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2017 DIGILAW 224 (GUJ)

Manishaben v. Secretary

2017-01-30

ABHILASHA KUMARI

body2017
JUDGMENT : Abhilasha Kumari, J. 1. Rule. Mr. Tirthraj Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader, waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 to 3. The fourth respondent, despite service of notice in the petition, has chosen not to appear. In any case, the said respondent, being one of the original owners of the land which has been sold long ago, is no longer the affected or interested party, therefore, there is no requirement of issuing notice of Rule to the said respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the petition be decided finally, therefore, with the consent of learned counsel for the respective parties, the Court proceeds to decide it. 2. The challenge in this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is to the order dated 18.06.2012, passed by the Special Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department ("SSRD"), the first respondent herein, confirming the order dated 04.10.2000, passed by the second respondent, Collector, Ahmedabad, whereby the order dated 29.12.1998, passed by the City Deputy Collector, the third respondent, has been quashed and set aside. 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the land in question, bearing new Block No. 596, admeasuring 22764 square meters, situated at Mouje Bhadaj, Taluka Daskroi, District Ahmedabad, forming part of old Survey No. 582, admeasuring 1 Acre 15 Gunthas, was reflected as old tenure land and old Survey No. 585 admeasuring 4 Acres 10 Gunthas was described as new tenure land. Prior to 1998, the land was originally owned by twelve persons as a joint family property. One of the original owners, Shri Kalidas Maganbhai, present respondent No. 4, filed an application dated 04.04.1998 before the third respondent, seeking a correction of the revenue records, as a portion of the land was erroneously shown as new tenure land. By the order dated 29.12.1998, the City Deputy Collector, after conducting an inquiry under Section 197 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, 1879 ("the Code") and considering the Report of the Mamlatdar, directed that the entry recording that a portion of the land (admeasuring 4 Acres and 10 Gunthas) as new tenure, be deleted. Hence, the entire land of Block No. 596 became old tenure land. Mutation Entry No. 3085 was inserted in the revenue record on 30.12.1998, recording the effect of the order dated 29.12.1998 passed by the third respondent. Hence, the entire land of Block No. 596 became old tenure land. Mutation Entry No. 3085 was inserted in the revenue record on 30.12.1998, recording the effect of the order dated 29.12.1998 passed by the third respondent. On 29.06.1999, this entry came to be certified by the City Mamlatdar. The entire land now being of old tenure, the original land owners sold the land by way of a Registered Sale Deed dated 02.09.1999, to the present petitioners, for a consideration of Rs. 3,90,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs Ninety Thousand Only). Clause 6 of the Sale Deed records the passing of the order dated 29.12.1998 by the third respondent, conversion of the entire land to old tenure, as well as the recording of Mutation Entry No. 3085 to this effect. As a result of the Sale Deed, Mutation Entry No. 3116 was recorded on 08.09.1999, whereby the land in question was mutated in the names of the petitioners. This entry was certified by the City Mamlatdar on 01.11.1999. However, the second respondent, taking the order dated 29.12.1998 of the third respondent in suo motu revision, issued a show cause notice dated 11.05.2000, only to one of the original owners of the land, respondent No. 4 herein. Though the names of the petitioners had already been entered in the revenue record as purchasers of the property and the entry to this effect had been certified, no show cause notices were issued to them. Before the Collector, respondent No. 4 appeared initially, but did not remain present during the subsequent dates of hearing. The second respondent passed the impugned order dated 04.12.2000, in the absence of respondent No. 4, setting aside the order dated 29.12.1998 passed by the third respondent. On 06.12.2000, respondent No. 4 filed a revision application before the SSRD, challenging the order dated 04.12.2000 passed by the Collector. Nobody remained present before the SSRD on various dates, hence, vide the impugned order dated 18.06.2012, the revision application came to be dismissed. The petitioners, being the purchasers of the land and the only parties aggrieved by the order passed by the SSRD have, therefore, approached this Court by way of the present petition. 4. Mr. I.H. Syed, learned counsel, has appeared for Mr. Y.H. Motiramani, learned advocate, on behalf of the petitioners. The petitioners, being the purchasers of the land and the only parties aggrieved by the order passed by the SSRD have, therefore, approached this Court by way of the present petition. 4. Mr. I.H. Syed, learned counsel, has appeared for Mr. Y.H. Motiramani, learned advocate, on behalf of the petitioners. He has submitted that the petitioners are bona fide purchasers of the land in question through a registered Sale Deed and their names are reflected in the revenue record, as such. The mutation entry to this effect has also been certified. The petitioners have purchased the land after it was converted to old tenure and the entry to this effect has been mutated and certified. In spite of the fact that the names of the petitioners were reflected in the revenue record as purchasers of the land, the Collector chose not to issue show cause notices to them but only issued a notice to respondent No. 4, who was one (out of twelve) of the original land owners and was no longer interested in the land that had already been sold. Admittedly, the petitioners have acquired right, title and interest in the land in question and the impugned orders affecting them adversely, have been passed behind their backs, without providing them with an opportunity of hearing. Hence, there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice and the order dated 04.12.2000, passed by the Collector, as well as the order dated 18.06.2012, passed by the SSRD, are liable to be quashed and set aside on this ground alone. 5. In support of this submission, reliance is placed upon a judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar v. State of Gujarat And Ors. - 2011(2) GLR 1676 . Another Division Bench judgment relied upon is that in the case of Bhakabhai Boghabhai Bharwad And Ors. v. State of Gujarat And Ors. - 2015 Lawsuit (Guj.) 15. 6. It is next submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that there is an unreasonable delay of about eighteen months on the part of the Collector in taking the order of the City Deputy Collector dated 29.12.1998, in suo motu revision, on 11.05.2000. There is no explanation for the delay. 7. - 2015 Lawsuit (Guj.) 15. 6. It is next submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that there is an unreasonable delay of about eighteen months on the part of the Collector in taking the order of the City Deputy Collector dated 29.12.1998, in suo motu revision, on 11.05.2000. There is no explanation for the delay. 7. It is further urged that the order dated 29.12.1998, passed by the third respondent, is a detailed order and while setting it aside the second respondent has ignored the basic premise on which the said order is passed, which is that, as far back as in the year 1915-16, the land in question was old tenure land and had been sold as there was no restriction on it. There is, therefore, no basis or explanation for the subsequent wrong endorsements of new tenure in the record. Besides, the Collector and the SSRD have, while passing the respective impugned orders, overlooked the fact that the order of the City Deputy Collector, converting the land to old tenure, has already been implemented in the revenue record. The land has been sold and further rights and equities have been created thereupon, relying upon the said order and the resultant mutation entries. The rights acquired by the petitioners over the land in question in the year 2000, cannot be negated at a belated stage behind their backs. 8. On the strength of the above submissions, it is submitted that the prayers made in the petition may be granted. 9. The petition has been opposed by Mr. Tirthraj Pandya, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for respondents Nos. 1 to 3. He has submitted that there are no flaws in the impugned orders passed by the Collector and SSRD. The order of the SSRD has been challenged before this Court by the petitioners, after a delay of three years. It is further submitted that the order of the Collector is very clear and records that the City Deputy Collector has entertained the application of the original owners for the correction of the entry of new tenure after a delay of seventy years, as the land is being reflected as new tenure land since the year 1929. Further, there is no mention of any application for condonation of delay. 10. Further, there is no mention of any application for condonation of delay. 10. Learned Assistant Government Pleader further submits that no application was made by the original owner for an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code. Still, however, such inquiry was conducted by the third respondent. That, in proceedings under Rule 108(5) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972 ("the Rules"), the third respondent could not have undertaken an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code. At the most, separate proceedings could have been initiated. The Collector has, therefore, rightly held that the order passed by the City Deputy Collector is without jurisdiction and a nullity, and the SSRD has rightly confirmed the order of the Collector. 11. It is further contended that the Collector has rightly stated in his order that the owners of the land knew it was old tenure land. Even on the date of the execution of the Sale Deed, it was known that the land was of new tenure. Referring to the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 3, learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that the revenue record shows the entries of new tenure since 1929, therefore it could not have been concluded by the City Deputy Collector that the land is of old tenure. 12. In rejoinder, Mr. I.H. Syed, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that it is not correct on the part of the learned Assistant Government Pleader to submit that the original landowner did not file an application for conducting an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code. In fact, by the application dated 04.04.1998, it was specifically requested that an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code be conducted for the removal of the wrong endorsements of new tenure for a part of the land and insertion of the entry of old tenure. 13. That the City Deputy Collector has conducted a thorough inquiry and after doing so, found that the land in question was originally of old tenure even in the year 1915. The land was subject to sale and there was no restriction on it. There is no basis for the later endorsements of new tenure, which are mistaken entries. 14. 13. That the City Deputy Collector has conducted a thorough inquiry and after doing so, found that the land in question was originally of old tenure even in the year 1915. The land was subject to sale and there was no restriction on it. There is no basis for the later endorsements of new tenure, which are mistaken entries. 14. It is submitted that neither the Collector nor the SSRD issued notices to the petitioners prior to the passing of the impugned orders, therefore, there is no question of delay on their part in approaching this Court. On the contrary, there is a delay of over eighteen months in initiating suo motu proceedings by the Collector, and that too not against the petitioners, which is highly unreasonable and unexplained. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that the submission of the learned Assistant Government Pleader to the effect that the petitioners knew it was new tenure land is not correct as the land was purchased subsequent to its conversion to old tenure and the mutation and certification of revenue entries in the revenue record. This aspect is noted in the Sale Deed and may not be sought to be misconstrued. The impugned orders would have the effect of nullifying the Sale Deed of the petitioners that was executed eighteen years ago, prejudicing their rights, title and interest on the land for no fault of their own, being bona fide purchasers. 16. In the background of the above factual and legal scenario, this Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length, perused the averments made in the petition and the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 3, as well as the contents of the documents on record. 17. Certain undisputed facts emerging from the record may be recapitulated at this stage. 18. There is no dispute regarding the fact that the entire land was of the joint ownership of twelve persons. The original landowners submitted an application dated 04.04.1998 to the third respondent through respondent No. 4, stating that they were the owners and in possession of the land in question, since the time of their ancestors. However, for a portion of the land, a wrong endorsement of new tenure is being reflected in the revenue record without any basis, which appears to have been mistakenly inserted. However, for a portion of the land, a wrong endorsement of new tenure is being reflected in the revenue record without any basis, which appears to have been mistakenly inserted. It was requested that in order to bring out the factual position, an inquiry be conducted under Section 197 of the Code and the endorsement of new tenure be removed. To this extent, learned Assistant Government Pleader is not correct in stating that the third respondent has conducted an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code without there being any request to do so. The fact that the original landowners had specifically made a request to conduct such an inquiry is also recorded in the order of the third respondent. 19. It is further an undisputed position that the third respondent conducted a detailed inquiry under Section 197 of the Code and also called for the report of the City Mamlatdar. After tracing the entire history of the land in question through the revenue records, each step of which is detailed meticulously in the order dated 29.12.1998, the third respondent arrived at the conclusion that the land in question was originally of old tenure ever since the year 1915 and there was no foundation or basis for the subsequent entries of new tenure which are not supported by any order of any competent authority. Consequently, by the order dated 29.12.1998, the third respondent directed that the endorsement of new tenure in respect of the land in question be deleted from the record, thereby converting the entire parcel of land to old tenure. 20. Admittedly, the above order of the third respondent was reflected in the revenue record as Mutation Entry No. 3085 was recorded on 30.12.1998, in this regard. This entry was certified by the City Mamlatdar on 29.06.1999. 21. After the entire land was converted to old tenure and after the certification of the mutation entry to this effect, the original owners of the land sold it to the present petitioners, vide a registered Sale Deed dated 02.09.1999. Pursuant to the Sale Deed, Mutation Entry No. 3116 was mutated in the record and the names of the petitioners were entered as the purchasers of the land. This mutation entry was duly certified by the City Mamlatdar on 01.11.1999. Pursuant to the Sale Deed, Mutation Entry No. 3116 was mutated in the record and the names of the petitioners were entered as the purchasers of the land. This mutation entry was duly certified by the City Mamlatdar on 01.11.1999. Thus, the revenue record clearly reflected the factum of the sale of the land, after its conversion to old tenure, as well as the names of the petitioners as the purchasers. 22. It is an admitted position that in spite of the fact that the revenue record clearly reflected the names of the petitioners as the owners of the land, the Collector did not issue notices to them while initiating suo motu proceedings. A notice was issued only to respondent No. 4, one of the twelve original owners of the land, in exclusion of all others. The fourth respondent, being no longer interested in the land as it had already been sold, appeared initially but later remained absent throughout the proceedings. The impugned order of the Collector, therefore, came to be passed in his absence. 23. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioners are the only interested and affected parties, having purchased the land. Before this Court as well, respondent No. 4 has not responded to the notice that was issued and has been served upon him. It, therefore, follows that even though the petitioners are the only interested and affected parties and their names are reflected in the revenue record, the Collector did not issue notices to them and has passed the impugned order behind their backs. It was not as though the Collector was oblivious of the factual position as the revenue record clearly reflects the factum of purchase by the petitioners. Even at the stage of the proceedings before the SSRD at the behest of respondent No. 4, the petitioners were not joined as parties. Respondent No. 4 did not remain present before the SSRD either, and the impugned order of the said authority again came to be passed without hearing the petitioners. In view of this position, when the petitioners were not consciously joined as parties to the proceedings and were unaware of the same, they cannot be faulted on the ground that there is a delay of three years in approaching this Court. 24. In view of this position, when the petitioners were not consciously joined as parties to the proceedings and were unaware of the same, they cannot be faulted on the ground that there is a delay of three years in approaching this Court. 24. The above factual position clearly reveals that a serious violation of the principles of natural justice has occurred while passing the impugned orders by the Collector and the SSRD, which has resulted in great prejudice to the petitioners. It was only after the land in question was converted to old tenure and the revenue entry to this effect was mutated and certified, did the petitioners purchase the land. No fault can be found with any conduct of the petitioners, who are bona fide purchasers for consideration. The impugned order of the SSRD would have the effect of nullifying the sale after an unreasonable period of about eighteen years. Apart from the above, the petitioners cannot be made to suffer for no fault of their own. 25. In Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar v. State of Gujarat And Ors. (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners, the Division bench of this Court has held as below: "21. In light of aforesaid facts of present case, we are of the view that while the conclusion and the decision of the competent and appellate authority holding the transaction in question as void, is in consonance with the provisions of the ordinance and cannot be faulted, in the interest of justice and equity it also ought not be overlooked that the impugned action in exercise of the power under Section 75 of the Ordinance to summarily evict the petitioner, after having allowed the transaction to remain alive for 17 years not only ignores the wide chasm between the date of transaction and the dates of the notice and the order but it also overlooks the fact that the petitioner has continued to put the land to use for agricultural purpose and has not changed the status and nature of the land and that he has also incurred expenditure to improve the quality of soil and invested further amounts for betterment of the land in question. The figures of such expenditure by the petitioner are not available on record, however the respondents have not disputed the said factual assertion by the petitioner." 26. The figures of such expenditure by the petitioner are not available on record, however the respondents have not disputed the said factual assertion by the petitioner." 26. The above principle of law has been reiterated by the Division Bench vide judgment dated 20.03.2014 in the case of Vallabhbhai Rambhai v. State of Gujarat And Ors. in Letters Patent Appeal No. 422 of 2010, quoted in the case of Bhakabhai Boghabhai Bharwad and Ors. v. State of Gujarat And Ors. (supra), as below: "5.2 As stated above, in the present case, the competent authority had initiated suo-moto powers, after a period of twenty one years. The learned Single Judge has relied upon the decision passed in Special Civil Application No. 11825 of 2009 which has been set aside by the Division Bench as observed hereinabove. Even though the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the order passed by the competent and appellate authority holding the transaction in question as void, is in consonance with the provisions of the Ordinance, in the interest of justice and equity, it also ought not be overlooked that the impugned action in exercise of the power under section 75 of the Ordinance to summarily evict the appellants, after having allowed the transaction to remain alive for 21 years not only ignores the wide chasm between the date of transaction and the dates of the notice and the order, but also overlooks the continued possession of the appellants who had put their land to use for agricultural purpose and had not changed the status and nature of the land." 27. The impugned orders of the Collector and SSRD ignore and overlook the fact that third party rights, interest and title have been created over the land, pursuant to a legal and valid Sale Deed that has not been challenged by any person in any Court of law. Such legal rights acquired by the petitioners cannot be jeopardised in the manner sought to be done by the respondents, especially after an unreasonable period of time. 28. In The State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha And Others - 1969(2) SCC 187 , the Supreme Court held as below: "12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under, Section 211. 28. In The State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha And Others - 1969(2) SCC 187 , the Supreme Court held as below: "12. It seems to us that Section 65 itself indicates the length of the reasonable time within which the Commissioner must act under, Section 211. Under Section 65 of the Code if the Collector does not inform the applicant of his decision on the application within a period of three months the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted. This section shows that a period of three months is considered ample for the Collector to make up his mind and beyond that the legislature thinks that the matter is so urgent that permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Reading Sections 211 and 65 together it seems to us that the Commissioner must exercise his revisional powers within a few months of the order of the Collector. This is reasonable time because after the grant of the permission for building purposes the occupant is likely to spend money on starting building operations at least within a few months from the date of the permission. In this case the Commissioner set aside the order of the Collector on October 12, 1961, i.e., more than a year after the order, and it seems to us that this order was passed too late." 29. As seen from the above-quoted extract of the judgment, in that case the Collector had passed the order after more than a year which, in the view of the Supreme Court, was not a reasonable period of time considering the fact that the occupant would be likely to incur expenditure on the land. In the present case, suo motu powers were exercised by the Collector after almost a year and a half, after Mutation Entry No. 3085 was recorded in the revenue record on 30.12.1998, pursuant to the order of the Deputy Collector converting the land to old tenure. As stated above, these proceedings were never initiated against the petitioners though their names were mutated in the revenue record, but against only one out of the twelve original landowners, who had, by then, lost interest in the land in question. As stated above, these proceedings were never initiated against the petitioners though their names were mutated in the revenue record, but against only one out of the twelve original landowners, who had, by then, lost interest in the land in question. Insofar as the petitioners are concerned, the adverse effect of the impugned order would be felt after a period of about eighteen years which cannot be considered as a reasonable period of time by any standards, and that too without hearing them. It would, therefore be unjust and unfair to disturb the mutation entries at this stage when the petitioners are in possession of the land for about eighteen years. This Court, therefore, finds substance in the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned orders are bad in law on the ground of the violation of the principles of natural justice and unreasonable delay, insofar as the petitioners are concerned. 30. Learned Assistant Government Pleader has advanced a submission that the Collector has rightly observed in his order that the City Deputy Collector could not have held an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code in proceedings under Rule 108(5) of the Rules. 31. In this context, it would be pertinent to take a look at the relevant provisions of law. Any dispute regarding a mutation entry is required to be entered in the Register of disputed cases as per Rule 108(1) of the Rules. Sub-rule (2) provides for an inquiry to be made in the village where the land is situated or the interested parties reside. Sub-rule (3) provides for the recording of the order pursuant to the enquiry and Sub-rule (4) provides for the certification of the entry in the Diary of mutations as being correct. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 108 provides for an appeal against an order recording a mutation entry. It specifies the competent authority before whom an appeal would lie as well as the procedure to be followed while deciding the appeal. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 108 is more of a procedural provision. 32. In juxtaposition, we may notice the provisions of Section 197 of the Code, which read as below: "197. It specifies the competent authority before whom an appeal would lie as well as the procedure to be followed while deciding the appeal. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 108 is more of a procedural provision. 32. In juxtaposition, we may notice the provisions of Section 197 of the Code, which read as below: "197. Ordinary inquiries how to be conducted:- An inquiry which this Act does not require to be either formal or summary, or which any revenue officer may on any occasion deem to be necessary to make, in the execution of his lawful duties, shall be conducted according to such rules applicable thereto, whether general or special, as may have been prescribed by the State Government or an authority superior to the officer conducting such inquiry, and, except in so far as controlled by such rules, according to the discretion of the officer in such way as may seem best calculated for the ascertainment of all essential facts and furtherance of the public good." 33. As can be seen from the language of Section 197, this provision lays down the procedure for conducting inquiries. As stated in the Section, the inquiry contemplated is not required to be either formal or summary. It is an inquiry which any revenue officer may on any occasion deem to be necessary to make in the execution of his lawful duties. There is, therefore, no restriction that the revenue officer is enjoined to conduct the inquiry in any particular manner or in any particular proceedings. Such revenue officer can make the inquiry in the execution of his lawful duties in any proceedings or any occasion, as and when he deems it necessary to do so. 34. The original owners had moved a specific application before the Deputy Collector to remove the disputed entries of new tenure, after conducting an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code. As the mutation entries of new tenure became disputed, the dispute would be brought under Rule 108(5). As an inquiry under Section 197 was sought for the purpose of deciding the dispute, such inquiry was made by the City Deputy Collector, as it would have been impossible to take a decision regarding the tenure of the land without conducting a thorough inquiry which, in the present case, has been done. As an inquiry under Section 197 was sought for the purpose of deciding the dispute, such inquiry was made by the City Deputy Collector, as it would have been impossible to take a decision regarding the tenure of the land without conducting a thorough inquiry which, in the present case, has been done. Section 197 nowhere provides for any separate proceedings but empowers any revenue officer to conduct an inquiry on any occasion, if he deems it necessary to do so in the execution of his lawful duties. Section 197 of the Code vests discretion in the revenue officer do to what may seem to be best calculated for the ascertainment of all essential facts and the furtherance of the public good. Considering the above provision of law and the manner in which it is worded, in the view of this Court, the City Deputy Collector has not committed any error in conducting an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code in the present proceedings. The findings of the Collector, as confirmed by the SSRD, that the order of the City Deputy Collector is beyond jurisdiction and a nullity, cannot be accepted or sustained. 35. A perusal of the order of the City Deputy Collector reveals that it is a well-reasoned and detailed order. The author of the said order has taken great pains to thoroughly trace and investigate the entire history of the land in question from each and every entry in the revenue record since the year 1915. After due inquiry, it was found that the land is originally of old tenure since the year 1915 and has been subject to sale without any restrictions. It has been noted that the entries of new tenure that appeared later on are without any basis or foundation. The land was ancestral property and there is no order of any authority, at any stage, in support of the entries of new tenure. The third respondent has further relied upon the Government Resolution dated 16.03.1982 while cancelling the entries of new tenure. 36. The impugned orders of the Collector and SSRD are based on the premise that the entries of new tenure were reflected since the year 1929, without explaining how, and on what basis, the entry of new tenure came to be mutated in the first place, when the land is originally old tenure land since the year 1915. 36. The impugned orders of the Collector and SSRD are based on the premise that the entries of new tenure were reflected since the year 1929, without explaining how, and on what basis, the entry of new tenure came to be mutated in the first place, when the land is originally old tenure land since the year 1915. Mere recording and perpetuation of wrong entries without any order, basis or foundation, would not change the original tenure of the land. 37. Insofar as the aspect of delay is concerned, the Deputy Collector has entertained the application of the original owners as valuable rights were involved. Besides, no limitation is prescribed for an inquiry under Section 197 of the Code, which can be conducted at any time. In any case, the petitioners, being bona fide purchasers, have approached the Court when coming to know that their rights have been prejudicially affected behind their backs, therefore, the argument of delay cannot be applied to them. 38. In his order, the Collector has ignored that part of the order of the third respondent that states that at the very initial stage of the record, in the year 1915, the land in question was of old tenure and there is absolutely no basis or foundation for the entries of new tenure that were subsequently recorded. It has been noted by the third respondent in his order that there is no order of any competent authority to justify the entries of new tenure. The Collector has not pointed out any such order justifying the entries of the new tenure, either. The SSRD has mechanically upheld the order of the Collector. Merely by mentioning the land as new tenure, without any basis or order, would not change the tenure of the land that was originally of old tenure. It is a settled position of law that a wrong entry of new tenure without any order, foundation or basis does not change the original tenure of land. A mistaken entry, repeated subsequently cannot change the factual position. 39. Considering all the above aspects of the matter cumulatively, this Court is of the view that the order of the City Deputy Collector, being a well-reasoned order, deserves to be, and is, upheld. 40. For reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned orders of the SSRD dated 18.06.2012, and that of the Collector dated 04.10.2000, are hereby quashed and set aside. 39. Considering all the above aspects of the matter cumulatively, this Court is of the view that the order of the City Deputy Collector, being a well-reasoned order, deserves to be, and is, upheld. 40. For reasons stated hereinabove, the impugned orders of the SSRD dated 18.06.2012, and that of the Collector dated 04.10.2000, are hereby quashed and set aside. 41. The petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. There shall be no orders as to costs.