JUDGMENT : 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the tribunal whereby the tribunal has partly allowed the appeal filed by the assessee and modified the order of CIT(A) to the extent of partly allowing the appeal. 2. This court while admitting the appeal on 21.2.2017 framed following substantial question of law:— “1. Whether on the facts and material available on record and in law the ld. ITAT was justified in holding that the assessee appellant was not entitled to exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab)/10(23C)(iv) of the Act”? 3. The facts of the case are that assessee appellant is an autonomous body established for the purpose of publication of books in Hindi language for post graduate student of Universities in India as per the Education Policy decision of the Ministry of Education & Social Welfare, Department of Education, Government of India. 4. The Board is functioning in public interest with no motive of profit or for profit. The Board is functioning under the management, Control & Supervision of the Government of Rajasthan. As per the directions of Shiksha Aur Samaj Kalyan Mantralaya (Shiksha Vibhag), Bharat Sarkar, Delhi the assessee appellant was to carry on its activities under Centrally Sponsored Scheme of publication of books at the University level in different languages by the creation of a Revolving Fund. 5. The assessee appellant filed its return of income for the assessment year 2010-11 on 28.9.2009 and claimed exemption u/s 10(23)(iv) of the Act. 6. The respondent vide order dt. 30.11.2012 passed u/s 143(3) of the Act held that the assessee appellant's income is not earned on account of educational activities and hence no benefit can be granted u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) or u/s 10(23C)(iv) of the Act. The ld. AO also held that the assessee appellant is carrying on the publication and sale of books and is not carrying on any charitable work and the work carried out by the assessee appellant is more in the nature of trade, commerce & industry. 7. The provision of claim of the institution regarding benefit u/s 10(23C)(iiiab)/10(23C)(iv) of the Act was rejected. 8. 7. The provision of claim of the institution regarding benefit u/s 10(23C)(iiiab)/10(23C)(iv) of the Act was rejected. 8. The provisions of Section 10(23C)(iiiab)/10(23C)(iv) Act which reads as under:— Section 10 (23C)(iiiab) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit, and which is wholly or substantially financed by the State Government, or Section 10(23C)(iv) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 any other fund or institution established for charitable purposes [which may be approved by the prescribed authority], having regard to the objects of the fund or institution and its importance throughout India or throughout any State or States; or 9. Counsel for the appellant Mr. Ranka contended that present appellant assessee is registered and granted exemption u/s 12AA vide certificate on 7.11.2007 and carrying on their activity only for the purpose of publication of the educational books which are given to the educational institutions where summary of income of the assessee is as under:— Nature of Income Gross Receipts % of Gross Receipts Interest Income 55,86,364/- 30.79% Misc. Income 99,025/- 0.55% Grant-in-Aid from Government of Rajasthan 1,24,10,000/- 68.40% Surplus on publication books 49,178/- 0.27% Total Receipts 1,81,44,567/- 100.00% 10. He contended that CIT(A) while considering the matter had not considered the judgments which are relied upon by the counsel for the appellant and rejected the appeal and confirmed the order of AO. The tribunal has also rejected the appeal on this ground however, allowed the appeal on other ground. 11. He Contended that the tribunal wrongly relied upon the observations of the CIT(A). 12. However, regarding benefit u/s 10(23C)(iv), Mr. Ranka has not pressed into service his arguments. 13. He further contended that the issue is now squarely covered by the decision of Delhi High Court in Council for the Indian School Certificate Examinations v. DGIT reported in (2012) 362 ITR 436 (Delhi) wherein it has been held as under:— 4. Reading of section 10(23C)(iv) shows that any University or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes qualify under the clause. The University and the educational institution should not be for the purposes of profit. The second requirement is negative in nature, whereas the first requirement is positive. Reading of section 10(23C)(iv) shows that any University or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes qualify under the clause. The University and the educational institution should not be for the purposes of profit. The second requirement is negative in nature, whereas the first requirement is positive. We cannot accept the contention of the Revenue and the reasoning given in the impugned order that the petitioner is not an educational institution because it is an examination body and its principal work is to conduct examination and charge examination fee, etc. The words “educational institution” used in Section 10(23C)(vi) and the phrase “educational purpose” have been interpreted and examined in several cases. We have a direct decision of Orissa High Court in the case of Secondary Board of Education v. ITO, (1972) 86 ITR 408 (Ori). The Secondary Board of Education was conducting examinations and a question arose whether it was an educational institute or not. It was held that the Secondary Board of Education exists solely for educational purpose and, therefore, an educational institution. The aforesaid Board had been created to control secondary education, prescribe courses of study and award certificates to the successful candidates. It was to conduct examinations, etc. The aforesaid activities undertaken by the Board, it was observed, qualify and were for the purpose of education. Thus, the Board was an educational institution. The High Court rejected the contention that fee, etc. for the said services, constitute and should be regarded as activities for purpose of profit. We may note that there is no allegation in the impugned order dated 08.10.2008 that the petitioner is engaged in activities for purposes of profit. 5. An institution established for educational purpose need not conduct teaching classes, is no longer a matter of doubt or ambiguity and was examined by the Supreme Court in Assam State Text Book Production and Publication Corporation Ltd. v. CIT (2009) 319 ITR 317 (SC). The said corporation: was engaged in publication of text books for the students and had claimed exemption under Section 10(22) of the Act. The Revenue disputed and claimed that the corporation was not an educational institution. The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the High Court and held that the said corporation was engaged in educational purposes and, therefore, an educational institution entitled exemption under Section 10(22) of the Act. The Revenue disputed and claimed that the corporation was not an educational institution. The Supreme Court reversed the finding of the High Court and held that the said corporation was engaged in educational purposes and, therefore, an educational institution entitled exemption under Section 10(22) of the Act. The said corporation was not engaged or conducting teaching classes or directly imparting education through teachers. In the said case the Supreme Court noticed the judgment of Orissa High Court in the case of Orissa Secondary Board Education and approved the ratio and principle enunciated therein. Reference was made to the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in CIT v. Rajasthan State Text Book Board, (2000) 244 ITR 667 (Raj.). This judgment was approved. Rajasthan State Text Book Board (supra) was not engaged in teaching students or holding classes but publication of text books. 7. Recently, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT v. M.P Rajya Pathya Pustak Nigam, (2009) 226 CTR (MP) 497 examined a similar question and after referring to several decisions has held that the term educational purpose was not restricted merely to holding of teaching class or lectures but educational purpose was equally served when educational text books were published. It is, therefore, clear that courts have laid emphasis on the activity undertaken, while construing or deciding whether or not a particular institution can be regarded as an educational institution. The courts have repeatedly held that the holding of classes is not mandatory for an institution to qualify and to be treated as an educational institution. If the activity undertaken and engaged is educational, it is sufficient. 8. When we apply the aforesaid principle to the admitted nature of activity undertaken by the petitioner, we have no hesitation in quashing the impugned order dated 08.10.2008 and holding that the petitioner is an educational institution. Writ of certiorari is accordingly issued. The petitioner/authorised representative will appear before the competent authority on 10.04.2012, when a hearing will be provided and thereafter an order in accordance with law will be passed within 60 days of the said hearing. We may clarify that we have not examined other issues and with reference to the order dated 23.03.2010 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 10(23C)(iv) of the Act for exemption. These issues and questions are left open. The writ petition is disposed of. No costs. 14. We may clarify that we have not examined other issues and with reference to the order dated 23.03.2010 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner under Section 10(23C)(iv) of the Act for exemption. These issues and questions are left open. The writ petition is disposed of. No costs. 14. He also relied upon the decision of Delhi High Court in Delhi Bureau of Text Books v. DIT (E) reported in ITA No. 807/2015 dated 3.5.2017 (Delhi) wherein it has been held as under:— 17. Countering the above submissions, Mr. Rahul Kaushik, learned Senior standing counsel for the Revenue, sought to support the impugned order of the ITAT by pointing out that the level of profits earned by the Appellant during the AYs. in question took its activity outside the ambit of a ‘charitable purpose’. He submitted that the ITAT was justified in negativing the plea by relying on the decision in Sole Trustee, Loka Shikshana Trust v. CIT (supra). While Mr. Kaushik was unable to dispute that the activity of the Appellant involved ‘education’, he maintained that the Appellant did not satisfy the requirement of the proviso under Section 2 (15) of the Act viz., that the activity should not be related to ‘trade, commerce or business’. 20. The Court first considers the question of the interpretation placed on the word ‘education’ occurring in Section 2 (15) of the Act. The exclusive activity of the Assessee is the publication and printing of text books and their distribution to Government schools and schools of the MCD, NDMC, etc. This activity has continued uninterruptedly since the time of its inception, i.e, from AY 1971-72 onwards. The fact that the Assessee is a non-profit organisation is not in dispute. Its essential activities are administered by the BODs comprising of officers of the Government of India as well as GNCTD, in its ex officio capacity. The textbooks are provided by the Assessee to the students at subsidized rates. Even the textbooks books, reading materials and school bags are being distributed free to deserving students. The essential activity of the Assessee is connected with ‘education’ and nothing else. 27. Reverting to the case on hand, the Court finds that what the ITAT has held in the impugned order is contrary to the settled law as explained in the above decisions. The essential activity of the Assessee is connected with ‘education’ and nothing else. 27. Reverting to the case on hand, the Court finds that what the ITAT has held in the impugned order is contrary to the settled law as explained in the above decisions. The ITAT came to the erroneous conclusion that merely because the Assessee had generated profits out of the activity of publishing and selling of school text books it ceased carrying on the activity of ‘education.’ The ITAT failed to address the issue in the background of the setting up of the Assessee, its control and management and the sources of its income and the pattern of its expenditure. The ITAT failed to notice that the surplus amount was again ploughed back into the main activity of ‘education’. The question to be asked was whether the activity of the Assessee contributed to the training and development of the knowledge, skill, mind and character of students? In the considered view of the Court, the answer to that question had to be, in the facts and circumstances outlined above, in the affirmative. 15. He also relied upon the decision of Patna High Court in Bihar State Text Book Publication Corpn. v. CIT (2011) 241 CTR 403 (Ratna) wherein it has been held as under:— 7. The spirit of the quondam section 10(22) was to exempt the income of a university or other educational institutions existing solely for the educational purpose and not for the purpose of profit. As stated hereinabove, this provision has been omitted with effect from 1.4.1999, and has been substituted by section 10(23C) of the Act. It is evident on a perusal of the relevant provision of section 10(23C), that the spirit of exemption from taxability of the income of the university or other educational institution without profit motive runs through the newly inserted provision with details added therein. Section 10(23C)(iii ab) appears to us to be of paramount importance in the present case and has been reproduced hereinabove. There is no denying the position that the assessee is an instrumentality of the State Government, and a government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, which carries out the mandate of the State Government, enshrined in Chapter-IV of the Constitution and summarized hereinabove. There is no denying the position that the assessee is an instrumentality of the State Government, and a government company within the meaning of section 617 of the Companies Act, which carries out the mandate of the State Government, enshrined in Chapter-IV of the Constitution and summarized hereinabove. It strives to carry out the directive principles of Chapter-IV of the Constitution and as per the direction of the State Government supplies books to students at low prices, the subsidy coming from the State Government. In such a situation, its charitable nature and character is in no doubt, and is dependent on the State finance. The fact that, in pursuit of its charitable purpose, it registers some income in its balance-sheet will not per se make it to be a profit-making organization. An organization of this size has to maintain its infrastructure and the staff which needs money. This kind of seemingly apparent income is really not Per Se indicative of profit-making. We are of the view that the activities of the assessee are covered by section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Act. The motive, the aims and objective, the purpose and the nature of its activities have to be adjudged, and are the relevant basic indicia. 8. We must consider the question of applicability of section 10(23C)(iiiad) to the present case. The admitted position is that the gross receipts of the assessee exceeds Rs. one crore. Applicability of section 10(23C)(iiiad) to the present case is obviated because the provision is applicable to those educational institutions with turn-over upto Rs. one crore. The gross receipts of the present assessee exceeds Rs. one crore and cannot, therefore, be within the mischief of section 10(23C)(iiiad) of the Act. 12. The ratio of the judgments discussed above is that the grant coming from the Government will qualify for exemption from taxation if the same was granted for a particular purpose of public utility or public importance, or to alleviate a situation affecting the general public, and cannot be used for any other purpose. The subsidy from the Government would be taxable if it can be used for any purpose the assessee likes including its trade and business, would then be in the nature of trade receipts and taxable. In other words, the basic question to be determined is whether a subsidy from payment from public funds is in the nature of capital or revenue. In other words, the basic question to be determined is whether a subsidy from payment from public funds is in the nature of capital or revenue. In the case of the former, it is not taxable, and is taxable in case of the latter. 16. He also relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in Assam State Text Book Production & Publication Corpn. v. CIT, Gauhati (2009) 319 ITR 317 (SC) wherein it has been held as under:— 3. On going through the records, we find that the High Court has not taken into account the prior history of the case, particularly in the context of incorporation of the Corporation under the Companies Act, 1956, as a Government Company. Initially, as stated above, the assessee was a State-controlled Committee and Board, which were attached to the office of the Director of Public Instruction, State of Assam. It is only in the year 1972 that the Government Company got constituted under Section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. That, prior to 1972, the entire funding for the working of the Committee/Board was done by the State of Assam and that even the ownership of the assets remained vested in the State of Assam which stood transferred to the Corporation in 1972 when it got incorporated under Companies Act, 1956. It is important to note that the assessee is a Government Company. It is controlled by the State of Assam. The aim of the said Corporation is to implement the State's policy on Education. That, Clause 21 of the Memorandum and Articles of Association provides a Return on Investment to the State of Assam. That, in the year 1975, in a similar situation, Central Board of Direct Taxes [for short, “C.B.D.T”] had granted exemption under Section 10(22) of the Act vide letter dated 19th August, 1975, to Tamil Nadu Text Books Society, which performed activities similar to those of the assessee. The letter dated 19th August, 1975, is referred to in the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rajasthan State Text Book Board reported in 244 I.T.R 667. As can be seen from the facts of that case, a similar question came up for consideration before the Rajasthan High Court, namely, whether Rajasthan State Text Book Board was entitled to exemption under Section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961? As can be seen from the facts of that case, a similar question came up for consideration before the Rajasthan High Court, namely, whether Rajasthan State Text Book Board was entitled to exemption under Section 10(22) of the Income Tax Act, 1961? One of the arguments advanced in that case on behalf of the Revenue was that the assessee was making profit on account of publishing and sale of text books and, consequently, it was not entitled to the benefit of exemption under Section 10(22) of the Act. However, the High Court noticed the letter issued by C.B.D.T on 19th August, 1975 in the case of Tamil Nadu Text Book Society which, as stated above, in similar circumstances had granted exemption to the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society as an Educational Institution within the meaning of Section 10(22) of the Act. The judgment of the High Court further recites that, under a similar situation, the C.B.D.T had also extended benefit of exemption under Section 10(22) of the Act to the Orissa Secondary Board Education, as reported in Secondary Board of Education v. Income Tax Officer, 86 I.T.R 408. Following these circulars/letters issued by C.B.D.T, the Rajasthan High Court came to the conclusion that the assessee in that case, namely, Rajasthan State Text Book Board, was entitled to claim the benefit of exemption under Section 10(22) of the Act. The operative part of the Rajasthan High Court's judgment reads as under: It is not disputed before us that the aims and objects of the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society and those of the respondent-assessee are almost identical. It is also not shown to us that the surplus amount, if any, of the respondent-assessee, is used for any other purpose or distributed to other members. The Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal have noticed that even if some amount remains surplus, that is utilised only for the purposes of education. Thus, having regard to the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and the Tribunal and also taking note of the letter of the Central Board of Direct Taxes itself, it is not possible for us to say that the order of the Tribunal is erroneous in any way. In this way, no question of law arises for consideration much less a substantial question of law. 17. In this way, no question of law arises for consideration much less a substantial question of law. 17. He also relied upon the decision of Rajasthan High Court in CIT v. Rajasthan State Text Book Board (2000) 113 Taxman 204 (Raj.) wherein it has been held as under:— “It could be seen from the orders of the Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the tribunal that, in a similar situation, in the case of Tamil Nadu Text Book Society, the CBDT, as per the letter dt. 19.8.1975 and F. No. 184/26 of 1975, stated that the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society was an educational institution, existing solely for the purpose of education, within the meaning of Sec.10(22). It was not disputed that the aims and objects of the Tamil Nadu Text Book Society and those of the assessee were almost identical. It was also not shown that the surplus amount, if any, of the assessee, was used for any other purpose or distributed to other members. The Commissioner (Appeals) as well as the Tribunal had noticed that even if some amount remained surplus, that was utilised only for the purposes of education. Thus, having regard to the concurrent finding of act recorded by the Commissioner(Appeals) and the tribunal has also taking note of the letter of the CBDT itself, it was not possible to say that the order of the tribunal was erroneous in any way. In this way, no question of law arose for consideration, much less a substantial question of law. 18. He also relied upon the decision of Orissa High Court in Secondary Board of Education v. ITO (1972) 86 ITR 408 (Orissa) wherein it has been held as under:— “Under the Orissa Secondary Education Act, 1953, the Board has a fund. There were various sources of income constituting the fund. One of the sources of income was earning profits by compilation, publication, printing and sale of text books. The profits so earned entered into the Board fund. The income and expenditure of the Board was controlled and the entire expenditure was to be directed towards development and expansion of educational purposes. Even if, there was some surplus it was not appropriated by others remained as part of the sinking fund to be devoted to the cause of education as and when necessary. The income and expenditure of the Board was controlled and the entire expenditure was to be directed towards development and expansion of educational purposes. Even if, there was some surplus it was not appropriated by others remained as part of the sinking fund to be devoted to the cause of education as and when necessary. Thus the object did not involve the carrying on the activity for the purpose of profit. The object was to carry on the activity of advancement of education which incidentally resulted in profits which in their return were devoted to the cause of education. This being the objection and there being various way of control of the income and expenditure, the Board of Secondary Education could not be said to be existing for purposes of profits. It existed solely for purposes of education. The income of the Board could not, therefore, be computed in the total income of the previous year u/s 10(22). The ITO exercised his 19. He also relied upon the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in CIT v. Madhya Pradesh Rajya Pathya Pustak Nigam (2009) 318 ITR 497 (MP) wherein it has been held as under:— 17. From a perusal of the aforesaid decisions, it is lucid that for the entitlement for getting exemption for the assessment year, it is required to see the activities of the assessee. That is the acid test. If the income/profit is applied for non-educational purposes, it is decided only at the end of the financial year. It is to be seen whether the assessee is engaged in any kind of educational activities. The authorities which we have referred to above have laid down the criteria under what circumstances, an assessee can claim exemption being involved in educational purposes and how the income is spent. We have already referred to the memorandum of association and also stated about reasonings assigned by the CIT (Appeals) to deny the exemption and the analysis made by the Tribunal to dislodge the finding of the first appellate authority. It is worth noting that the Assessing Officer has not ascribed any reason. 20. We have already referred to the memorandum of association and also stated about reasonings assigned by the CIT (Appeals) to deny the exemption and the analysis made by the Tribunal to dislodge the finding of the first appellate authority. It is worth noting that the Assessing Officer has not ascribed any reason. 20. He also relied upon the decision of Karnataka High Court in DIT v. Dhampakasha Rajakarya Prasakta B.M Sreenivasiah Educational Trust (2015) 372 ITR 307 (Karnataka) wherein it has been held as under:— “Section 10(23C) of the income tax act, 1961-Educational institutions (institutions substantially financed by Government) Assessment years 2003-04 and 2005-06-Assessee was running a number of educational institutions-Assessing Officer declined to grant relief claimed by assessee u/s 10(23C)(iiiab)-material on record disclosed that Government had financed assessee-institutions and its share was 25 per cent. Further, it was not existing for fake of profit making-whether when 25 per cent of finance to assessee-institutions flowed from Government, it constituted substantial finance and it satisfied all legal requirement provided u/s 10(23C)(iiiab)-whether, therefore, assessee would be entitled to benefit provided u/s 10(23C)(iiiab).” 21. However, counsel for the respondent Mr. Jain strongly contended that while considering the matter, the CIT(A) has he matter and observed as under:— “3.3 The submission of the appellant was forwarded to the AO for his comments. The AO has stated in the remand report dt. 23.12.2013, which is as under:— “In this connection it is submitted that the assessee “Rajasthan Hindi Granth Academy” is claiming exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee has produced various documents and material before you in support of his claim. The same have been duly verified and considered by the office of the undersigned. However, the assessee could not produce any material in support of his claim which may reverse the decision of the AO. The AO in his order dt. 30.12.2012 for the A.Y 2010-11 has mentioned that the objects and activities of the assessee does not fall under the ambit of education and it is covered under general public utility as per 2(15) of the IT Act, 1961. As the objects of the assessee are not covered under the definition of education, no benefit of exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) can be granted to the assessee. Section 10(23C)(iiiab) clearly says that “10. As the objects of the assessee are not covered under the definition of education, no benefit of exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) can be granted to the assessee. Section 10(23C)(iiiab) clearly says that “10. In computing the total income of a previous year of any income falling within any of the following clauses shall not be included-[(23C) any received by any person on behalf of-[iiiab) any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit and which is wholly or substantially financed by the Government; or…” Hence in light of the above the undersigned and the opinion of the then AO rant it is reported that no exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) should allowed to the assessee. In continuation with the letter dt. 23.12.2013, it is further clarified that the assessee's submission that it should be allowed exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) and 10(23C)(iv) and addition so made by the AO may also be deleted is not correct on the basis of following issues:— 1. The assessee in its return of income has no where claimed exemption u/s 10(23C)(iv) rather it has claimed exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab). (copy of computation enclosed). Hence, the assessee cannot be granted such exemption without claiming it. 2. The assessee is also not eligible for exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) as discussed in letter dt.23.12.2013 3. The assessee is not eligible for exemption u/s 10(23C)(iv) because for that following two requirements should not be complied with. (i) The assessee should be existing solely for education purpose. (ii) Such university and educational institution should be approved by the Hon'ble Chief Commissioner of Income Tax. As rightly discussed in the assessment order dt. 30.12.2012, the assessee does not fulfill any of the above conditions. It cannot be allowed exemption u/s 10(23C)(iiab)(iv) r.w.s 2(15) of the IT Act, 1961. Hence, in view of the above discussion, it is reported that the assessee is not eligible for any exemption claimed by it u/s 10(23C)(iiiab) and 10(23C)(iv).” 22. He further contended that by no stretch of imagination, the activities carried by the appellant assessee cannot be considered as educational institutions and publication of educational books is not educational activity and, therefore, they will not be covered under the provisions of 10(23C)(iiiab)/10(23C)(iv) of the Income Tax Act. 23. He further contended that by no stretch of imagination, the activities carried by the appellant assessee cannot be considered as educational institutions and publication of educational books is not educational activity and, therefore, they will not be covered under the provisions of 10(23C)(iiiab)/10(23C)(iv) of the Income Tax Act. 23. Counsel for the respondent has relied upon the decision o The Supreme Court in The Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana Trust v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Mysore reported in 1975 (101) ITR 234 wherein Supreme Court held as under:— 5. The sense in which the word “education” has been used in section 2(15) is the systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life. It also connotes the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received. The word “education” has not been used in that wide and extended sense, according to which every acquisition of further knowledge constitutes education. According to this wide and extended sense, travelling is education, because as a result of travelling you acquire fresh knowledge. Like wise, if you read newspapers and magazines, see pictures, visit art galleries, museums and zoos, you thereby add to your knowledge. Again, when you grow up and have dealings with other people, some of whom are not straight you learn by experience and thus add to your knowledge of the ways of the world. If you are not careful, your wallet is liable to be stolen or you are liable to be cheated by some unscrupulous person. The thief who removes your wallet and the swindler who cheats you teach you a lesson and in the process make you wiser though poorer. If you visit a night club, your get acquainted with and add to your knowledge about some of the not much revealed realities and mysteries of life. All this in a way is education in the great school of life. But that is not the sense in which the word “education” is used in clause (15) of section 2. What education connotes in that clause is the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by formal schooling. 24. He also relied upon the decision of Rajasthan High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust reported in 1988 (169) ITR 379 wherein it has been held as under:— 7. What education connotes in that clause is the process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and character of students by formal schooling. 24. He also relied upon the decision of Rajasthan High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Maharaja Sawai Mansinghji Museum Trust reported in 1988 (169) ITR 379 wherein it has been held as under:— 7. It is amply clear from a bare reading of it that the “educational institution” must exist “solely” for educational purposes. “Solely’ means exclusively and not primarily. Simply because certain persons may add something to their knowledge by visiting the museum, it cannot be said that the museum exists “solely” for educational purposes. The emphasis in Section 10(22) is on the word “solely”. 25. He contended that the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 26. We have heard counsel for the parties. 27. Before proceeding with the matter, it will not be out of place to mention that Rajasthan Hindi Granth Academy is established by the State Government to see that the books are available to the students of the educational institutions at the grass root level, therefore, while considering the matter, we have considered that mainly the substantive amount out of receipts of Rs. 1,81,44,567/-, Rs. 1,24,10,000/- is received by the assessee from State Government by way of subsidy. Even if, name of the institution i.e Rajasthan Hindi Granth Academy is considered, it is established that it is for the purpose of publication of Hindi Granth i.e for education. In that view of the matter, in our considered opinion in view of decisions referred by Mr. Ranka, this is an educational institution activity. 28. In that view the matter, we are of the opinion that this academy is running only with a view to publish educational books and we have no hesitation in accepting the submissions of Mr. Ranka that this is only for the purpose of academy which is educational in nature. 29. In that view of the matter, the assessee will be entitled for the benefit u/s 10(23)(iiiab). Even from the table, looking to the turnover, the profit is negligible, therefore, it is clear that the institution has no profit motive. 30. In view of the above, the issue is required to be answered in favour of the assessee and against the department. 31. The appeal stands allowed.