JUDGMENT ORDER Mohammad Rafiq, J. - Under challenge is the order dated 1-9-2017 passed by the trial court dismissing the petitioner-defendant''s (hereafter ''the defendant'') application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC read with 151 CPC in the respondent-plaintiff''s (hereafter ''the plaintiff'') suit for permanent injunction, damages, delivery up, rendition of accounts for infringement of its patent under the Patent Act, 1970 (hereafter the Act of 1970''). 2. The plaintiff in its suit claimed to be one of the largest companies in the world inter alia for manufacturing and grinding elements used in reducing wear costs and optimized mill operations leading to reduction in power costs and improving throughput. It alleged infringement of its Indian Patent No. 248740 (IN740) (hereafter suit patent) valid and subsisting inter alia by the defendant. It was submitted that during May, 2016 the plaintiff obtained a product sample of the defendant from the scrap market believed to be infringing the suit patent. The sample product was tested and analyzed at an independent expert laboratory i.e. Metallergy and Material Engineering Division of M.S. University of Baroda on May 9, 2016. The Laboratory''s test results revealed that the defendant''s product contained Aluminia, Livcoria and Titanum Oxide clearly infringed the plaintiff''s patent IN740. It was submitted that the other co-defendants in the suit were on their part indulging by placing orders on its manufacturers infringing the plaintiff''s registered valid and existing patent and hence were also required to be injuncted from so doing and making such purchases. Legal notices having been issued to such defendants from refraining from facilitating and encouraging breach of the plaintiff''s patent but to no avail, the cause of action for laying the suit arose. Litigation in respect of the disputes relating to the suit patent and otherwise were adverted to in the plaint-which it was however emphatically stated had little or no bearing on the suit as filed. 3. The plaintiff claimed that Section 48 of the Patent Act grants an exclusive monopoly to the patentee to make use, sell offer, offer for sale, import and distribute its patented product and processes required to manufacture the goods in issue. It was submitted that thus any sale/use offer for sale of the patented product and processes without the plaintiff''s permission/licence constituted an infringement under the Act of 1970. It was submitted that thus any sale/use offer for sale of the patented product and processes without the plaintiff''s permission/licence constituted an infringement under the Act of 1970. It was submitted that an infringement by the defendant and user of such manufactures by the purchaser made both liable for infringement. Injunction was thus sought against the principal defendant and co-defendants impleaded who were purchasing or in the process of purchasing manufactures in infringement of the plaintiff''s suit patent IN740. For laying the suit, the cause of action was set out in the plaint for reasons stated as May 2016 and as the petitioner defendant had its registered office at Jaipur, the jurisdiction of the Jaipur courts was stated to have been invoked. 4. The petitioner defendant in reply to the summons in the plaintiff''s suit filed an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC on the ground of limitation, absence of cause of action and res judicata. By the impugned order dated 1-9-2017 the said application has been dismissed. 5. Mr. G.D. Bansal, appearing for the petitioner defendant submitted that the issue agitated in the suit was also earlier agitated in writ petition No. 9062/2012, before the Andhra Pradesh High Court at Hyderabad inter alia seeking restrain on the A.P. Power Generation Corporation Ltd. from making purchases of the defendant''s products purportedly manufactured in infringement of the plaintiff''s patent IN740. That was dismissed. It was stated that the plaintiff in 2016 also filed a suit for permanent injunction against the defendant before the Delhi High Court which the court vide its order dated 16-2-2017 returned to the plaintiff on an application in opposition under Order 7, Rule 10 CPC for lack of territorial jurisdiction. It was submitted that the averments in the plaint made it evident that the plaintiff admitted having learnt of the alleged infringement of its patent IN740 by the defendant and selling its manufactures in infringement thereof in pursuant to a tender in 2001, or in any event in 2011-12. It was submitted that on the face of the plaintiff''s own admissions aforesaid, the cause of action having arisen last in 2011, the suit when laid in 2014 was time barred particularly as no cause of action was stated to have thereafter arisen. Mr. It was submitted that on the face of the plaintiff''s own admissions aforesaid, the cause of action having arisen last in 2011, the suit when laid in 2014 was time barred particularly as no cause of action was stated to have thereafter arisen. Mr. G.D. Bansal also submitted that the plaintiff having failed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court in SBCWP No. 9062/2012 dismissed on 17-8-2012, where the defendant was impleaded as defendant, the issue agitated in the suit at Jaipur having earlier been thus adjudicated finally between the same parties, could not be allowed to be re-agitated it on the principles of res judicata. It was submitted that the plaint also failed to disclose a complete cause of action for the alleged infringement of the plaintiff''s patent under the Patent Act. In support of his contentions Mr. G.D. Bansal relied upon the judgments in Daryao & Others vs. State of UP [ AIR 1961 SC 1457 ]; UP State Road Transport Corporation vs. State of UP [ (2005)1 SCC 444 ]; Hanuman Singh vs. Board of Revenue [ AIR 2002 (Raj.) 365 ]; Decor India (P) Ltd. vs. Association Ltd. [ 2012(193) DLT 337 ]; and M. Banupriya vs. M. Lakshmi [ 2013(4) CTC 175 ]. 6. Mr. Mahendra Singh, appearing for the respondent No. 1- plaintiff (hereafter ''the plaintiff'') opposed the writ petition and submitted that the defendant in order to clothe the petition with a semblance of maintainability, purports to invoke Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, in that object, he has miserably failed, for no manifest jurisdictional error on the part of learned Commercial Court in passing the impugned order has been made out. It was submitted that even section 8 of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (hereafter ''the Act of 2015'') is of no avail to the defendant as it precludes interference by way of a civil revision application or by way of any other proceeding against any interlocutory order on the issue of jurisdiction and provides that any such challenge can be raised only in an appeal against the final decree of the Commercial Court. It was pointed out by Mr. It was pointed out by Mr. Mahendra Singh that even Section 13 of the Act also cannot entail a D.B. Appeal against an order dismissing an Order 7, Rule 11 CPC application being maintainable as it provides for an appeal only against specified orders of the Commercial Court as are appealable under Order 43 of the Civil Procedure Coder. And an order of dismissal of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC is not such an order. 7. Mr. Mahendra Singh on the merits of the petition submitted that while considering an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, the court is only required to examine the averments of the plaint, which is what has been done in the present case while negating the grounds set up by the defendant and rejecting its application. Defences of the defendant are not to be addressed for whatever their worth. That follows in a regular trial. Mr. Mahendra Singh submitted that the Act of 2015 was enacted by the Parliament with the avowed object to provide expeditious adjudication of commercial disputes of specified value and matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The petitioner despite service of summons of the suit on 4-5-2017, has only been protracting the proceeding seeking unjustified adjournments and moving frivolous applications such as the one under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, which ought not to be countenanced. In support of the arguments, reliance has been placed by Mr. Mahendra Singh upon the judgments in the case of Jogendra Singhji Vijay Singhji vs. State of Gujarat [ (2015)9 SCC 1 ]; Pujari Bai vs. Madan Gopal [ (1989)3 SCC 433 ]; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar vs. State of Maharashtra [ AIR 1967 SC 1 ] and Radhey Shyam vs. Chhabi Nath [ (2015)5 SCC 423 ]. 8. Heard. Considered. 9. The object of the Act of 2015 is to provide early resolution of the Commercial disputes and to that end appeals against interlocutory orders have been curtailed and revisions even on the issue of jurisdiction prohibited. This is evident from Section 8 of the Act of 2015, which prohibits civil revisions and challenges against any interlocutory order of a Commercial Court, inter alia on the issue of its jurisdiction albeit subject to the provisions of Section 13 thereof. This is evident from Section 8 of the Act of 2015, which prohibits civil revisions and challenges against any interlocutory order of a Commercial Court, inter alia on the issue of its jurisdiction albeit subject to the provisions of Section 13 thereof. Miscellaneous appeals against orders of the Commercial Court, under Section 13(1) of the Act of 2015 are limited to specified orders as under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC as obtaining. In respect of other interlocutory orders in the course of a suit under the Act of 2015, the remedy lies only in a regular appeal against the final judgment of the Commercial Court. 10. Within the aforesaid architecture of the Act of 2015, no miscellaneous appeal against an order passed by the Commercial Court dismissing an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC is maintainable. It is trite that an appeal being a statutory remedy, unless provided for specifically under the statute in issue is not maintainable. Not surprisingly the petitioner defendant has filed this composite and clearly muddled D.B. Appeal invoking dual remedies; one under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the other under Section 8 of the Act of 2015. And both the two remedies invoked in the challenge to the impugned order dated 1-9-2017 are misdirected. 11. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Waryam Singh vs. Amarnath [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] has on the scope of power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 of the Constitution held that it is to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. In Ouseph Mathai vs. M. Abdul Khadir [ (2002)1 SCC 319 ] following the aforesaid Constitution Bench judgment in the case of Waryam Singh (supra) it was held that Article 227 confers on the High Court the power of superintendence over all courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises territorial jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the said jurisdiction under the said Article as a matter of right. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarta [ (1975)1 SCC 858 ] held that the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited only to seeing that the subordinate court functions within the limits of its authority and does not extend to correction of mere error of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it. Even an error of fact, even though apparent on the face of the record, is not subject to correction by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227, which function is the domain of appellate court. 12. It is thus quite clear that while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court in its enquiry has to ascertain whether any jurisdictional error was committed by the court below and it cannot go into the factual aspects again undertaking appreciation of evidence like an appellate court. As held by the Apex Court the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purposes of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. The impugned order dated 1-9-2017 suffers no such infirmity. It would also be appropriate to add that a resort to Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be permitted as to circumvent the legislative intent to eschew challenges to interlocutory orders during the pendency of proceedings as provided for under the Act of 2015, where revisions are prohibited and challenges in miscellaneous appeals confined to orders of the Commercial Court a la orders which are appealable under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC. To allow reckless resort to Article 227 of the Constitution, without palpable error of jurisdiction being made out or the order impugned leading to manifest injustice shocking the conscience of the court, would be to defeat the legislative intent. No such situation or ground has been adverted to in the petition nor even argued for the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution to be invoked against the impugned order dated 1-9-2017. No such situation or ground has been adverted to in the petition nor even argued for the jurisdiction of this court under Article 227 of the Constitution to be invoked against the impugned order dated 1-9-2017. Having earlier held neither a revision petition under Section 8 of the Act of 2015 nor miscellaneous appeal under Section 13 of the Act of 2015 is maintainable against the order of rejection of an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC, we are of the view that this petition/D.B. Appeal is wholly misdirected in every conceivable manner. 13. Albeit we have held that the petition is not maintainable for multiple reasons set out here-in-above, on merits too, the petitioner-defendant has no case. It is well settled that the plaint has to be read as laid for addressing an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC there against. On that first principle, the plaint setting out the cause of action in the infringement of the plaintiff''s patent IN740 in May, 2016 could not be questioned for alleged lack of it at the stage of Order 7, Rule 11 CPC application. Infringement of a patent detailed in the plaint is a clear cause of action and why it is not so as submitted by the petitioner defendant''s counsel is not comprehensible. On the ground of limitation, section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963 make tortuous acts, as infringement of a valid and subsisting patent, is a continuing cause of action. Even otherwise a question of limitation is ordinarily one of mixed law and fact. Finally a defence of res judicata for whatever its worth cannot be a ground for an application under Order 7, Rule 11 CPC as held by the Apex Court in Kamala vs. K.T. Eshwara Sa [ (2008)12 SCC 661 ]. In view of above, there is no merit in this petition. It is accordingly dismissed. Stay application also stands dismissed.