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2017 DIGILAW 234 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Usufbhai Umarbhai

2017-01-31

A.J.SHASTRI, S.R.BRAHMBHATT

body2017
JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred by the State under Section 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, against the judgment and order of acquittal dated 10th December, 2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 17 of 2004 against the present the respondents accused. 2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that while the complainant Budabhai @ Chhanabhai, a resident of Bhagvangar, was sleeping at his house at about 8 p.m. on 11.11.1998, his baby conveyed him that somebody is calling outside and, therefore, the complainant went outside the house and saw an unknown person residing at Ranika and he went away. Thereafter, at about 8.30 p.m., when the complainant went to his nature's call from the house, one chief armed with open knife rushed down to the complainant, gave blow on stomach and while he was inflicting second blow on the complainant, he took up the knife which left him with an injury on his finger and, therefore, the person who attacked the complainant ran away and the complainant with an injury left the spot immediately and straightaway went to Walket Police Chowki where initially he was instructed to go immediately to hospital and, therefore, was admitted in Government hospital. As the complainant has apprehended that this attack must have been done by Ramanikbhai and Babubhai, a complaint came to be filed before 'C' Division Police Station, Bhavnagar, for the offence punishable under section 307 read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code which is registered as C.R. No. I-234 of 1998. The complaint was entrusted to PSI, Girirajsinh Pratapsinh Chauhan, who carried out investigation, drew panchnama of scene of offence, panchnama of knife which is said to have been used in the commission of crime, panchnama of body of the complainant as also of clothes and recovered the muddamal and recorded statements of relevant witnesses. This investigating officer has also collected medical certificate of injury. Dying declaration has also been recorded of the complainant and muddamal which has been recovered was also sent to FSL for laboratory examination. Investigating officer then arrested the accused and since he collected sufficient material, a charge sheet came to be filed before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhavnagar against six accused persons. Dying declaration has also been recorded of the complainant and muddamal which has been recovered was also sent to FSL for laboratory examination. Investigating officer then arrested the accused and since he collected sufficient material, a charge sheet came to be filed before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhavnagar against six accused persons. 2.1 Since the original accused No. 3 - Yunus Sultan died during the course of trial, the case was declared as abated qua him. In addition thereto, prior to committal order, learned Magistrate has passed an order on 19.1.2004 below Exh. 1 to segregate charge-sheet qua accused No. 4 - Ramnikbhai Chhanabhai Koli and accordingly, Yadi was sent to police station and therefore, separate charge-sheet came to be filed qua this accused. It appears from the record that accused Nos. 1, 5 and 6 gave a joint application below Exh. 12 requesting that since accused No. 2 - Rasul @ Rajubhai Dadubhai has absconded and not available for trial, his case be segregated and after considering the said request, on 17.8.2004 an order came to be passed and then, case was proceeded further which was registered as Sessions Case No. 17 of 2004. The learned Sessions Judge, Bhavnagar was pleased to frame the charge for offence punishable under Sections 307 r/w Section 120-B of the IPC vide Exh. 15. A plea also came to be recorded of accused from Exh. 16 to Exh. 18 and having denied the offence being committed, the case was put up for trial. 2.2 The prosecution with a view to prove and establish the case against the respondents accused has led the oral as well as documentary evidence. Initially, the prosecution has examined the oral evidence in the following manner:- P.W. No. Name of Witness Exhibit No. 1. Budhabhai Chhanabhai 38 2. Rameshbhai Nanubhai 40 3. Bebiben Budhabhai 41 4. Dr. Dineshbhai Harjibhai Gohil 42 5. Balabhai Ranchhodbhai 45 6. Ashokbhai Odhavjibhai Parmar 47 7. Kadarbhai Dadubhai Belim 48 8. Bharatbhai Nanubhai 49 9. P.S.I. Matubha Ravatsinh Gohil 50 10. Mohanbhai Popatbhai 53 11. Gavuben Budabhai Vaghela 96 12. Budhabhai Chhanabhai 38 2. Rameshbhai Nanubhai 40 3. Bebiben Budhabhai 41 4. Dr. Dineshbhai Harjibhai Gohil 42 5. Balabhai Ranchhodbhai 45 6. Ashokbhai Odhavjibhai Parmar 47 7. Kadarbhai Dadubhai Belim 48 8. Bharatbhai Nanubhai 49 9. P.S.I. Matubha Ravatsinh Gohil 50 10. Mohanbhai Popatbhai 53 11. Gavuben Budabhai Vaghela 96 12. PSI Girirajsinh Pratapsinh Chauhan 70 2.3 The prosecution has also led the documentary evidences in the following manner:- Description Exhibit No. Panchnama of scene of offence 20 Panchnama of body position 21 Dying declaration of the injured 22 Panchnama of surname 23 Panchnama of sample of complainant 24 Muddamal forwarding note 25 Muddamal receipt by FSL 26 Entrusting of investigation 27 Complaint 39 Medical certificate of Budabhai 43 Panchnama of seizure of Muddamal money 46 Station diary entry 51 Copy of FIR 52 Map of scene of offence 55 Panchnama of test identification parade 57 Forwarding letter of Forensic Science Laboratory 59 Preliminary report of Forensic Science Laboratory 60 Preliminary serological report 61 Panchnama of identification parade of accused 62 2.4 Having adduced the evidence, a closing pursis has been given by the prosecution and then accused persons have been given an opportunity to tender further statements under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Thereafter issues came to be framed and ultimately, after analysing the evidence on record and after conducting the entire trial, learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Bhavnagar, in exercise of power under section 235(1) of Cr.P.C. was pleased to acquit the respondents accused for the offence punishable under section 307 read with section 120B of IPC by this judgment and order dated 10th December, 2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 17 of 2004. The appeal then has come up for final hearing before this Court. It is this judgment and order of acquittal against the respondents accused which is giving rise to present appeal by the State. The appeal came to be admitted vide order dated 1.4.2008 and it has come up for final hearing. 3. To assail the order passed by the learned trial Judge, learned APP, Mr. Chintan Dave appearing on behalf of appellant-State has contended that the prosecution has led enough evidence to prove the case and, therefore, the learned trial Judge has committed a serious error of law in passing the order of acquittal. Mr. 3. To assail the order passed by the learned trial Judge, learned APP, Mr. Chintan Dave appearing on behalf of appellant-State has contended that the prosecution has led enough evidence to prove the case and, therefore, the learned trial Judge has committed a serious error of law in passing the order of acquittal. Mr. Dave has further contended that though the panchas have become hostile, their evidence is sufficient enough to establish the guilt and, therefore, the reasons which are assigned while passing the order of acquittal are not germane to law. Mr. Dave has further pointed out that a serious blow with a deadly weapon knife was given on the complainant whereby he sustained serious injuries and, therefore, the learned trial Judge ought not to have passed an order when there is a specific assertion on the part of the complainant who identified the accused persons. It has also been established by the prosecution that this act on the complainant was committed at the instance of Ramanikbhai and there was a motive to commit such act upon the complainant on account of dispute with his elder brother Ramanikbhai who kept a second wife and was not paying sufficient amount to his first wife and since the complainant had taken side of the first wife, it appears that an attempt is made to do away with the complainant. Mr. Dave has further pointed out that looking to the injury certificate which is produced on the record coupled with the evidence of doctor, though the injuries were stated to have been simple, but if complication is not taking place, then only it can heal within a short time of 7-10 days and injury which has been caused on the complainant is with a sharp cutting weapon like knife which is used during the course of commission of crime as is evident from the record. Even the act of the accused No. 2 of remaining absconding is an indication to keep him away from the trial so as to see that respondents accused can save their skin and, therefore, since each accused has conspired against the complainant and in furtherance of said act, since the attack was made upon the complainant, the prosecution has made every attempt to establish the guilt and despite the aforesaid formal evidence reflecting on record, the learned trial Judge has not applied its mind in proper perspective and passed the order of acquittal which is worth to be reversed. Mr. Dave has further pointed out that looking to the weapon being used, the manner in which the attack was made and the injury which has been caused and the circumstances which are narrated are sufficient enough to attract the ingredients of section 307 read with section 120B of IPC and, therefore, the order of acquittal deserves to be corrected by convicting the respondents accused appropriately. No other submissions have been made. 4. Learned advocate, Mr. Mrudul Barot appearing for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, has vehemently opposed the stand taken by learned APP. Mr. Barot has invited the Court's attention that so far as accused No. 1 is concerned, on account of his death, appeal stood abated qua him. Mr. Mrudul Barot has further specifically contended that looking to the overall material on record, it cannot be said that offence is committed by present the respondents accused. Mr. Barot has further contended that looking to the nature of injuries and narration of the complainant himself, no attribution can be possible against the respondents accused and, therefore, on the basis of a bare assertion without any corroboration by cogent material, it cannot be said that the respondents accused are responsible for commission of crime as alleged by the complainant. Even the medical evidence is also not suggesting that the charge which has been framed is attracted or possible to be established. The reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge are just and proper not warranting any interference and, therefore, he has requested the Court to dismiss the appeal. Mr. Barot has further contended that it is Rasul, who at the best has committed the crime and not the present the respondents accused. The reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge are just and proper not warranting any interference and, therefore, he has requested the Court to dismiss the appeal. Mr. Barot has further contended that it is Rasul, who at the best has committed the crime and not the present the respondents accused. There is no connecting link between the respondents accused and the act which has been alleged and, therefore, in the absence of any specific cogent material establishing link with the respondents accused with commission of crime, it is not possible to establish the guilt of the respondents accused and, therefore, since the prosecution has failed to proved the case beyond reasonable doubt in so far as present the respondents accused are concerned, appeal deserves to be dismissed. 5. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having perused the material on record and while going through the order impugned in the appeal, following circumstances are emerging: 5.1 P.W. No. 1, Budhabhai Chhanabhai examined at Exh. 38, has deposed before the Court that knife blow was given by Rasul Dudubhai and in no assertion, the respondents accused are attributed any actual attack on the complainant. From this evidence, it is also clearly established that the very complainant has not identified specifically the accused who made an attack. 5.2 It is also emerging from the record that the only cause which is apprehended by the complainant is that on account of his elder brother Ramanikbhai not paying any amount to the first wife and when the complainant took her side, keeping that solitary circumstance in mind, this attack is made and, therefore, the complainant appears to have named the respondents accused merely on the basis of suspicion which is not getting corroborated so cogently. 5.3 It is also emerging from the record that this very complainant has admitted in his cross-examination that person who called the complainant at his house is not the person who inflicted blow with knife and, therefore, even about identity of the attacker, the complainant has not come out with specific evidence. 5.4 In his deposition, it is further coming out and admitted by him that only on the basis of suspicion, he referred the name of the respondents accused Babubhai and Jyotiben else, there is no other circumstance to connect them with commission of crime. 5.4 In his deposition, it is further coming out and admitted by him that only on the basis of suspicion, he referred the name of the respondents accused Babubhai and Jyotiben else, there is no other circumstance to connect them with commission of crime. 5.5 It has also been emerged from the deposition of P.W. No. 2, Rameshbhai Nanubhai, examined at Exh. 40 that he has not cogently identified the person who attacked the complainant. A further perusal of his evidence indicated that the injuries which have been caused by the complainant were not that much grave which can create any complication and may lead to death. 5.6 Dr. Dineshbhai Harjibhai Gohil, P.W. No. 4 examined at Exh. 42, has also deposed that when the complainant came to the hospital, in the history which has been given, it has been stated that somebody caused injury without referring the name of any person. In addition thereto, the injuries which have been caused no doubt can cause with a knife as stated but the injuries were trivial in nature and unless and until some complication takes place, the wound can heal out within a period of 7-10 days and, therefore, nothing much turns on the evidence of this doctor to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt. While considering this evidence, we have also gone through the injury certificate which is produced at page 205 of the paper book compilation and the injuries are not that much grave as deposed by Dr. Dineshbhai Harjibhai Gohil and, therefore, looking to this overall circumstances, it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt against the respondents accused. On the contrary, Bharatbhai Nanubhai, P.W. No. 8, examined at Exh. 49 has turned hostile and not supported case of the prosecution. Similarly, Mohanbhai Popatbhai, P.W. No. 10 examined at Exh. 53 has also turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution who can be said to be the star witness and, therefore, there is no direct evidence which establishes the case against the respondents accused beyond reasonable doubt. 5.7 It is also emerging from the record that the theory which has been tried to be pressed into service that Rs. 5.7 It is also emerging from the record that the theory which has been tried to be pressed into service that Rs. 1.00 lakh has been given to accused No. 2 but to prove then, there is no evidence worth the name led before the Court and, therefore, in the absence of any cogent evidence connecting the link of the respondents accused with commission of crime, no case is made out against the respondents accused and, therefore, considering this overall material on record, the learned trial Judge appears to have rightly opined and concluded that conspiracy has not been established. 5.8 A further examination of material witness i.e. Rameshbhai Nanubhai, P.W. No. 2 examined at Exh. 40 indicated that he has specifically admitted in his cross-examination that he has not seen the assailant. He has also admitted that no test identification parade was held before the Mamlatdar and, therefore, in the absence of any test identification parade being held, the case at least against the respondents accused may not be possible to be established. 5.9 A further fact is that test identification parade of accused No. 2 Rasul @ Rajubhai Dadubhai appears to have been held on 1.1.1999 but so far as present the respondents accused are concerned, no TI parade was held as is visible from the order passed by the learned trial Judge which is based upon examination of material and, therefore, when the main case has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt against the respondents accused, we are afraid to interfere with the order passed by the learned trial Judge. There must be a connecting established link visible from the evidence and the same would be of such impeccable in nature which may dislodge us from the finding arrived at by the learned trial Judge. We hardly see any such instance on the record and, therefore, in the absence of any cogent material, we are not in a position to distinguish the finding on the basis of some material which have already been examined by the learned trial Judge. 6. The reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge appear to be plausible reasons considering the overall evidence on record and, therefore, in the absence of any perversity, we are not in a position to dislodge the finding or substitute the same looking to the well defined scope of jurisdiction while dealing with acquittal appeals. 6. The reasons which are assigned by the learned trial Judge appear to be plausible reasons considering the overall evidence on record and, therefore, in the absence of any perversity, we are not in a position to dislodge the finding or substitute the same looking to the well defined scope of jurisdiction while dealing with acquittal appeals. We are of the considered opinion that there is no error committed by the learned trial Judge which calls for any interference and to arrive at this conclusion, propositions of law propounded by serious of decisions on exercise of jurisdiction under the acquittal appeal may be reiterated hereunder: 6.1 In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Another, (2006) 6 SCC 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under: "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 6.2 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles: "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 6.3 In another decision delivered by the Supreme Court in case of Sureshkumar v. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 16 SCC 353 , it was observed that if two views are possible, the High Court should hold in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an order of acquittal. The relevant observations of the decision are reflected in Para.55, 56 and 57 which read as under : "55. The second contention is that the High Court ought not to have interfered in the acquittal by the Trial Court. It was submitted that if two views are possible, the High Court should lean in favour of the accused and should not interfere with an acquittal. 56. A few years ago, the law on the subject was culled out from a large number of decisions and summed up in Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. (2008) 10 SCC 450 : AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 1318 : 2008 AIR SCW 6598 as follows: "1. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. The appellate court may review the evidence in appeals against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can review the trial court's conclusion with respect to both facts and law. 2. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when he was before the trial court. The trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. 3. Due or proper weight and consideration must be given to the trial court's decision. This is especially true when a witness' credibility is at issue. It is not enough for the High Court to take a different view of the evidence. There must also be substantial and compelling reasons for holding that the trial court was wrong. In light of the above, the High Court and other appellate courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallised by number of judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal: 1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so. A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when: (i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong; (ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law; (iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice"; (iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal; (v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable; (vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. (vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive." 57. Learned counsel for Suresh Kumar referred to S. Anil Kumar v. State of Karnataka, (2013) 7 SCC 219 : 2013 AIR SCW 6180 particularly paragraph 14 of the Report wherein reliance was placed on Rohtash v. State of Haryana, (2012) 6 SCC 589 : AIR 2012 SC 2297 : 2012 AIR SCW 3318 to conclude that it is "only in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and where the judgment in appeal is found to be perverse, can the High Court interfere with the order of acquittal." In Rohtash it was further observed: "The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. (Vide State of Rajasthan v. Talevar, (2011) 11 SCC 666 : AIR 2011 SC 2271 : 2011 AIR SCW 3889 and Govindaraju v. State, (2012) 4 SCC 722 : AIR 2012 SC 1292 : 2012 AIR SCW 1994." 6.4 The principle laid down in Chandrappa (supra) has been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Basappa v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 (2) SCC (Cri) 497. It has been held in paragraph 15 of the said decision as under: "(15) In this context, yet another caution struck by this Court in Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 would also be relevant. "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 6.5 The principle in Chandrappa (supra) has further been reiterated by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of C.K. Dasegowda & Others v. State of Karnataka, reported in 2014 (8) Scale 557 wherein it has been held in paragraph No. 17 as under: "(17) In the case of Chandrappa and others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , it has been held by this Court as under: "39. In Harijana Thirupala v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. AIR 2002 SC 2821 : 2002 AIR SCW 3199, this Court said: 12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal either against an order of acquittal or conviction as a court of first appeal has full power to review the evidence to reach its own independent conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. However, it will not interfere with an order of acquittal lightly or merely because one other view is possible, because with the passing of an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in favour of the accused gets reinforced and strengthened. The High Court would not be justified to interfere with the order of acquittal merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an order of acquittal to examine and discuss the reasons given by the trial court to acquit the accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the High Court fails to make such an exercise the judgment will suffer from serious infirmity. 40. In Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunat Jha AIR 2004 SC 1053 : 2003 AIR SCW 6731, this Court observed: "21. There is no embargo on the appellate Court reviewing the evidence upon which an order of acquittal is based. Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate Court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, for the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not". 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P. AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated: "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. 41. Recently, in Kallu v. State of M.P. AIR 2006 SC 831 : 2006 AIR SCW 177, this Court stated: "8. While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals, the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 6.6 In yet another decision in the case of Ramaiah @ Rama v. State of Karnataka, 2014 (9) SCC 365 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It has been observed in paragraph Nos. 30 and 31 as under: "30. This very principle of law was formulated by the Court in M. Madhusudhan Rao (supra) in the following manner: "13. There is no embargo on the appellate court to review, reappreciate or reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. Yet, generally, the order of acquittal is not interfered with because the presumption of innocence, which is otherwise available to an accused under the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a court of law, gets further reinforced and strengthened by his acquittal. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. It is also trite that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case and the one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it should not be disturbed. Nevertheless, where the approach of the lower court in considering the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by the court below is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any court acting reasonably and judiciously and is, therefore, liable to the characterised as perverse, then, to prevent miscarriage of justice, the appellate court is obliged to interfere. 14. All these principles have been succinctly culled out by one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) in Chandrappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 111 : 2007 AIR SCW 1850." 31. In Chandrappa (supra), which was followed in the aforesaid case, the Court had observed: "44. In our view, if in the light of above circumstances, the trial court felt that the accused could get benefit of doubt, the said view cannot be held to be illegal, improper or contrary to law. Hence, even though we are of the opinion that in an appeal against acquittal, powers of the appellate court are as wide as that of the trial court and it can review, reappreciate and reconsider the entire evidence brought on record by the parties and can come to its own conclusion on fact as well as on law, in the present case, the view taken by the trial court for acquitting the accused was possible and plausible. On the basis of evidence, therefore, at the most, it can be said that the other view was equally possible. But it is well established that if two views are possible on the basis of evidence on record and one favourable to the accused has been taken by the trial court, it ought not to be disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. In this case, a possible view on the evidence of prosecution had been taken by the trial court which ought not to have been disturbed by the appellate court. The decision of the appellate court (the High Court), therefore, is liable to be set aside." 6.7 In the case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, 2015 (5) Scale 634 , it has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court that when there are two views culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. Paragraph No. 10 of the said decision reads thus: "10. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and Another v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (See Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (See Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." 6.8 The Supreme Court in case of Golbar Hussain & Others v. State of Assam & Another, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 242, has held in Para.6, 7 and 8 as under : "6. The present case involves consideration on two issues. First being the powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. Second, being the sufficiency of the testimonies of PW-4 and PW-5 to convict the accused persons without any corroboration from an independent witness and the relevancy of the statement of a hostile witness involving appreciation of the statement of PW-8 who turned hostile. 7. On the first issue, the legal principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal, have been reiterated by this Court in a catena of cases. This Court culled down five general principles in Chandrappa and Others v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , as follows: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. (3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied) 8. The Court referred to Kallu alias Masih and Others v. State of M.P. (2006) 10 SCC 313 , in the above-mentioned judgment, where it held that: "While deciding an appeal against acquittal, the power of the Appellate Court is no less than the power exercised while hearing appeals against conviction. In both types of appeals the power exists to review the entire evidence. However, one significant difference is that an order of acquittal will not be interfered with, by an appellate court, where the judgment of the trial court is based on evidence and the view taken is reasonable and plausible. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. It will not reverse the decision of the trial court merely because a different view is possible. The appellate Court will also bear in mind that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the accused is entitled to get the benefit of any doubt. Further if it decides to interfere, it should assign reasons for differing with the decision of the trial Court'." 6.9 Yet in another decision in case of Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, reported in (2015) 11 SCC 124, the Supreme Court while dealing with an order of the High Court in acquitting appeal, has observed as under: "14. Taking the First question for consideration, we are of the view that in case there are two views which can be culled out from the perusal of evidence and application of law, the view which favours the accused should be taken. It has been recognized as a human right by this Court. In Narendra Singh and Another v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 : AIR 2004 SC 3249 , this Court has recognized presumption of innocence as a human right and has gone on to say that: "30. It is now well settled that benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. It is further trite that suspicion, however grave may be, cannot take place of a proof. It is equally well settled that there is a long distance between 'may be' and 'must be'. 31. It is also well known that even in a case where a plea of alibi is raised, the burden of proof remains on the prosecution. Presumption of innocence is a human right. Such presumption gets stronger when a judgment of acquittal is passed. This Court in a number of decisions has set out the legal principle for reversing the judgment of acquittal by a Higher Court (See Dhanna v. State of M.P., Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana and Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P.) which had not been adhered to by the High Court. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx 33. We, thus, having regard to the postmortem report, are of the opinion that the cause of death of Bimla Bai although is shrouded in mystery but benefit thereof must go to the appellants as in the event of there being two possible views, the one supporting the accused should be upheld." (Emphasis Supplied) 15. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 : AIR 2003 SC 3601 , wherein this Court observed thus: "7. Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference." (Emphasis Supplied). 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/ appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. 16. Therefore, the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has erred in reversing the acquittal of accused appellant, stands good. The Additional Sessions Judge was right in granting him benefit of doubt. The view which favours the accused/ appellant has to be considered and we discard the opposite view which indicates his guilt. 17. We are also of the view that the High Court should not have interfered with the decision taken by the Additional Session Judge, as the judgment passed was not manifestly illegal, perverse, and did not cause miscarriage of justice. On the scope of High Court's revisional jurisdiction, this Court has held in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar, (2002) 6 SCC 650 : AIR 2002 SC 2907 "that in absence of any manifest illegality, perversity and miscarriage of justice, High Court would not be justified interfering with the concurrent finding of acquittal of the accused merely because on re-appreciation of evidence it found the testimony of PWs. to be reliable whereas the trial Court had taken an opposite view." This happens to be the situation in the matter before us and we are of the view that the High Court was wrong in interfering with the order of acquittal of Upendra Pradhan passed by the Additional Sessions Judge. 18. The Second ground pleaded before us by the counsel for the accused appellant, that the testimonies of P.W. 1 and P.W.7 should not have been considered, as they were interested witnesses, holds no teeth. We are of the opinion that the testimonies of interested witnesses are of great importance and weightage. No man would be willing to spare the real culprit and frame an innocent person. This view has been supplemented by the decision of this Court in Mohd. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 7. Ishaque v. State of West Bengal, (2013) 14 SCC 581 . * * * 22. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court. The appellant has been released on bail vide this Court's order dated 15.04.2014. His bail bonds are discharged." 7. In view of aforesaid propositions of law propounded by the Hon'ble Apex Court, we are of the considered opinion that the appeal filed by the State and the contentions raised to substantiate the appeal are not sufficient enough to permit us to take a different view and accordingly, by observing this, we have found that no case appears to have been made out to interfere with the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge. 8. Considering the overall materials on record and upon examination of the reasons assigned by the learned trial Judge and even on re-appreciation of evidence also, we found nothing extra-ordinary which would compel us to substitute our findings and accordingly, considering aforesaid proposition of law laid down on the issue of power of interference in acquittal appeal by the Hon'ble Apex Court, we hereby refrain ourselves from interfering in the judgment and order passed by the learned trial Judge and accordingly, the appeal being found merit-less is required to be dismissed. 9. We must make it clear that this judgment is restricted qua present respondents accused only and will not have any bearing upon the case of original accused No. 2, who has run away from the clutches of law by absconding and it is needless to say that as and when he is available for trial, his case will be dealt with in accordance with the law on the basis of material which may be adduced. With this clarification, we dispose of the present appeal. 10. The appeal being found merit-less is hereby dismissed. The judgment and order of acquittal dated 10th December, 2004 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 1, Bhavnagar, in Sessions Case No. 17 of 2004 is hereby confirmed. Bail bonds, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and proceedings shall be sent back forthwith to the trial court.