JUDGMENT : 1. Though served, none appears for the respondent workman. 2. Challenge in SCA No.1168 of 2016 is to the award and order dated 21/09/2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No.224 of 2012 whereby the office order No.91/12/DCR/TRA/D/16392 imposing a punishment of reduction of salary by five stages upon the workman came to be set aside while reviving the salary of the workman to a stage it was as on the date of the said order, with a further direction to treat the period between the date of said order and the date of award as a notional period for consequential benefits accruing to the workman on account of said award. 2.1 Challenge in SCA No.7335 of 2016 is to award dated 08/10/2015 passed by the Industrial Tribunal in Reference (IT) No. 227 of 2012 whereby office order No. 100/ DCR / TRA /D/ 17280 dated 14/08/1987 imposing punishment of stoppage of one increment with future effect came to be substituted with the stoppage of one increment without future effect and workman was held to be entitled to receive the notional benefits for the period between the date of the said office order and the date of the award. 2.2 The first respondent was employed as a conductor in the transport facility in which the petitioner Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation is engaged. He is stated to be a habitual offender ; having been subjected to 23 punishments in past including stoppage of five increments with permanent effect by office order dated 1.8.1987 which is subject matter of challenge. 2.3 Services of the workman were terminated declaring him unfit; with effect from 10.2.2006. After 21 years of punishment and after two years of his termination of service, two separate industrial disputes came to be raised as referred to herein above by union. The dispute in both the cases was referred to the Industrial Tribunal at Rajkot under references aforestated. 2.4 Submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner raise following questions: (i) Whether a delayed demand reference after 21 years sans explanation was maintainable ? (ii) Whether the judicial pronouncements in relation to the punishment in the nature of cessation of employment could have been applied to the cases involving punishments other than cessation of employments in demand references ? (ii) Whether the judicial pronouncements in relation to the punishment in the nature of cessation of employment could have been applied to the cases involving punishments other than cessation of employments in demand references ? (iii) Whether in demand reference, the principles regarding belated disputes enunciated in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Another (2015) 15 SCC 1 can be applied? 3. Apropos delayed or stale reference, the learned counsel for the petitioner drew the attention of this court to the averments made by the workman in his statement of claim to an effect that he has been pursuing the matter with the petitioner from time to time and eventually after notice by Union, the dispute was raised and reference was made. The learned counsel submitted that this was not an adequate and sufficient explanation for the delay of 21 years. In the submission of the learned counsel, appropriate Government ought to have considered various questions concerning delay, laches and acquiescence as indicated in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Another (supra). 3.1 The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that irrespective of the party raising the question of delay, laches, acquiescence or waiver; a duty is cast upon the judicial authority under the Industrial Disputes Act to consider the said aspect before exercising jurisdiction in view of the decision in Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota v. Mohan Lal (2013) 14 SCC 543 . 4. To appreciate the contention with regard to delay, acquiescence, laches and waiver and the duty of the judicial authority constituted under the Industrial Disputes Act to consider such question at the threshold before entering into adjudication of the case on merits, suffice it would be to refer to Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota (supra). In the said case, in paragraph No. 19 it has been observed thus: “We are clearly of the view that though Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to the reference made under the I.D. Act but delay in raising industrial dispute is definitely an important circumstance which the Labour Court must keep in view at the time of exercise of discretion irrespective of whether or not such objection has been raised by the other side. The legal position laid down by this Court in Gitam Singh that before exercising its judicial discretion, the Labour Court has to keep in view all relevant factors including the mode and manner of appointment, nature of employment, length of service, the ground on which termination has been set aside and the delay in raising industrial dispute before grant of relief in an industrial dispute, must be invariably followed.” (emphasis supplied) 4.1 In Prabhakar (supra) various principles in regard to delay, laches, acquiescence, waiver and existence of the dispute and satisfaction of the appropriate Government regarding such existence of live dispute and the definition of the ‘industrial dispute’ and the ‘dispute’ have been elaborately explained. 4.2 The relevant principles of law in Prabhakar (supra) as summarized in paras 42.1 to 42.6 are thus: “42.1 An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that ’any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended’. The words ’industrial dispute exists’ are of paramount importance unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2 Dispute or difference arises when one party make a demand and other party rejects the same. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2 Dispute or difference arises when one party make a demand and other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary pre-condition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exist. 42.3 Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose, he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute seized to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances discloses that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4 Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2A of the Act. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the labour authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5 Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6 In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an ’existing dispute’. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted.” 4.3 Broadly speaking, under the Industrial Disputes Act, there can be a reference for certain demands made by Union for the workmen or the reference of the individual nature raising a dispute against the cessation of employment which may be raised by the workmen under section 2A of the Act. The demand made by the Union may rest on the cause of action or it may be a fresh demand not based upon cause of action. In the demand not accruing on cause of action, the Union on behalf of the workmen may demand certain benefits or alterations in the conditions of service of the workmen to their benefits. For example, termination of employment of workman in masses may furnish a cause of action to the Union to raise a demand for their reinstatement. 4.4 The Apex Court in Prabhakar (supra) was concerned with the case arising out of cessation of the employment of the workmen. The case was thus based upon the cause of action. Thus, where the case is based upon cause of action, the principles laid down in Prabhakar (supra) would apply. 4.5 In the instant case, the punishment upon the workman was imposed 21 years back. The cause of action, therefore, arose for the workman to raise industrial dispute 21 years ago. He, therefore, owed an explanation for belated raising of the industrial dispute. The principles regarding belated reference laid in Prabhakar (sura) can therefore be applied to the case of the respondent workman even if the dispute was referred to on account of the demand made by the Union. In the opinion of this court, the Union owed an explanation for belated industrial dispute; which never came forth. Having regard to the principles laid in Prabhakar (supra), it was the duty of the Industrial Tribunal to examine whether live industrial dispute existed on the date of its reference and in view of Assistant Engineer, Rajasthan State Agriculture Marketing Board, Sub-Division, Kota (supra), even in absence of contention by the first party the said question required consideration by the Tribunal. No such exercise was done. No such exercise was done. 4.6 Apropos the question whether the judicial pronouncement in relation to punishment in the nature of cessation of employment could have been applied to the cases involving punishment other than cessation of employment in demand reference, the answer should be in the negative for the following reasons: 4.7 In South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union v. Kerala State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd. and others (2006) 5 SCC 201 , the Apex Court was dealing with the case where a punishment of reversion as factory clerk came to be imposed upon the Assistant Personnel Manager of the concerned establishment. Industrial dispute was raised wherein inquiry was found to be in order inasmuch as it was in compliance with the principles of natural justice. No perversity, impropriety or invalidity was noticed in the inquiry. In the above contextual facts, the Supreme Court in paragraph No. 16 of the judgment ruled thus: “The Labour Court had earlier held that the enquiry was properly held and there was no violation of the principles of natural justice and that the findings were not perverse. The vitiating facts found by the Labour Court against the enquiry are erroneous and are liable to be set aside. If enquiry is fair and proper, in the absence of any allegations of victimization or unfair labour practice, the Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed. Section 11A of the Act gives ample power to the Labour Court to reappraise the evidence adduced in the enquiry and also sit in appeal over the decision of the employer in imposing punishment. Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of a workman as clearly mentioned in the Section itself. Before the introduction of Section 11A in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen [(1958) SCR 667] this Court held that the Tribunal does not act as a Court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the Management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. on the part of the management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice, victimisation etc. in this case. on the part of the management. There is no allegation of unfair labour practice, victimisation etc. in this case. The powers of the Labour Court in the absence of Section 11A is illustrated by this Court in Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management [ (1973) 1 SCC 813 ]. When enquiry was conducted fairly and properly, in the absence of any of the allegations of victimisation or malafides or unfair labour practice, Labour Court has no power to interfere with the punishment imposed by the management. Since Section 11A is not applicable, Labour Court has no power to re-appraise the evidence to find out whether the findings of the enquiry officer are correct or not or whether the punishment imposed is adequate or not. Of course, Labour Court can interfere with the findings if the findings are perverse. But, here there is a clear finding that the findings are not perverse and principles of natural justice were complied with while conducting enquiry.” (emphasis supplied) 4.8 What can be noticed from the above quotation is that section 11A of the Act is only applicable in the case of dismissal or discharge of the workman. Section 11A came to be introduced as a consequence of the decision in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workmen (supra). The said provision enhanced the scope of judicial authorities contemplated under the said provision in the matter of dismissal or discharge of a workman. Before the amendment, jurisdiction of the above referred authorities was circumscribed and interference was warranted only when there was want of good faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice etc., irrespective of the nature of punishment i.e. even the cases of discharge and dismissal were governed by the said principles. This has been reiterated in paragraph No. 16 above, while relying upon Workmen of Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. The Management (supra). 4.9 Thus the case of South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union (supra) settles the legal position that section 11A of the Act would apply only in case of dismissal or discharge of a workman and while examining the cases other than dismissal or discharge, the powers of the judicial authorities would continue to suffer fetters indicated in several judicial pronouncements. 4.9 Thus the case of South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union (supra) settles the legal position that section 11A of the Act would apply only in case of dismissal or discharge of a workman and while examining the cases other than dismissal or discharge, the powers of the judicial authorities would continue to suffer fetters indicated in several judicial pronouncements. In other words, such cases cannot be examined beyond the parameters like perversity, lack of bona fides, breach of procedural requirements during inquiry, victimisation; unfair labour practice and the likes. 4.10 However, the learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly pointed out the decision rendered in Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. D.V. Chauhan 2006(2) G.L.H. 64 (Full Bench) wherein the scope of relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act including section 11A, section 7 read with second Schedule thereof came to be considered and eventually it was observed in paragraphs No. 10 and 11 thus: “10. There is no disagreement amongst the parties that Section 11A deals with punishments of discharge or dismissal. Disagreement is whether the Labour Court/ Tribunal have jurisdiction to interfere in cases of other punishments? Managements say `no' while workmen say `yes'. Prior to incorporation of Section 11A, Labour Court/ Tribunal was guided by judicial pronouncements and interfered with punishments irrespective of their nature but the situation took turn by Apex Court decision in Indian Iron & Steel Company Limited v. Their Workmen (supra), limiting the jurisdiction to (i) when there is want of good faith, (ii) when there is victimization or unfair labour practice, (iii) when the management has been guilty of basic error or violation of principle of natural justice, and (iv) when on the materials, the finding is completely baseless or perverse. While prescribing these conditions, the Apex Court also said that management may have power to direct its own internal administration and discipline but the power is not unlimited. When an industrial dispute arises, Industrial Tribunals/ Labour Courts have been given powers to see whether termination of service of a workman is justified and to give appropriate relief, adding further that in cases of dismissal or discharge, the Industrial Tribunal / Labour Court does not act as a Court of Appeal and substitute its own judgment for that of the management. As to what is the extent of interference in cases of other punishments, the Apex Court does not opine in Indian Iron & Steel Company Limited v. Their Workmen (supra). Therefore, jurisdiction in such cases is left untouched, which means, Labour Court/ Tribunal can interfere to the extent permitted by judicial pronouncements and facts of individual case. While examining the legality and propriety of the order, subject matter of industrial dispute, irrespective of nature of punishment, without being exhaustive, same can be (1) want of good faith, (2) victimization or unfair labour practice, (3) basic error or violation of principles of natural justice, (4) finding completely baseless or perverse, (5) colourable exercise of power or want of bonafide, (6) punishment shockingly disproportionate in the facts of the case, and (7) conduct of workman/ workmen, present or past. 11. Adverting to the question, which of the two judgments referred to by the Division Bench (Coram: R.S. Garg & Ravi R. Tripathi, JJ.) decides the law correctly, our answer is, Section 11A may exclusively deal with cases of discharge or dismissal, but criteria, after common reference under Section 10, to decide an industrial dispute is same, namely, the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule. In other words, in all cases of punishments, Labour Court/ Tribunal can examine the legality and propriety of punishment, irrespective of nature thereof. Scope of examination of an industrial dispute and extent of interference is same irrespective of the fact that Section 11A deals specifically with cases of discharge or dismissal, because, as said, in all cases, it is the legality and propriety of the order passed by the employer which is to be examined. In cases of discharge or dismissal, the Labour Court/ Tribunal exercises power under Section 10 read with Section 11A read with the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule, while in other cases, it exercises jurisdiction under Section 10, read with the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule. In cases of discharge or dismissal, the Labour Court/ Tribunal exercises power under Section 10 read with Section 11A read with the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule, while in other cases, it exercises jurisdiction under Section 10, read with the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule. Mere mention of Section 11A while exercising power in cases of punishments other than discharge or dismissal would not make the order illegal since jurisdiction to interfere is traceable to Section 10, read with the Second Schedule and the Third Schedule.” (emphasis supplied) 4.11 It may be noted that the Court was also concerned with the demand references other than section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act and in paragraph No. 10 it acknowledged the well settled principles of law that while examining legality and propriety of the order which is made subject matter of industrial dispute, irrespective of the nature of the punishment without being exhaustive can be (1) want of good faith; (2) victimization or unfair labour practice; (3) basic error of violation of principles of natural justice; (4) finding completely based on perverse; (5) colourable exercise of powers or want of bona fide; (6) punishment shockingly disproportionate in the facts of the case; and (7) conduct of workman/workmen, present or past. The above categories are not exhaustive but only illustrative as ruled in numerous cases. 4.12 It can however be seen that according to D.V. Chauhan (supra) in case of punishment other than the one resulting into cessation of employment; the Labour Court/Tribunal can examine its legality and propriety and the scope of examination of an industrial dispute and the extent of interference is same as section 11A. The reasons for taking the said view in D.V. Chauhan (supra) were that in Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Their Workman (supra) the extent of interference in cases of other punishments was not opined and was left untouched. However, as indicated above, in South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union (supra) which was pronounced on May 12, 2006 i.e. later in point of time than the pronouncement in D.V. Chauhan (supra) on 21.3.2006, circumscribed jurisdiction of the Labour Court/Tribunal came to be reiterated. However, as indicated above, in South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union (supra) which was pronounced on May 12, 2006 i.e. later in point of time than the pronouncement in D.V. Chauhan (supra) on 21.3.2006, circumscribed jurisdiction of the Labour Court/Tribunal came to be reiterated. Thus following South Indian Cashew Factories Workers’ Union (supra) it must be held that the scope of interference in punishment other than discharge or dismissal where the enquiry is found to be just, legal, valid, fair, not suffering from perversity and is in compliance with the principles of natural justice etc., is limited to the parameters indicated therein. In other words, in cases other than the punishment of discharge or dismissal the workman, in order to succeed, will have to show either (1) want of good faith; (2) victimization or unfair labour practice; (3) basic error of violation of principles of natural justice; (4) finding completely based on perverse; (5) colourable exercise of powers or want of bona fide; (6) punishment shockingly disproportionate in the facts of the case; and (7) conduct of workman/workmen, present or past. The above categories are not exhaustive but only illustrative as ruled in numerous cases. 4.13 On facts of the case, it is found that without binding itself to the circumscribed jurisdiction, the Tribunal seems to have sat in appeal and re-appreciated the evidence by invoking section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act which approach, in the light of the observations made in this judgment, was erroneous and unsustainable. It is worthwhile to note that the Tribunal interfered with the punishment despite being aware of the fact that the compliance of the procedural aspects during inquiry was not in dispute. After noting the said fact, it unnecessarily doubted the validity and propriety of the inquiry only because the workman did not produce the inquiry papers before it. It was also erroneous on the part of the Tribunal to throw the burden on the employer to prove the legality and validity of the inquiry despite there being no dispute in that regard. 5. In the above circumstances, the impugned judgment and award cannot be sustained. The petitions, therefore, deserve to be allowed. Accordingly, both the petitions are allowed. The impugned judgments and awards are quashed and set aside. The punishment imposed by the petitioner upon the respondent workman in each case is upheld. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No costs. 5. In the above circumstances, the impugned judgment and award cannot be sustained. The petitions, therefore, deserve to be allowed. Accordingly, both the petitions are allowed. The impugned judgments and awards are quashed and set aside. The punishment imposed by the petitioner upon the respondent workman in each case is upheld. Rule is made absolute accordingly. No costs. Petitions allowed.