JUDGMENT AND ORDER : Sanjeev Prakash Sharma, J. Petitioner has challenged the award dated 14/02/2007 whereby the reference dated 21/01/1986 as regards the petitioner has been rejected. 2. Case of the petitioner is that a joint reference of nine workmen was made on 21/01/1986, however, on account of absence of notice to the petitioner-workman, he could not put in appearance and could not file his affidavit due to which ex-parte proceedings were undertaken against him. So far as the other six workmen, who had put in appearance, are concerned, the award was passed in their favour and they were directed to be reinstated and the management reinstated them in service after they foregone their back wages. 3. On coming to know about the said facts, the petitioner-workman moved an application for setting aside the ex-parte proceedings against him and his application was allowed by the Labour Court on 07/10/2003 and was further allowed to submit the statement of claim. The statement of claim was thereafter submitted. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that case of the petitioner was similar to that of the other six workmen. He, therefore, submitted the same claim as submitted by the other six workmen. The Labour Court has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that there is no date mentioned in the terms of reference on which the petitioner was terminated from service. Learned counsel submits that firstly, there is no such requirement under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 for mentioning the date of termination in the reference. Secondly, on such a technical ground, the reference cannot be rejected as has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Agra Electric Supply Company Limited, Agra v. Workmen : (1983) 1 SCC 436 wherein it has been held as under:— “It is plain that industrial jurisprudence is an alloy of law and social justice and one cannot be too pedantic in construing the terms of a reference respecting a dispute for industrial adjudication. Liberally viewed, we are left with the impression that the Tribunal's construction of the terms of reference is correct. The question referred may be dichotomised. Was the retirement of the workmen legal and justified? If not, what compensation was payable to them? The first limb of the reference contains the pregnant impression “justified”. Liberally viewed, we are left with the impression that the Tribunal's construction of the terms of reference is correct. The question referred may be dichotomised. Was the retirement of the workmen legal and justified? If not, what compensation was payable to them? The first limb of the reference contains the pregnant impression “justified”. It is one thing to say, speaking in terms of industrial jurisprudence that an action is legal. It is another thing to say that it is justified. When the reference is comprehensive enough to cover both these concepts, it is within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to investigate into whether the retirement is legal and, if legal, whether it is also justified. In the ordinary law of contracts, when a thing done is legal there is an end of the matter but in industrial law the rigid rules of contract do not govern the situation and an amount of flexibility in the exercise of powers taking liberties with the strict rights of parties is permitted to Tribunals. Relying on a series of decisions of this Court for this wider ambit of jurisdiction permissible in industrial adjudication, the Tribunal has held that the grievance of the workmen that their services should come to an end by way of retirement without payment of gratuity is real and substantial and that pragmatic considerations justify a direction for payment of gratuity more or less prevalent in many industries in the region. This approach is informed by social justice, and it is not for us to fault the Tribunal when it makes a direction for payment of gratuity. We read the award in a composite and comprehensive sense as an award that the retirement is justified if it is accompanied by payment of gratuity. The dissection attempted in the submission made by learned counsel is a distortion of the true intendment of award. In this view, we think there is no substance in the first contention. 5. In the case of Om Prakash (Dead) by Lrs. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak (2002) 10 SCC 412, it was held as under:— “3. We have been taken through the award made by the Tribunal. The Tribunal approached the matter in a very technical way. In this view, we think there is no substance in the first contention. 5. In the case of Om Prakash (Dead) by Lrs. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Rohtak (2002) 10 SCC 412, it was held as under:— “3. We have been taken through the award made by the Tribunal. The Tribunal approached the matter in a very technical way. The substance of the reference made to the Tribunal was in regard to putting an end to the services of the appellant and the scope of reference should have been understood in that light as to whether the termination of services of the appellant was justified or not. Indeed the law is clear on the matter that whenever the service of an employee is put to an end even on the ground of abandonment of service it must be in terms of the Standing Orders and in the present case there is no compliance with the terms of the Standing Orders. The appellant was absent from work on account of his being detained by the police from 9-9-1970 to 16-1-1971 when he was enlarged on bail.” 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that parity had to be maintained with regard to the workman whose reference was commonly made by the Government. Merely because the award has been separately passed in the case of the petitioner, distinction cannot be drawn from the award which has been passed earlier. Learned counsel has taken this Court to the earlier award passed in favour of the other workmen relating to the same reference dated 21/01/1986 wherein the award has been passed on 28/04/1988. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that it is not only on account that the date of termination has not been mentioned in the reference but also on the ground that there was a discrepancy in the statement made by the workmen about his date of appointment. While the employer mentioned of appointing the workman from August, the workman in his statement of claim had mentioned his appointment from 15 the September of the year 1981. Noting the said discrepancy, the statement was not found to be truthful by the learned Labour Court. However, he admits that the reference was made commonly for all the workmen and the other workmen have already been reinstated subject to foregoing back wages. 8. Noting the said discrepancy, the statement was not found to be truthful by the learned Labour Court. However, he admits that the reference was made commonly for all the workmen and the other workmen have already been reinstated subject to foregoing back wages. 8. Appreciating the fair stand taken by the learned counsel and noting that the reference is the same as answered in the award dated 28/04/1988 as well as the impugned award, this Court finds that a gross error has been committed by the learned Labour Court in rejecting the reference so far as the petitioner-workman is concerned. As per the judgments, noted above, too technical approach by the Tribunal/Labour Court is not healthy for the purpose of disposal of the disputes raised under the Act of 1947. The workman cannot be said to be in a capacity to formulate the terms of reference and if the employer has any objection to the terms of reference, it is always open for them to have got the reference amended. In some circumstances, even the workman may do so. 9. However, that would not deter this Court from examining the present case where the terms of reference were same for all the workmen but different awards have been passed. The discrepancy of the date of appointment shall not affect the number of days, the workman has worked. As per respondents' reply petitioner worked for more number of days. Keeping in view that the issue of the workman having worked for almost one year is not denied by the respondents in their reply to the statement of claim, this Court set asides the award dated 14/02/2007 impugned herein and holds the removal of the petitioner-workman from service as illegal and unjustified with further directions to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner. However, in view of the similar approach adopted by the respondents of reinstating without back wages, same order needs to be passed in the present case also as the parity has to be maintained at all levels. 10. Accordingly, it is directed that the respondents shall reinstate the petitioner-workman with continuity of service, however, the back wages shall not be payable to him upto the date of award dated 14/02/2007 wherafter the petitioner-workman shall be given the same status and benefits as given to the other workmen mentioned in the reference. Arrears shall be calculated and released accordingly. Accordingly, it is directed that the respondents shall reinstate the petitioner-workman with continuity of service, however, the back wages shall not be payable to him upto the date of award dated 14/02/2007 wherafter the petitioner-workman shall be given the same status and benefits as given to the other workmen mentioned in the reference. Arrears shall be calculated and released accordingly. The compliance of this order shall be made by the respondents within a period of three months of receipt of certified copy of this order in their office. 11. The writ petition stands allowed in the terms as indicated above.