JUDGMENT : B.S. WALIA, J. 1. Prayer is for quashing of order dated 07.06.2014 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu whereby delay in filing the written statement by respondent No. 1 was condoned and written statement filed was allowed to be placed on the record subject to payment of Rs. 500/- as costs. Brief facts of the case leading to the filing of the instant petition are that the petitioner filed a suit before the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu leading to interim order dated 24.01.2014 directing the parties to maintain status-quo till the next date with notice for 10.02.2014. 2. Respondent No. 1 filed written statement as well as objections to the interim application after the lapse of statutory period of 90 days allowed for filing the written statement along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the written statement. 3. Petitioner filed objections to the same whereupon after hearing arguments of both the sides, the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu condoned the delay and allowed respondent No. 1 to place written statement on record subject to payment of Rs. 500/- as costs vide order dated 07.06.2014. 4. Main thrust of the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the impugned order has not been passed by the learned Court below in accordance with the mandate of Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC. 5. Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that a counsel had been engaged by respondent No. 1 and vakalatnama was given vide communication No. ED/JMU/Court-case/District-Jammu/236, dated 07.02.2014, stand of the National Highway Authority of India was communicated to learned counsel for filing written statement and defending its interest and said counsel had caused his appearance on behalf of the NHAI before the learned trial court on 10.02.2014 and sought time to file written statement but despite repeated requests, learned counsel did not file the written statement whereupon respondent No. 1 engaged another counsel on 26.05.2014, got the written statement drafted and filed the same on 29.05.2014. On the basis of the same, it is contended that the delay in filing written statement was neither intentional nor deliberate and further that as per well settled law, parties should not be allowed to suffer for the mistake/negligence of counsel and neither the rightful, meritorious and enforceable right of a party should be frustrated because of the negligence and dereliction of duties of the counsel engaged by the party. 6. Learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of this Court in 'Shyam Lal Dhar v. M/s. Ply Board Industries', AIR 1981 J & K 95' to contend that as a general rule, a litigant could not be held responsible for the negligence of his counsel unless there had been any remissness on the part of the litigant himself. Relevant extract of the aforementioned decision is reproduced hereunder:- 'On these observations, with which we generally agree, it necessarily follows that where the defendant employs a counsel for the purpose of his appearance in the case Court and the counsel neglects or fails to appear in the case, his neglect or failure would constitute a sufficient cause for the non-appearance of the defendant within the meaning of 0.9. R-13 provided that the defendant had done all that was required of him to ensure that the counsel would represent him on all the necessary hearings. It also follows that where the delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree is due to the negligence or failure of the counsel to inform the defendant that an ex parte decree had been passed against him, such neglect or failure would be a sufficient cause for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act provided the defendant had done all that was required of him in order to keep himself posted with the progress of the case. In this background our reply to the question whether a litigant can be held responsible for the negligence of the counsel would be that it is difficult to lay down any inflexible rule and that each case must be decided on its own facts but generally speaking a litigant would not be responsible for the negligence of his counsel unless there has been any remissness on the part of the litigant himself.' 7. Learned counsel also relies upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in case titled as 'Masroor Ali v. Court of Incharge, Distt. Judge/Addl. Distt. Judge Court No. 1, Kanpur Nagar & Ors., AIR 2005 Allahabad 334' to contend that although Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC was a part of Procedural Law and had been held to be directory, however, keeping in view the need for expeditious trial of civil cases, the time schedule contained in Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC was to be followed as a rule and departure there from could be only by way of exception and that prayer for extension of time by a defendant for permission to file the written statement beyond the stipulated period of time was not to be granted as a matter of routine but only by way of exception for reasons to be assigned by the defendant. Relevant extract of the aforementioned decision is reproduced hereunder:- 'The purpose of providing the time schedule for filing the written statement under Order-VIII, Rule-1 of CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the hearing. The provisions spells out a disability on the defendant. It does not impose an embargo on the power of the Court to extend the time. Though the language of the proviso to Rule-1 of Order VIII of the CPC is couched in negative form, it does not specify any penal consequences flowing from the non-compliance. The provision being in the domain of the Procedural Law, it has to be held directory and not mandatory. The power of the Court to extend time for filing the written statement beyond the time schedule provided by Order-VIII, Rule-1 of the CPC is not completely taken away. Though Order-VIII, Rule-1 of the CPC is a part of Procedural Law and hence directory, keeping in view the need for expeditious trial of civil causes which persuaded the Parliament to enact the provision in its present form, it is held that ordinarily the time schedule contained in the provisions is to be followed as a rule and departure there from would be by way of exception. A prayer for extension of time made by the defendant shall not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking, more so when the period of 90 days has expired. A prayer for extension of time made by the defendant shall not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking, more so when the period of 90 days has expired. Extension of time may be allowed by way of an exception, for reasons to be assigned by the defendant and also be placed on record in writing, howsoever briefly, by the Court on its being satisfied. Extension of time may be allowed if it was needed to be given for the circumstances which are exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. Costs may be imposed and affidavit or documents in support of the grounds pleaded by the defendant for extension of time may be demanded depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case.' 8. Learned counsel contended that in the circumstances, it was apparent that the delay in filing the written statement by respondent No. 1 was neither intentional nor deliberate, therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly condoned the delay and allowed taking written statement on record subject to payment of Rs. 500/- as costs. 9. Learned counsel also relied upon the decision of Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in case titled as Sakshi Sehgal v. State Bank of India wherein while making reference of case titled as Kailash v. Nanhku & Ors. 2005 (4) SCC 480 , the Hon'ble Single Judge held that the provision of Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC were not mandatory rather directory in nature and on sufficient cause being shown, defendant could be permitted to submit written statement even after expiry of period. 10. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and an of the view that no case is made out warranting interference with the well reasoned order passed by the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu. It was the categorical stand of respondent No. 1 before the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu that a counsel had been engaged by it and said counsel had been requested to draft the written statement and file the same but needful was not done despite the said counsel having put in appearance on 10.02.2014. 11. It was the categorical stand of respondent No. 1 before the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu that a counsel had been engaged by it and said counsel had been requested to draft the written statement and file the same but needful was not done despite the said counsel having put in appearance on 10.02.2014. 11. No doubt, since the period of 90 days stipulated in Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC had lapsed, an application for condonation of delay in filing the written statement was filed explaining the reasons why the written statement could not be filed within the stipulated period of time. It was only after considering the explanation submitted by respondent No. 1 that the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu condoned the delay as sufficient cause was found for not filing the written statement within the stipulated period of time. Reference in this context can be made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in "Kailash v. Nanhku & Ors., (2005) 4 SCC 480 ". Relevant extract of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash's case (Supra) is reproduced hereunder:- '27. Three things are clear. Firstly, a careful reading of the language in which Order 8, Rule 1 has been drafted, shows that it casts an obligation on the defendant to file the written statement within 30 days from the date of service of summons on him and within the extended time falling within 90 days. The provision does not deal with the power of the court and also does not specifically take away the power of the court to take the written statement on record though filed beyond the time as provided for. Secondly, the nature of the provision contained in Order 8 Rule 1 is procedural. It is not a part of the substantive law. Thirdly, the object behind substituting Order 8 Rule 1 in the present shape is to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants adopting dilatory tactics, delaying the disposal of cases much to the chagrin of the plaintiffs and petitioners approaching the court for quick relief and also to the serious inconvenience of the court faced with frequent prayers for adjournments. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. The process of justice may be speeded up and hurried but the fairness which is a basic element of justice cannot be permitted to be buried. 30. The object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. The process of justice may be speeded up and hurried but the fairness which is a basic element of justice cannot be permitted to be buried. 30. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 Order 8 is circumscribed by the words-"shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided for though they may be read in by necessary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form. 32. Our attention has also been invited to a few other provisions such as Rules 9 and 10 of Order 8. In spite of the time limit appointed by Rule 1 having expired, the court is not powerless to permit a written statement being filed if the court may require such written statement. Under Rule 10, the court need not necessarily pronounce judgment against the defendant who failed to file written statement as required by Rule 1 or Rule 9. The court may still make such other order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit. 41. Considering the object and purpose behind enacting Rule 1 of Order 8 in the present form and the context in which the provision is placed, we are of the opinion that the provision has to be construed as directory and not mandatory. In exceptional situations, the court may extend the time for filing the written statement though the period of 30 days and 90 days, referred to in the provision, has expired. However, we may not be misunderstood as nullifying the entire force and impact-the entire life and vigour-of the provision. The delaying tactics adopted by the defendants in law courts are now proverbial as they do stand to gain by delay. However, we may not be misunderstood as nullifying the entire force and impact-the entire life and vigour-of the provision. The delaying tactics adopted by the defendants in law courts are now proverbial as they do stand to gain by delay. This is more so in election disputes because by delaying the trial of election petition, the successful candidates may succeed in enjoying the substantial part, if not in its entirety, the term for which he was elected even though he may lose the battle at the end. Therefore, the judge trying the case must handle the prayer for adjournment with firmness. The defendant seeking extension of time beyond the limits laid down by the provision may not ordinarily be shown indulgence. 42. Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 has to be honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is served on him he should take steps for drafting his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his "appearance in the Court. The extension of time sought for by the defendant from the court whether within 30 days or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for the asking, more so, when the period of 90 days has expired. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the Court to its satisfaction. It must be spelled out that a departure from the time schedule prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code was being allowed to be made because the circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and such extension was required in the interest of justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. 45. However, no straitjacket formula can be laid down except that the observance of time schedule contemplated by Order 8 Rule 1 shall be the rule and departure there from an exception, made for satisfactory reasons only. We hold that Order 8 Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form, is directory being a provision in the domain of processual law. 46. However, no straitjacket formula can be laid down except that the observance of time schedule contemplated by Order 8 Rule 1 shall be the rule and departure there from an exception, made for satisfactory reasons only. We hold that Order 8 Rule 1, though couched in mandatory form, is directory being a provision in the domain of processual law. 46. We sum up and briefly state our conclusions as under:- (iv) The purpose of providing the time schedule for filing the written statement under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is to expedite and not to scuttle the hearing. The provision spells out a disability on the defendant. It does not impose an embargo on the power of the Court to extend the time. Though the language of the proviso to Rule 1 Order 8 CPC is couched in negative form, it does not specify any penal consequences flowing from the non-compliance. The provision being in the domain of the Procedural Law, it has to be held directory and not mandatory. The power of the Court to extend time for filing the written statement beyond the time schedule provided by Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is not completely taken away. (v) Though Order 8 Rule 1 CPC is a part of Procedural Law and hence directory, keeping in view the need for expeditious trial of civil causes which persuaded Parliament to enact the provision in its present form, it is held that ordinarily the time schedule contained in the provision is to be followed as a rule and departure there from would be by way of exception. A prayer for extension of time made by the defendant shall not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for asking, more so when the period of 90 days has expired. Extension of time may be allowed by way of an exception, for reasons to be assigned by the defendant and also be placed on record in writing, howsoever briefly, by the Court on its being satisfied. Extension of time may be allowed if it is needed to be given for circumstances which are exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. Extension of time may be allowed if it is needed to be given for circumstances which are exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended. Costs may be imposed and affidavit or documents in support of the grounds pleaded by the defendant for extension of time may be demanded, depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case.' 12. No doubt, in terms of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kailash Nankhu's case (supra), an obligation is cast on the defendant to file written statement within the stipulated period of time but it has also been held that Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC does not specifically take away the power of the Court to take the written statement on record, though filed beyond the time as provided for where sufficient cause is shown for not filing the same within the stipulated period of time. Secondly, the provisions of Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC are procedural and not part of the substantive law and the object behind Order-8 Rule-1 CPC is to curb the mischief of unscrupulous defendants in adopting dilatory tactics and delaying disposal of the cases, thus the object is to expedite the hearing and not to scuttle the same. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that merely because Order-8 Rule-1 of the CPC was couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, yet the same was not without exceptions and the Courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provisions, could, while keeping in view the entire context in which the said provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that the provision although directory, yet the observance of the time schedule contemplated therein was to be adhered to as a matter of rule and departure there from could be only by way of an exception and for satisfactory reasons. In view of the position as noted above, I find that sufficient cause was made out for condoning the delay in filing the written statement beyond the stipulated period of time and for taking the same on record subject to payment of costs. In view of the position as noted above, I find that sufficient cause was made out for condoning the delay in filing the written statement beyond the stipulated period of time and for taking the same on record subject to payment of costs. The stand of the petitioner is merely by way of hyper technicality so as to scuttle the adjudication of the lis on merit. The same is not the intendment of law. Accordingly, no circumstances warranting interference with the well reasoned order passed by the learned 3rd Additional Munsiff, Jammu is made out. Impugned order dated 07.06.2014 (wrongly mentioned as 07.06.2013) is upheld and the petition under section 104 No. 70/2014 dismissed.