1 in Part A of said schedule, which takes into its sweep offence under Indian Penal Code. 19. Section 3 or substantive part of Section 4, therefore, does not spring into action only if offence is a scheduled offence. Wrongful act envisaged therein appears to be perceived as offence since the inception (i.e. 17.01.2003) of 2002 Act. Moreover, whether the offence in so far as petitioner in Writ Petition No. 697/2017 is concerned, was completed in 2005 or then before 2009 or then in 2011, are all questions of fact. Wrongful act envisaged therein appears to be perceived as offence since the inception (i.e. 17.01.2003) of 2002 Act. Moreover, whether the offence in so far as petitioner in Writ Petition No. 697/2017 is concerned, was completed in 2005 or then before 2009 or then in 2011, are all questions of fact. In this jurisdiction and at this stage we cannot record any finding about it. The investigating agency may unearth some material which may show continued indulgence of petitioners in offence under Section 3 punishable under Section 4, even now. Prima facie Section 3 takes note of various modes and manner in which proceeds of crime can be dealt with. This mode and manner (clandestine operations) therefore, may be continuous one because of undertaking different processes at different times. The person involved in it may not be an offender under IPC. Section 3 speaks of a person who in its absence, could not have been perhaps roped in for said offence or any other offence. Section 5[1][a] speaks of "any person" in possession of any proceeds of crime. Thus, person in possession may not be aware of the character of proceeds in his hand or may not be party to various operations, made offence under Section 3. Attachment of proceeds of crime wherever they are found, is allowed. This discussion, therefore, shows that the contentions about offence being already complete before addition of Section 120B or Section 420 of Indian Penal Code, as scheduled offence, are misconceived and cannot be examined at this stage. Similarly, contention that unless and until there is conviction, proceeds cannot be classified as "proceeds of crime", is equally misconceived. The argument that petitioners are not yet charged for commission of any offence under Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, is irrelevant. 20. At this stage, it is necessary to peruse the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Girish Suneja v. CBI (supra). The judgment shows that because of directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, CBI filed charge sheet against Girish Kumar Suneja and others. On 29.04.2016, learned Special Judge appointed to hear Criminal case arising out of illegal allocation of coal blocks directed framing of charges. Against that order, Misc. Criminal Case was filed in Delhi High Court by Girish Suneja. The judgment shows that because of directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, CBI filed charge sheet against Girish Kumar Suneja and others. On 29.04.2016, learned Special Judge appointed to hear Criminal case arising out of illegal allocation of coal blocks directed framing of charges. Against that order, Misc. Criminal Case was filed in Delhi High Court by Girish Suneja. Before High Court in the backdrop of paragraph No. 10 of order dated 25.07.2014, passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the Writ Petition was taken. Learned Single Judge of Delhi High Court dismissed the petition as not maintainable, and against that an appeal came before the Hon'ble Supreme Court at the instance of Shri Suneja. Facts mentioned in judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court show that a Special Judge has been nominated for trial of the coal block allocation cases. 21. It will be appropriate to reproduce paragraph No. 2 of this judgment in case of Shri Suneja, as it quotes order dated 25.07.2014 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court itself. "2. Much earlier, on 25th July, 2014 the following order was passed by this Court in the Coal Block Allocation cases (the relevant extract is reproduced): "4. In pursuance of our order dated 18.7.2014, the Registrar General, Delhi High Court has intimated to the Secretary General of this Court that the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has been pleased to nominate Mr. Bharat Prashar, an officer of Delhi Higher Judicial Service for being posted as Special Judge to deal and exclusively try the offences pertaining to coal block allocation matters under the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 and other allied offences. 5. We, accordingly, direct the competent authorities to issue requisite notifications appointing Mr. Bharat Prashar, an officer of Delhi Higher Judicial Service as Special Judge for the above purpose. The notifications shall be issued within two weeks from the date of communication of copy of this order. 6. We also order that Mr. R.S. Cheema, senior advocate shall be appointed as Special Public Prosecutor by the Government of India to conduct the prosecution of the offences pertaining to coal block allocation matters on behalf of CBI and Enforcement Directorate. On such appointment, Mr. R.S. Cheema may choose two other advocates, who, in his opinion, will be of assistance in the matter. R.S. Cheema, senior advocate shall be appointed as Special Public Prosecutor by the Government of India to conduct the prosecution of the offences pertaining to coal block allocation matters on behalf of CBI and Enforcement Directorate. On such appointment, Mr. R.S. Cheema may choose two other advocates, who, in his opinion, will be of assistance in the matter. While doing so, Mr. R.S. Cheema may keep in view the magnitude and complexities of the case. 7. The Special Public Prosecutor shall have access to the entire evidence/material including case diaries collected in the course of investigation. 8. We direct the CBI to render all necessary assistance to the Special Public Prosecutor. 9. All cases pending before different courts in Delhi pertaining to coal block allocation matters shall stand transferred to the court of Special Judge as afore-noted. 10. We also make it clear that any prayer for stay or impeding the progress in the investigation/trial can be made only before this Court and no other Court shall entertain the same." 22. Several contentions raised by the learned counsel for Shri Suneja are reproduced by the Hon'ble Supreme Court briefly in paragraph No. 9. Findings of Hon'ble Supreme Court thereupon show that in extra ordinary circumstances, it is advisable for High Court to decline to interfere under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph No. 41, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in said matter related with allocation of coal blocks, High Court ought not to have intervened and should have left it to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Alleged violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India is the looked into in paragraphs 42 to 46. Again finding given is against Shri Suneja. Violation of Article 21 is the aspect looked into in paragraph No. 47 onwards upto paragraph No. 49. The observations in paragraph No. 49 are important and the same are reproduced below. "49. It must not be forgotten that the cases arising out of the coal block allocations are not ordinary cases but fall under a special or distinct category which requires special attention given the magnitude of the illegalities allegedly committed including some with criminal intent. The observations in paragraph No. 49 are important and the same are reproduced below. "49. It must not be forgotten that the cases arising out of the coal block allocations are not ordinary cases but fall under a special or distinct category which requires special attention given the magnitude of the illegalities allegedly committed including some with criminal intent. It is in this view of the matter that this Court had no option but to hand over the investigations to the CBI and to monitor the investigations so that they reach their logical conclusion, without any interference from any quarter. The magnitude of the illegalities is such that it appears that even the integrity of the Director of the CBI was prima facie compromised, and this Court had to intervene and direct investigations into the conduct of the Director of the CBI. That being so, it can hardly be said with any degree of seriousness that the procedure adopted by this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, violate any right to the life and liberty of any of the appellants or any other persons allegedly involved in the criminality associated with the allocation of coal blocks." 23. Discussion in paragraph No. 57 in said judgment shows that the Hon'ble Supreme Court found that it was necessary to conclude the coal block allocation scam at the earliest. Any application intended to stay or impede that trial, therefore, is to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court only. 24. These observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court therefore, clearly show that all matters which question any such investigation or offence pertaining to coal block allocation and related matters under Indian Penal Code, 1860, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and other allied offences must be looked into by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 25. Facts of case at hand reveal that provisional attachment order and complaint filed by the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement beyond doubt show the nexus of proceeds of crime with coal block allotment. The contention of enforcement department that it got knowledge of proceeds of crime only through investigation into coal block allotment, cannot be disputed at this stage. 25. Facts of case at hand reveal that provisional attachment order and complaint filed by the Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement beyond doubt show the nexus of proceeds of crime with coal block allotment. The contention of enforcement department that it got knowledge of proceeds of crime only through investigation into coal block allotment, cannot be disputed at this stage. The reply on preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition filed by respondents, shows that on the basis of FIR dated 07.08.2014, CBI, New Delhi registered a case under Section 120B and 420 of Indian Penal Code and a charge sheet came to be filed on 31.12.2015 before the Additional Sessions Judge and CBI Special Court, New Delhi against petitioner and his company. That FIR and charge sheet was forwarded by CBI to respondents as case involved economic offence and offence of money laundering. Respondents claim that it is the only organization empowered to investigate offence of money laundering. They submit that in case in Criminal Writ Petition No. 697/2017, the proceeds of crime relating to scheduled offence, were noticed and the provisional attachment order was made on 12.09.2016 attaching properties worth Rs. 1.67 Crores. Paragraph No. 9 thereof discloses that the adjudicating authority has on 31.01.2017 confirmed the attachment of property. 26. Accused persons have filed an appeal on 24.03.2017 before the Appellate Tribunal under 2002 Act at New Delhi and it is pending before that Tribunal. 27. These facts sufficiently reveal, at least at this stage and before this Court in its jurisdiction under Article 226, that the link between the pending prosecution for coal block allotment and the attachment order which gave rise to present writ-petitions cannot be ignored. 28. It is apparent that this court cannot make any observation and record any finding which will interfere with proceedings pending before the Appellate Tribunal. It is also apparent that this court cannot and could not have passed an order granting any interim relief to the petitioners in present matters. In ground No. 9[g] in Writ Petition No. 697/2017, the petitioner has stated that the trial of offence under Sections 420 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code is at the stage of recording of statement of accused under Section 313 Criminal Procedure Code. Arguments advanced show that the matter has not progressed further because of interim directions of this Court. 29. Arguments advanced show that the matter has not progressed further because of interim directions of this Court. 29. Though petitioners have not relied upon the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of Karnataka High Court, the respondents have pointed out, that the view reached there in favour of petitioners is stayed in Special Leave Petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and the said Division Bench judgment cannot be cited as a precedent. We have already made some comments upon petitioners' contentions based upon Article 20, and we need not therefore, go into this issue at all. 30. In the light of this discussion, we uphold the preliminary objection raised by learned A.S.G.I. We declare that Criminal Writ Petitions filed before this Court are not maintainable. We also clarify that the observations made by us supra, are in the light of arguments advanced and only to the extent necessary to evaluate the same. The same will not have any bearing or influence on the pending appeal before the Appellate Authority under 2002 Act, or pending prosecutions before the Special Court at New Delhi. 31. Accordingly Writ Petitions are dismissed. Needless to mention that interim orders operating in the petitions, stand vacated. Rule discharged. No costs. 32. At this stage, the learned counsel appearing for respective petitioners seek continuation of interim orders for a period of eight weeks more so as to enable them to approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The learned A.S.G.I. submits that period of 180 days allowed in the matter has already expired, and because of the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the cognizance could not have been taken by this Court. 33. We have accepted the preliminary objection of the learned A.S.G.I. Hence, the prayer for continuation of interim order cannot be entertained. The same is therefore, rejected.