Gulam Nabi alias Ballu son of Abdul Sattar v. State of Rajasthan Through PP.
2017-10-31
KAILASH CHANDRA SHARMA, MOHAMMAD RAFIQ
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Mohammad Rafiq, J. 1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated 21st July, 2012 passed by the Court of Additional District Judge, Jaipur District, Jaipur (for short ‘the trial court’) whereby the accused-appellant has been convicted for offence under Sections 498A and 302 IPC and sentenced under Section 302 IPC to life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 2,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo additional rigorous imprisonment for 3 months and under Section 498A IPC, to rigorous imprisonment for 3 years with fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo 3 months’ additional rigorous imprisonment. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. Facts of the case are that FIR No. 38/2011 was registered at Police Station Chandwaji, District Jaipur Rural on the basis of parcha bayan given by one Smt. Raju Bano wife of the accused-appellant Gulam Nabi @ Ballu (Exhibit P-17), which was recorded by Ratan Lal, Sub Inspector of Police Station Chandwaji on 7th February, 2011. FIR was initially registered for offence under Sections 498A, 323 and 307 IPC. During the course of treatment, Smt. Raju Bano succumbed to her injuries, therefore, offence under Section 302 IPC was added and investigation commenced. Upon completion of investigation, the police filed charge sheet against the accused-appellant for offence under Sections 302 and 498A IPC before the court of concerned Magistrate, who committed the case to the trial court. The trial court framed charges under Sections 498A and 302 IPC against the accused-appellant, which he denied and claimed to be tried. The prosecution, in support of its case, produced 13 witnesses and got exhibited 39 documents. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was examined under section 313 Cr.P.C. wherein he stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case. In defence, 4 witnesses were produced and two documents were got exhibited. The trial court, on conclusion of trial, convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant vide impugned judgment in the manner, as indicated above. 3. The impugned judgment is primarily founded on parcha bayan given by the deceased on 7th February, 2011 (Exhibit P-17) and secondly, on the basis of dying declaration (Exhibit P-5) recorded by Manoj Meena, Judicial Magistrate (P.W.1) on 8th February, 2011. The deceased in the parcha bayan alleged that her marriage was solemnized with the accused 7 years ago and she had a son aged about 4½ years.
The deceased in the parcha bayan alleged that her marriage was solemnized with the accused 7 years ago and she had a son aged about 4½ years. Her husband was earning his livelihood by doing the work of tiles fitting. On the fateful day, when the deceased was in her room, the accused came drunk at about 12.00 in the noon. The accused closed the room from inside and threatened the deceased that he would kill her. When she cried for help and tried to open the door, the accused did not allow. A jerrican, full of kerosene, was lying in the room. The accused lifted the jerrican and poured kerosene over the body of the deceased and lit the fire. The deceased opened the door and came out while crying for help. Accused-appellant also came out of the room. Salim Khan, cousin of the accused poured water on the body of the deceased to quench the fire. Then, someone wrapped her body with blanket and extinguished the fire. The deceased became unconscious. When the deceased was admitted in seriously injured condition in SMS Hospital, Jaipur, Assistant Sub Inspector of Police Station Chandwaji (P.W.7) submitted an application to Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jaipur District on 7th February, 2011 praying therein that Magistrate be nominated to record dying declaration of Smt. Raju Bano. Chief Judicial Magistrate nominated Shri Manoj Meena, Judicial Magistrate (P.W.1), who visited the hospital at 6.40 P.M. on 7th February, 2011. He inquired from Dr. Vishal, Senior Resident, Plastic Surgery Department as to fitness of Smt. Raju Bano, who told this witness that she was not in a fit condition to give her statement and also gave a return certificate to that effect. SHO, Police Station Chandwaji on the following day, i.e. 8th February, 2011 again moved an application to Additional Civil Judge (JD) and Judicial Magistrate No. 5, Jaipur District, Jaipur contending that now, as per the opinion given by doctor, the deceased was in a fit condition to give her statement, therefore, her statement be recorded. 4. As per the proceedings drawn by Manoj Meena, Judicial Magistrate (P.W.1) at 11.15 A.M. on 8th February, he visited the hospital. This time, SHO Police Station Chandwaji gave an application to Duty Doctor, SMS Hospital, Jaipur for obtaining fitness certificate of the deceased. Dr.
4. As per the proceedings drawn by Manoj Meena, Judicial Magistrate (P.W.1) at 11.15 A.M. on 8th February, he visited the hospital. This time, SHO Police Station Chandwaji gave an application to Duty Doctor, SMS Hospital, Jaipur for obtaining fitness certificate of the deceased. Dr. Akhilesh Jangid (P.W.9) gave certificate that Smt. Raju Bano was fit to give statement at 11.40 A.M. on 8th February, 2011. It is on this basis that Manoj Meena, Judicial Magistrate (P.W.1) recorded dying declaration of the deceased (Exhibit P-5) in question and answer form. He also drew the proceedings thereof at 11.40 A.M. in a separate sheet that after concluding the statement, he left the hospital at 12.10 P.M. and reached the Court at 12.35 P.M. Be that as it may, the Judicial Magistrate in the dying declaration enquired whether the deceased was staying in the joint family with her mother-in-law and father-in-law, to which she stated that they were staying separately. In answer to a question as to who else was staying with her, she answered that her husband and a minor son, her sister, husband of her sister and their two children were staying with her. At the time of incident, she and her husband were present. In answer to a question that how she got the burn injuries, she stated that her husband poured kerosene over her body and then lit the fire. When it was asked as to why her husband did so, she answered that her husband was a drunkard and he usually used to quarrel with her, whenever he was drunk. When it was asked to her as to why they quarreled this time, she answered that for the reason that her husband fought with her after being drunk but she denied about any demand of dowry being ever made from her. In answer to a question that who burnt her, the deceased held her husband, i.e. accused-appellant as responsible. Lastly, she stated that her husband used to harass her after consuming alcohol and he also used to threaten her that he would put her on fire and it was he, who had put her on fire. 5.
In answer to a question that who burnt her, the deceased held her husband, i.e. accused-appellant as responsible. Lastly, she stated that her husband used to harass her after consuming alcohol and he also used to threaten her that he would put her on fire and it was he, who had put her on fire. 5. Medico-legal Report of the deceased Smt. Raju Bano (Exhibit P-34) was prepared on the same day of incident, i.e. 4th February, 2011, according to which she sustained burn injuries all over her body, having 95% to 100% burns, though in number 6 injuries were indicated. She succumbed to her injuries on 8th February, 2011. Dr. D. K. Nagar (P.W.12) has proved Exhibit P-34 and stated that in his report bed-head ticket number was indicated and it was also indicated that the deceased was not responding to oral commands meaning thereby she was unconscious. It was also mentioned in the report that the deceased was burnt from top to bottom having 95% to 100% burns. Postmortem report of the deceased (Exhibit P-8) indicated following injuries and the cause of death: “Injuries as seen at the time of postmortem examination 1. IInd to IIIrd degree of burn with blackening, peeling off skin, syringing of body hair’s and scalp hair’s (A) Face, Neck as a whole with syringing of scalp hair’s of frontal and temporal at the hair line. (B) Chest and abdomen as a whole in all aspect (C) Both thigh both lip and both feet as a whole with private parts. (D) Both arms, both forearm and both hands as a whole. All injuries are anti-mortem in nature. OPINION– The cause of death in SHOCK (septicemia) in brought about as a result of anti-mortem duly with flame burn, sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature.” 6. Dr. Rajesh Kumar Verma (P.W.2) has proved Postmortem Report of the deceased (Exhibit P-8). 7. Mr. Hemant Gupta and Mr. Deshraj Kalwania, learned counsel for the accused-appellant have argued that Dr. D.K. Nagar (P.W.12), who examined the deceased in a seriously injured condition, has categorically stated in his cross examination that she was not responding to oral commands and was unconscious. Her hairs were burnt and she was burnt from top to bottom.
7. Mr. Hemant Gupta and Mr. Deshraj Kalwania, learned counsel for the accused-appellant have argued that Dr. D.K. Nagar (P.W.12), who examined the deceased in a seriously injured condition, has categorically stated in his cross examination that she was not responding to oral commands and was unconscious. Her hairs were burnt and she was burnt from top to bottom. Rajesh Kumar Verma (P.W.2), who conducted postmortem on the body of the deceased, has stated that the deceased had burns of IInd to IIIrd degree. Her skin was peeled off. Her hairs were burnt; her face and legs were fully burnt. Hairs of front area of head and temporal region were burnt and area covering chest and stomach was fully burnt; both thighs, both legs were also fully burnt; both shoulders and the forearm and both hands were fully burnt. All the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and cause of death of the deceased was shock (septicemia). In cross examination, this witness admitted that skin of the shoulders, fingers and the thumb was fully burnt and skin of the foot was also burnt. Learned counsel therefore argued that such being the position of the deceased, she could not have gained consciousness and therefore, she was not in a position to give any kind of statement. Not only her dying declaration is fabricated, but also her thumb impression on such dying declaration recorded by the magistrate is also not genuine as her hands, forearms and thumbs were fully burnt and therefore her thumb impression could not have been obtained. 8. It is argued that Dr. Akhilesh Jangid (P.W.9), who gave fitness certificate of the deceased, was not competent to give such certificate. He could not prove his duty chart as to whether he was on duty at 11.40 A.M. on 8th February, 2011. Neither he could give such proof to the police nor produce the same before the trial court. This witness in cross examination stated that he saw the patient for 5 minutes and stated that she was conscious during that time. If the deceased was conscious for only 5 minutes, there was no possibility of her dying declaration being recorded.
Neither he could give such proof to the police nor produce the same before the trial court. This witness in cross examination stated that he saw the patient for 5 minutes and stated that she was conscious during that time. If the deceased was conscious for only 5 minutes, there was no possibility of her dying declaration being recorded. Learned counsel argued that parcha bayan (Exhibit P-17) as also dying declaration (Exhibit P-5) of the deceased both were recorded in the presence of family members of the deceased, therefore, she was tutored by them and dying declaration cannot be said to be voluntary, as the deceased was tutored by her family members. Learned counsel submitted that the deceased when stated in her parcha bayan that the incident took place in her room, the deceased did not speak the truth as the evidence collected by the investigating officer clearly proves that the incident took place in the room of her elder sister. Hari Ram (P.W.13), investigating officer, in his statement has admitted this fact that the incident took place in the room of Noori Bano. He also admitted in the cross examination that there were no marks of struggle in the room and that the allegation of the deceased in the parcha bayan that accused tied her mouth with a handkerchief could not be substantiated because no such handkerchief was seized. The investigating officer rather stated that this fact was not proved in his investigation. There were no marks of struggle even in the photographs (Exhibit P-22 to Exhibit P-33). Learned counsel submitted that in fact the accused admitted the fact that he used to harass the deceased and it may be true because the accused was a habitual drunkard and he used to subject his wife to beating, but the evidence does not at all prove that it was he only, who put kerosene over her body and put her on fire. 9. It is argued that the deceased in her parcha bayan alleged that when she came out of the room, Salim Khan, cousin of her husband, poured water on her body and someone wrapped her body by blanket to quench the fire. The police neither recorded statement of said named eyewitness Salim Khan, nor produced him as a witness of prosecution.
It is argued that the deceased in her parcha bayan alleged that when she came out of the room, Salim Khan, cousin of her husband, poured water on her body and someone wrapped her body by blanket to quench the fire. The police neither recorded statement of said named eyewitness Salim Khan, nor produced him as a witness of prosecution. However, the defence has produced Salim Khan as D.W.3, who has stated that when Smt. Raju Bano came out of the room, she was burning and this witness poured water over her body. Then, her husband, i.e. accused-appellant put his arms around her and in that processing process, he burnt his hand and face. At that time, Shabbir Khan and Kajod also came there. Shabbir put blanket over her body. Shabbir has also been examined as D.W.4, who has made similar statement. Learned counsel argued that Noori Bano, elder sister of the deceased was also an eyewitness, who has not been produced by the prosecution, but the defence has produced her as D.W.1. She has stated that the deceased Smt. Raju Bano wanted to prepare tea and told her to go to her room. She lit the stove. Since kerosene in the stove was not sufficient, therefore, she was trying to get the jerrican of kerosene oil plaved over ‘tand’ (an upper shelf in a room). Since the jerrican was open, the oil fell on her body and she caught fire from the stove. She came out of the room while burning. Salim poured water over her body and Shabbir put blanket on her body. 10. Learned counsel argued that Suleman, father of the deceased (P.W.3); Bano, mother of the deceased (P.W.4) and Babu Khan, elder brother of father of the deceased (P.W.5) have all admitted that the deceased was taken to hospital by the accused and his family members and that entire expenditure of her treatment was incurred by the accused and the accused himself was present in the hospital.
This explains that the deceased, who might have been annoyed with the accused, in the parcha bayan as also in dying declaration deliberately made a false statement, but in fact, the accused in order to save her put his arms around her body and got himself burnt, which is evident from the note written by the investigating officer in the arrest memo of the accused (Exhibit P-14) that his left hand upto elbow was burnt and that his cheek was also burnt by left side. It is true that the dying declaration of a person, who is having fear of imminent death is entitled to greatest amount of value, but at the same time, the court must weigh all the attending circumstances to find out whether such dying declaration inspire confidence and can be believed or not. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the deceased was burnt on 4th February, 2011 and was not in a position to give statement till 7th February, 2011, then suddenly she gained consciousness and gave statement on 8th February, 2011 and ultimately died on 11th February, 2011, which cannot be believed. The dying declaration of the deceased has thus been recorded in suspicious circumstances. Learned counsel, in support of their arguments, relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in Surinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana, (2011) 10 SCC 173 ; State of Punjab Vs. Gian Kaur and Another, AIR 1998 SC 2809 ; Ramilaben Hasmukhbhai Khristi & Another Vs. State of Gujarat, (2002) 7 SCC 56 ; Panneerselvam Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2008) 17 SCC 190 ; Kake Singh alias Surendra Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1982 SC 1021 . It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be allowed and the accused-appellant be acquitted of all the charges framed against him by the trial court. 11. Mr. R.S. Raghav, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the appeal and argued that there is no reason why the parcha bayan as also dying declaration of the deceased should not be believed. Parcha bayan of the deceased was recorded by Ratan Lal (P.W.7) Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, who had no reason to falsely implicated the accused-appellant.
11. Mr. R.S. Raghav, learned Public Prosecutor opposed the appeal and argued that there is no reason why the parcha bayan as also dying declaration of the deceased should not be believed. Parcha bayan of the deceased was recorded by Ratan Lal (P.W.7) Assistant Sub Inspector of Police, who had no reason to falsely implicated the accused-appellant. Besides, parcha bayan sounds quite natural because the deceased, even when she was in a seriously injured condition, has not alleged anything against any other member of the family of the accused-appellant but has alleged only against the accused that it was he, who put kerosene over her body and lit the fire. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that the burn injuries received by the accused could have been received when he was trying to put the deceased on fire and not in the process of saving her. 12. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that merely because the deceased was not in a position to give statement on 7th February, 2011 at 7:00 P.M as certified by Dr. Vishal does not mean that she could not gain consciousness on the following day, which fact has been proved by Dr. Akhilesh Jangid (P.W.9), who gave the fitness certificate that the deceased was in fit condition and Mukesh Meena, Judicial Magistrate (P.W.1), who proved this fact in his statement that the deceased was fully conscious and was oriented to understand the implications of the proceedings. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that minor discrepancies in the investigation should not be a basis to discard the entire prosecution case. It is argued that an inspection team inspected place of incident and gave its report (Exhibit P-19), which has been approved by Suresh (P.W.10), which indicated that there were two broken pieces of bangle of red colour near the gate and pieces of papers were also found there. Newspaper placed over the ‘tand’ was also found burnt. A synthetic rope was also burnt. Learned Public Prosecutor invited attention of the Court towards photograph of the place of incident, especially Exhibit P-33, showing plastic cane of kerosene oil. 13.
Newspaper placed over the ‘tand’ was also found burnt. A synthetic rope was also burnt. Learned Public Prosecutor invited attention of the Court towards photograph of the place of incident, especially Exhibit P-33, showing plastic cane of kerosene oil. 13. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that Suleman (P.W.3); Bano (P.W.4); Babu Khan (P.W.5) and Habib Khan (P.W.6) have also stated that Raju Banu told that it was the accused-appellant, who put kerosene over her body and all the family members were attending the deceased and it cannot be believed that Raju Banu would make a false statement against the accused-appellant at the instance of her relatives. In any case, allegation that dying declaration is fabricated is totally baseless, particularly when it has been recorded by Judicial Magistrate, who has entered witness box to prove the same. Learned Public Prosecutor referred to site plan (Exhibit P-12) and submitted that investigating officer has put a note therein that the accused and his family members had washed the house and systematically arranged the goods, which shows that an effort was made by the accused and his family members to destroy the evidence, even then the police found a kerosene jerrican and match box in the room where the incident took place. Learned Public Prosecutor in support of his arguments relied upn the judgments of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ram Sagar Yadav & Others, (1985) 1 SCC 552 ; Ramawati Devi Vs. State of Bihar (1983) 1 SCC 211 ; Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1982) 1 SCC 700 ; Nanhau Ram & Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1988 (Supp) SCC 152 and Prabin Ali & Another Vs. State of Assam, AIR 2013 SC 542 . It is, therefore, prayed that the appeal be dismissed and the judgment passed by the trial court be affirmed. 14. We have given our anxious consideration to rival submissions and carefully scanned the material available on record. 15. It is no doubt true that the deceased in the parcha bayan recorded on 4th February, 2011, when she was in seriously injured condition, made a specific allegation against the accused that he came home around 12.00-1.00 in the noon in a highly drunk state. While both were in the room, the accused-appellant closed the room from inside and threatened the deceased that he would kill her.
While both were in the room, the accused-appellant closed the room from inside and threatened the deceased that he would kill her. When she cried for help, he tied her mouth with a handkerchief. When she tried to open the door, the accused-appellant did not allow her to do so. The accused poured kerosene over her body from a plastic cane and picked the matchbox, which was lying near by the stove and then lit the fire. She then opened the door and came out of the room while burning. Accused-appellant also came out of the room. Salim Khan (D.W.3) poured water over her body and then someone put blanket around her to quench the fire. However, the investigating officer, Hari Ram (P.W.13) in his statement has failed to explain as to why he did not record statement of Salim Khan (D.W.3), Shabbir Khan (D.W.4) and Noori Bano (D.W.1) who could have been the best witness of the incident and they should have been produced by the prosecution but they were produced by the defence. Besides, the Investigating Officer has also admitted that the incident had not taken place in the room of the deceased as she alleged in parcha bayan but rather the incident happened in the room of her elder sister, Noori Bano (D.W.1), which is the case of the defence as well. Investigating officer has also stated that his investigation did not prove that the mouth of the deceased was tied by the accused by a handkerchief and no such handkerchief could be recovered. 16. Noori Bano (D.W.1) elder sister of the deceased has given a different story of the incident. She has stated that Raju Banu wanted to prepare tea for herself. She (this witness) told her to go to her room. Raju Bano went inside. Even though she had lit the stove but it did not have enough kerosene, therefore, she approached ‘tand’ of the room to get the jerrican of kerosene, which was open, therefore, the kerosene accidentally fell over her body and she caught fire from the burning stove. She has stated that Salim (D.W.3), who happened to be cousin of the accused, poured water over the body of the deceased and Shhabbir (D.W.4), who happened to be elder brother of her husband, put blanket over the deceased. 17.
She has stated that Salim (D.W.3), who happened to be cousin of the accused, poured water over the body of the deceased and Shhabbir (D.W.4), who happened to be elder brother of her husband, put blanket over the deceased. 17. Bundu Khan (D.W.2) elder brother of the appellant has also made similar statement and stated that when the accused saw the deceased in burning condition, he (accused-appellant) put his arms around her body and also sustained burn injuries. Even if presence of Bundu Khan (D.W.2) is not believed, then also, presence of Salim Khan (D.W.3) at the place of occurrence has to be believed because of what has been stated by the deceased in her parcha bayan. He has also stated that when Raju Bano came out of the room, he poured water over her body to quench the fire and that accused-appellant put his arms around her body in order to save her and Shabbir Khan (D.W.4) put the blanket over her body. Shabbir Khan, cousin of the accused-appellant (D.W.4) has also corroborated this story and stated that when the blanket was put around the body of the deceased, accused-appellant Gulam Nabi put his arms around her body with an object to save her and in that process, he also sustained burn injuries. When we look at the arrest memo of the appellant, this fact is corroborated that he had burnt his left hand from wrist to elbow and also left cheek. There is no explanation to the fact that as to why the investigating officer did not get the accused-appellant medically examined, therefore, we have to view the parcha bayan and dying declaration of the deceased in this light. Even though, the deceased might have given the kind of statement that is attributed to her, which reflects that she used to be harassed and beaten by the accused, mostly when he was drunk and on the day of incident also it is alleged that the accused-appellant came in a drunken state. Therefore, if the deceased has made allegation that it was accused, who put kerosene over her body and put her on fire, cannot be straight away believed.
Therefore, if the deceased has made allegation that it was accused, who put kerosene over her body and put her on fire, cannot be straight away believed. Besides, no evidence has been led to explain that when the deceased was admitted in the hospital on 4th February, 2011, why no efforts were made for getting her dying declaration recorded on 5th and 6th February, 2011 and why such effort was made on 7th February, 2011. 18. Proceedings drawn by Manoj Meena, Judicial Magistrate at 7.00 P.M. on 7th February, 2011 indicates that when he went to Bed No. 40 in Burn Ward of SMS Hospital, treating doctor Vishal, Senior Resident, Plastic Surgery Department told him that the injured was not in a position to give statement and on the second day, i.e. 8th February, 2011, when statement was recorded by Judicial Magistrate therein the deceased alleged that her husband used to beat her after consuming alcohol and that he used to quarrel with her in a drunken state. Family members of the deceased, especially her mother Bano (P.W.4); father, Suleman (P.W.3); her two uncles namely Babu Khan (P.w.5) and Habib Khan (P.W.6) were all alone with the deceased at the time of her treatment. All these witnesses have stated that it was accused and his family members, who brought the deceased to the hospital and incurred entire expenses of her treatment. If the accused had an intention of putting his wife on fire, his normal conduct would have been to run away from the place of incident and not be available around the deceased. Conduct of the accused-appellant in the present case goes in his favour. Besides, possibility of the deceased being tutored and prompted cannot be ruled out, particularly keeping in view the fact that these witnesses also stated that the accused used to harass the deceased and he was habitual drunker. It is no doubt true that a dying declaration can be relied to convict the accused even without its corroboration and it can be the sole basis for conviction, if it inspires confidence of the Court. 19. The Supreme Court in Jumni & Others Vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 11 SCC 355 set aside conviction of accused-appellants therein which was based on dying declaration.
19. The Supreme Court in Jumni & Others Vs. State of Haryana, (2014) 11 SCC 355 set aside conviction of accused-appellants therein which was based on dying declaration. The Supreme Court taking into consideration the evidence in that case concluded that it is not possible to discount the theory suggested by defence that the case was possibly one of suicide out of extreme frustration and not of murder. Following observation of the Supreme Court are worth quoting: “37. On a reading of the dying declaration it is quite clear that Asha Devi was very disturbed on the morning of 5-4-1996 and that is why she broke her bangles in the presence of Jumni. This may be because of the events of the previous day or her being a victim of continuous harassment. This, coupled with a lack of response from Jumni on the morning of 5-4-1996 may have completely frustrated Asha Devi leading her to commit suicide. Whatever be the cause of Asha Devi being upset, the evidence of Puran Chand has not been challenged and so it cannot be glossed over. In the face of this, it is not possible to discount the theory suggested by learned counsel that the case was possibly one of the suicide out of extreme frustration and not of murder. 38. It is true that when a person is on his or her death bed, there is no reason to state a falsehood but it is equally true that it is not possible to delve into the mind of a person who is facing death. In the present case the death of Asha Devi and the circumstances in which she died are extremely unfortunate but at the same time it does appear that for some inexplicable reason she put the blame for her death on all her in-laws without exception. Perhaps a more effective investigation or a more effective cross-examination of the witnesses would have brought out the truth but unfortunately on the record as it stands, there is no option but to give the benefit of doubt to Jumni (and Sham Lal) and to hold that they were not proved guilty of the offence of having murdered Asha Devi.” 20. The Supreme Court in Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi 2011 (1) WLC (SC) Cri.
The Supreme Court in Atbir vs. Government of NCT of Delhi 2011 (1) WLC (SC) Cri. 107 : (2010) 9 SCC 1 -, while revisiting its previous judgments in Munnu Raja vs. State of M.P. (1976) 3 SCC 104 , Paras Yadav vs. State of Bihar - (1999) 2 SCC 126 , Balbir Singh vs. State of Punjab 2006 - (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 631 : (2006) 12 SCC 283 , State of Rajasthan vs. Wakteng 2007 (2) WLC (SC) Cri. 405:(2007) - 14 SCC 550, Bijoy Das vs. State of W.B. 2008 (2) WLC (SC) - Cri. 325: (2008) 4 SCC 511 , Muthu Kutty vs. State 2005 (2) - WLC (SC) Cri. 216: (2005) 9 SCC 113 , Panneerselvam vs. 25 State of T.N. (2008) 17 SCC 190 -, culled out the following principles to be kept in view while dealing with a case of dying declaration: “(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the Court. (ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. (iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. (iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. (v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity such as the deceased was unconscious and could never make any statement cannot form the basis of conviction. (vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be rejected. (viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail.
(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded. (ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail. (x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. “ 21. The parameters aforesaid indicate that dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction, if it inspires full confidence of the Court, which in the present case is lacking. Another parameter laid down by the Supreme Court is that dying declaration cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. 22. In the facts of the present case, we are not inclined to rely on the dying declaration of the deceased without its corroboration and therefore, even if we do not believe the statement and ignore the statement of Dr. D.K. Nagar (P.W.12), who stated that forearms and hands of the deceased were fully burnt including her thumb and fingers. Thumb impression of the deceased could not have been obtained on the dying declaration. Very many attending circumstances, even otherwise, makes dying declaration suspicious, thus, necessitating corroboration, which is found wanting in the present case. Thus, guilt of the accused-appellant cannot be held to have been proved by the required standard of beyond reasonable doubt; which entitles him to benefit of doubt. 23. In view of above discussion, present appeal deserves to succeed and is allowed. Impugned judgment dated 21.07.2012 passed by the trial court is set aside and the accused-appellant is acquitted of the charges under Section 302 and 498-A IPC. Accused-appellant is in jail and be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case. 24.
In view of above discussion, present appeal deserves to succeed and is allowed. Impugned judgment dated 21.07.2012 passed by the trial court is set aside and the accused-appellant is acquitted of the charges under Section 302 and 498-A IPC. Accused-appellant is in jail and be set at liberty forthwith if not required to be detained in any other case. 24. Keeping, however, in view the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Accused-appellant, namely, Gulam Nabi alias Ballu is directed to forthwith furnish a personal bond in the sum of Rs.20,000/- and a surety bond in the like amount, before the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, which shall be effective for a period of six months, undertaking that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of leave, he, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Supreme Court.