JUDGMENT AND ORDER : This application u/s 482 read with section 483 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is preferred by the petitioner for quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 14.10.2016, passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, No.1, Kamrup (M), Guwahati in Crl. A. No.62/2015 affirming the judgment and order dated 29.06.2015, passed by the learned JMFC, Kamrup(M), Guwahati in D.V. Case No.124M/2009, wherein the learned trial court came to the finding that the dispute involved in the D.V. Case No. 124M/2009 relates to property and is purely a dispute of civil nature and criminal court does not have jurisdiction to decide the same and as such the dispute needs to be decided by taking evidence by the civil court. 2. Heard Mr. P. K. Roy Choudhury, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and also heard Mr. U. K. Barman, learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 3. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner has brought to the notice of this court that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No.1, Kamrup (M), Guwahati by its judgment dated 11.7.2012, passed in Crl. A. No. 62/2015, arising out of the said D.V. Case No. 124M/2009, u/s 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has specifically observed that the present petitioner is not entitled to the second floor of the apartment where the aggrieved party is residing, claiming the same to be her portion of the shared house and the report dated 25.06.2014, the Protection Officer clearly reveals that the aggrieved person is also occupying the room in the terrace of the second floor which were constructed by the present petitioner. 4. Mr. Choudhury, further contends that the respondent herein did not challenge the order of the appellate court dated 11.07.2012, passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge No.1, Kamrup(M), Guwahati in Crl. A. No.62/2015 as well as the report dated 25.06.2014 which was submitted by the Protection Officer before the learned Magistrate, Kamrup(M), Guwahati. 5. In controversion, Mr. Barman, learned counsel for the respondent wife submits that she was allowed to occupy the second floor of the building by both the learned courts below which was in her occupation and the rooms of the terrace of the building were in occupation of her driver and maid servant prior to passing of the protection order by the learned court. 6. 6. Before adverting to the submissions, it is necessary to have an overview of the factual aspect of the case leading to the filing of this petition. 7. The respondent herein who is the wife of the petitioner filed an application u/s 12 of the D.V. Act, being registered as D.V. Case No.124M/2009, seeking protection u/s 18 of the Act. The learned trial court upon consideration of the petition and the report of the Protection Officer granted interim relief to the respondent wife vide order dated 01.12.2009 by restraining the petitioner husband; “(a) From entering the place of residence of the respondent, located at Shanti Path, House No. 326, R.G. Baruah Road, Guwahati-24, and particularly the second floor of the apartment where the respondent is residing. (b) From entering the business place of the respondent, located at North Guwahati, Abhayapuri, College Nagar, and from causing any violence to her employees and dependents and further directed that (c) The appellant shall stay away from the respondent and her employees and shall cause to the respondent no violence and shall do not act which amounts to domestic violence.” 8. Aggrieved by the order the petitioner husband filed a petition before the learned trial court praying for modification/alteration of the order and accordingly, the said petition was disposed of by the learned trial court by modifying the aforesaid interim order by allowing the petitioner to enter into his business premises but the remaining part of the order was kept intact. Against the aforesaid order the petitioner preferred an appeal where the appellate court vide order dated 11.07.2012 allowed the petitioner to enter into the house being situated at Shanti Path, R.G. Baruah Road but restrained him from entering into the second floor of the aforesaid house where his wife was residing. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition before the learned trial court alleging violation of the order dated 11.07.2012 of the appellate court which was dismissed by the learned trial court vide order dated 09.09.2014 after receiving a report from the concerned District Social Welfare Department Officer and the Protection Officer. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order in the appellate court and the said appeal was dismissed by the appellate court granting liberty to the petitioner to file appropriate petition seeking appropriate relief. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid order in the appellate court and the said appeal was dismissed by the appellate court granting liberty to the petitioner to file appropriate petition seeking appropriate relief. Thereafter, the petitioner filed two petitions before the learned trial court with a prayer to drop the aforesaid proceedings against him and to direct the respondent to vacate the ground floor and the 3rd floor of the aforesaid house but the learned trial court after hearing both the parties dismissed both the petitions vide order dated 26.06.2015. 9. Being highly aggrieved by the order, the appellant preferred appeal before the appellate court but the appellate court also affirmed the order so passed by the learned trial court. 10. The contention of the petitioner before the learned trial court is that after dissolution of the marriage between the parties by a decree of divorce, there was no relationship of husband and wife and on this count alone the proceeding under D.V. Act should be dropped but during the hearing of this petition Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the petitioner conceded that in view of the judgment of the Apex Court in Juveria Abdul Masjid Patni vs Atif Iqbal Mansoori in Crl.A.No.2069/2014 once an act of domestic violence is committed subsequent decree of divorce will not absolve the liability. 11. In view of the settled legal position the proceeding cannot be dropped. Mr. Choudhury contends that taking advantage of the restraint order passed by the court the respondent wife forcefully occupied the terrace of the 2nd floor where the rooms were constructed by the petitioner for his own occupation and she is liable to be evicted from these rooms in her occupation. 12. The contention of Mr. Barman, learned counsel for the respondent is that the rooms are in occupation of the respondent even before passing of the order by the court and these are in occupation of her driver and maid servant and no eviction order can be passed for their eviction. Before adverting to the submissions it is necessary to have an overview of the law relating to Domestic Violence. 13. The D.V. Act provides for the right of woman to reside in her matrimonial home or shared household, whether or not she has any right or title in such home or household. The Act empowers the Magistrate to pass residence order. 13. The D.V. Act provides for the right of woman to reside in her matrimonial home or shared household, whether or not she has any right or title in such home or household. The Act empowers the Magistrate to pass residence order. Section 17 of the Act provides that the aggrieved person shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the respondent save in accordance with the procedure established by law. Section 25 of the Act empowers the Magistrate, in changed circumstances, on an application made by the aggrieved person or the respondent to alter, modify or revoke the order, but the reasons must be recorded in writing. 14. The D.V. Act only empowers the Magistrate to pass protection order in favour of the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent from aiding or committing an act of domestic violence or any such specified Act. Section 2 defines “aggrieved person” which means any women who is or has been in domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. From the objective of the act itself it is apparent that the act was enacted by the legislature to give protection to the women who is in domestic relationship with the respondent. There is no provision in the Act for giving protection to the respondent(husband). Rule 15 of the Rules provided under the D.V. Act only speaks of protection to “aggrieved person” which is obviously an women. 15. In the instant case, admittedly the protection order was passed in favour of the wife and although the petitioner claimed that taking advantage of the order she occupied rooms on the terrace of the 2nd floor, the court is not empowered to order her eviction from the rooms. Proper recourse in such cases for the petitioner is to approach civil court seeking appropriate relief. The petitioner was restrained by the learned courts from interfering with the possession of the respondent in respect of the 2nd floor of the house and since no protection order was passed in respect of the other parts of the building he cannot be prevented from going to the other parts including the terrace of the building. 16. The petitioner was restrained by the learned courts from interfering with the possession of the respondent in respect of the 2nd floor of the house and since no protection order was passed in respect of the other parts of the building he cannot be prevented from going to the other parts including the terrace of the building. 16. From the order passed by the learned appellate court it appears that the learned court directed the parties to appear before the learned lower court to enable the court to record evidence but in my considered view such an exercise is not contemplated under the Act, even if the allegations brought by the petitioner against the respondent is eventually found to be true that would not empower the court to order eviction of the respondent wife from the rooms situated on the terrace of the building and the only available remedy in such cases is to approach the civil court for adjudication of the dispute. 17. In view of the above, the petition is found to be devoid of merit and is dismissed relegating the petitioner, if so advised, to approach the civil court for final adjudication of the dispute between them.