JUDGMENT : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. Heard Dr. Jamal, for the appellant and learned AGP for respondents 1 and 4. Nobody appears for respondent nos.2, 3 and 5. 2. The judgment delivered by School Tribunal on 11.4.2001 dismissing Appeal No. STC 1/1997 preferred by present appellant-Tukaram, was questioned by him before the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No.3887/2001. The learned single Judge has dismissed that petition on 7th December, 2009. These concurrent judgments are questioned in present Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Dr. Jamal contends that provisions contained in Section 7 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and Rule 40 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules,1981 (henceforth abbreviated to “ the Act of 1977” and “the Rules of 1981” respectively) have been totally lost sight of. He relies upon the Division Bench judgment, in the case of Chandrakant Lone vs. Chhatrapati Shivaji Education Society and others, reported at 1988 Vol.I CLR page 175, particularly paragraph 6 to submit that though provisions may be held to be directory, a substantial compliance therewith must be demonstrated. He submits that appellant-Tukaram was working in a granted school since 1991 and he has been orally terminated on 6.12.1996. This fact and legal implications flowing therefrom are totally ignored by School Tribunal as also by learned single Judge. He further submits that as appellant had put in about 6 years of service and was a permanent employee, resignation submitted by him (if any) ought to have been of duration of three months. Resignation of a shorter duration could have been accepted by management after demanding a proportionate amount for shortfall from appellant or then after deducting that amount from his dues, that is not the defence anywhere before School Tribunal. He further states that acceptance of alleged resignation by management on 7.12.1996 is not even pleaded in written statement before School Tribunal and hence finding, in that respect, is perverse. 4. He invites attention to police complaint lodged by Tukaram on 8.12.1996 and sequence of events disclosed therein, to show that from 5th December 1996 pressure was brought on Tukaram to complete registers/musters in a particular way and, for that purpose, he was even required to visit the residence of President of educational society. 4. He invites attention to police complaint lodged by Tukaram on 8.12.1996 and sequence of events disclosed therein, to show that from 5th December 1996 pressure was brought on Tukaram to complete registers/musters in a particular way and, for that purpose, he was even required to visit the residence of President of educational society. He submits that when he pointed out that information filled in was true and as per law, the President did not like it and he was threatened. According to him, in such atmosphere under coercion and putting Tukaram under fear of assault, resignation was obtained in a back date. He submits that complaint lodged to police officers on 8.12.1996 narrates all these facts but its cognizance has not been taken by School Tribunal. Learned counsel submits that mere non-mention of date “05.11.1996” as the date on which resignation was shown to have been obtained in police complaint, cannot be held to be fatal in present circumstances. He contends that thus there is total non-application of mind, not only by School Tribunal but also by learned single Judge to the relevant facts and hence the impugned judgments need to be quashed and set aside. 5. Learned AGP submits that Rule 40 of the Rules of 1981 also envisages a resignation with prior notice of one month. Material on record does not show that Tukaram was a permanent employee duly approved, regularly recruited and, therefore, he ought to have submitted the resignation three months in advance. She submits that learned single Judge has looked into the police complaint and found that grievance of asking an ante-dated resignation does not figure in. He further states that, in this situation, various judgments of this Court which comment upon scheme of Rule 40 and Section 7 have been looked into and thereafter a possible view has been reached. According to her, there is no jurisdictional error or perversity and hence Letters Patent Appeal needs to be dismissed. 6. Perusal of challenge as presented to School Tribunal through Appeal under section 9 reveals narration of story which commences in December, 1996. It is pleaded that President of society devised a plan and obtained resignation under duress by confining him in house of one Deorao Raghute on 6.12.1996. The fact that it was ante-dated also appears therein. The filing of police complaint on 8.12.1996 has also been pleaded. It is pleaded that President of society devised a plan and obtained resignation under duress by confining him in house of one Deorao Raghute on 6.12.1996. The fact that it was ante-dated also appears therein. The filing of police complaint on 8.12.1996 has also been pleaded. Earlier, he has stated that he joined employment from 3.9.1991 and at that time the school was not receiving grant-in-aid. By order dated 15.7.1993 he was continued as Junior Clerk until further orders. The oral termination on 6.12.1996 is also pleaded. Appellant-Tukaram has then pointed out that on 9.12.1996 he was not allowed by Headmaster to sign the muster roll though he was present in the School for the whole day. He has also alleged that he was not permitted to perform his legitimate duties. 7. In reply, respondents have denied all these facts. 8. The judgment delivered by School Tribunal on 11th April, 2001 takes note of ante-dated resignation, of the police complaint or plea of not permitting the appellant to sign the muster on 9.12.1996 or not allowing to perform his duties with effect from 10.12.1996. It also records that from 1995 the School was receiving 25 per cent grants. The School Tribunal has found that Tukaram was initially appointed as Laboratory Attendant and later on as Junior Clerk with effect from 15.7.1993. However while framing points for adjudication first point framed by School Tribunal is, whether alleged oral termination order dated 6.12.1996 issued by respondent is legal and valid. It has been answered in affirmative. The School Tribunal has found that there was resignation letter dated 5.11.1996 signed by Tukaram and a resolution dated 7.12.1996 passed by the Sanstha accepting the same. It has also observed that Tukaram was informed about acceptance on 9.12.1996 under registered post. In paragraph 27, the School Tribunal has found that respondent no.4 before it, namely, Shri Bhure was validly appointed after termination of Tukaram and appeal filed by Tukaram was time-barred. In paragraph 27 itself, it mentions that resignation tendered on 5.11.1996 was accepted on 7.11.1996 and Tukaram could have filed report to Police Station on the next day, but he filed the complaint on 8.12.1996. It is also observed that during said period, he could have withdrawn said resignation but he did not do so. The period of limitation therefore started from 5.11.1996 and Appeal before School Tribunal was filed on 4.1.1997. It is also observed that during said period, he could have withdrawn said resignation but he did not do so. The period of limitation therefore started from 5.11.1996 and Appeal before School Tribunal was filed on 4.1.1997. Therefore, resignation letter was not obtained under threat but it was a voluntary act of appellant. In paragraph 28 while summing up, the School Tribunal observes that the resignation letter dated 5.11.1996 was accepted by management vide resolution dated 7.12.1996 hence plea of oral termination was not sustainable. After acceptance of resignation on 7.12.1996 the appellant filed the Appeal on 4.1.1997 and, therefore, the Appeal was within limitation. It therefore, answered the point No.1 framed by it in affirmative and dismissed the Appeal. Thus, there is some inconsistency and vagueness in observations contained in paragraph 27 and paragraph 28 as Appeal needed to be filed within 30 days of the cause of action. 9. The judgment delivered by learned single Judge looks into these facts and finds nothing wrong with consideration of controversy by School Tribunal. Learned Single Judge noticed that in police complaint lodged on 8.12.1996, the fact that resignation was required to be ante-dated is not pleaded. Resignation letter is found to be written by Tukaram in his own handwriting and taking overall view of the matter, the learned single Judge has dismissed the Writ Petition. 10. Perusal of police complaint filed by Tukaram on 8.12.1996 specifically points out all events taking place after 5.12.1996. He has submitted that under duress and threat resignation was obtained from him by President and these events have taken place on next date i.e. 6.12.1996. Thus, he has specifically pleaded that resignation was obtained from him on 6.12.1996 and that resignation carries the date 5.11.1996. In this situation, mere fact that it was required to ante-dated by itself cannot be held to be fatal as contention that resignation was obtained under duress and threat very much exists in police complaint. 11. Perusal of Rule 40 of Rules of 1981 reveals that a permanent employee can leave service after giving three calender months’ notice and nonpermanent employee may leave service after giving one calender month’s notice. The resignation letter in this matter is dated 5.11.1996 and it states that Tukaram has resigned on 5.11.1996. It is therefore no notice, either of one month duration or then notice of three months. 12. The resignation letter in this matter is dated 5.11.1996 and it states that Tukaram has resigned on 5.11.1996. It is therefore no notice, either of one month duration or then notice of three months. 12. It may be pointed out here that as per judgment of this Court in the case of Anna Manikrao Pethe vs. Presiding officer School Tribunal and others, reported in 1997 (3) Mh.L.J. 697 , the Tribunal is supposed to frame preliminary issue regarding the nature of employment. The said Division Bench judgment also expected the School Tribunal to frame preliminary issue about the grant of approval by Education Department. The full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of St.Ulai High School and another vs. Devendra Jagannath Singh reported in 2007(1) Mh.L.J. 597 has deleted requirement of framing the last issue. However, had the School Tribunal framed two earlier issues, the nature of employment of Tukaram could have very well come on record. In that case, whether he was a permanent employee and therefore he should have given notice of three months’ duration or not, could have been answered. As that issue has not been framed, nothing can be said with certainty about it. 13. The issue framed by School Tribunal itself presupposes oral termination on 6.12.1996. The resignation given by Tukaram is on 5.11.1996 and he has requested the management to accept it. It is not the case of Management that on 6.12.1996 Tukaram was informed that his resignation was accepted and, therefore, he was relieved. Though the School Tribunal observes that resignation was accepted by Management on 7.12.1996, said date is not pleaded anywhere in written statement by the Management. If there is any intimation to Tukaram that his resignation was accepted and therefore he was relived, that letter also does not find any consideration in the judgment of School Tribunal. If story of Management that it accepted resignation on 7.12.1996 is correct, there could not have been any oral termination, even on 6.12.1996. 14. We, therefore, find that the facts at hand needed an in-depth consideration in the light of the records and police complaint lodged by appellant-Tukaram. The School Tribunal ought to have framed preliminary issues as directed by this Court in its two judgments mentioned supra and, after answering those preliminary issues only scrutiny on merits of controversy should have been undertaken. Admittedly that has not been done. 15. The School Tribunal ought to have framed preliminary issues as directed by this Court in its two judgments mentioned supra and, after answering those preliminary issues only scrutiny on merits of controversy should have been undertaken. Admittedly that has not been done. 15. In this situation, we quash and set aside the judgment dated 11th April, 2001 delivered by School Tribunal in Appeal STC No. 1/1997 and restore the Appeal back to the file of School Tribunal. Parties are directed to appear before School Tribunal on 15.12.2017 and to abide by its further instructions in the matter. The School Tribunal shall decide the preliminary issues as mentioned supra first, within next two months and thereafter, if necessary, consider merits of controversy and pass final judgment in next three months. 16. With these directions, we partly allow the Letters Patent Appeal and dispose it of. No costs.