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2017 DIGILAW 234 (KER)

PADMANABHAN PALLATH, PRESIDENT OF BEYPORE SERVICE CO-OPERATIVE BANK LTD. v. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATION

2017-02-01

DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents and the learned Senior Government Pleader. 2. The writ petition from which this appeal arises was filed challenging an election notification in terms of the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, hereinafter referred to as 'the KCS Act', for short. 3. Going by the material facts, it appears that the electoral college is constituted from different categories. The question that ultimately emerged for consideration during the course of the writ petition was as to whether the electoral college has been duly identified in terms of the provisional voters' list, as also, the final voters' list. The inclusion or exclusion of certain Co-operative Societies on the basis of their eligibility conditions appears to be an issue, whatever that be, during the course of the proceedings. Elections were held on the basis of provisional orders issued by this Court. Those interlocutory orders now stand merged in the judgment dated 24.09.2014, which is challenged in this writ appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner submits that 78 Co-operative Societies had earlier filed writ petitions seeking inclusion in the voters list. It appears that there were interlocutory orders for provisional admission into the electoral college. Thereafter, after enjoying the benefit of interlocutory orders, those writ petitions were withdrawn or closed as infructuous by those 78 Societies. This is also a moot issue on which the appellant before us is allegedly aggrieved, since, according to him, that would have a direct impact on the total number of votes that could have been polled in favour or against any particular candidate. 5. The aforesaid discussions will clearly show that the learned single Judge was well founded in saying that it would not be possible within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to adjudicate on the different questions, including the eligibility of the different voters and the constitution of the electoral college on the basis of the provisional list and the final list. The learned single Judge was abundantly justified in being extremely cautious in further pushing forward in the writ jurisdiction and confining the adjudication to be one which had to be closed down paving way for further proceedings in terms of the provisions of Section 69 of the KCS Act. The learned single Judge was abundantly justified in being extremely cautious in further pushing forward in the writ jurisdiction and confining the adjudication to be one which had to be closed down paving way for further proceedings in terms of the provisions of Section 69 of the KCS Act. The learned single Judge had also noticed the Bench decision in Sulthan Bathery Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Limited, Wayanad v. Jayaprakash P.R. [2014 (3) KHC 51], to notice that the period of limitation for instituting proceedings under Section 69 could be regulated by the High Court while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and thereby, directing that the time taken in prosecuting the case in writ jurisdiction could be excluded on the basis of principles akin to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 6. We do not find our way to disagree with the approach adopted by the learned single Judge. However, we need to say that the authority which may be moved under Section 69 of the KCS Act would ensure that the earlier interlocutory orders issued during the course of W.P.(C).No.2303/2013 and also the interim orders and final judgments issued in the different writ petitions filed by the afore-noted 78 Societies are not treated of such value as would impair the rights of the parties to the election dispute to raise all conditions de hors those interlocutory orders or final judgments. With this clarification, we direct that any dispute to be raised under Section 69, within a period of 30 days from today will be entertained as if it is within the prescribed period of limitation and that dispute shall be adjudicated in accordance with law and having regard to what we have clarified above in relation to the judgments and orders issued by the High Court. That shall also be done untrammelled by anything stated in this judgment except to the aforesaid extent and the judgment of the learned single Judge. Having regard to the fact that nearly four years would have passed through by now after the election is over, we are sure that the authority to be moved under Section 69, will expedite final disposal of that matter. The writ appeal is ordered accordingly.