JUDGMENT : D.N. Patel, J. This interlocutory application has been preferred under section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for suspension of sentence awarded to this applicant by the Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C., Sahibganj in Sessions Case No. 204A of 2006, whereby this appellant has been convicted vide order dated 25th August, 2009 and sentenced to life imprisonment for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code to be read with section 34 thereof vide order dated 27th August, 2009. 2. Learned counsel for the appellant, while praying for suspension of sentence, during the pendency of this appeal, has submitted that there are discrepancies between the ocular evidences and the medical evidence. In fact, as per informant P.W.9 and P.W.1, there are three gun shots or firearm injuries, whereas, there are only two injuries as per post mortem report given by P.W.11 Dr. Ramashraye Singh. 3. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the evidences on record, it appears that there is a prima facie case against this appellant accused. As the Criminal Appeal is pending, we are not much analysing the evidences on record, but, suffice it to say looking to the evidences of P.W.1 and P.W.10, who are the eye witnesses, who have clearly narrated the role played by this applicant, there is prima facie case against this appellant. Moreover, looking to the medical evidence given by P.W.11, there is enough corroboration by medical evidence to the depositions given by these two eye witnesses. 4. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, reported in (2000) 1 SCC 247 that:- 7. In support of the impugned judgment the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vainly attempted to point out some discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses for discrediting the prosecution version. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution's case doubtful. The normal course of the human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies, such discrepancies in law may render credential to the depositions. Parrot-like statements are disfavoured by the courts. The normal course of the human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies, such discrepancies in law may render credential to the depositions. Parrot-like statements are disfavoured by the courts. In order to ascertain as to whether the discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness was making the statement. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. In Jagdish v. State of M.P. this Court held that when the discrepancies were comparatively of a minor character and did not go to the root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue importance. Mere congruity or consistency is not the sole test of truth in the depositions. This Court again in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki held that in the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however, honest and truthful they may be. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person. 8. Referring to and relying upon the earlier judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., Appabhai v. State of Gujarat and Rammi v. State of M.P., this Court in a recent case Leela Ram v. State of Haryana held : "There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence.... Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence.... The court shall have to bear in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations: whereas some become speechless, some start wailing while some others run away from the scene and yet there are some who may come forward with courage, conviction and belief that the wrong should be remedied. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. There cannot be any set pattern or uniform rule of human reaction and to discard a piece of evidence on the ground of his reaction not falling within a set pattern is unproductive and a pedantic exercise." 5. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chaudhari Ramjibhai Narasangbhai v. State of Gujarat, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 184 that: 11. Coming to the plea that the contradictions noticed by the trial court were ocular vis-a-vis the medical evidence, we find on reading of the judgment it is not to be so. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") applies when the same person makes two contradictory statements. It is not permissible in law to draw adverse inference because of alleged contradictions between one prosecution witness vis-a-vis statement of other witnesses. It is not open to the court to completely demolish the evidence of one witness by referring to the evidence of other witnesses. Witness can only be contradicted in terms of Section 145 of the Evidence Act by his own previous statement and not with the statement of any other witness. (See Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of Maharashtra). As was held in the said case, Section 145 applies only to cases where the same person makes two contradictory statements either in different proceedings or in two different stages of a proceeding. If the maker of a statement is sought to be contradicted, his attention should be drawn to his previous statement under Section 145 of the Evidence Act only. Section 145 has no application where a witness is sought to be contradicted not by his own statement but by the statement of another witness. 6. If the maker of a statement is sought to be contradicted, his attention should be drawn to his previous statement under Section 145 of the Evidence Act only. Section 145 has no application where a witness is sought to be contradicted not by his own statement but by the statement of another witness. 6. It has been held by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case State v. Saravanan, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 587 that: 18. The High Court also held that as there were some discrepancies and improvements in the statement of the witnesses, their evidence should not be relied upon. In State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony this Court has laid down the approach which should be followed by the court in such cases: (SCC pp. 514-15, para 10) "10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper-technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals. Cross-examination is an unequal duel between a rustic and refined lawyer." Even otherwise, it has been said time and again by this Court that while appreciating the evidence of a witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters without affecting the core of the prosecution case, ought not to prompt the court to reject evidence in its entirety. Further, on the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness, the trial court upon appreciation of evidence forms an opinion about the credibility thereof, in the normal circumstances the appellate court would not be justified to review it once again without justifiable reasons. It is the totality of the situation, which has to be taken note of. Difference in some minor detail, which does not otherwise affect the core of the prosecution case, even if present, that itself would not prompt the court to reject the evidence on minor variations and discrepancies. 7. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Khilari v. State of U.P. and another reported in AIR 2008 S.C. 1882 especially in paragraph 10, which reads as under: "10. In Anwari Begum v. Sher Mohammad and Anr. [ 2005 (7) S.C.C. 326 ] it was, inter alia, observed as follows: "7. Even on a cursory perusal the High Court's order shows complete non-application of mind. Though detailed examination of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case is to be avoided by the Court while passing orders on bail applications, yet a court dealing with the bail application should be satisfied as to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The court dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a mater of course. 8. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail, they are : 1. 8. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused was charged of having committed a serious offence. It is necessary for the courts dealing with application for bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail, they are : 1. The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence; 2. Reasonable apprehension of tampering of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant; 3. Prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge. Any order dehors of such reasons suffers from non-application of mind as was noted by this Court, in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh and Ors. ( (2002) 3 S.C.C. 598 ); Puran etc. v. Rambilas and Anr. etc. ( (2001)6 SCC 338 )) and in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav & Anr. [JT 2004 (3) SC 442]." (Emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal and Anr., as reported in (2002) 9 SCC 366 , in paragraph no. 3, as under: "3. Absolutely no reason is shown by the learned Single Judge for adopting this exceptional course in a case where an accused was found guilty by the trial court under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The normal practise in such cases is not to suspend the sentence and it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted." (Emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Hasmat, as reported in (2004) 6 SCC 175 , in paragraph nos. 6 to 9, as under: "6. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine. 7. The appellate court is duty bound to objectively assess the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of misuse of liberty during the period the accused respondent was granted parole. 8. The learned Sessions Judge, Gurgaon by a judgment dated 24.10.2001 had found the accused respondent guilty. Criminal Appeal No. 100-DB of 2002 was filed by the respondent. The fact that during the pendency of the appeal the accused respondent was on parole goes to show that initially the accused respondent was not given the benefit of suspension of execution of sentence. The mere fact that during the period of parole the accused has not misused the liberties does not per se warrant suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. What really was necessary to be considered by the High Court was whether reasons existed to suspend the execution of sentence and thereafter grant bail. The High Court does not seem to have kept the correct principle in view. 9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 I.P.C., it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. 9. In Vijay Kumar v. Narendra and Ramji Prasad v. Rattan Kumar Jaiswal it was held by this Court that in cases involving conviction under Section 302 I.P.C., it is only in exceptional cases that the benefit of suspension of sentence can be granted. The impugned order of the High Court does not meet the requirement. In Vijay Kumar case it was held that in considering the prayer for bail in a case involving a serious offence like murder punishable under Section 302 I.P.C., the Court should consider the relevant factors like the nature of accusation made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, and the desirability of releasing the accused on bail after they have been convicted for committing the serious offence of murder. These aspects have not been considered by the High Court, which passing the impugned order." (Emphasis supplied) 10. In view of the prima facie case against the applicant and evidences on record and the quantum of punishment and the manner in which this appellant is involved in the offences, as alleged by the prosecution, and also looking to the fact that previously also the applicant's prayer for suspension of sentence, has been rejected by speaking order dated 09.11.2009, we are not inclined to suspend the sentence awarded to this appellant by the trial court. There is no substance in this Interlocutory Application and, therefore I.A. No.6659 of 2016 is dismissed. Application dismissed.