ORDER : Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 10.05.2012 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bastar, Jagdalpur (C.G.) in Sessions Trial No.112 of 2009, by which, the appellant has been held guilty of commission of offence. The conviction and sentence of the appellant imposed by the Court below are as follows : Conviction Sentence Under Section 302 of IPC Imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for two years. 2. Prosecution story, as unfolded from the impugned judgment and records of the case, is that an FIR Ex.P/2 was lodged in the police station Lohandiguda, District Bastar by Hunga (PW1) at 9:15 hrs. on 19.08.09 wherein it was reported that while his younger daughter, a child aged 7 months, was being taken care of and in the lap of his elder daughter Lalita, the appellant/accused came in, snatched 7 months old child from the lap of Lalita and dashed her head repeatedly on a nearby lying stone, due to which, the baby child Hemwati died. A merg was also recorded at 9:20 hrs. immediately after recording FIR and thereafter the police proceeded to the scene of occurrence where inquest over the dead body was prepared in Ex.P/4 and dead body was sent for postmortem. Dr. N.S. Nag (PW7) conducted postmortem and prepared postmortem report in Ex.P/10. According to the opinion of the doctor, death was homicidal in nature. Investigation was carried out, statement of witnesses were recorded and thereafter, upon completion of usual investigation, charge sheet was filed before the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jagdalpur, who in turn, committed the case for trial to the Sessions Judge, Jagdalpur. On the basis of material contained in the charge-sheet, learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant alleging that on 19.08.09, at about 7:00 am. in the morning, the appellant murdered baby child, aged about 7 years and thereby committed the offence. The appellant having abjured guilt, was subjected to trial. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses. The appellant was also examined under section 313 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 in respect of incriminating evidence and circumstances appearing against him, led by the prosecution. The appellant took the defence that he has not committed any offence and falsely implicated. No defence witness was examined. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 7 witnesses. The appellant was also examined under section 313 of the Cr.P.C., 1973 in respect of incriminating evidence and circumstances appearing against him, led by the prosecution. The appellant took the defence that he has not committed any offence and falsely implicated. No defence witness was examined. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence of the prosecution does not inspire confidence and is more or less stereotyped statement. Next submission is that the prosecution has failed to come out with any motive why the appellant would kill a baby child. There is no material to show that the appellant had any animosity with any of the members of the family of the deceased child. Therefore, the entire story of the prosecution becomes highly doubtful and improbable. Lastly, it is submitted that, in any case, no intention could be attributed to the appellant as even according to the prosecution witnesses, the appellant was in a drunken state and therefore, was unable to understand the consequences of his act. Therefore, even if it is found that because of the overt act of the appellant, the baby child died, it would not be a case of commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC but only under Section 304 part II of the IPC. He further submits that the appellant has undergone more than five years of imprisonment. Therefore, a prayer is made for altering the conviction under Section 304 Part II of IPC for the period already undergone by the appellant. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel supports the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence by arguing that the appellant acted cruelly in killing 7 months old baby child by dashing her head repeatedly on the stone and thereby causing her death. The incident was seen by more than one eyewitnesses. Sukman (PW2), Satbai (PW3) and Lalita (PW5), all have clearly stated that it was the appellant who had snatched the girl child from the hands of Lalita and then acted in a cruel manner to kill the child. The statement of eyewitnesses are reliable as in their cross-examination, nothing could be elicited to impeach their credibility. Sukman (PW2), Satbai (PW3) and Lalita (PW5), all have clearly stated that it was the appellant who had snatched the girl child from the hands of Lalita and then acted in a cruel manner to kill the child. The statement of eyewitnesses are reliable as in their cross-examination, nothing could be elicited to impeach their credibility. The next submission of the State counsel is that the manner in which the appellant committed offence involving an element of cruelty, it is a case of cold blooded murder. Lastly, it is submitted that even if there is some evidence that the appellant was in a drunken stage, the burden was on the defence to prove by leading cogent evidence that his state and condition of drunkenness was to such an extent that he was completely unable to understand the consequences of his act. As the appellant failed to come out with any such maternal evidence, the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence does not warrant any interference. 5. FIR (Ex.P/2) has been duly proved by Hunga (PW1), the father of the deceased child. He has clearly stated in his Court statement that he lodged the report and has proved his signature. The contents of the FIR are that while Hunga's elder daughter Lalita was playing with the child in her lap, the appellant came in and snatched the baby child from the hands of Lalita, took her to a stone lying nearby and smashed her head against the stone twice, resulting in death. The FIR has been lodged promptly at 9:15 hrs in the morning of the date of incident. 6. Sukman (PW2), one of the three eyewitnesses, has stated to have seen the appellant smashing the girl child on the stone. He has stated that when he saw the incident, he ran away from the spot and informed the villagers. He has clearly stated in his evidence that the appellant had smashed the head of the child twice on the stone lying under the Mahua tree and thereafter the body of the child was thrown away. He is also the witness of inquest (Ex.P/4). A perusal of inquest report also shows that the name of the appellant has appeared which shows that it has been the case of the prosecution right from the beginning that it is the appellant who had killed the baby child. He is also the witness of inquest (Ex.P/4). A perusal of inquest report also shows that the name of the appellant has appeared which shows that it has been the case of the prosecution right from the beginning that it is the appellant who had killed the baby child. In the cross-examination of this witness, nothing could be elicited to doubt the statement of this witness as in his statement, he has denied the suggestion that he has not seen the incident. There is no reason why this witness, who is not related to any of the parties, would tell a lie. 7. Satbati (PW3) is the mother of the deceased Hemwati. She has deposed in her evidence that while her daughter Lalita was playing with the girl child, the appellant came in and snatched Hemwati, took her towards stone near Mahua tree and smashed her head twice on the stone. She states that when Lalita informed her she came out and saw the appellant smashing the head of the child on the stone and thereafter he threw the body away and ran away. In the cross-examination, she has denied the suggestion that she had not seen the incident. 8. One of the important witnesses of the incident is Lalita (PW5), a child witness, aged 7 years, who happened to be the sister of the deceased. She has fully supported the case of the prosecution by emphatically stating in her Court statement that while she was holding her younger sister Hemwati in her lap near the door of the house, the appellant came in, snatched the child from her hand and then she was smashed to kill. She has also stated that the baby child was smashed on the stone lying nearby. In the cross-examination, she has denied the suggestion that she is deposing as tutored by her mother. This witness is only 7 years old. The questions put to her by the Court to test her level of understanding lent creditworthiness to her statement, particularly, when there is nothing to show that she was a tutored witness. She was the elder sister of the deceased child and it was from her lap that the baby child was snatched by the appellant and killed. She appears to be natural witness of the incident. 9. She was the elder sister of the deceased child and it was from her lap that the baby child was snatched by the appellant and killed. She appears to be natural witness of the incident. 9. The ocular testimony of the three eyewitnesses is fully supported by the medical evidence led in trial. Dr. N. S. Nag (PW7) had examined the dead body and prepared postmortem report. The following injuries were found: 3- esjs }kjk 'ko dh igpku flxyw jke] cYnso vkSj gwaxk ds }kjk dh x;h rRi'pkr~ eSaus izFke :i ls 'ko dk ckg; ijh{k.k fd;kA ,d e`r cPph dk 'ko ftldh nksuksa vka[ks can Fkh eqag can Fkk 'kjhj ds nksuksa gkFk ,oa iSjksa ij vdM+u ugha ik;s x;s rkyw ,oa gFksyh vkaf'kd :i ls ihyk ik;k x;kA e`frdk ds 'kjhj ls fdlh Hkh izdkj dk ey ,oa Jko ugha ik;k x;kA e`frdk ds 'kjhj ij ckgzk :i ls fuEu pksVsa ik;h x;h%& 1- e`frdk ds [kksiM+h ds fiNys fgLls ij daV;wtu jDr tek gqvk ik;k x;k tks fd vkdkj esa xksy Fkk ,oa 2 xq.kk 2 bap yack ,oa pkSM+k FkkA 2- ekFks ij daV;wtu ik;k x;k tks 2 xq.kk 2 bap yack ,ao PkkSM+k FkkA 3- nkfgus gkFk ds lkeus ds fgLls ij daVq;tu ik;k x;k tks fd 3 xq.kk 2 bat yack ,oa pkSM+k FkkA 4- /kalk gqvk pksV vFkkZr~ nck gqvk e`frdk ds fiNys fgLls ds [kksiM+h ij ik;k x;k tks fd bl pksV ds laca/k esa pksV dzekad 1 esa mYysf[kr fd;k x;k gSA mijksDr pksVs e`R;q ds iwoZ dh Fkh ,oa fdlh Bksl HkksFkjs ,oa cyiwoZd izgkj ls dkfjr dh x;h FkhA mijksDr pksVs esjs ijh{k.k ds 4 ls 6 ?kaVs njE;ku dh Fkh laHkor%A [kksiM+h [kksyus ij e`frdk ds vfrfjr vkDlhihVy jhtu ij jDr tek gqvk ik;k x;k tks fd ckg; ijh{k.k djus ij pksV dzeakd 1 ,oa dzekad 4 ij mYys[k fd;k x;k gSA 10. After proving the aforesaid injuries, Dr. After proving the aforesaid injuries, Dr. N.S. Nag (PW7) gave the following opinion in his evidence : 6- vfHker & esjs erkuqlkj e`R;q dk dkj.k dkjfM;ks jslizsjVjh vjsLV efLrd vk?kkr ,oa vakrfjd jDr L=ko dh otg ls gqvk Fkk tks fd flj ds pksV ds otg ls mRiUu gqvk FkkA e`R;q dk le; esjs ijh{k.k ds 4 ls 6 ?kaVs ds njL;ku dh FkhA e`R;q dk izdkj ekuoo/k izd`fr dk Fkk esjs }kjk nh x;h fjiksVZ izn'kZ ih 10 gS ftlds v ls v Hkkx ij esjs gLrk{kj gSA 11. The evidence of the doctor fully supports the postmortem report prepared by him on which he has proved his signature. In the cross-examination, the doctor has denied the suggestion that the injuries could be caused due to fall. 12. The nature and extent of injuries and the manner in which the appellant killed the baby child, clearly proves beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant acted in a very cruel manner, he took the baby child, hardly 7 months old and smashed her head more than once on a stone. This cruel act of the appellant does not entitle him to take the stand that his case would be covered by any of the exceptions under Section 300 of IPC. The cruel manner in which the appellant has murdered a baby child, only proves that the appellant is guilty of commission of offence under Section 302 of IPC and has been rightly imposed life imprisonment by the learned Trial Court. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant feebly argued that as the appellant was in a state of drunkenness, no intention could be attributed to him and this would provide him sufficient defence in view of the prosecution's overwhelming evidence that he was in a drunken state. 14. True, it is that the prosecution witnesses, as referred to above, have stated that the appellant was a known drunkard and at the time of incident also, he was drunk. There is no material evidence on record to warrant a conclusion that he was in such a state of drunkenness that he was unable to understand the consequences of his act. There is no material evidence on record to warrant a conclusion that he was in such a state of drunkenness that he was unable to understand the consequences of his act. Mere state of drunkenness by itself is not sufficient to provide a defence against a criminal act unless it is shown to be of such an extent as to hold that the person involved in a criminal act was unable to understand the things as a person of reasonable mind. 15. In view of the above, we do not find any merit in the appeal and therefore the appeal is dismissed.