ORDER : 1. By way of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the judgment and order of the Tribunal whereby the Tribunal, Central Excise dismissed the appeal of department. 2. This Court while admitting the appeal on 04.01.2012 framed following substantial question of law: “Whether the assessee is eligible to avail exemption benefit under notification No. 108/95-CE dated 28.8.1995 when the condition of said notification for producing certificate from the United Nations or International Organization has not been fulfilled by them, in as much as they have produced a photocopy issued in the name of other firm with whom they have entered into an agreement?” 3. Counsel for appellant contended that in view of decision of the Supreme Court reported in case of CCE, New Delhi v. Hari chand Shri Gopal reported in 2010-TIOL-95-SC-CX-CB, wherein it has been observed as under:— 22. The law is well settled that a person who claims exemption or concession has to establish that he is entitled to that exemption or concession. A provision providing for an exemption, concession or exception, as the case may be, has to be construed strictly with certain exceptions depending upon the settings on which the provision has been placed in the Statute and the object and purpose to be achieved. If exemption is available on complying with certain conditions, the conditions have to be complied with. The mandatory requirements of those conditions must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, though at times, some latitude can be shown, if there is a failure to comply with some requirements which are directory in nature, the non-compliance of which would not affect the essence or substance of the notification granting exemption. In Novopan Indian Ltd. (supra), this Court held that a person, invoking an exception or exemption provisions, to relieve him of tax liability must establish clearly that he is covered by the said provisions and, in case of doubt or ambiguity, the benefit of it must go to the State. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Hansraj Gordhandas v. H.H Dave (1996) 2 SCR 253, held that such a notification has to be interpreted in the light of the words employed by it and not on any other basis. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Hansraj Gordhandas v. H.H Dave (1996) 2 SCR 253, held that such a notification has to be interpreted in the light of the words employed by it and not on any other basis. This was so held in the context of the principle that in a taxing statute, there is no room for any intendment, that regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words and that the matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification, i.e, by the plain terms of the exemption. 23. Of course, some of the provisions of an exemption notification may be directory in nature and some are of mandatory in nature. A distinction between provisions of statute which are of substantive character and were built in with certain specific objectives of policy, on the one hand, and those which are merely procedural and technical in their nature, on the other, must be kept clearly distinguished. In Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. (supra), this Court held that the principles as regard construction of an exemption notification are no longer res integra; whereas the eligibility clause in relation to an exemption notification is given strict meaning wherefore the notification has to be interpreted in terms of its language, once an assessee satisfies the eligibility clause, the exemption clause therein may be construed literally. An eligibility criteria, therefore, deserves a strict construction, although construction of a condition thereof may be given a liberal meaning if the same is directory in nature. DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE AND ‘INTENDED USE’: 24. The doctrine of substantial compliance is a judicial invention, equitable in nature, designed to avoid hardship in cases where a party does all that can reasonably expected of it, but failed or faulted in some minor or inconsequent aspects which cannot be described as the “essence” or the “substance” of the requirements. Like the concept of “reasonableness”, the acceptance or otherwise of a plea of “substantial compliance” depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the purpose and object to be achieved and the context of the prerequisites which are essential to achieve the object and purpose of the rule or the regulation. Such a defence cannot be pleaded if a clear statutory prerequisite which effectuates the object and the purpose of the statute has not been met. Such a defence cannot be pleaded if a clear statutory prerequisite which effectuates the object and the purpose of the statute has not been met. Certainly, it means that the Court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent for which the statute was enacted and not a mirror image type of strict compliance. Substantial compliance means “actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute” and the court should determine whether the statute has been followed sufficiently so as to carry out the intent of the statute and accomplish the reasonable objectives for which it was passed. Fiscal statute generally seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with regulatory requirements that are important, especially when a party seeks the benefits of an exemption clause that are important. Substantial compliance of an enactment is insisted, where mandatory and directory requirements are lumped together, for in such a case, if mandatory requirements are complied with, it will be proper to say that the enactment has been substantially complied with notwithstanding the non-compliance of directory requirements. In cases where substantial compliance has been found, there has been actual compliance with the statute, albeit procedurally faulty. The doctrine of substantial compliance seeks to preserve the need to comply strictly with the conditions or requirements that are important to invoke a tax or duty exemption and to forgive noncompliance for either unimportant and tangential requirements or requirements that are so confusingly or incorrectly written that an earnest effort at compliance should be accepted. The test for determining the applicability of the substantial compliance doctrine has been the subject of a myriad of cases and quite often, the critical question to be examined is whether the requirements relate to the “substance” or “essence” of the statute, if so, strict adherence to those requirements is a precondition to give effect to that doctrine. On the other hand, if the requirements are procedural or directory in that they are not of the “essence” of the thing to be done but are given with a view to the orderly conduct of business, they may be fulfilled by substantial, if not strict compliance. In other words, a mere attempted compliance may not be sufficient, but actual compliance of those factors which are considered as essential. In other words, a mere attempted compliance may not be sufficient, but actual compliance of those factors which are considered as essential. and taking into consideration that the certificate was not in the name of assessee, the issue was not rightly considered by the assessing commissioner and tribunal has seriously committed error. 4. Counsel for the respondents has relied upon the observations made by the Commissioner (Appeals), reads as under: I have carefully gone through the case record, submissions made by the appellants in appeal memorandum and at the time of personal hearing. I find that there is not dispute that the goods have not been manufactured by the Appellant and the goods have not been exported through ‘MFIL’ World Food Programme of United Nations for free distribution in Afganistan. This has been accepted by the adjudicating Authority in the discussion & finding of the impugned order in Para 9 (III) at Page 8, as mentioned. It may relevantly be stated that the substantial compliance of manufacture of fortified Biscuits and supply to world Food Programme of united nations for free distribution in Afganistans not a disputed question to be decided here”. I find the dispute is regarding the Certificate to be produced by the manufacturer as per conditions of Notification No. 108/95 CE dated 28.8.95 The certificate is to be produced by the manufacturer and not by the other company. M/s. Bakwell Agro Ltd., Bhieadi, the certificate has been issued by the World Food Programme to M/s. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., hence the certificate is not valid. As far as the agreement of sub-comfort between M/s. Bakwell Agro Ltd., Bhiwadi and M/s. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. Is concerned such agreement find no place in Notification No. 108/95 dated 28.8.95, accordingly the Adjudicating Authority has held in the impugned order that the conditions of Notification No. 108/95 are not satisfied as the certificate issued by the United Nation World Food Programme is not in the name of the Appellants and the benefit availed by the appellants under Notification No. 103/95 CE on the strength of the photo copy of 1 he certificate issued in the name of M/s. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. Is not available. But I do not agree, in this context, I find that Adjudicating Authority have not gone through property, the case laws cited laws cited by the Appellants and also have not seen the Appellants letter dated 20.11.02, in which they intimated to the Dy. Commissioner, Central Excise Division, Bhiwadi and copy also endorsed to the Superintendent, Central Excise, Range I, Bhiwadi regarding manufacture and clearance of Biscuits under Notification No. 108/95 CE dated 28.8.95 and also enclosed the copy of Certificate issued by the World Food Programme of United Nations. The Appellants sough guidance through this letter as to whether any further declaration or information to be provided by them or not. The contents of the letter are “We are enclosing herewith a Exemption Certificate copy being provided by World Food Programme under which the product (BISCUITS) we will be manufacturing are exempted from excise duty under General Exemption No. 73 UNF No. 108/95 CE dated 28.8.95 as amended by Notification No. 50/01. CE dated 12.10.01 further have to inform that we may be advise if any further related declaration or information has to be provided by us. You are requested to guide us accordingly.” The Appellants again submitted the copy of agreement with the M/s. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. On 3.12.02 to the Dy. Commissioner, Central Excise, Bhiwadi. In the agreement M/s. Bakwell Agro Ltd., Unit II, Industrial Area, Bhiwadi shall produce and supply Fortified Biscuits as per the formulation prescribed by the MFIL and as per the schedule and the production of fortified Biscuits shall be carried out presently at factory premises located at M/s. Bakwell Agro Ltd., Bhiwadi. I find that the Adjudicating Authority has not taken any action on the above letter and the copy of the agreement submitted by the Appellants at the time of commencing the production in the factory to supply the Biscuits through World Food Programme of United Nations. I agree with Adjudicating Authority's finding that such agreement find no place in the wording of the Notification, but since on the intimation and supplying the copy of the agreement by the Appellants, Adjudicating Authority has not taken any action nor stopped production for supply to MFIL for World Food Programme. In this connection, the Appellants contended that although they have submitted the copy of the said Certificate dated 21.10.02 through their letter to the Dy. In this connection, the Appellants contended that although they have submitted the copy of the said Certificate dated 21.10.02 through their letter to the Dy. Commissioner, Central Excise Division, Bhiwadi and copy to the Superintendent well before starting of the dispatches of the Fortifies Biscuits without payment of duty availing exemption under Notification No. 108/95 CE and also requested the authority to inform them if any further information/documents are required. Since the department neither informed them that Certificate in their name is required, nor objected to their clearances of the Biscuits on the basis of the said Certificate issued in the name of MFIL they were under strong belief that the Certificate issued in the name of MFIL is sufficient for supplies to be made to UNWFP through MFIL. In view of above facts, I hold benefit will go to the Appellants only. Ii is also in the Appellant's favour that all the impugned goods removed from the factory premises under Notification No. 108/95 were sent to the United Nations Food Programme through MFIL, therefore there remains no doubts about the use of the impugned goods removed at the nil rate of duty under Notification No. 108/95 dated 28.8.95 as amended. It is also on record that before removal of the impugned goods from the Appellants factory premises the same were duly inspected by the officers of the Food Research and Analysis Center, New Delhi the agency duly authorised by the Food Aid Organization of the United Nations for inspecting and analyzing the quality of the Fortified Biscuits. There is no allegation of the impugned goods having been diverted elsewhere for other nurpose. The substant ve conditions having been l filled by the Appellants as per Notification No. 108/95 CE dated 28.8.95 hence exemption can not be denied for procedural lapse, that goods should be cleared directly from the factory of manufacturer and that the certificate should be in the name of the Appellants. 8. The appellant has supplied the impugned goods to the ‘MFLI’ for further supply to the United Nation World Food Programme, which is listed in the Annexure at Sl. No. 7 and covered in clause (b)(I) of the notification. In some cases the appellant had removed the impugned goods to MFIL at nil rate of duty under Notification No. 108/95-CE dated 28.8.95 mentioning on the invoices that “Biscuits Modern under World Food Programme”. No. 7 and covered in clause (b)(I) of the notification. In some cases the appellant had removed the impugned goods to MFIL at nil rate of duty under Notification No. 108/95-CE dated 28.8.95 mentioning on the invoices that “Biscuits Modern under World Food Programme”. These goods were sent to WFP Kabul (Afganistan) under the delivery challan of MFLI. In other cases the appellant has mentioned the name of consignee as “WFP The Food Aid Organization of the United Nations. I further find that the Food Aid Organization of the United Nations, vide Certificate No. WFP/RPR-027(B)/02 dated 20.09.2004, has certified that: “M/s. Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd., Palika Bhawan (3rd Floor, R.K Puram, Ring Road, sector-13, New Delhi-110066 had manufactured and supplied 4526 MT biscuits to World Food Programme under GOI's donation of 1,000,000 tons of wheat to Afganistan against WFP Order No. WFP/RPR/027(B)02 dated 14 October 2002. Out of 4526 MT, a quantity of 1311.04 MT fortified biscuits was manufactured and supplied from their manufacturing unit at M/s. Bakewell Agro Ltd., F-1038, Phase-III, Bhiwadi (Rajasthan) during the period November 2002 to April 2003. The supply of goods i.e Fortified Biscuits had been taking place from bakewell Agro Ltd.’s factory at Bhiwadi under the Central Excise Invoices of bakewell Agro Ltd., under the Delivery Challans of Modern Food Industries (India) Ltd. And were delivered to M/s. Cargo Movers, the approved official WFP Clearing and Forwarding Agents at Kandla for arranging shipment to Afganistan.” 5. He has also relied upon the decision of Tribunal, reads: “We have heard both the sides and carefully perused the agreement entered into between M/s. Modern Food Industries (I) Ltd. and the assessee’s. The agreement clearly brings out that M/s. MFIL, to whom a contract had been awarded by the United Nations World Food Programme for supply of fortified biscuits to Afganistan, had engaged the respondents to manufacture such biscuits and supplied them to the United Nations World Food Programme. A clear link between M/s. MFIL, in whose name the certificate was issued, and the respondent has thus been established. A clear link between M/s. MFIL, in whose name the certificate was issued, and the respondent has thus been established. In this view of the matter, the decisions of the Tribunal in Hindustan Colas Ltd. v. CCE, Vadodara-I reported in 2007 (219) ELT 430 (Tribunal-Ahmd.) and Baroda Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE, Vadodara-I reported in 2009 (236) ELT 622 (Tribunal-Ahmd.) holding that the certificate issued by the project implementing authority under Notification No. 108/95 is not necessarily required to be in the name of supplier of the products used in the project, are directly applicable to the facts of the present case and following the ratio of the same, we uphold the impugned order extending the benefit of the notification and reject the appeal of the revenue.” 6. In view of the fact that the complete goods which were produced by the assessee were supplied to the international concerns which has been finding of both the authorities. 7. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the issue is answered in favour of assessee and against the department. 8. The appeal is dismissed.