ORDER : PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI, J. 1. This criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C has been preferred against FIR No. 42 dated 01.03.2016 registered at Police Station, Bichhwal, District Bikaner for the offences under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC. 2. The interim order, in this case, was passed on 28.03.2016 and is continuing till date. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the amount outstanding towards M/s. Hariyali Khad Beej Agency was reflected in the ledger for the period from 01.04.2015 to 17.07.2015 The amount was outstanding against the complainant in connection with the goods supplied to the complainant. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also submitted that the post dated cheques for the period were issued on 13.08.2017 The said three cheques bearing No. 439033, 439034 and 439035 were submitted on the concerned Bank on 23.11.2015, 30.11.2015 and 24.11.2015 respectively, which were returned by the Bank on 24.11.2015, 30.11.2015 and 25.11.2015 respectively. 5. The legal notice dated 09.12.2015 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was served upon the complainant on 15.12.2015 On 21.12.2015, a letter was sent by the complainant, denying the outstanding amount of the cheques, and thereafter, the cases were filed on 25.01.2016 bearing Cases No. 71/2016, 72/2016 and 73/2016 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in respect of the aforesaid three dishonoured cheques. 6. After filing of the cases on 25.01.2016, as aforesaid, the present FIR was lodged by the complainant on 01.03.2016 as a counter-blast. The copy of the Bank statement of the petitioner is also on record, reflecting that the transaction had taken place between the parties. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent has however, stated that the cheque was on the name of ‘Karan Agri Genetics’ and not ‘Karan Agri Genetics Private Limited’, and therefore, the petitioners had illegally entered the words ‘Private Limited’ and created a forged document. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor has stated that the detailed status report has been submitted, in which the details of the investigation have been mentioned. 9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.P Gulati, Manager Accounts, Jetking Infotrain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2015 AIR SCW 6051, relevant paras 7 to 9 of which read as under:— “7. 9. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in D.P Gulati, Manager Accounts, Jetking Infotrain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in 2015 AIR SCW 6051, relevant paras 7 to 9 of which read as under:— “7. We have carefully considered the rival submissions made before us. From bare perusal of Section 482 of the Code, it is clear that the object of exercise of power Under the Section is to prevent abuse of process of law, and to secure ends of justice. In Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor: (2013) 3 SCC 330 , this Court has enumerated the steps required to be followed before invoking inherent jurisdiction by the High Court Under Section 482 of the Code as under: “30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashment raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure: 30.1 Step one: whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two: whether the material relied upon by the accused would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint i.e. the material is such as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false? 30.3 Step three: whether the material relied upon by the accused has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four: whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, the judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings in exercise of power vested in it Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as proceedings arising therefrom) specially when it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.” 8. In Rishipal Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 7 SCC 215 , explaining the law in the similar circumstances, as in the present case, this Court observed, in paragraph 17, as under: “It is no doubt true that the courts have to be very careful while exercising the power Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure. At the same time we should not allow a litigant to file vexatious complaints to otherwise settle their scores by setting the criminal law into motion, which is a pure abuse of process of law and it has to be interdicted at the threshold.” In Rishipal Singh (supra), the complainant, who was an accused in connection with an offence punishable Under Section 138 of the Act, had filed a criminal complaint relating to offences punishable Under Sections 34, 379, 411, 417, 418, 467, 468, 471 and 477 Indian Penal Code. 9. In view of above position of law, and having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, and after going through the criminal complaint filed against Respondent No. 2 and thereafter, one filed by him against the Appellant, we are of the view that it is a clear case of abuse of process of law on the part of Respondent No. 2.” 10. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the decision rendered by this Court in Hanuman v. The State of Rajasthan (S.B Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1490/2017 decided on 21.08.2017), which reads as under:— “1. This criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C has been preferred for quashing the registration and investigation of FIR dated 15.04.2017 bearing No. 203/2017 registered at Nohar Police Station, District Hanumangarh for the offences under Sections 379, 420, 452, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC. 2. Petition No. 1490/2017 decided on 21.08.2017), which reads as under:— “1. This criminal misc. petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C has been preferred for quashing the registration and investigation of FIR dated 15.04.2017 bearing No. 203/2017 registered at Nohar Police Station, District Hanumangarh for the offences under Sections 379, 420, 452, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC. 2. The allegation against the present petitioner is that the complainant is running a shop of building material, which remained closed for 3-4 days, and was thereafter opened, upon which the petitioner came to the shop and demanded the documents of transaction regarding material evidence, but simultaneously, the petitioner stole the cheques and asked Satveer to make payment within seven days or face the consequence. The cheques of Axis Bank were presented, but payment towards those cheques was stopped at the instance of the complainant under the belief that the cheques were stolen by the present petitioner. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that in the FIR itself, it is written that on 29.03.2017, the complainant received an SMS from the Axis Bank that cheques No. 3132 and 3133 pertaining to payment of Rs.1,50,000/- each have been presented before the Bank by the present petitioner. On receiving such SMS, the respondent has initiated the requisite proceedings. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that on the face of it, the FIR is highly improbable, as allegedly on 21.02.2017, the cheques were stolen, regarding which the complainant has never made a complaint. However, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that at the first instance, when the cheques were produced before the Bank on 29.03.2017, the complainant immediately filed the complaint on 30.03.2017, which means that even the requisite time for ascertaining the theft or the details of the cheques was not available with the complainant. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that it is a clear case of counterblast and to escape the liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the FIR has been lodged, as the complainant was very well aware that those cheques were with the present petitioner and they shall have to face the liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act. 6. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also argued that it is a clear case of counterblast and to escape the liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the FIR has been lodged, as the complainant was very well aware that those cheques were with the present petitioner and they shall have to face the liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P, reported in 2017 Law Suit (SC) 313, wherein the criminal proceeding, on being found as a counterblast to the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, had been quashed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The relevant paras 36, 37, 38 and 39 of the said judgment read as under:— “36. Writ petition was filed by the Accused for quashing the FIR which was dismissed by the High Court on 27.08.2007 Thereafter, charges were framed on 01.12.2008 Dissatisfied with the framing of charges Criminal Revision Petition was filed which was dismissed by Delhi High Court on 16.01.2009 The order of Additional Sessions Judge has been extracted by this Court in paragraph 14 which is quoted below: “14. Dissatisfied with the action of the trial Court in framing charges against him, the Appellant-accused filed Criminal Revision Petition No. 08 of 2009, whereby he assailed the order dated 1.12.2008 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The Delhi High Court dismissed the revision petition on 16.1.2009, by inter alia observing as under: 12. Truthfulness or falsity of the allegations, essentially pertains to the realm of evidence and the same cannot be pre-judged at this initial stage. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order. Consequently, this Revision Petition is dismissed in limine while making it clear that anything herein shall not be construed as an opinion on merits at trial.” 37. The appeal was filed against the aforesaid judgment of the High Court by the Accused contending that there was sufficient material collected in the investigation which proved that allegations were unfounded and the prosecution of the Appellant was an abuse of process of the Court. In paragraph 23 this Court noted several circumstances on the basis of which this Court held that judicial conscience of the High Court ought to have persuaded it to quash the criminal proceedings. In paragraph 23 this Court noted several circumstances on the basis of which this Court held that judicial conscience of the High Court ought to have persuaded it to quash the criminal proceedings. This Court further noticed that Investigating Officer has acknowledged, that he could not find any proof to substantiate the charges. The charge-sheet had been filed only on the basis of the statement of the complainant/prosecutrix Under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure. In paragraphs 24 and 25 of the judgment following was stated: “24. Most importantly, as against the aforesaid allegations, no pleadings whatsoever have been filed by the complainant. Even during the course of hearing, the material relied upon by the Accused was not refuted. As a matter of fact, the complainant/prosecutrix had herself approached the High Court, with the prayer that the first information lodged by her, be quashed. It would therefore be legitimate to conclude, in the facts and circumstances of this case, that the material relied upon by the Accused has not been refuted by the complainant/prosecutrix. Even in the charge sheet dated 28.6.2007, (extracted above) the investigating officer has acknowledged, that he could not find any proof to substantiate the charges. The charge-sheet had been filed only on the basis of the statement of the complainant/prosecutrix Under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 25. Based on the holistic consideration of the facts and circumstances summarized in the foregoing two paragraphs; we are satisfied, that all the steps delineated by this Court in Rajiv Thapar's case (supra) stand-satisfied. All the steps can only be answered in the affirmative. We therefore have no hesitation whatsoever in concluding, that judicial conscience of the High Court ought to have persuaded it, on the basis of the material available before it, while passing the impugned order, to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused-Appellant, in exercise of the inherent powers vested with it Under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Accordingly, based on the conclusions drawn hereinabove, we are satisfied, that the first information report registered Under Sections 328, 354 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code against the Appellant-accused, and the consequential charge-sheet dated 28.6.2007, as also the framing of charges by the Additional Sessions Judge, New Delhi on 1.12.2008, deserves to be quashed. The same are accordingly quashed.” 38. The same are accordingly quashed.” 38. Thus, above was the case where despite statement Under Section 164 Code of Criminal Procedure by prosecutrix the Court referring to material collected during investigation had held that the case was fit where the High Court ought to have quashed the criminal proceedings. 39. Inherent power given to the High Court Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice. In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the Categories as illustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or harassment. When there are material to indicate that a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to the following effect: “(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present case. Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of the State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to the relevant facts of the present case, materials on which Final Report was submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and quashed the criminal proceedings. 7. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present is a fit case where High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction Under Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure and quashed the criminal proceedings. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent however, vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner and stated that the theft in this case was committed by the present petitioner and there is no delay in lodging the FIR, because as soon as the SMS regarding the cheques in concern was received by the complainant on 29.03.2017, the complaint was lodged on 30.03.2017 8. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the quick action of the respondent shows that in fact he was the sufferer of the theft of the cheques at the hands of the present petitioner, who made use of the transition period in the shop of the complainant and stole the cheques, on the pretext of accounting for the transactions between the parties in the shop. 9. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case along with the precedent law cited at the Bar, this Court is of the opinion that on the face of it, the impugned FIR is nothing but a counterblast, as the respondent became aware of the cheques being dishonoured on 29.03.2017 and out of fear of the proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complaint was lodged on 30.03.2017 10. It is clear that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C can be invoked to quash the proceeding, which amounts to the abuse of the process of law and instituted with an ulterior motive and the Court has to act at the threshold, as enumerated in the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, condition No. 7 of which in relation to interference by the Court with the proceedings reads as under:— “7. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, condition No. 7 of which in relation to interference by the Court with the proceedings reads as under:— “7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” Thus, the aforequoted condition No. 7 is clearly attracted in the present case, as the complainant had the knowledge that he shall be facing the proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and there was no reason available with the present petitioner, so as to stole the cheques in concern. 11. In light of the aforesaid discussion as well as the precedent law cited by learned counsel for the petitioner, the present misc. petition is allowed and the impugned FIR dated 15.04.2017 bearing No. 203/2017 registered at Nohar Police Station, District Hanumangarh is quashed and set aside. The stay application also stands disposed of.” 11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the case alongwith the precedent law cited at the Bar. 12. The condition No. 7 of the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 is clearly attracted in the present case, as the complainant had complete knowledge that he was facing proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in relation to the aforementioned three cheques and there was no reason available for the complainant to have escaped the liability arising out of the said three cheques. In light of the aforesaid condition No. 7, in which the counterblast has been stated to be a perfect reason for granting indulgence in a case of Negotiable Instruments Act for the Court to stop abuse of the process of the malicious criminal proceedings instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused. 13. In light of the aforesaid condition No. 7, in which the counterblast has been stated to be a perfect reason for granting indulgence in a case of Negotiable Instruments Act for the Court to stop abuse of the process of the malicious criminal proceedings instituted with ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused. 13. It is apparent that the cheques were submitted in 2015 and as soon as the aforesaid legal notice dated 09.12.2015 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was served upon the complainant on 15.12.2015 and a letter was sent by the complainant on 21.12.2015, as a counterblast, the present FIR has been lodged by the complainant on 01.03.2016 levelling allegations against the petitioners, which clearly are nothing but an effort of the complainant to escape the liability arising out of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 14. The presumption clause of the Negotiable Instruments Act is absolute and has been discussed in the precedent law cited above, and thus, allowing the complainant to carry on with such malicious criminal proceedings in response to the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would be nothing but an abuse of the process of law. 15. Learned Public Prosecutor has shown the case diary, and the case diary does not reflect any answer to the counterblast criminal proceedings, as it is reflected by the documents that the cheques were actually issued by the complainant, and even if some kind of dispute regarding the multiple Firms, or the words ‘Private Limited’ is there, the same can be a good defence for the complainant at the time of contesting the proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, but the same cannot be a ground for criminal prosecution against the petitioners. 16. In light of the aforesaid discussion as well as the precedent law cited by learned counsel for the petitioners, the present misc. petition is allowed and the impugned FIR No. 42 dated 01.03.2016 registered at Police Station, Bichhwal, District Bikaner is quashed and set aside. The stay application also stands disposed of.