JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this appeal, appellant/plaintiff has challenged the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track Court, Kullu in Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2005 as well as the judgment and decree passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Manali, District Kullu in Civil Suit No. 35/2003-93 of 2004, vide which learned trial Court dismissed the suit for permanent injunction filed by the present appellant and the learned appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree so passed by the learned trial Court. 2. The present appeal was admitted by this Court on 06.07.2007 on the following substantial questions of law: “1. Whether the learned first appellate Court while entertaining a doubt about the correctness of demarcation and the report, had erred in not exercising its discretion in allowing the application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC for appointment of a Local Commissioner to determine the lis inter se the parties and whether the said application could be rejected in the judgment while holding the previous demarcation bad without ordering for a fresh one? 2. Whether once the learned District Judge had entertained a doubt about the correctness of the report, it was incumbent to have appointed Local Commissioner to demarcate the disputed area instead of proceeding to dismiss the suit, when the plaintiff had proved his case, and whether such impugned judgment and decree is sustainable in law?” 3. Brief facts necessary for the adjudication of the present case are that the appellant/plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as ‘the plaintiff”) filed a suit against the respondents/defendants (hereinafter referred to as ‘the defendants’) for permanent prohibitory injunction on the grounds that plaintiff had purchased land measuring 0-0-5 bighas from one Norbu Ram, comprised in Khasra No. 1044/2, Khatauni No. 114 min/360 to the extent of 5/1198 shares in Phati and Kothi Bajaura, situated at village Sharabai Phati and Kothi Bajaura, Tehsil and District Kullu vide registered sale deed No. 535, dated 17.04.2003 and in fact the suit land stood handed over by Norbu Ram to the plaintiff even before the execution of the sale deed and the plaintiff was in continuous possession of the suit land with the consent of said Norbu. It was further the case of the plaintiff that on 09.04.2003, defendants with an ulterior motive and dishonest intention came with a group of 20 to 25 persons and started fencing the suit land without any right or title. The matter was reported to the police and police visited the spot and instructed the parties not to interfere over the suit land till the demarcation of the same was duly carried out. Further, as per the plaintiff, Tehsildar Kullu was requested by the police on 16.04.2003 and Patwari and Kanoongo accordingly came on the spot on 22.4.2003 and demarcated the land in the presence of plaintiff and defendants as well as in the presence of members of Panchayat and police. As per the plaintiff, the suit land was found to be of Norbu Ram, qua which subsequently sale deed stood executed in his favour. It was further the case of the plaintiff that defendants were never in possession over the suit land and that the plaintiff after demarcation had put the boundary wall on the suit land, but despite this, defendants had started interfering in the possession of the plaintiff by removing the retaining wall partly and by taking up quarrel with the plaintiff as well as with his wife. As per the plaintiff, the cause of action arose in his favour on 27.04.2003 when defendants forcibly tried to remove the retaining wall which stood constructed by the plaintiff and on these bases, the plaintiff filed the abovementioned suit praying for the following relief: “It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction may kindly be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants, restraining the defendants from interfering in the suit land by themselves or through their agents servants or relatives in any manner. Any other relief which this Hon’ble Court deems fit may also be granted in favouf of the plaintiff and against the defendants in the interest of justice.” 4. The suit of the plaintiff was contested by the defendants, who by way of their written statement even denied the factum of the plaintiff being owner or being in possession of the suit land. As per the defendants, the suit land which initially comprised of Khasra No. 1044 was owned by several owners and the same was in possession of Shri Jayoti Parshad etc. As per the defendants, the suit land which initially comprised of Khasra No. 1044 was owned by several owners and the same was in possession of Shri Jayoti Parshad etc. Land measuring 4-2-0 bighas of the suit land was sold in favour of Nurbu, Panchi Ram, Tashi Dawa, Bhagwan Dass and Tashi Angrop. On account of there being National Highway 21 on the Western side of the suit land, part of Khasra No.1044 bearing Shikmi, Khasra No. 1044/1 measuring 1-2-2 bighas alongwith houses and trees was acquired for the purpose of widening the said National Highway vide Notification dated 04.08.1986 and award qua the acquisition of the same was also passed on 27.01.1988 and compensation amount of Rs. 1,99,837/- was paid to S/Sh. Nurbu, Panchi Ram, Tashi Dawa, Bhagwan Dass and Tashi Angroop. Further, as per defendants, after acquisition of the said land, the aforesaid owners were left with only 2-19-18 bighas of land in Shikmi Khasra No. 1044/2 and they sold the same in favour of 12 persons, who constructed 11 houses over Shikmi Khasra numbers and there was no land left vacant over the same. Further as per the defendants, towards the Southern eastern side of the suit land, there was Khasra No. 1047, which was a site for Gharat and Khasra No. 1045, on which Kuhal for the said Gharat existed, which were possessed by Shri Chamaru as tenant at will , who became owner of the same by way of operation of Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act. It was further mentioned in the written statement that the estate of Chamaru was inherited by his daughter’s sons as per Will dated 28.09.1990 and after the death of Narinder Kumar, one of the sons of his daughter, the estate of Narinder Kumar was inherited by his widow Savitri Devi. It was further mentioned in the written statement that there was another Gharat over Khasra No. 1046 and its Kuhal was on Khasra No. 1041 towards the Eastern side of Khasra No. 1047 and Chamaru was also sub tenant and after his death, his grand sons became sub tenants and approach to Khasra No. 1047 and 1046 was through Khasra No. 1044 and after acquisition of aforesaid Khasra No. 1044/1, now there was a direct approach to Khasra Nos. 1047 and 1046 through National Highway 21 and thus, there was no vacant land in between Khasra No. 1047 and acquired Khasra No. 1044/1. It was also mentioned in the written statement that on the basis of a false report lodged by the plaintiff, the police party as well as Patwari, Kanungo and Panchayat members had visited the spot and after demarcation, they advised the plaintiff not to cause any unlawful interference over the peaceful possession of defendants over the aforesaid Gharat and its approach through National Highway 21. On these bases, the suit of the plaintiff was resisted by the defendants. 5. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction, as prayed for? OPP. 2. Whether suit of plaintiff is not maintainable in the present form? OPD. 3. Whether the plaintiff is stopped from filing the present suit by his act and conduct? OPD. 4. Relief. 6. On the basis of evidence adduced by the respective parties in support of their respective claims, the following findings were returned by learned trial Court on the issues so framed: “Issue No. 1: No. Issue No. 2: Yes. Issue No. 3: No. Relief: The suit is dismissed per operative part of the judgment. 7. Learned trial Court on the basis of evidence on record concluded that plaintiff had failed to prove his possession over the suit land as on 09.04.2003, when as per the plaintiff, defendants interfered over the suit land. Learned trial Court also held that plaintiff had failed to prove that any cause of action had accrued in his favour as was set up by him in the plaint. On these bases, learned trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. While arriving at the said conclusion, it was held by the learned trial Court that as per the case put forth by the plaintiff, defendants caused interference on the suit land for the first time on 9th April, 2003 on which date, he was in possession of the suit land. As per plaintiff, suit land was purchased by him on 17.04.2003, however before that he was in possession of the same with the consent of owner of the land. As per plaintiff, suit land was purchased by him on 17.04.2003, however before that he was in possession of the same with the consent of owner of the land. Learned trial Court held that plaintiff had failed to prove on record his possessory title over the suit land as on 09.04.2003 either by way of examining its owner Nurbu or any other co-sharer, who could have stated that in fact it was the plaintiff who was in possession of the suit land as on 09.04.2003 and further plaintiff had also failed to prove that cause of action accrued in his favour after demarcation was carried out by revenue authorities on 22.04.2003, in view of the fact that plaintiff himself had categorically stated in his statement that defendants damaged his danga on 17.04.2003, but said damage was not caused by the defendants in his presence. On these bases, it was held by the learned trial Court that no danga was existing on 17.04.2003, as averred in para 3 of the plaint by the plaintiff, in view of the fact that plaintiff himself had deposed that he had put the boundry wall by way of constructing a retaining wall and boundry wall on the suit land after demarcation of the suit land which was carried out on 22.04.2003. Learned trial Court also held that plaintiff had admitted in his statement that there stood 11 houses on Khasra No. 1044/02, which covered this entire Khasra number and this included his house also which was constructed 14-15 years back. Learned trial Court also held that the plaintiff had admitted that Khasra No. 1047, which was in possession of defendants was abutting National Highway which was existing on Khasra No. 1044/1 and thus, there was no question of interference by defendant over the land comprised in Khasra No. 1044/2, as defendants had direct approach to their Gharat and land from the National Highway. On these bases, learned trial Court dismissed the suit so filed by the plaintiff. 8. In appeal, learned trial Court while upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court held that taking into consideration the fact that relief of injunction was a discretionary relief, parties have to approach the Court with clean hands and a party which suppresses material facts, is not entitled for discretionary relief of injunction. 8. In appeal, learned trial Court while upholding the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court held that taking into consideration the fact that relief of injunction was a discretionary relief, parties have to approach the Court with clean hands and a party which suppresses material facts, is not entitled for discretionary relief of injunction. Learned appellate Court further held that plaintiff had withheld material facts from the Court and neither the officer who carried out the demarcation was examined nor any demarcation report was placed on record and in the absence of same, it was difficult to infer that defendants had raised any construction over the suit land by removing danga. Learned appellate Court further held that PW-1 Moti Ram had admitted in the course of his cross-examination that on Khasra No. 1044/2, 11 houses stood constructed and there was nothing on record to suggest that either suit land was lying vacant on the spot or the said piece of land was exclusively in the ownership and possession of the plaintiff. Learned appellate Court also held that the identity of the land was also not established in view of the fact that the suit land was joint and it was concluded by the learned appellate Court that it could safely be said that the plaintiff had not been able to establish on record that there was any interference on the suit land at the behest of defendants. On these bases, learned appellate Court dismissed the appeal. 9. Feeling aggrieved by the judgments and decrees so passed by both the learned Courts below, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case as well as the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. 11. I will deal with both the substantial questions of law on which the appeal was admitted, independently. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records of the case as well as the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. 11. I will deal with both the substantial questions of law on which the appeal was admitted, independently. Substantial Question of Law No. 1: “Whether the learned first appellate Court while entertaining a doubt about the correctness of demarcation and the report, had erred in not exercising its discretion in allowing the application under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC for appointment of a Local Commissioner to determine the lis inter se the parties and whether the said application could be rejected in the judgment while holding the previous demarcation bad without ordering for a fresh one?” 12. In the present case, there was no demarcation report placed on record by the plaintiff. This is evident from the findings returned in this regard by the learned first appellate Court in para 14 of its judgment, wherein it has been held by the learned trial Court that no demarcation report was placed before the Court by the appellant. The finding so returned by the learned appellate Court is not a perverse finding, because a perusal of exhibits on records demonstrate that no demarcation report was placed on record by the plaintiff. During the course of arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant could not satisfy the Court as to how this substantial question of law arose from either the facts of the case or from the adjudications made by both the Courts below. Therefore, in view of the fact that there was no demarcation report on record, there was no question of learned first appellate Court entertaining any doubt about the correctness of any demarcation report. Therefore, in this view of the matter, the substantial question of law is misleading. 13. Now coming to the issue as to whether the learned appellate Court erred in not exercising its discretion in allowing the application under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for appointment of Local Commissioner “while holding the previous demarcation bad is concerned”, the mode and manner in which the said part of the substantial question of law has been framed, the same is also misleading. This is for the reason that as per record, no application under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for appointment of Local Commissioner was ever filed by the plaintiff before the learned appellate Court. Thus, when no such application was filed, there was no question of learned appellate Court allowing or disallowing the same. Further, as I have already held above, there is no observation or finding returned by the learned appellate Court that “previous demarcation” was bad as is being tried to be demonstrated by the plaintiff. What learned appellate Court held was that plaintiff never placed any demarcation report on record. The factum of no such application under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure having been filed before the learned appellate Court is also evident from the grounds of appeal as have been mentioned in this Regular Second Appeal, in which it is mentioned that learned Courts below erred in not “suo moto” appointing the Local Commissioner to have the suit land demarcated. Therefore, in view of the discussion held above, I hold that the said substantial question of law as framed is misleading and in fact not borne out from either the records of the case or from the adjudications made by both the learned Courts below, as neither plaintiff had placed any demarcation report on record which was disbelieved by the learned Courts below nor any application was filed under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure for appointment of Local Commissioner, which was disallowed by the learned appellate Court. This substantial question of law is answered accordingly. Substantial Question of Law No. 2: “Whether once the learned District Judge had entertained a doubt about the correctness of the report, it was incumbent to have appointed Local Commissioner to demarcate the disputed area instead of proceeding to dismiss the suit, when the plaintiff had proved his case, and whether such impugned judgment and decree is sustainable in law?” 14. This substantial question of law in fact is nothing but an extension of the first substantial question of law, which has already been answered by me above. This substantial question of law in fact is nothing but an extension of the first substantial question of law, which has already been answered by me above. The present substantial question of law is also misleading and not borne out from the records of the case and from the adjudications made by both the learned Courts below, because as I have already held above, as there was no demarcation report on record placed by the plaintiff, there was no occasion for the learned appellate Court to have had entertained any doubt over the same nor learned appellate Court has entertained any doubt about the correctness of the report. In this view of the matter, the present substantial question of law is misleading because it is not as if learned appellate Court went on to adjudicate upon the matter after disbelieving one demarcation report and thereafter not calling upon for another demarcation report to be filed after having the land demarcated. Accordingly, this substantial question of law is answered in above terms. 15. Therefore, in view of the discussion held above, as there is no merit in the present appeal, the same is dismissed with costs and the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. 13 of 2005, dated 19.10.2006 and the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Manali in Civil Suit No. 35 of 2003-93 of 2004, dated 10.01.2005 are upheld. CMP No. 1043 of 2006 16. By way of this application, the appellant/applicant has prayed that additional evidence appended with the present application, i.e. copy of sale deed dated 17.04.2003, copy of demarcation report conducted by the revenue agency at the behest of police, be taken on record. 17. Vide order dated 06.07.2007, the said application was ordered to be heard with the main appeal and the same was accordingly heard with the main appeal. 18. Reason given in the application as to why the documents which are now intended to be placed on record were not initially produced either before the learned trial Court or before the learned first appellate Court, is that inadvertently the same could not be exhibited due to the reason that the demarcation report had not been supplied by police authorities to the applicant. There is no murmur in the application as to why certified copy of sale deed was not previously exhibited either before the learned trial Court or before the learned appellate Court. 19. In Lekhraj Bansal Vs. State of Rajasthan and another (2014) 15 SCC 686 has categorically held that parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence in appellate Court unless conditions stipulated under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure are satisfied. 20. Now, as per the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure, parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the appellate Court, until and unless the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted or the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not even after exercise of due diligence could be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or if the appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. 21. In the present case, the additional evidence which the plaintiff intends to produce on record is not required by this Court for the purpose of adjudication of the case. Incidentally, it is not the case of the plaintiff that either of the learned Courts below refused to admit the evidence which is now intended to be produced by way of the present application. Not only this, it is not the case of the plaintiff that the said documents were not in his knowledge or despite due diligence, he could not produce them earlier. In fact, in my considered view, there is no cogent explanation as to why these two documents, which were well within the knowledge of the appellant/applicant, and which facts demonstrate, were also in his possession, were not produced before the learned Courts below. The feeble attempt made in the application to explain as to why the demarcation report was not earlier produced before the learned Courts below, does not inspire any confidence. Not even a whisper is there as to why the sale deed was not produced before the learned Courts below. The feeble attempt made in the application to explain as to why the demarcation report was not earlier produced before the learned Courts below, does not inspire any confidence. Not even a whisper is there as to why the sale deed was not produced before the learned Courts below. Therefore, filing of the present application is nothing but an attempt to place on record those documents which the plaintiff has omitted to do so and to fill up lacunae and the appellant has failed to satisfy any of the conditions stipulated under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, in my considered view, he is not entitled to produce additional evidence. 22. In State of Karnataka and another Vs. K.C. Subramanya and others (2014) 13 SCC 468 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that additional evidence can be permitted only if the evidence sought to be produced could not be produced at the stage of trial in spite of exercise of due diligence and the evidence could not be produced as it was not within the knowledge of the parties. Hon’ble Supreme Court went on to hold that there are conditions precedent before allowing a party to adduce additional evidence at the stage of appeal, which specifically incorporates conditions to the effect that the party in spite of due diligence could not produce the evidence and the same cannot be allowed to be done at his leisure or sweet will. 23. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in A. Andisamy Chettiar Vs. A. Subburaj Chettiar, AIR 2016 SC 79 has held as under: “Under the scheme of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “the Code”) whether oral or documentary, it is the trial court before whom parties are required to adduce their evidence. But in three exceptional circumstances additional evidence can be adduced before the appellate court, as provided under S. 107(1)(d) read with Rule 27 of Order XLI of the Code. Rule 27 of Order XLI reads as under: - “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. – (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. Rule 27 of Order XLI reads as under: - “27. Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court. – (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if – (a) The Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or (aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or (b) The Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, The Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” (emphasis supplied) From the opening words of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27, quoted above, it is clear that the parties are not entitled to produce additional evidence whether oral or documentary in the appellate court, but for the three situations mentioned above. The parties are not allowed to fill the lacunae at the appellate stage. It is against the spirit of the Code to allow a party to adduce additional evidence without fulfillment of either of the three conditions mentioned in Rule 27. In the case at hand, no application was moved before the trial court seeking scientific examination of the document (Ex.A-4), nor can it be said that the plaintiff with due diligence could not have moved such an application to get proved the documents relied upon by him. Now it is to be seen whether the third condition, i.e. one contained in clause (b) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 27 is fulfilled or not. In K.R. Mohan Reddy Vs. Net Work Inc., this Court has held as under:- “19. Appellate Court should not pass an order so as to patch up the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party before the trial Court, but it will be different if the Court itself require the evidence to do justice between the parties. In K.R. Mohan Reddy Vs. Net Work Inc., this Court has held as under:- “19. Appellate Court should not pass an order so as to patch up the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party before the trial Court, but it will be different if the Court itself require the evidence to do justice between the parties. The ability to pronounce judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce judgment satisfactorily to the mind of the Court. But mere difficulty is not sufficient to issue such direction…….” In North Eastern Railway Admn. Vs. Bhagwan Das, this Court observed thus:- “13. Though the general rule is that ordinarily the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and additional evidence, whether oral or documentary is not admitted but Section 107 C.P.C., which carves out an exception to the general rule, enables an appellate court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. These conditions are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. Nevertheless, the additional evidence can be admitted only when the circumstances as stipulated in the said rule are found to exist……” In Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin and another, this Court has held as under: “49. An application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is to be considered at the time of hearing of appeal on merits so as to find out whether the documents and/or the evidence sought to be adduced have any relevance/bearing on the issues involved. The admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the appellate Court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause. The true test, therefore is, whether the appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced………..” 24. In N. Kamalam (dead) and another Vs. The true test, therefore is, whether the appellate Court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced………..” 24. In N. Kamalam (dead) and another Vs. Ayyasamy and another (2001) 7 SCC 503 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court while interpreting Rule 27 of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, has observed in para 19 as under:- “…….the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 has not been engrafted in the Code so as to patch up the weak points in the case and to fill up the omission in the Court of Appeal - It does not authorise any lacunae or gaps in evidence to be filled up. The authority and jurisdiction as conferred on to the Appellate Court to let in fresh evidence is restricted to the purpose of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way.” 25. Coming to the facts of the present case, as I have already held above, the documents intended to be produced by way of additional evidence are not required by this Court to pronounce judgment, as this Court is in a position to pronounce judgment even without taking into consideration the additional evidence sought to be adduced. 26. Therefore, in the light of discussion held above and the ratio of judgments cited above, there is no merit in the present application and the same is accordingly dismissed. CMP No. 1042 of 2006 27. By way of this application, appellant/applicant has prayed for appointment of a Local Commissioner for the purpose of local investigation and demarcation of the land subject matter of the present appeal. 28. Rule 9 of Order 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure envisages that in any suit in which the Court deems a local investigation to be requisite or proper for the purpose elucidating any matter in dispute etc., the Court may issue a commission to such person as it thinks fit directing him to make such investigation and to report thereon to the Court. 29. 29. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after having gone through the records of the case as well the judgments passed by both the learned Courts below, in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court does not deem it fit to have a Local Commissioner appointed for demarcation of the suit land, as has been prayed for by the appellant/applicant. Why the demarcation carried out before the institution of the suit was not exhibited by the appellant/applicant before the learned trial Court, has not been satisfactorily explained by him. Why no such application was filed either before the learned trial Court or before the learned appellate Court, has also not been satisfactorily explained by the appellant/applicant. Not only this, misleading substantial questions of law were framed so as to give an impression as if there was a demarcation report on record and learned appellate Court despite expressing its doubts over the correctness of the same, failed to appoint a fresh Local Commissioner for the purpose of demarcating the suit land. Even otherwise, application under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not to be allowed at the whims of the parties. Satisfaction has to be that of the Court and though the said satisfaction of the Court can also not be arbitrary, but then there has to be cogent material on record placed by the applicant to satisfy the Court that appointment of Local Commissioner is necessary for the adjudication of lis before it. In the present case, in my considered view, material on record is sufficient for the purpose of adjudication of the appeal and no report of Local Commissioner is required for the purpose of adjudication of the present appeal. Further, in my considered view, none of the issue arising in the present case, involve any scientific investigation. 30. Therefore, in view of the discussion held above, as there is no merit in the present application, the same is dismissed.