JUDGMENT : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. The writ petition has come up with a case that he has appointed as a conductor on 30.07.1975 and he had been suspended in the year 1995 on ground of certain charges levelled against him. While he was under suspension the respondents establish new scheme for pension under the Corporation Employees Pension Scheme and option form was asked to opt for pension he submitted his option within 30 days after he was reinstated on 06.07.1996. Thereafter, the Disciplinary Authority dismissed him from services on 29.04.1997. The Industrial Tribunal rejected the application under Section 33(2)(b) seeking approval of the management on 21.08.2004. Vide order dated 16.01.2008, the Single Bench of this Court upheld the order of the Tribunal. The said appeal preferred against the said order was dismissed by DB on 21.03.2013. Supreme Court dismissed the SLP preferred against the same on 18.11.2013 where-after an order was issued on 09.01.2014 by the respondents purportedly in compliance of the orders passed by the Tribunal on 21.08.2004, however, consequential benefits were not granted as the petitioner had already attained superannuation. The petitioner was not released pension and denied on the ground that his option form had not been received within time in terms of the notification dated 15.06.1996. In the circumstances it was asserted by the department that the petitioner was not entitled to receive pension. 2. The petitioner by way of the present writ petition has prayed for release of his pension by treating the petitioner to be reinstated from the date of his suspension and to grant him all consequential service benefits in view of the order dated 09.01.2014 being set aside. It is further prayed to accept the option form of the petitioner for pension. 3. The respondents have submitted in their reply and have stated that on 28.05.1996 amended was made in Sub-Regulation (L) of Regulation 3 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees Pension Regulations 1989 following words were added : "Any existing employee who does not exercise the final option in favour of Pension within the specified period of 90 days, shall continue to be regulated under the RSRTC CPF Regulation, 1964." 4. The said amendment was made effective from 01.04.1989, the petitioner was required to submit his option form but no such form was ever submitted by the petitioner. 5. The said amendment was made effective from 01.04.1989, the petitioner was required to submit his option form but no such form was ever submitted by the petitioner. 5. It has further been stated that the documents Annex.-1 of the writ petition was never issued from office of the respondent-corporation and the same is not an official letter. It is further stated that in the dispatch register of the respondent-corporation, the letter which was issued with No. 335 is a different letter from the letter which has been placed on record as Annex.-1. In the circumstances it has been submitted that the petitioner has placed a forged document. 6. As regards the order dated 09.01.2014 and compliance on account of refusal on approval application, the respondents have stated that an amount of Rs. 4,42,202/- as calculated under Section 33(C)(2) has been paid to the petitioner however benefits of pension cannot be granted to the petitioner. In rejoinder the petitioner has stated that the respondents have wrongfully denied, the office order dated 06.07.1996 issued by their Sub-ordinate Officials, the dispatch register copy which has been submitted mentions about the letter dated 06.07.1996 relating to the petitioner and it cannot be said that the letter which has been filed by the petitioner in any manner is forged. It is stated that there was no other letter dated 06.07.1996 to which the respondents have placed the photocopy of the letter dated 06.07.1996 sent by dispatch bearing No. 335 and thus, the respondents have asserted of the letter dated 06.07.1996 being a different letter. Original letters have however not been produced before this Court. The previous record of petitioner has been submitted by the respondents relating to certain enquiries for which the record in the nature of history sheet have been submitted by the RSRTC. The petitioner has stated that the no enquiry was conducted and charges mentioned in the so called history sheets are all false. 7. During the course of arguments counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was never reinstate in service, however, in view of Jaipur Ziia Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors., 2002(2) SCC 244 , passed by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court relating to effect of rejection of approval application, the petitioner shall be deemed to be reinstated in service. He also relies on the judgment passed in (2010) 8 SCC 383 : Meghmala and Ors. v. G. Narasimha Reddy and Ors. to submit that the issue of misrepresentation fraud were only adverted to deny the petitioner his original claim for pension. It is submitted that once the Court has directed the petitioner to be reinstated in service in earlier litigation with continuity of service and the respondents were required have passed all orders accordingly. The respondents were required to again ask petitioner to submit option for the purpose of pension after reinstatement. Even otherwise the letter issued by the authorities mentions about the petitioner having submitted his option form. Respondents having produced the letter dated 06.07.1996 in original before the Court and the entire story has been set up to deny the claim. During the course of hearing the original dispatch register of Jhalana Dungri Depot was called wherein at No. 335 there is a letter dated 06.07.1996 address and sent to the Executive Officer relating to the petitioner which relates to the decision to the Court relating to some earlier litigation. 8. In rebuttal the counsel for the petitioner has submitted an affidavit submitting that the petitioner had already been under suspension from 1995 and had been dismissed on 29.04.1997 and the documents Annex.-R-11 and R-12 are fictitious could not have been issued during the period as he was under suspension; on the other hand, the respondents have been contesting the matter of the way upto Supreme Court and they have lost upto Supreme Court and they want to deny the benefit already given to the petitioner. 9. I have seriously considered the facts and find that the allegation of forged document quite vague and not made out. Taking into consideration of law laid down in these circumstances by the Apex Court (Supra) and also considering that the petitioner was suspended in the year 1995 and was not in possession of the documents which were only with the respondents and Annex.-1 had been issued by their Manager, it cannot be said that the letter which has been sent by dispatch No. 335 was only the documents Annex.-R-11 and not Anne.x-1 as both related to the petitioner. The original record of the petitioner was not produced before the Court and only photostat documents cannot be sufficient to assess forgery. 10. The original record of the petitioner was not produced before the Court and only photostat documents cannot be sufficient to assess forgery. 10. On merits, I find that the respondents have not complied with the award which was upheld upto Supreme Court and only the amount which was computed under Section 33(C) of the period of upto the date of award has been released. 11. In Jaipur Zila Sahakari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd. v. Ram Gopal Sharma and Ors., 2002(2) SCC 244 it was held as under: "14. Where an application is made under Section 33(2)(b) proviso, the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer has to examine whether the order of dismissal or discharge is bona fide; whether it was by way of victimization or unfair labour practice; whether the conditions contained in the proviso were complied with or not, etc. If the authority refuses to grant approval obviously it follows that the employee continues to be in service as if order of discharge or dismissal never had been passed. The order of dismissal or discharge passed invoking Section 33(2)(b) dismissing or discharging an employee brings an end of relationship of employer and employee from the date of his dismissal or discharge but that order remains incomplete and remains inchoate as it is subject to approval of the authority under the said provision. In other words, this relationship comes to an end de jure only when the authority grants approval. If approval is not given, nothing more is required to be done by the employee, as it will have to be deemed that the order of discharge or dismissal had never been passed. Consequence of it is that the employee is deemed to have continued in service entitling him to all the benefits available. This being the position there is no need of a separate or specific order for his reinstatement. But on the other hand if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. But on the other hand if approval is given by the authority and if the employee is aggrieved by such an approval, he is entitled to make a complaint under Section 33A challenging the order granting approval on any of the grounds available to him. Section 33A is available only to an employee and is intended to save his time and trouble inasmuch as he can straightaway make a complaint before the very authority where the industrial dispute is already pending between the parties challenging the order of approval instead of making efforts to raise an industrial dispute, get a reference and thereafter adjudication. In this view, it is not correct to say that even though where the order of discharge or dismissal is inoperative for contravention of the mandatory conditions contained in the proviso or where the approval is refused, a workman should still make a complaint under Section 33A and that the order of dismissal or discharge becomes invalid or void only when it is set aside under Section 33A and that till such time he should suffer misery of unemployment in spite of statutory protection given to him by the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). It is not correct to say that where the order of discharge or dismissal becomes inoperative because of contravention of proviso to Section 33(2)(b), Section 33A would be meaningless and futile. The said Section has a definite purpose to save, as already stated above, enabling an employee to make a complaint, if aggrieved by the order of the approval granted." 12. In view thereof, the petitioner would be deemed to be in service continuously from 1985 and would be entitled to fixation of his salary and payment of all due till the date of his retirement and thereafter he would have also be entitled to receive the pension in terms of the pension rule existing at the time of suspension. The action of the respondents is unjustified as the amount has not been released for so many years even after having lost the battle upto Supreme Court and entails interest on the amount. Interest @ 9% per annum is therefore directed to be released on the entire arrears, the calculation of the amount released also shall be done within period of three months henceforth from the date of submission of certified copy of this order. 13. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. Interest @ 9% per annum is therefore directed to be released on the entire arrears, the calculation of the amount released also shall be done within period of three months henceforth from the date of submission of certified copy of this order. 13. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No costs.