JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri Chandra Bhan Gupta, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri Shivam Yadav, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, Kanpur Development Authority and learned Standing Counsel for respondent Nos. 1,3 and 4. 2. With the consent of learned counsel for parties, we proceed to hear and decide this case finally at this stage. 3. This writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India has been filed challenging recovery certificate (undated) annexure 4 to the writ petition issued by Kanpur Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “KDA”) to Collector, Kanpur (City) for recovery of Rs. 4,62,400/- as arrears of land revenue under Section 40 of Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning & Development Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1973”). 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioners submitted that at no point of time any demand of said amount was raised to petitioners and there is no occasion to declare any amount as due from petitioner and therefore no recovery under Section 40 of Act, 1973 could have proceeded with as no amount was due to KDA on the part of petitioners. 5. Section 40 reads as under: “Recovery of moneys due to Authority : Any money due to an Authority on account of any fee, or charges, or from disposal of land, building or any other property, movable or immovable, by way of rent, premium, profit or hire-purchase instalment, may, without prejudice to the right of recovery by any other mode of recovery provided by or under this Act or any other law for the time being in force, be realised- (a) either, as arrears of land revenue upon a certificate of the amount due sent by the Authority to the Collector, or (b) by attachment and sale of property in the manner provided in Sections 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509,510, 512, 513 and 514 of the Uttar Pradesh Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959, (2 of 1959); and such provisions of the said Adhiniyam shall mutatis mutandis apply to recovery of dues of an Authority as they apply to recovery of a tax due to a Nagar ‘Mahapalika’, so however, that references in the aforesaid sections of the said Adhiniyam to ‘Mukhya Nagar Adhikari’, ‘Mahapalika and ‘Executive Committee’ shall be construed as references to ‘Vice Chairman’, ‘Development Authority’ and ‘Chairman’ respectively: Provided that no two or more modes of recovery shall be commenced or continued simultaneously.” 6. From a bare reading of aforesaid section, it can be safely concluded that any money ‘due’ can only be recovered and for that this section sufficiently permits the authority to take appropriate action for recovery. However, when an amount can be said to be ‘due’ is a question to be considered in the present case. Petitioners have categorically stated that no demand was ever raised by KDA in respect to amount sought to be recovered as arrears of land revenue impugned in this writ petition. Nothing has been placed before us by respondent-2 to show that any demand was ever raised by petitioner to pay the amount which is now sought to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. What they have placed before us alongwith counter-affidavit is a calculation chart prepared in their office note-sheet but whether any such demand was ever raised or communicated to petitioner asking him to pay is neither stated anywhere nor document has been placed on record. When no demand has ever been raised, question of failure in payment thereof on behalf of person liable to pay does not arise. In such case, it cannot be said that an amount calculated by an authority in its order-sheet kept in file has fallen due and that being so, Section 40, in our view, in the present case would not be attracted. Considering as to what is the meaning of “due” the matter has been examined in State of Kerala and others v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty and another, (1999) 3 SCC 657 . Referring to meaning of word “due” as defined in Black Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, Page 499 and considering a pari materia provision in Section 71 of State Financial Corporations Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 1951”), Court in para-8 of the judgment said: “Looking to the object of Section 71 we have to examine whether time-barred claims of the State Financial Corporation and the banks can be recovered under it. Is the object only speed of recovery or is it also enlargement of the right to recover? The respondent-institutions rely on the words “amount due” in Section 71 as encompassing time-barred claims also. Now, what is meant by the words “amounts due” used in Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act as also in the notifications issued under Section 71? The respondent-institutions rely on the words “amount due” in Section 71 as encompassing time-barred claims also. Now, what is meant by the words “amounts due” used in Section 71 of the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act as also in the notifications issued under Section 71? Do these words refer to the amounts repayable under the terms of the loan agreements executed between the debtor and the creditor irrespective of whether the claim of the creditor has become time-barred or not? Or do these words refer only to those claims of the creditor which are legally recoverable? An amount “due” normally refers to an amount which the creditor has a right to recover. Wharton in Law Lexicon defines “due” as anything owing; that which one contracts to pay to another. In Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th Edn. at page 499 the following comment appears against the word “due”. “The word “due” always imports a fixed and settled obligation or liability; but with reference to the time for its payment there is considerable ambiguity in the use of the term, the precise signification being determined in each case from the context. It may mean that the debt or claim in question is now (presently or immediately) matured and enforceable, or that it matured at sometime in the past and yet remains unsatisfied, or that it is fixed and certain but the day appointed for its payment has not yet arrived. But commonly and in the absence of any qualifying expressions, the word “due” is restricted to the first of these meanings, the second being expressed by the term “overdue” and the third by the word “payable”.” There is no reference in these definitions to a time-barred debt. In every case the exact meaning of the word “due” will depend upon the context in which that word appears.” (emphasis supplied) 7. Thus, it is clear that the word ‘due’ implies an obligation or liability to pay and when it is prefixed to word amount, it clearly means that one owes liability to pay the amount. However, if there is a liability to pay the amount or in other words obligation to pay the same, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of M/s. Modern Industries v. M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, 2010 (5) SCC 44 , that any “amount due” will be an amount which is demandable. However, if there is a liability to pay the amount or in other words obligation to pay the same, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in the case of M/s. Modern Industries v. M/s. Steel Authority of India Ltd. and others, 2010 (5) SCC 44 , that any “amount due” will be an amount which is demandable. Thus, if the authority requires an amount from any person taking it to be as an obligation for such person towards authority then it means it is a demandable amount and then in that circumstances, it is required to issue a demand notice. The act of issuing demand notice should precede the action for recovery. 8. We do not find any such exercise being adopted in instant case by the Development Authority and Sri Shivam Yadav, learned counsel for Development Authority has very fairly conceded that they have never issued any demand notice to the petitioner before issuing a recovery certificate. Thus it is a cardinal principle of Justice in the matter of recovery, where coercive measure has to be adopted, a notice in the shape of demand notice should be issued to the persons concerned before taking any coercive measure. This is also a rule of principle of natural justice that nobody should be condemned unheard. In fact some calculation was made in the note-sheets of files of KDA and thereupon recovery certificate had been issued. Now whether the petitioner is liable to pay any amount to the Development Authority and a ‘money due’ to the Development Authority and whether Development Authority has computed the same or not are pure questions of fact and we are not going to decide it. We are allowing the writ petition on pure legal question that recovery certificate issued without any demand notice is an illegal exercise of power and therefore, in view of law discussed hereinabove, the impugned order of recovery cannot be sustained and is liable to be quashed. 9. In view of above, the writ petition is allowed. The recovery certificate, annexure 4 to the writ petition is quashed. 10. However, we make it clear that this judgement shall not preclude respondent-KDA from taking fresh steps in accordance with law for recovery of any amount if found due on the petitioners.