ORDER : Meenakshi Madan Rai, J. 1. By filing this Petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Petitioner/Appellant seeks condonation of fifty-five days delay in filing the Appeal. 2. It is averred that the Judgment and Award was pronounced by the learned Member, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, East Sikkim at Gangtok (for brevity “learned Tribunal”) on 21.09.2016 in MACT Case No. 9 of 2016. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, applied for a certified copy on 17.12.2016 and the Appeal ought to have been filed by 21.12.2016. That, the Kolkata Branch after receiving the Judgment copy forwarded the same to the Jaipur Head Office. As per the internal procedure, the Jaipur Head Office sent back the file to Kolkata Divisional Office for appointing an Advocate but due to practical problems, the File took considerable time to reach the Kolkata Branch Office. That, the reasons assigned constitute sufficient cause besides, the Insurance Company being a Government undertaking ought to be afforded some flexibility in case of delay due to the fact that some time is taken for papers to be processed. That, the Petitioner has a good case on merits and will suffer irreparable loss and injury, if the delay is not condoned. 3. Vehemently opposing the Petition, learned Counsel for the Respondents contended that in the first instance, after the Judgment was pronounced on 21.09.2016, the Petitioner took their time to obtain copies of the Judgment which was done only on 17.12.2016, much after the pronouncement of the Judgment. Thereafter, no dates have been assigned pertaining to the File movement and merely because the Petitioner allegedly has a good case on merits, delay cannot be condoned if the grounds are devoid of “sufficient cause”. The grounds for delay shown by the Petitioner does not amount to sufficient cause, hence the Petition deserves no consideration and ought to be rejected. 4. I have given careful consideration to the submissions put forth by the parties. As pointed out by learned Counsel for the Respondents, it is indeed appalling that although the impugned Judgment was pronounced on 21.09.2016, the Petitioner deemed it fit to apply for a copy thereof only on 17.12.2016. 4. I have given careful consideration to the submissions put forth by the parties. As pointed out by learned Counsel for the Respondents, it is indeed appalling that although the impugned Judgment was pronounced on 21.09.2016, the Petitioner deemed it fit to apply for a copy thereof only on 17.12.2016. It is not denied that the Petitioner was represented before the learned Tribunal by a counsel, therefore, there ought to have been no delay in obtaining certified copy of the Judgment. In fact, the procurement of the Judgment is almost at the end of the period of limitation of ninety days granted to file the appeal. Thereafter, the Petitioner has tried to assign reasons for the delay by stating that the File went from Kolkata to Jaipur and back and due to practical problems, the time elapsed leading to delay. 5. Firstly, it has to be observed that dates of File movement have not been elucidated. The Petitioner cannot put forth the reason that it is a settled position of Law that government undertakings have to be permitted some flexibility in cases of condonation of delay. This is not a blanket rule, it depends on the facts and circumstances. I am constrained to opine that a pathetic state of affairs appears to be existing in the administration of the Petitioner Company with no direction and adherence to time schedule. This is not the first petition of the Petitioner that lays down the same baseless grounds for delay. This Court has oft repeated that the Law of Limitation is for the purpose of maintaining discipline in judicial proceedings. Also, the Law does not envisage discrimination amongst litigants, be they private litigants or government agencies or for that matter government undertakings. Every litigant is expected to adhere by the time schedule put forth in the relevant statute. Latitude can be given by the Court only if the grounds put forth are found to be substantial and reasonable. It goes without saying that the party is entitled to wait till the last date of limitation for filing appeal but when limitation expires, he has to establish “sufficient cause” as required by Law when seeking condonation of delay. 6. Besides that, in the instant Petition, the provision of Law for condoning delay that ought to have been invoked is the proviso to Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 6. Besides that, in the instant Petition, the provision of Law for condoning delay that ought to have been invoked is the proviso to Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This provision lays down that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal on time. The grounds resorted to by the Petitioner lack in substance. They have taken steps at a leisurely pace and thereafter expect latitude from the Court. The crux of the provision deals with “prevented by sufficient cause”, these words cannot be lost sight of and every endeavour is to be made by the party applying for condonation of delay to establish that ground, which I am afraid is sadly lacking in the case at hand. 7. That, having been said, we may remind ourselves that the Motor Vehicles Act is a social welfare legislation, a benevolent legislation under which compensation is provided to the aggrieved party on account of the death of a kin. Procedural technicalities cannot be allowed to defeat the benevolent purposes of the Act. The Petitioner, on pain of repetition, has failed to act promptly and diligently in pursuing the matter, I find that the grounds lack bona fides and the Petitioner must suffer for its inaction, while at the same time it cannot by its attitude make the Respondents suffer. Delay cannot be condoned mechanically on the grounds of administrative exigencies, hence in the end result and in view of the facts and circumstances discussed hereinabove, the Petition deserves no other end but a dismissal. 8. Consequently, Appeal also stands dismissed.