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2017 DIGILAW 228 (GUJ)

Ashima Denims v. Dhanjibhai Valjibhai

2017-01-30

K.M.THAKER

body2017
JUDGMENT : K.M. Thaker, J. 1. Heard Mr. K.M. Patel, learned Senior Counsel, with Mr. V.K. Patel, learned advocate for the petitioner company, and Mr. Sharma, learned advocate for the respondent No. 1. Though served (by affixing), no one has entered appearance for the respondent No. 2. 2. In present petition, the petitioner company has placed under challenge:- "[a] Order dated 27.12.1999 whereby learned Labour Court declared that the domestic inquiry conducted against present respondent No. 1 was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice; [b] Order dated 25.9.2002 passed by learned Industrial Court in Revision Application No. 5 of 2000 whereby the learned Industrial Court approved the decision by learned Labour Court with regard to domestic inquiry and the learned Industrial Court rejected the revision application; [c] Judgment and order dated 27.4.2005 passed by learned Labour Court whereby the learned Labour Court allowed T Application No. 385 of 1993 filed by present respondent with direction to present petitioner to reinstate original claimant with direction against present respondent No. 2 to pay backwages for the period from date of termination until the date of the judgment, i.e. from 26.6.1993 to 27.4.2005; [d] Order dated 10.11.2006 passed by learned Industrial Court (IT) No. 28 of 2005 whereby the learned Industrial Court rejected the appeal filed by present petitioner against the judgment dated 27.4.2005 passed by learned Labour Court in T Application No. 385 of 1993." 3. Before proceeding further, it is relevant to clarify that original claimant, i.e. present respondent No. 1, was employee of present respondent No. 2 company (Mihir Textile) and his service was terminated vide order dated 26.6.1993 by present respondent No. 2, i.e. said Mihir Textile. However, subsequently, i.e. somewhere in 1994, present petitioner had taken over said respondent No. 2 company. 3.1 Consequently, present petitioner was impleaded as party opponent in the proceedings before the learned Labour Court. Thereafter, all proceedings, i.e. before labour Court, the revision application, appeal and present petition have been pursued and prosecuted by present petitioner. However, subsequently, i.e. somewhere in 1994, present petitioner had taken over said respondent No. 2 company. 3.1 Consequently, present petitioner was impleaded as party opponent in the proceedings before the learned Labour Court. Thereafter, all proceedings, i.e. before labour Court, the revision application, appeal and present petition have been pursued and prosecuted by present petitioner. 3.2 It is also appropriate to mention that after present petitioner came to be impleaded as party opponent before the learned Labour Court, present respondent No. 2 has not challenged any order passed by the learned Labour Court and/or by learned Industrial Court and even the final decision dated 10.11.2006 by learned Industrial Court in Appeal No. 28 of 2005 is also not challenged by the respondent No. 2, the petition against the said judgment is taken out only by the petitioner i.e. original opponent No. 2. 3.3 It is also necessary to mention at this stage that after explaining reasons and circumstances, this Court specifically asked learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 whether the respondent No. 1 would have objection if the matter is heard and decided by this Court (the petition is listed in cause list for final hearing before this Court in regular course since subject matter of present petition is assigned to this Court under present roster) and learned advocate for the respondent No. 1 declared that the said respondent has no objection if the matter is heard and decided by this Court. 4. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record that upon feeling aggrieved by order dated 26.6.1993, the claimant invoked provision under Section 78 and Section 79 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act [hereinafter referred to as "BIR Act"] and filed application before the learned Labour Court and challenged the order dated 26.6.1993 whereby he came to be dismissed from service. 4.1 The said application was registered as T Application No.385 of 1993. In the statement of claim (application), the claimant claimed and alleged that he had joined the opponent company (present respondent No. 2) in 1974 and since then, he was working with the company as Winder in its Winding Department. 4.1 The said application was registered as T Application No.385 of 1993. In the statement of claim (application), the claimant claimed and alleged that he had joined the opponent company (present respondent No. 2) in 1974 and since then, he was working with the company as Winder in its Winding Department. He also alleged that on concocted allegation and with a view to victimizing him, the company issued show-cause notice/charge-sheet dated 16.4.1993 with allegations in nature of dereliction in duty, negligence and disobedience not complying the orders and directions by supervisor/superior officer. The claimant also alleged that the opponent company (present respondent No. 2) initiated domestic inquiry pursuant to the charge-sheet. According to the claimant, sufficient and effective opportunity of hearing and defence was not granted to him during inquiry process and he was not allowed to examine his witness. The claimant alleged that inquiry was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice. He further alleged that though the allegations against him were not proved, the Inquiry Officer submitted report holding that the allegations are proved and the disciplinary authority accepted the report and acted on the report and without issuing/serving second show-cause notice and without providing copy of the Inquiry Officer's report, the opponent company (present respondent No.2) illegally and arbitrarily terminated his service. With such allegations, the claimant demanded that he should be reinstated in service with consequential benefits. 4.2 The application was opposed by present respondent No. 2, i.e. original opponent. The opponent company filed its reply and contended that the claimant was in habit of filing incorrect and concocted case against the company/its officers and that he was in habit of causing indiscipline and misconduct and during his past service, the claimant was visited with minor penalties including penalty of suspension. The company also contended that it had received reports from supervisor/department head that the claimant was continuously wandering from department to department and he was not attending his duties regularly and after presenting himself at his work place on commencement of the shift, he would leave his work place and would not return during entire shift and would come back only at the time of closing of the shift. It was also alleged that he disobeyed the orders of the supervisor and superior officers. It was also alleged that he disobeyed the orders of the supervisor and superior officers. The company contended that in view of such reports, show-cause notice/charge-sheet dated 16.4.1993 was issued which was followed by domestic inquiry. Upon conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiry Officer submitted his report wherein he held that the allegations are proved. The report was considered by the disciplinary authority and after having regard to relevant aspects, the disciplinary authority decided to terminate service of the claimant and therefore, order dated 26.6.1993 came to be passed whereby the claimant came to be dismissed. The company claimed that there is no illegality in the decision of the company and that the action is taken after granting sufficient and reasonable opportunity of hearing to the claimant and that therefore, his demand/application should be rejected. 4.3 During the proceedings before the learned Labour Court, the claimant challenged legality and propriety of the domestic inquiry. Therefore, the said issue was considered and decided by learned Labour Court as preliminary issue. 4.4 After hearing the parties and after examining the record of domestic inquiry, learned Labour Court reached to the findings that the inquiry was defective and it was not conducted in legal and fair manner. Therefore, the learned Labour Court, vide order dated 27.12.1999, declared that domestic inquiry against the claimant was defective and therefore, illegal. 4.5 The learned Labour Court, by the same order, granted opportunity to the company to conduct fresh inquiry before the Court i.e. to prove the allegations and charge against the claimant in the Court. 4.6 Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to mention at this stage that before the learned Labour Court declared that the inquiry was defective, the petitioner herein had taken over the original opponent company (i.e. Mihir Textile) and that present petitioner was already impleaded as party opponent before the learned Labour Court before the order dated 27.12.1999 came to be passed. In that background, the respondent No. 2 company and the petitioner company challenged the said decision dated 27.12.1999 in revision application No. 5 of 2000 before the learned Industrial Court. The learned Industrial court considered the revision application and after hearing the parties, learned Industrial Court rejected the revision application vide order dated 25.9.2002. In that background, the respondent No. 2 company and the petitioner company challenged the said decision dated 27.12.1999 in revision application No. 5 of 2000 before the learned Industrial Court. The learned Industrial court considered the revision application and after hearing the parties, learned Industrial Court rejected the revision application vide order dated 25.9.2002. 4.7 Since after declaring domestic inquiry defective, the learned Labour Court had granted opportunity to prove the charges in the Court the case was returned to learned Labour Court for further proceedings and that therefore, it was for the employer to examine witness and prove the allegations. 4.8 When the proceedings re-commenced before the learned Labour Court after the learned Industrial Court passed the order dated 25.9.2002 in revision application, the company claimed that its witnesses have tendered resignation from the service and that therefore, the witnesses are not available to prove the allegations/to conduct inquiry. 4.9 In that view of the matter, the learned Labour Court proceeded to decide T Application on the premise that the inquiry conducted against the claimant is illegal. 4.10 The learned Labour Court considered relevant facts and circumstances, and the material available on record as well as the dismissal order. After considering relevant aspects and rival contentions, the learned Labour Court reached to the finding that allegations against the claimants cannot be considered as proved and that therefore, the termination of the claimant's service cannot be accepted. Consequently, the learned Labour Court passed final judgment dated 27.4.2005 in T Application No. 385 of 1993 with above mentioned directions. 4.11 The appeal filed against the said judgment also failed and learned Industrial Court rejected the appeal vide judgment dated 10.11.2006. 5. Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel, assailed the above mentioned four orders and submitted that the learned Labour Court committed error in declaring that the inquiry against the claimant was not conducted in legal and fair manner. According to Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the learned Labour Court declared the inquiry illegal mainly on two grounds viz. (a) that the intimation about date of hearing (12.6.1993) was not served to the claimant and the Inquiry Officer proceeded with the inquiry without verifying as to whether the intimation which was forwarded by registered post was served to the claimant or not and (b) that the company had not issued and served second show-cause notice. (a) that the intimation about date of hearing (12.6.1993) was not served to the claimant and the Inquiry Officer proceeded with the inquiry without verifying as to whether the intimation which was forwarded by registered post was served to the claimant or not and (b) that the company had not issued and served second show-cause notice. With reference to first ground, Mr. Patel submitted that the learned Labour Court ought to have considered whether any prejudice was actually caused to the claimant or not. He submitted that before 3.6.1993, the witnesses of the company were already examined and the claimant had conducted cross examination of the company's witness and even claimant's statement was also concluded and on 12.6.1993 the hearing was scheduled for cross examination of the claimant and that therefore, no prejudice was caused to the claimant. However, the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the said aspect. With reference to second ground, Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner company, submitted that the standing orders do not provide for second show-cause notice and that therefore, there was no obligation to issue and serve second show cause notice. Hence, any fault could not have been found with regard to the process of inquiry on the ground of second show cause notice. 5.1 With reference to the fact that the decision rendered in 1999 with regard to legality of inquiry is sought to be challenged by the company in petition filed in 2007, Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel relied on the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe [ 1976 (1) SCR 361 ] and he submitted that it is open to the employer to challenge the decision with regard to legality of domestic inquiry at the stage of final judgment if rendered against the employer. 6. It is necessary to mention that the said contention would have been available to the petitioner company if the decision dated 27.12.1999 had not been challenged by the company in revision application No. 5 of 2000. It is pertinent that in the said revision application the decision with regard to legality of the inquiry was challenged by present petitioner company as well as present respondent No. 2. The learned Industrial Court rejected the said revision application. It is pertinent that in the said revision application the decision with regard to legality of the inquiry was challenged by present petitioner company as well as present respondent No. 2. The learned Industrial Court rejected the said revision application. The petitioner company as well as the present respondent No. 2 company accepted the said decision, inasmuch as any petition or any other provision against the said decision dated 25.9.2002 in revision application was not filed by petitioner or respondent No. 2. 6.1 Having once challenged the decision with regard to legality of the inquiry at the relevant time and after having failed in revision application as back as in 2002, the employer cannot now i.e. after almost five years raise challenge against the said decision dated 25.9.2002 in petition which is filed in 2007 after having failed in revision application and after having accepted said decision without further challenge at that point of time. The learned Senior Counsel could not dispute this position and did not press the contention further. 6.2 Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner company further contended that so far as justification of the company's action against the claimant is concerned, in view of the misconduct by the claimant, there is no illegality or arbitrariness in the decision. 6.3 After having assailed the conclusion by learned Labour Court and learned Industrial Court with regard to legality of the inquiry, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner company assailed the final decision by the learned Labour Court and learned Industrial Court and he submitted that the service of the claimant was terminated for misconduct and that therefore, impugned order directing the company to reinstate the claimant on his original post with full backwages is unjustified. Learned Senior Counsel for the company submitted that the learned Industrial Court failed to appreciate that the winding department was partially closed down and in view of the settlement with the representative union, substantial number of posts in the department were reduced and that therefore, the direction to reinstate the claimant is not justified. Learned Senior Counsel for the company submitted that before learned Industrial Court also, it was submitted that in view of such circumstances, appropriate alternative remedy may be considered, in the event, the case in support of the termination of the claimant is not accepted by the Court. Learned Senior Counsel for the company submitted that before learned Industrial Court also, it was submitted that in view of such circumstances, appropriate alternative remedy may be considered, in the event, the case in support of the termination of the claimant is not accepted by the Court. Learned Senior Counsel for the company submitted that, however, the learned Labour Court failed to appreciate the said contention and directed the company to reinstate the claimant which is unjustified and incapable of being complied with. On the very same ground, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner company assailed the judgment by learned Industrial Court and he submitted that the learned Industrial Court failed to appreciate that learned Labour Court committed error in rejecting the contentions of the company. With said submissions, Mr. Patel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner company, submitted that four impugned orders may be set aside and the petition may be allowed. 7. Per contra, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the claimant, submitted that, there is no error in the decision by learned Labour Court in holding that the domestic inquiry was defective, inasmuch as the Inquiry Officer conducted the proceedings in arbitrary manner by closing the inquiry without ascertaining as to whether the date of hearing was duly intimated to the claimant or not. He submitted that even the date when the proceedings were scheduled for hearing was not informed to the claimant and when the intimation was not received by or served to the claimant, there was no justification in concluding the proceedings in absence of the claimant and therefore, the decision by learned Labour Court is just and reasonable and it is subsequently confirmed by learned Industrial Court. He further submitted that the company is also not right and justified in contending that any prejudice is not caused to the claimant and therefore, inquiry could not have been declared defective. He emphasized that the company not only failed in issuing second show cause notice, but the company also did not serve report of the Inquiry Officer to the claimant and that therefore, the contention against the learned Labour Court's decision with regard to domestic inquiry is unjustified and without any basis in facts or in law. He emphasized that the company not only failed in issuing second show cause notice, but the company also did not serve report of the Inquiry Officer to the claimant and that therefore, the contention against the learned Labour Court's decision with regard to domestic inquiry is unjustified and without any basis in facts or in law. He submitted that the learned Labour Court has also concluded that the allegations against the claimant are not proved and therefore, the termination of claimant's service is unjustified and that there is no error in that decision. He submitted that the erstwhile - Mihir Textile was taken over by the petitioner company - Ashima Denims and the petitioner company has been running erstwhile Mihir Textiles and that therefore, there is no justification in contending that the claimant could not be reinstated and the direction to reinstate the claimant is unjustified. According to learned counsel for the claimant, when the domestic inquiry conducted against the claimant is declared defective and when it is held that the allegations against the claimant are not proved despite the fact that the employer was granted opportunity to the company to establish allegations by leading evidence before the Court and when violation of principles of natural justice is established, there is no justification to interfere with the final conclusions and directions by learned Labour Court which are confirmed by learned Industrial Court. 8. I have considered rival submissions by learned counsel for the petitioner company and the respondent claimant and I have also considered the impugned judgments and orders and other material on which learned counsel for the petitioner company and the respondent claimant relied. 9. As mentioned earlier, when the learned Labour Court declared that the domestic inquiry against the claimant is defective and illegal, the company had challenged the said decision in revision application before the learned Industrial Court. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision by Apex Court in case of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe [ 1976 (1) SCR 361 ] is of no assistance to the petitioner company. Therefore, reliance placed on the decision by Apex Court in case of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe [ 1976 (1) SCR 361 ] is of no assistance to the petitioner company. 9.1 Further, when the company availed opportunity and exercised right of filing revision application against interlocutory order with regard to the legality of domestic inquiry and after the learned Industrial Court confirmed the decision of learned Labour Court, the company consciously and voluntarily dropped the challenge against the learned Labour Court's decision at that stage, and did not carry the order in further challenge. 9.2 After having failed before the learned Industrial Court in revision application, the petitioner company accepted the decision by learned Labour Court and having not challenged the said decision for almost 6 years. 9.3 In this view of the matter, now, the company is not justified in raising the said issue while challenging the final decision of learned Labour Court. Therefore, the company's challenge against the decision with regard to the legality and propriety of domestic inquiry cannot be entertained at this stage and the said contention deserves to be rejected. 10. Besides this, Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent claimant, would contend that there is no error in the decision of learned Industrial Court and learned Labour Court with regard to domestic inquiry. 10.1 In this context, it is pertinent that undisputedly, the company had not forwarded the report of the Inquiry Officer to the claimant. 10.2 It is not the case of the petitioner that the said finding is incorrect and the report was forwarded to and it was served to/received by the claimant. 10.3 The said defect violates the inquiry proceedings. The proceeding stand vitiated on ground of breach of principles of natural justice report of inquiry officer was not submitted. The learned Labour Court's decision, based on the said undisputed fact (rather defect) cannot be faulted. 10.4 The said defect is in addition to the hasty closure of the proceedings of the inquiry on the ground that the claimant did not attend the hearing though intimation about the date of hearing was not served to and received by the claimant. 10.5 It is pertinent that the petitioner failed to establish that the intimation about the date for further proceedings of inquiry was actually served to the delinquent. 10.5 It is pertinent that the petitioner failed to establish that the intimation about the date for further proceedings of inquiry was actually served to the delinquent. 10.6 There was no evidence before inquiry officer to hold that the claimant did not attend the inquiry proceedings despite knowledge (upon service of notice/intimation conveying the date for further proceeding) about the proceedings. Though the inquiry officer had no basis for assuming that the claimant did not attend the proceedings even after service of intimation, he closed the proceedings even after service of intimation, he closed the proceeding without satisfying himself about factual aspect and/or without verifying the fact/evidence. 10.7 Inquiry officer's decision and action are, to say the least, hasty and unjustified and unwarranted. So far as the issue of prejudice is concerned, it is relevant that the said contention was not raised before learned Labour Court and since learned Labour Court has not deliberated on this issue and since there is no finding recorded with regard to said issue (it was not raised at that stage) and also having regard to the fact that violation of principles of natural justice is conclusively established this issue would slide into insignificance. When violation of principles of natural justice is established - in light of the fact that inquiry officer's report was not given to the respondent - the contention that the hasty decision of inquiry officer to close the proceedings (on the ground that the workman did not attend the proceedings on scheduled date) though the intimation about the date was not served to the petitioner, did not result into any prejudice to the workman would not save the employer and would not vitiate or invalidate labour Court's decision. This Court would, therefore, close it at this stage. 10.8 Even if, the labour Court's decision with regard to the Inquiry Officer's decision to close the proceedings (when the claimant did not attend the hearing) though intimation about the schedule was not served to the employee - claimant is not taken into account then also, the fact that the Inquiry Officer's report was not supplied to the claimant before the company passed final order terminating service of the claimant, the learned Labour Court's decision that the inquiry was conducted in violation of principles of natural justice cannot be faulted. 10.9 Therefore also, the decision by learned Labour Court which is confirmed by learned Industrial Court with regard to domestic inquiry does not warrant any interference and the objections raised by the company with reference to the domestic inquiry are not sustainable and they are hereby rejected. 11. So far as petitioner's contention against learned Labour Court's decision with regard to domestic inquiry is concerned, actually, in view of the fact that the petitioner company did not challenge the order passed by learned Industrial Court in revision application, the company is now - after 5 years - not entitled to raise any contention against the decision by learned Labour Court and the learned Industrial Court with regard to legality of the inquiry. However, irrespective of the said position, this Court has considered the submissions by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. 12. When the decision by learned Labour Court is examined, it comes out clearly that there is no error in the said order and the decision with regard to legality and propriety of the inquiry. Even if the claimant's submission on the ground that actual prejudice to the claimant on account of Inquiry Officer's decision to close the proceedings when the claimant did not attend hearing is not established, is entertained and accepted then also, in view of the undisputed fact that the report/findings of the Inquiry Officer were not supplied to the claimant, the disciplinary authority passed the order terminating his service, the decision by learned Labour Court holding that the inquiry proceedings are defective and/or that the termination order is passed in violation of principles of natural justice cannot be faulted. 12.1 After the learned Industrial Court confirmed the decision of learned Labour Court with regard to domestic inquiry, learned Industrial Court remitted the proceedings to learned Labour Court for further proceedings. At that time, it was open for the company, and it had opportunity, to lead evidence to prove the allegations and charge against the claimant. 12.2 However, the employer failed to lead any evidence and failed to prove the allegations/misconduct against the claimant. The company claimed before the Court that the witnesses are not available and for want of witness, it cannot lead evidence and prove the allegations and charge against the workman. 12.3 Therefore, the learned Labour Court had to proceed to examine the case in absence of evidence regarding allegations against the claimant. The company claimed before the Court that the witnesses are not available and for want of witness, it cannot lead evidence and prove the allegations and charge against the workman. 12.3 Therefore, the learned Labour Court had to proceed to examine the case in absence of evidence regarding allegations against the claimant. The learned Labour Court considered whatever material was available on record and having regard to the fact that inquiry was vitiated on account of principles of natural justice and was found defective and having regard to the fact that even after the Court granted the opportunity, the company failed to prove the allegations and charge against the claimant. The allegations against the claimant remained mere allegations and the said allegations and charge are not proved. 12.4 In light of the facts of the case, the said conclusion by learned Labour Court is correct and justified and cannot be faulted. 13. In this context, the question which would arise is when the domestic inquiry is found defective on ground of violation of natural justice and consequently, it is found that the allegations are not proved and when the employer has, despite second opportunity, failed to lead evidence before the learned Court and prove the allegations, whether the decision by learned Labour Court holding, inter alia, that the allegations are not proved and the termination of claimant's service is illegal and unjustified can be faulted. 14. The answer would be in Negative. There is nothing on record to convince this Court that the learned Labour Court committed any error in holding that the allegations against the claimant are not proved and the claimant's termination is vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice and that therefore, the termination of claimant's service cannot be sustained. 15. Having reached said conclusion, the learned Labour Court directed the petitioner company to reinstate the respondent claimant and to pay full backwages to the respondent claimant. 16. In light of the observations by Hon'ble Apex Court in para 38.1 to 38.6 in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 ], the said decision and direction by learned Labour Court does not deserve to be disturbed. Besides this, the petitioner has failed to make out any exceptional circumstance to disturb and/or modify said direction or to deviate from the principle explained by Hon'ble Apex Court. Besides this, the petitioner has failed to make out any exceptional circumstance to disturb and/or modify said direction or to deviate from the principle explained by Hon'ble Apex Court. 16.1 At this stage, it is necessary to mention and clarify that both i.e. erstwhile - Mihir Textile and present Ashima Denims were party before the learned Labour Court. 16.2 It was established before the learned Labour Court that the said Ashima Denims has been running and managing erstwhile Mihir Textile. The learned Labour Court considered the said fact situation and divided/bifurcated the final directions, inasmuch as the obligation to pay backwages from the date of termination until the date of judgment dated 27.4.2005 is cast on the opponent No. 1 - Mihir Textile whereas obligation to reinstate the claimant is cast on Ashima Denims. 16.3 In background, it is pertinent that Ashima Denims i.e. present petitioner company has not challenged the learned Labour Court's decision granting full backwages to the claimant from the date of termination till the date of judgment i.e. 27.4.2005. The said direction is not challenged even by respondent No. 1 i.e. Mihir Textile. Differently put, the direction to pay backwages for the period from date of termination to the date of judgment is not challenged either by the petitioner and/or opponent No. 1 Mihir Textile. 16.4 The challenge by the petitioner company against the judgment is restricted to the direction to reinstate the claimant. 17. So far as the direction to reinstate the claimant is concerned, for the reasons mentioned above, there is no justification to interfere with the direction to reinstate the claimant on his original post. Further, it is relevant to recall and note that:- "[a] the learned Labour Court found that the domestic inquiry was defective and it was not conducted in legal and fair manner and it was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice; [b] in revision application against said decision, the appeal/revisional Court confirmed the decision of labour Court with reference to inquiry; [c] the decision of industrial Court was not carried further and it attained finality. Besides this, after considering submission by petitioner in this petition, this Court found no error in said decision and petitioner failed to make out any ground against said decision; [d] since violation of principles of natural justice during domestic inquiry is established, the findings and conclusions by Inquiry Officer would not survive and allegations against the claimant would remain merely allegations and cannot be considered "proved misconduct"; [e] therefore, the learned Labour Court did not approve the order of termination which was based on findings vitiated by violation of principles of natural justice; [f] the appeal Court confirmed said decision by learned Labour Court; [g] in light of the fact that the reasons recorded by learned Labour Court for setting aside the termination of respondent's service (which are confirmed by appellate Court) are found to be sound and cogent and satisfactory by this Court any ground to interfere with reasons concurrently recorded by learned trial Court and appeal Court is not made out." 18. In this view of the matter, there is nothing on record and the petitioner has also failed to make out any ground, to convince the Court to disturb said conclusion. Now, at this stage, it is appropriate to refer to the observation in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) [ (2013) 10 SCC 324 ]. Besides this, at this stage, it is also necessary to mention and clarify that the claimant, as declared by learned counsel for the claimant, has attained age of superannuation. Therefore, the question of actual reinstatement does not survive. 18.1 At the same time, it is also relevant to note that even the claimant has not challenged the decision of learned Labour Court imposing the burden of payment of backwages qua opponent No. 1 - Mihir Textile. The claimant has accepted the said judgment. 19. Under the circumstances, in present petition, the Court is not required to examine and decide any issue against the direction to reinstate the claimant. In this view of the matter, the obligation of original opponent No. 2 i.e. present petitioner company would be to pay the wages to the claimant for the period from 28.4.2005 to the date on which the claimant attained age of superannuation. In this view of the matter, the obligation of original opponent No. 2 i.e. present petitioner company would be to pay the wages to the claimant for the period from 28.4.2005 to the date on which the claimant attained age of superannuation. 19.1 Whereas the obligation to pay backwages for the period from the date of termination until 27.4.2005 would be, in view of the direction No. 4 in the operative order dated 27.4.2005 passed by learned Labour Court, on original opponent No. 1 - Mihir Textile. As mentioned earlier, the said direction is not challenged by any one i.e. neither by Mihir Textile nor by the petitioner and not even by the claimant. 20. The appeal Court i.e. the learned Industrial Court did not find any merits in the appeal and rejected the appeal vide judgment dated 10.11.2006. The learned Industrial Court's judgment confirming the learned Labour Court's final conclusions and directions is just and proper and there is no reason or justification to disagree with the decision by learned Industrial Court. 20.1 In the result, the petition fails and deserves to be rejected and is, hereby, rejected. 21. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel for the company submitted that the petitioner should be at liberty to adjust excess amount paid to the claimant in pursuance of interim direction vide order dated 2.8.2007. In this context, learned Senior Counsel for the company also referred to the order dated 26.11.2015 passed in Civil Application (for vacating stay) No. 11873 of 2015 whereby the company had prayed for permission to discontinue the payment of the said amount to the claimant as he had crossed age of superannuation. 21.1 On this count, it is appropriate to take into account the details mentioned in paragraph No. 3 of the Civil Application, which read thus:- "3. It is submitted that as per the certified Standing Order No. 19 of the applicant company, the age of superannuation of workman is 60 years. It is further open for the applicant to continue any workman in service for further period of two years after reaching the superannuation at the age of 60 years. In other words, the any workman of the applicant company at best can work with company till the age of 62 years. It is further open for the applicant to continue any workman in service for further period of two years after reaching the superannuation at the age of 60 years. In other words, the any workman of the applicant company at best can work with company till the age of 62 years. In the present case, as per the record of the of the applicant company, the date of birth of the respondent workman is 17-09-1953 and therefore, the respondent workman has already reached the age of superannuation of 60 years on 17-09-2013 and 62 years on 17-09-2015, the applicant has paid wages under Section 17B of the ID Act to the respondent workman till 17-9-2015. The copy of the said provident fund record is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure B." 21.2 From the said details, it comes out that the claimant attained 60 years of age on 17.9.2013. According to the standing orders (applicable to the company) age for superannuation is 60 years. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that in that view of the matter, even otherwise, the claimant would not be entitled for lump sum amount of Rs.2,000/- p.m. Beyond 17.9.2013 and the company would be justified in adjusting excess amount paid to the claimant. Therefore, while making payment of backwages for complying impugned award from the date of award until the date on which the claimant attained age of superannuation, the company would be entitled to adjust the excess amount paid to the claimant under interim order. With aforesaid observations, clarifications and direction, present petition stands disposed of. Rule is discharged. Disposed off.