State of Jharkhand v. Raj Mohan Pd. Sinha, Son of Late Jagarnath Lal
2017-02-03
D.N.PATEL
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Arbitration Appeal has been preferred by the appellants challenging the order passed by Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Gumla dated 20th February, 2014, whereby, Miscellaneous Case no.13 of 2005 preferred by the State of Jharkhand has been dismissed without appreciating the fact that the claim of this respondent is absolutely time barred. 2. Counsel for the State-appellant mainly submitted that in pursuant to an Agreement No.F2/47 of 1989-90, the work was allotted to the respondent of Construction of Left Outlet of Upper Shankh Reservoir Project in District Gumla of the State of Jharkhand. Partly the work was done and rest of the work was abandoned. Thereafter, the respondent preferred a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No.3870 of 1995(R) which was disposed of by Hon'ble High Court at Patna allowing the petitioner to file a suit. Thereafter, another writ petition being C.W.J.C. No.3750 of 1997(R) was preferred in which also, the Hon'ble High Court at Patna allowed the petitioner to take recourse under law. Thereafter, Arbitration Application No.11 of 2002 under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was instituted and learned Arbitrator was appointed on 19th January, 2005. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that the date of award is 08.06.2005. The interest awarded by the Arbitrator is from 15th February, 1992. The whole claim of this respondent is hopelessly time barred. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Arbitrator, nor by the Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Gumla while dismissing Miscellaneous Case No.13 of 2005 and the counsel for the appellants has relied upon a decision reported in (2003) 9 SCC 505 (Union of India & anr Vs British India Corporation Limited & Ors.) and also a decision reported in 2009 (4) JCR 101 : (2009) 5 SCC 121 (State Bank of India Vs B.S. Agriculture Industries). On the basis of the aforesaid two decisions, it is mainly submitted that as because claim of the respondent is time barred, the amount awarded by the learned Arbitrator, which is at Rs.11,86, 949/- with interest at the rate of 6% till the date of award, shall be paid with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that higher amount was paid to the respondent than what he was entitled to.
Counsel for the appellant further submitted that higher amount was paid to the respondent than what he was entitled to. The written statement filed by the appellant was also not appreciated by the learned Arbitrator. 3. Counsel for the respondent submitted that after having participated in the arbitration proceeding and getting consent for appointment of the Arbitrator, this appellant should not be allowed to raise plea of limitation. Counsel for the respondent submitted that the work order was given on 8th February, 1990, agreement was entered into on 22nd February, 1990, the bill was raised on 31st May, 1991 and the last bill had been raised, which is 9th running bill, on 15th May, 1992 and the letter was written by the Secretary to the Executive Engineer on 3rd April, 1992 which is at Annexure-3 and, thereafter, the Arbitration Application was preferred bearing No.11 of 2002 in which consent was given for appointment of learned Arbitrator on 9th January, 2005 and hence, the claim of this respondent is not time barred. 4. Having heard learned counsels for both sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the claim of the respondent is based upon Arbitration Agreement No.F2/47 of the year 1989-90. The claim is hopelessly time barred. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Arbitrator while passing an award dated 8th June, 2005 and the written statement has also not been appreciated by the learned Arbitrator. Similarly, Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Gumla has also not appreciated the period of limitation while dismissing Misc. Case No.13 of 2005 vide order dated 20th February, 2014. 5. The work allotted by this appellant to the respondent is about the construction of Left Outlet of Upper Shankh Reservoir Project in the district of Gumla. Partly work was done and rest of the work was abandoned. Certain bills were raised by the respondent and it is the claim of the respondent that the said bills were not paid and hence, writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3870 of 1995(R) was instituted by the respondent. Hon'ble Patna High Court disposed of the writ application allowing the respondent to file a civil suit. 6.
Certain bills were raised by the respondent and it is the claim of the respondent that the said bills were not paid and hence, writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3870 of 1995(R) was instituted by the respondent. Hon'ble Patna High Court disposed of the writ application allowing the respondent to file a civil suit. 6. Thereafter, the respondent preferred another writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3750 of 1997(R) which was also disposed of by the Hon'ble Patna High Court allowing the respondent to initiate proceeding in accordance with law. 7. It appears that thereafter Arbitration Application No.11 of 2002 was preferred by the respondent which was disposed of by this Court and the learned Arbitrator was appointed on 19th January, 2005. 8. It appears that the learned Arbitrator has not properly appreciated the period of limitation. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs British India Corporation Ltd reported in (2003) 9 SCC 505 as under:- “7. As to the first point, the question of limitation is a mandate to the forum and, irrespective of the fact whether it was raised or not, the forum must consider and apply it, if there is no dispute on facts. Section 50 of the 1922 Act, as modified by Rule 4-A, is a provision of the statute which was required to be applied by the High Court at the time of considering the relief, if any, to be granted in the writ petition. The claim being barred by time, the writ petition could not have been allowed nor could any relief be granted. The first contention, therefore, fails.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of India Vs B.S. Agriculture Industries reported in 2009 (4) JCR 101 : (2009) 5 SCC 121 as under:- “12. As a matter of law, the consumer forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the complaint has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take notice of Section 24-A and give effect to it.
In other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take notice of Section 24-A and give effect to it. If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the consumer forum decides the complaint on merits, the forum would be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside. 13. In Union of India v. British India Corpn. Ltd. while dealing with an aspect of limitation for an application for refund prescribed in the Business Profits Tax Act, 1947 this Court held that the question of limitation was a mandate to the forum and, irrespective of the fact whether it was raised or not, the forum must consider and apply it. 14. In HUDA v. B.K. Sood this Court while dealing with the same provision viz. Section 24-A of the Act, 1986 held: (SCC pp. 167-68, paras 10-12) “10. Section 24-A of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (referred to as ‘the Act’ hereafter) expressly casts a duty on the Commission admitting a complaint, to dismiss a complaint unless the complainant satisfies the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission, as the case may be, that the complainant had sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the period of two years from the date on which the cause of action had arisen. 11. The section debars any fora set up under the Act, admitting a complaint unless the complaint is filed within two years from the date of which the cause of action has arisen. Neither the National Commission nor had the State Commission considered the preliminary objections raised by the appellant that the claim of the respondent was barred by time. According to the complaint filed by the respondent, the cause of action arose when, according to the respondent, possession was received of the booth site and it was allegedly found that an area less than the area advertised had been given. This happened in January 1987. Furthermore, the bhatties which were alleged to have caused loss and damage to the respondent, as stated in the complaint, had been installed before 1989 and removed in 1994. The complaint before the State Commission was filed by the respondent in 1997, ten years after the taking of possession, eight years after the cause of alleged damage commenced and three years after that cause ceased.
The complaint before the State Commission was filed by the respondent in 1997, ten years after the taking of possession, eight years after the cause of alleged damage commenced and three years after that cause ceased. There was not even any prayer by the respondent in his complaint for condoning the delay. 12. Therefore, the claim of the respondent on the basis of the allegations contained in the complaint was clearly barred by limitation as the two year period prescribed by Section 24-A of the Act had expired much before the complaint was admitted by the State Commission. This finding is sufficient for allowing the appeal.” 15. In a recent case of Gannmani Anasuya v. Parvatini Amarendra Chowdhary this Court highlighted with reference to Section 3 of the Limitation Act that it is for the court to determine the question as to whether the suit is barred by limitation or not irrespective of the fact that as to whether such a plea has been raised by the parties; such a jurisdictional fact need not be even pleaded.” (Emphasis supplied) 10. In view of the aforesaid decisions, even if the plea of limitation is not raised, the learned Arbitrator as well as Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Gumla ought to have appreciated the period of limitation looking to the fact of the present case that the Arbitration Agreement was of the year 1989-90. Initially the writ petition was preferred by the respondent being C.W.J.C. No.3870 of 1995(R) and the respondent was permitted to file a civil suit. Thereafter, another writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3750 of 1997(R) was preferred, in which also the respondent was permitted to initiate legal proceeding in accordance with law. Nonetheless, nothing was initiated by the respondent within a period of three years and ultimately Arbitration Application No.11 of 2002 was preferred and the Arbitrator was appointed in the year 2005. The award was passed on 08.06.2005. Thus, it appears that the claim of respondent is time barred. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Arbitrator while passing the award dated 8th June, 2005, nor this aspect of the matter has been appreciated by the Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Gumla in the order dated 20th February, 2014 in Misc. Case No.13 of 2005. 11.
This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Arbitrator while passing the award dated 8th June, 2005, nor this aspect of the matter has been appreciated by the Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Gumla in the order dated 20th February, 2014 in Misc. Case No.13 of 2005. 11. Hence, this Arbitration Appeal is allowed and the order passed by learned Arbitrator, which is at Annexure 1, as well as the order passed by Civil Judge, Senior Division-I, Gumla in Misc. Case No.13 of 2005 dated 20th February, 2014, are, hereby, quashed and set aside. The amount deposited by the appellant will be returned by the Registrar General of this Court upon proper application by the State-appellants and upon proper identification. 12. In view of the final order passed in Arbitration Appeal, I.A. No.1875 of 2015 stands disposed of.